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Many people have contributed to this work. I owe a great deal of 
thanks to the many libraries and archives at which I spent a great deal 
of time and where the staff were invariably friendly and helpful. In 
particular I wish to mention the staff at the Public Record Office at 
Kew, at Lambeth Palace library, including the archivist of the Church of 
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Minster library and at Valworth Road. Helpful above and beyond the call 
of duty was Naomi Linell, the archivist at Kent University, where reside 
the papers of Hewlett Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury. Ms Linell not 
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of which were unindexed, but provided me with access to her own early 
work on the Dean. 
I am indebted to a large number of individuals who generously gave 
of their time to recall for me their experiences and impressions of the 
period. In this respect I wish to thank C Abramsky, RA Bird, Anthony 
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Kirkby, Major General Lascelles, Kenneth Leech, John Little, 
Patrick Mendies, Professor Needham, Ian Mikardo M. P., Laurence 
Otter, Andrew Rothstein, John Rowe, and Mrs Ray Waterman. 
I also wish to thank those who provided bed and board during the 
extensive period of my research, especially John and Renie Harrington, 
Robert Crothers, Tanya Rose, Irving Stone, John Williams and Constance 
Saville. 
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I want to thank the academic and administrative staff of the 
American Studies Department at the University of Hull for putting up 
with me for so long, particularly Dustin Mirick and Louis Billington, 
and the Departmental Secretary, Brenda West. I owe a great deal to my 
supervisor, John Saville, without whose determination and faith in the 
whole project, this work would not have come to fruition. 
Finally, I owe an incalculable amount to my parents who without ever 
really understanding what I was doing, or why, were nevertheless always 
there. 
Dianne Kirby, 
September 1990. 
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At the end of Vorld Var 11 the Western Allies were seeking to 
achieve precisely what they had sought to achieve at the end of Vorld 
Var 1, the restoration and stabilisation of an old order convulsed by 
war and threatened by the radicalism fostered by war. This endeavour 
took many different forms which involved confrontation with the Soviet 
Union at many different points and set in motion a dialectic of 
escalation and counter-escalation. 
Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, anti-Communism 
has been a crucial factor, of profound implications, in the political 
affairs of the Western nations. Professor Arno Mayer has noted that 
"the Paris Peace Conference made a host of decisions, all of which in 
varying degrees, were designed to check Bolshevism. "(1) Anti-Communism 
was a central element in the diplomatic and political history of the 
inter-war years. The containment of Communism and its spread through 
the British Empire was a major preoccupation of British diplomacy. 
Anti-Communism also had a very specific impact on the conduct of the 
Second World War, particularly from 1942 onwards with fears of social 
upheaval at the end of the war and the contribution which Soviet 
military successes and advances might make to the revolutionary 
transformation in liberated countries. Anti-Communism was an even more 
critical factor in the post-war decade, which proved the formative 
period of alignment in international relations. Anti-Communism played a 
vital and significant role in the division of the post-war world into 
two armed and relatively disciplined camps, accompanied by the 
-4- 
sharpening of ideological conflict and a process of internal political 
repression to consolidate a quasi-wartime national 'conoensus'. 
The detailed study of anti-Communist repression in post-World War 11 
America, The Great Fear by David Caute, states that: 
Britain also committed itself to a political and military alliance 
against the Soviet Union, but without the corollary of domestic Red- 
baiting and witch-hunting. 
Caute notes that "American liberalism failed to sustain the 
authentically liberal values and standards of tolerance that persisted 
in Britain despite that country's ... general posture of confrontation 
with Russia. The British of the Attlee era, unlike the British of the 
Pitt era or of the sixteenth century confrontation with Spain, kept 
their heads... "(2) For many years this was the conventional wisdom. My 
own research began as a study of British reactions to "McCarthyism". My 
findings brought into question the general assumption of British 
liberalism and tolerance in this era and led to an interest in the 
domestic impact of the Cold War on British politics, of which there was 
no major study. While the British experience was far removed from that 
of the American, the lesser public impression of McCarthyism did not 
denote its absence. This was pointed out in a 1984 article by Reg 
Whitaker, who observed that the Cold War was launched in other Western 
nations-allied to the United States and that its domestic implantation 
differed according to the specific conditions of individual countries. 
Whitaker argued that: 
Although it was McCarthyism in its highly visible American form 
which raised the most concern among liberals, it is important to 
realise that state repression was, and is, an integral part of the 
domestic implantation and reproduction of the Cold War in all 
Western countries. The greater concentration among America's allies 
on the repressive apparatus of the state has misled many observers 
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into the false conclusion that domestic repression was a peculiarly 
American aspect of the Cold Var. (3) 
Whitaker pointed out that while "the British purge does seem mild 
compared to the American orgy", the principle involved is of 
considerable significance, in that Communism as a set of beliefs, and 
association with known Communists or alleged Communist organizations 
were made criteria for dismissal from public posts. Although the 
British purge was in part ineffective, as indicated by the numerous spy 
scandals of the post-war era, still it continued; from which Whitaker 
concluded that the ideological functions of the purge were as least as 
important as the possibility of detecting a potential espionage agent: 
What the purge did accomplish was the official proscription of 
certain political beliefs and political associations, as a 
'legitimate' exercise of liberal democracy. The state was setting 
an example, pour encourager les autres. The actual numbers affected 
are not then so important as the public notice that certain ideas 
and associations are no longer considered legitimate. The 
politicised excesses of McCarthyism are only ugly and unnecessary 
excrescenses on this system. The British establishment has no need 
of them. (4) 
This ideological function, and how it was achieved, is of the 
foremost importance in examining the role of the Church in this era, 
which for many was the arbiter of Christian thought and conduct. My 
early research into the response of the British authorities to 
McCarthyism confirmed Whitaker's view of the purge. I discovered that 
while British officials were disturbed by McCarthyism, they were 
offended by the means, not the aims. McCarthyism was viewed with alarm 
as being a danger to the cause it espoused. In the early 1950s British 
middle-class sentiment was aroused by the excesses of McCarthyism. Its 
expression, however, was very much a means of venting resentment of 
American domination, traditional feelings of cultural superiority, and 
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mild British patriotism, without unsettling the basic links which bound 
Britain to America. 
Detailed research into the domestic impact of the Cold War in 
Britain proved difficult in the realm of official Government papers 
because of the extreme sensitivity of state departments on the subject 
of Communism. This meant a tendency to retain relevant documents 
within the department. Many other documents relating to Communism and 
anti-Communism and listed in the PRO indices, were not in the indicated 
files. A large number of documents concerned with Communism and anti- 
Communism indexed in Kraus proved untraceable. This latter initially 
appeared problematic to certain staff at the Public Record Office who, 
after searching for the references themselves, finally passed it to 
superior powers. These too had no success. 
In due course my field of research became narrowed to a concern with 
the role and place of the Churches, most particularly the Established 
Anglican Church. Here I discovered a wealth of material reflecting on 
the impact of the Cold War in Britain and on the Church's role, 
particularly in the private papers of leading ecclesiastics and in the 
records of the Church of England, Council on Foreign Relations, in the 
archives of Lambeth Palace. 
The traditional anti-Communism of the Church, particularly that of 
Rome, has been examined by Francois Houtart who argues that the Church's 
social doctrine is determined by a reading of the most immediate aspects 
of social reality, namely inter-human social relations, with a refusal 
to read social reality in terms of class antagonisms and class struggle. 
This results in a theoretical basis for opposition to any form of social 
ethics which is elaborated in terms of a structural analysis of classes. 
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This opposition is exacerbated by the fact that during the transition to 
socialism the institutional space allotted to the churches is reduced 
for a variety of reasons: 
On the one hand, the state takes over the organization of health, 
educational and cultural networks in order to extend them to the 
whole population. On the other, the transition is a difficult 
period in which ideological mobilization may take the form of 
constraint. Finally, the social space required for the autonomy of 
religious institutions is defined both by the specific religious 
model in question and by the degree of social rigidity deemed 
necessary for the transition to socialism. (5) 
The emergence of more socialist countries in Europe was perceived as 
a direct threat to the institution of the Church. The Church adopted a 
hostile attitude and the socialist countries took measures against the 
Church and sometimes against religion itself. Outside Europe, the 
Vatican saw the process of de-colonization and the increase in Marxist- 
inspired revolutionary movements - not to mention the fact that whole 
countries like China were going over to Communism - as a basic threat to 
the Church and its mission work. It was in this context that new 
Western alliances culminated in the formation of NATO, that a series of 
religious conflicts broke out in the East, and that Pius X11 adopted a 
hard-line towards Communism and the socialist countries. The dialectic 
of confrontation was present at every level, both theoretical and 
practical. (6) 
Added to this inherent antipathy toward Communism, was the role of 
the Church as a part of the state apparatus. This was particularly true 
of the Church of England which was not only a state Church, but whose 
leadership in the main derived from the Establishment, and which had a 
vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo. The leadership of 
the Anglican Church supported and cooperated with the British Government 
-8- 
in both domestic and foreign affairs, particularly in its opposition to 
Communism. This meant that the Church was allied with a political 
system intrinsically bound up with the capitalist organization of 
society, with its integration into the economy of the West and with 
policies which were dominated by the United States. While the Church 
tried to maintain that its opposition to Communism had a spiritual and 
not a political basis, ecclesiastical anti-Communism was used as a 
political argument, which meant that the Church itself took on a 
political complexion. Although cautious not to be seen to be using 
religion for political ends, the Western powers sought to exploit the 
popular emotional objections to the atheism of Communism as a means of 
discrediting the whole philosophy of Marx. This led to a direct use of 
religion and manipulation of the Churches by Western Governments in 
their conflict with the Soviet Union and Communism. 
Although the religious sources of anti-Communism have deep 
theoretical roots, the attitudes of the Churches and institutionalized 
religions are not monolithic. Large numbers of Christians, including 
some members of the clergy, accept the social analysis developed by 
Marxism and use it as a means to formulate an ethic. This inevitably 
formed a source of conflict within the Churches when statesmen looked to 
ecclesiastics to endorse and support a perspective of Communism which 
sought to present the confrontation between the Western world and the 
socialist world as a conflict between good and evil. Those who found 
meaning in Marxism and saw socialism as a step on the road leading to 
the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth were becoming, however, 
an increasingly marginalised minority in this period. 
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The majority of Church documents, then and now, begin their 
discussion of Marxism by describing its philosophy and its critique of 
religion, but the description itself is often simplistic or even 
caricatural. This practice emulates that of official Government 
documents which rarely give a succinct account of the various positions 
Marx and Engels adopted with regard to religion and they do not situate 
those positions in terms of the historicity of their production. This 
caricature of Marxist positions allows them to be more easily criticised 
and attacked. While a major objective of Church denigration of 
Communism has been to assert the superiority of a religious view of the 
meaning of life, man and the universe that is denied by Marxism, during 
the Cold War the spiritual antipathy to Communism was invested with a 
political dimension intended to give moral sanction to the containment 
of the Soviet Union and make the counter-revolutionary activities of the 
West appear as a necessary defence of Western civilisation and of 
Christianity. 
Similarly, the western political application of the "totalitarian" 
label to both Communist and Fascist regimes was a part of the Vest's 
ideological warfare against the Soviet Union which the Churches 
emulated. The suggestion was that they were very similar regimes, and 
that Communism and Nazism were more or less identical. There are in 
fact enormous differences, despite their common use of mass murder and 
mass terror. The intent, however, was a message that here were two 
philosophies, equally repugnant, both of which Christians should equally 
reject. 
The 1950 political campaign to elect a new British Government was 
begun with a Church service attended by leaders of all the parties at 
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which the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered a sermon setting "the 
amicable conflict of the election in the shadow of the deeper world 
conflict of Christianity and materialism. " British support for the Cold 
War was inspired and consolidated under social democratic auspices. 
From the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution there existed alongside 
conservative anti-Communism a fierce social democratic anti-Communism. 
Profound divisions between right and left existed in the labour 
movements of capitalist societies. These were deepened by the Bolshevik 
victory, taking on new institutional forms; the repressive nature of the 
Soviet regime and Communist attacks on social democratic leaders served 
to reinforce already well developed tendencies towards a socialism 
which did not threaten the established order. This provided a powerful 
ideological basis of agreement between social democratic leaders and 
their conservative opponents, providing, from 1945 on, the basis for a 
broad consensus between them on foreign and defence policies. Britain's 
Labour Government played a major role in the legitimation of the Cold 
War and in the mobilisation of labour movements and of the Church behind 
the banner of anti-Communism. 
Britain contributed directly to the international policies which led 
the wartime Allies into the fissure of Cold War. The British Government 
was initially more determined than the Americans to confront the Soviet 
Union and put the worst face on Soviet interests and intentions. The 
political convergence of the Labour and Tory parties, particularly in 
foreign affairs and with regard to anti-Communism and the establishing 
of Britain as part of the American sphere of influence, meant that 
American credit and American conditions pre-empted a distinctive social- 
democratic policy at home. Benin's foreign policy, formulated and 
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impressed upon him by a conservative Foreign Office, was not conducive 
to a sustained socialist offensive in domestic affairs. The 
exacerbation of the Cold War undermined the Labour Left. As Robert 
Jones observed in The Russia Complex: "The reason was partly that 
socialism and Russia were interrelated ideas and the discrediting of one 
damaged the other, and partly that Cold War reactions to Soviet pressure 
strengthened the Right and weakened social democracy all over the 
world. "(7) 
The Labour Party did have a direct stake in using the Cold War to 
discredit opinion and activity on its Left. As a government it wished 
to encourage working class solidarity behind its projects, as a party it 
hoped to kill off its historical rival for working class support, and as 
the architect of the Anglo-American alliance it wished to maintain as 
much national unity and consensus behind its defence and foreign 
policies as possible. However, anti-Communism was of the greatest value 
to conservative forces in their struggle against the whole Left, social 
democracy included. In 1951 the Tory Party was returned to power. 
The Cold War initiated a massive enterprise of anti-Communist 
propaganda and indoctrination disseminated by a multitude of different 
sources and means - newspapers, radio, television, films, articles, 
pamphlets, books, speeches, sermons, official documents, and so on. It 
was based on two fundamental contentions: that "Communism" was a supreme 
and unqualified evil; and an evil which the Soviet leaders were seeking 
to impose upon the rest of the world. The Soviet Union was depicted as 
being the principal and most dangerous enemy. These two contentions, 
and the depiction of the Soviet Union as the embodiment of evil, were 
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reiterated and given moral endorsement by ecclesiastical leaders vested 
with the spiritual authority of the Church. 
Defenders of the Soviet Union, from 191? until the 20th Soviet 
Communist Party Congress of 1956, painted the regime in the brightest 
possible colours and resolutely dismissed all criticism of the Soviet 
Union. Because anti-Communism painted Soviet "Communism" in the darkest 
possible colours, they dismissed all criticism as propaganda, invention 
and lies. This was not sufficient justification for the total and 
unqualified endorsement given the Soviet regime by its defenders, 
particularly in view of the immense crimes committed during the Stalin 
era. There are reasons to account for the wholehearted support given 
Stalinist policies and actions, not least that alongside massive 
repression and murder there was also great construction and advance. 
The latter should not have served to occlude the former. By the same 
token, anti-Communists should not have under-stated or altogether 
ignored the advances made by the Communist regimes, nor the adverse 
conditions and circumstances in which these were made. 
Anti-Communism was grossly selective in its view of Communist 
regimes, systematically presenting a highly distorted picture of the 
reality. Western Church leaders reinforced these views, particularly 
with regard to the highly emotive concern of religious persecution. 
Another respect in which the Church supported anti-Communist selectivity 
was in the condemnation of the political and human abuses of Communist 
dictatorships while condoning or simply ignoring the abuses and crimes 
of right-wing regimes. Similarly, while the Church spoke loudly against 
Communist persecution of religion in this era, it said little about 
other types, particularly Roman Catholic, bringing into question either 
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the genuineness of its own actual concern, or its own total submission 
to political'anti-Communism. Western Church leaders readily criticised 
their counterparts in Communist regimes for cooperating with'their 
governments in the political sphere, although it was no more than they 
themselves were doing. 
In the post-war period, anti-Communism was an essentially 
conservative stance which used the experience of Soviet-type-regimes as 
a means of combating as utopian, absurd, dangerous and sinister any 
transformative project which went beyond modest attempts of social 
engineering. Most Church leaders favoured reforms which would alleviate 
the conditions of the poorest sections of society, and which would 
incidentally remove the conditions they believed led to revolution. 
They did not favour any radical changes to the established order, and in 
this respect looked askance even at the moderate policies of the British 
Labour Government. This attitude, however, was confined to the domestic 
sphere; in foreign affairs, the Church leadership gave its wholehearted 
support to the anti-Communist policies of first the Labour and then the 
Tory governments. 
Acting in their "individual capacities", certain leading British 
ecclesiastics gave services of a very practical nature to the British 
policy of Soviet containment. But it was in the ideological sphere of 
the Cold War that the Church made its greatest contribution. Within a 
common framework, there are numerous versions of anti-Communism, with 
distinct positions, emphases and nuances. For purposes of political 
warfare the most useful was the absolutist position, which finds many 
expressions, but whose common denominator is a total, unqualified and 
vehement rejection of Communism as the embodiment of evil, the work of 
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Satan, the product of the darkest and most sinister impulses of the 
human spirit, the negation of civilisation and enlightment, and so 
forth. Couched in extreme moralistic terms, this form of anti-Communism 
often has strongly religious connotations which picture the Soviet Union 
as the material incarnation of evil and as the main source of the 
dissemination of evil. The release of Russia from its Communist regime 
was presented as a prime condition of human regeneration and salvation. 
The absolutist position was presented in its most untarnished form 
by the Vatican, far which the destruction of Communism was something to 
be prayed and worked for, fought and died for. While the absolutist 
position has very strong political resonances, it was not a position 
which the British government could readily adopt in the immediate post- 
war era, as a residue of sympathy peristed for the Soviet Union, owing 
to its tremendous wartime sacrifices, and the majority of people longed 
for peace, after the ardours of the anti-Nazi struggle. British leaders 
had perforce to deal with the Soviet Union in less inflamed terms, from 
which negotiation and even compromise could not be excluded. This was 
also the stance, following the government, of the Anglican Church. 
Privately the Foreign Office was often supportive of the Vatican crusade 
against Communism, although always wary of the political dangers of open 
support. The Archbishop of Canterbury in the immediate postwar years, 
for whom the Roman Catholic Church was an anathema, was strident in his 
condemnation of the Vatican's anti-Communist crusade, calling the Roman 
Catholic Church as totalitarian as the Soviet Union. Anglican antipathy 
toward the Vatican created a dilemma for its leadership when the 
President of the United States sought to create a Christian anti- 
Communist front against the Soviet Union, which demanded the cooperation 
- 15 - 
of the leaders of all the Western Churches with the Pope, under the 
direction of the United States. 
Although such blatant political use of the Churches was resisted by 
the Anglican leadership, this did not deter its support for political 
anti-Communism. Even before 1917, conservatives had denounced those who 
opposed them as godless, immoral, unpatriotic and subversive. The fact 
that Communism could be identified with the Soviet Union and that after 
1945 the Soviet Union was proclaimed to be a dire and urgent threat, - 
meant that those on the Left could be denounced as supporters, allies or 
agents of their country's greatest enemy. Not all Communist 
sympathisers or friends of the Soviet Union were denounced as traitors; 
often they were denigrated as only weak and naive dupes. The Dean of 
Canterbury was regarded as being of the latter variety in the early days 
of the Cold War, but as the political situation deteriorated during the 
Korean War, he was denounced in no uncertain terms as belonging to the 
ranks of traitors. The activities of the "Red" Dean, his left-wing 
views and his support for the new Communist regimes were a source of 
embarrassment and anger to the Anglican hierarchy, forcing the 
Archbishop of Canterbury to issue a number of disclaimers dissociating 
himself both from the Dean and from his views, which he entirely 
condemned. 
Where the Dean bf Canterbury opposed American domination and 
supported the peace movement, the Anglican leadership supported the 
Anglo-American alliance and endorsed the Korean Var as a necessary stand 
against Communist aggression. The Anglican Church, whose political 
intelligence derived in the main from the Foreign Office, subscribed to 
the view that the Soviet Union was imperialist and expansionist, and 
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thus reinforced the belief in the bogey of a Soviet military threat of 
world-wide dimensions. This bogey not only legitimated American and 
other interventionist enterprises in every part of the world against 
revolutionary and reformist movements, on the basis of the "domino 
effect", but also legitimated the arms race. The Archbishops of 
Canterbury and York both preached the need for a nuclear "deterrent" in 
view of the Soviet desire for world domination. 
During the Cold War the Church of England acted as a political 
institution on behalf of the British Government, while maintaining that 
it acted independently as a spiritual institution which was above the 
political conflict. This was very clearly not the case, and ultimately 
such a stance could only undermine the credibility of the Church and 
damage its spiritual authority. It also created difficulties in its 
international relations with other Churches, and with many of its own 
clergy. 
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The Cold War has been described many times as one of the world's 
great religious wars. Such a perception owes much to the success of 
Western propaganda's skilful presentation of the East-West power 
struggle and its own counter-revolutionary activities as resistance to 
the militant march of atheistic Communism. The roots of the Cold War 
struggle were planted prior to the Second World War, as early as 1917. 
The awareness of the conflict between two world philosophies was 
immensely sharpened with the civil war in Spain, from the summer of 
1936. It appeared that two underlying sets of principles were at stake, 
which issued in opposed ways of thinking about society; touching the 
nature of justice, or the possibility of political freedom, or the 
rights of the individual, or even the old fraternities and equalities of 
the French Revolution. The nature of Western Civilisation was an 
increasingly important subject; the roots of Western culture, the place 
of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in the European inheritance, the moral 
principles of Europe became significant questions. Writers like Arnold 
Toynbee and Christopher Dawson grew in influence. 
Within the European mind there was a wide, deep, often vague 
struggle between the traditional heritage of moral ideas in politics and 
society, and revolutionary doctrines of social morality which might be 
ascribed, not always plausibly, to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 
Gobineau, Richard Wagner, Nietzsche and, most imporant of all for the 
left, Karl Marx. On January 25,1937, Winston Churchill spoke at the 
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annual dinner of the Leeds Chamber of Commerce. He likened Fascism and 
Communism to the Arctic and Antarctic zones of the world and said that 
he preferred a temperate zone: 
It is strange that certain parts of the world should now be wishing 
to revive the old religious wars. There are those non-God religions 
Nazism and Communism... I repudiate both and will havce nothing to 
do with either... They are as alike as two peas. Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee were violently contrasted compared with them. You leave 
out God and you substitute the devil. (1) 
This speech shows how men who were not at all ecclesiastical and not 
even particularly religious might see, in that war of ideologies, a 
conflict of men for the soul of Europe. In this quest, the Churches, 
indeed, Christianity itself, were inevitably of interest to the 
politicians. (2) 
The emotive power of religion has long been known to man and used to 
inspire and comfort, as well as oppress, pacify and exploit, fellow men. 
Neither Church nor State has hesitated to trespass into the other's 
domain to protect or promote their own interests; and both have freely 
collaborated when it has proved mutually advantageous. To twentieth 
century man this historical process proved morally repugnant and 
threatened within modern democracies to undermine the moral authority of 
both political and spiritual institutions. Although this effected a 
subtle transformation of Church-State relations, the practice persisted. 
World War 11 and the Cold War illustrate that religion was too potent a 
force, too powerful a weapon for political considerations to relinquish 
to moral. While the resistance of the Churches to political 
manipulation was neither insignificant nor ineffective, political 
compliance and cooperation was the predominant practice, despite 
ecclesiastical sensitivity to charges of political subservience. The 
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cooperation of the British Churches in the national war effort high- 
lighted the fears of both Church and State to an adverse public response 
toward the use of the spiritual by the political. When these fears 
proved largely superfluous, the way was prepared for postwar cooperative 
relations in a joint Church/State assault on Communism. 
Religious influences had played their part in World War 1, with the 
respective Churches lining up behind their national governments. As 
World War 11 loomed ever larger upon the horizon a further religious 
role was anticipated and provided for within the British Administration. 
A Religions Division was set up within the Ministry of Information, an 
innovation which existed in shadow from 1935 to 1939. No comparable body 
existed in the First World War and it was clearly a response to the 
success of Goebbel's Ministry of Propaganda. (3) For several months 
prior to war being declared the Religions Division of the Planning 
Section of the Ministry of Information worked in informal consultation 
with the leaders of the Churches. The staff of the division were 
themselves clerics or prominent churchmen. The work was under the 
general direction of Mr Kenneth Maclennan, formerly General Secretary of 
the Conferences of British Missionary Societies, who gave special 
attention to the preparation of a programme for the dissemination of 
information among Protestant churches and missions. Through Lord Perth, 
the Honourable Richard Hope was related to work on the Roman Catholic 
side and received advice from Roman leaders. (4) 
The reports prepared by Maclennan and Hope, who worked all along in 
close consultation, indicated that relations with the Churches would 
have to be handled in an entirely different way from other sections of 
the Ministry's activities. It was pointed out that by their nature the 
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Churches were ecumenical in outlook and supranational in their 
objectives; delicate questions had been raised as to whether it was 
possible or desirable that they should be used as channels of publicity. 
They concluded that it was of the utmost importance that the Churches 
and missions, which were themselves international, were not suspected of 
being used as channels of propaganda by one side in an international 
struggle. It was felt that with regard to Christian missions the most 
effective propaganda would be that their work should be carried on in 
full strength in as normal a way as possible, with the missionaries 
supplied with reliable information for use in such ways as they thought 
right. That is, individual missionaries could choose to act discreetly 
as willing conduits for British propaganda. Apart from the fact that the 
Ministry had no effective means to impose such a task upon missionaries 
in the field, coercion could only prove counterproductive in such a 
sensitive operation. 
Confidential consultations with Church and Missionary Society 
leaders had made it clear that they could not be openly identified with 
the normal propaganda work of the Ministry. Individual churchmen, 
however, were willing to be brought into consultation with the Ministry 
and to act in friendly cooperation with it. This procedure was a 
corollary to the already established practice whereby various church 
bodies nominated onto their committees political figures who provided 
them with discreet direction. It was, however, a two way process in that 
the Church sought to increase its own influence in the corridors of 
power through these same men. This process was particularly demonstrated 
in the formation and development of the Church of England Committee on 
Foreign Relations. After the war when the Church of England perceived an 
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opportunity in the reconstruction process to reassert itself as a force 
in the life of the nation, then it quite deliberately looked for men of 
public affairs to be involved in Church affairs as a direct means of 
increasing its own influence in the political sphere. 
The solution to the discreet incorporation of the Churches into the 
war effort was to set up a Religions Section of the Ministry with the 
stated purpose of promoting friendly cooperation, passing on reliable 
information to the different churches and missions and helping them deal 
with the problems arising from the war. It was suggested that the 
section needed to be semi-autonomous in character, but subject to the 
control of the Minister and in appropriate relations with the Foreign 
Office, the India Office, the Colonial Office and the Dominions 
Office. (5) 
Hitler's exploitation of religion for strategic purposes was 
planned and activated well in advance of direct military aggression. 
Vital to Hitler's design for his domination of Europe was the fact that 
the Russian Orthodox Church had become a Church without a country when 
irreligion was proclaimed a fundamental law in the Soviet Union and 
excluded from any participation in public life. Hitler, unsparing in 
promises when he wished to secure the allegiance of powerful forces, 
cultivated the synod of emigre bishops who had established a 
headquarters at Karlovci under Anastasius and claimed to be the true 
representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Bishop in 
Berlin was appointed by the Karlovci Council. By 1937 Hitler had 
obtained effective control of the machinery of the Karlovci jurisdiction 
in Germany and the warm sympathy of the Karlovci Council of Russian 
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Bishops by the granting of considerable subsidies, certainly to the 
former and probably to the latter. (6) 
A strong well equipped 'Russian' Orthodox Church of Germany was 
considered to be a useful instrument for the permeation of the Balkans 
and ultimate domination of Russia. The planned Unified Orthodox Church 
was to include the Churches of Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Roumania, Bulgaria, Austria, Greece, the Ukraine, White Russia and 
Central Russia. Hitler's original concept was to make Germany a great 
Orthodox centre outside Russia where all the Orthodox of the Balkans 
would naturally gravitate. The intention was to start an Academy for the 
training of Orthodox priests and to create a new Patriarchate at 
Breslau, the capital of Silesia: requisite preparations for the collapse 
of the Soviet regime and the winning of the Russian people's confidence 
through the restoration of their Church. The Germans actually built a 
Russian Orthodox Cathedral in Berlin as part of this grand design. 
Once Britain declared war against Germany it became part of 
Religions Division's task to counter Hitler's design in the religious 
sphere. There already existed in Paris a Theological Academy for Russian 
emigres opposed to the Communist regime which was supported by funds 
from Britain and the USA. Influential Church of England figures, George 
Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, Oliver Tomkins, Assistant General 
Secretary of the WCC and AC Don, Secretary to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, urged the Religions Division to give financial support to 
the Paris Academy to enable it to meet the rivalry of the proposed 
Russian Orthodox Institute at Breslau under the control of Seraphim 
Lade, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Berlin, appointed by the Karlovci 
Council and owing allegiance to Hitler. Recognising the inherent danger 
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of Hiltler's religious plans to the British war effort, the Foreign 
Office informed the Ministry of Information in April 1940 that, in view 
of the political factors involved, it might be possible to supplement 
from official sources those funds already received by the Academy from 
Britain and the USA. C7) 
F. O. interest in the Academy meant that in June 1941 fears for its 
welfare led to the proposal that it be moved from Paris to either 
Britain, Portugal or the USA. Douglas doubted the value of the proposal 
feeling that matters had been left too late to implement effective 
action, while the doubts of A. C. Don concentrated on the question of 
whether the Paris Academy was really proving an effective means of 
countering the activities of Seraphim Lade. (8) Although the Ministry 
was in friendly relations with the Academy, it realised that more 
effective results could be obtained by direct contact with the Churches 
in Eastern Europe, ecclesiastical circles there being suspicious of the 
Academy. 
'Without any contacts of its own the Ministry necessarily had to rely 
on the influence of British ecclesiastics in Orthodox circles. The 
Bishop of Gibraltar, with the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and the assistance of the Ministry of Information, arranged therefore to 
take to the Balkans a party of English bishops and clergymen who had 
some knowledge of the Year East. (9) The Church of England delegation, 
which included Douglas, visited Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria in May 
1940. A secret report on the visit from Usher to Maclennan confirmed 
that it had been made as a counter to German propaganda trying to win 
sympathy in the area, especially that of the Orthodox through Seraphim 
Lade and an ambitious scheme for an Orthodox seminary at Breslau where 
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large numbers of students from the Balkans could receive a free 
education in Orthodox divinity and Nazi ideology. The report recommended 
that it was important to proceed as quickly as possible with the 
proposals by the Ministry and the Foreign Office regarding the provision 
of facilities for Balkan theological students at the Orthodox 
Theological Academy in Paris, or in this country. Britain needed to 
respond to the German willingness to educate freely and to Nazify any 
Orthodox theological students who went to them. 
In Yugoslavia the delegation visited not only the King and the 
Patriarch Gavrilo, but also the Roman Catholic hierarchy, conveying 
greetings to them from Britain's Roman Catholic leaders. Usher 
subsequently recommended visits similar to the Church of England 
delegation's by Britain's Roman Catholic dignitaries to Croatia and 
Slovenia. 
Although the major task of the delegation was countering German 
propaganda, anti-Russian propaganda was also an important consideration, 
as was made apparent in Usher's report on the visit to Maclennan: 
Quite apart from general considerations of policy with respect to 
Russia, it is useless in Yugoslavia to devote propaganda to the 
misdeeds of the Russian Government. The higher clergy are already 
aware of the anti-religious policy of the Soviets though they hope 
that the partial restoration of normal relations between Yugoslavia 
and Russia will enable the Serbian Church to resume contact with the 
Metropolitan Sergius in Moscow and his colleagues. But everyone 
assured us that the feelings of the Serbian peasantry toward Russia 
were quite unchanged. Communism was a mere name to them. The 
Russians were Slav and Orthodox. They were their natural protectors, 
their brothers in blood and in faith. (10) 
Usher's report regarded the visit as both successful and effective. 
Although it noted that the settling of the Cyprus question would have 
the most beneficial effect in Greece, in Bulgaria the delegation had 
been welcomed with pleasure and told that the Bulgarians were getting trenn 
Lhiax 
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tired of their over numerous German visitors. Most telling however, was 
the fact that throughout the journey the delegation was the object of 
persistent attacks over the German wireless and in the German press both 
of which complained of the "English spiritual offensive". Usher 
concluded that the generation of so much German hostility was an 
indication of the delegation's effectiveness, moreover the Germans 
lacked the available personnel to send round a rival delegation. 
Indicating the success of the delegation, Usher noted that certain steps 
had already been taken to follow up the visit, "That its effect may not 
be merely transitory. " 
The value of the Church of England to Religions Division and the war 
effort was clearly demonstrated by the success of the Anglican 
delegation in consolidating relations with the Orthodox Churches in that 
region. The Ministry received a further major religious ally in the 
ideolgical struggle for the Balkans when Hitler invaded the S. U. and the 
Russian Orthodox Church there, instead of giving its support to the Axis 
as saviours of Christianity from atheistic Communism, threw itself 
wholeheartedly into the struggle against Hiltler, immediately providing 
the Allies with a powerful religious force in that region. This was 
important because it represented a major Christian rejection of Hitler's 
claim that his war against Russia was a crusade against the Godless 
Bolshevists into whose hands the Allies would deliver Christian Europe. 
Hitler's declaration of a crusade necessarily provided impetus to 
those elements in Britain who wished to present the Allied cause in 
crusading terms, while undermining the reluctance of those who supected 
such a course would prove counter-productive, especially as the alliance 
with Communist Russia virtually demanded extra emphasis on Britain's own 
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Christianity. Whether or not Britain should present her cause as a 
crusade, whether or not religion should be used for propaganda purposes, 
to what extent the Churches should be used as political tools and how 
effective, or otherwise, such methods would prove, were major concerns 
within the Minstry of Information, particularly in the early days when 
the methods of working for Religions Division were being formulated. The 
Religions Division, staffed by clergymen and advised by the leaders of 
the Churches, was only too aware of the inherent danger of promoting God 
as a national champion. However in August 1940 the Head of Religions 
Division sought justification for so using religion when he sent the 
Director General of the Ministry a 'Revised Summary of Duties of 
Religions Division', in which he declared : "... the Nazi regime has 
openly derided Christianity and announced that it is setting up a new 
religion. The Christian issue has therefore become much more important 
than in other wars, where both sides invoked the same creed. "(11) 
Whatever reasons were given for using religion as a weapon of war, 
the justification followed the intent which was evident from the 
beginning by the actual formation of a Religions Division. The method of 
working anonymously through Church leaders was a deliberate policy 
initiated before the outbreak of direct hostilities. On September 12, 
1939, the then Minister of Information, Lord MacMillan, addressed what 
was officially referred to as a 'select' group of Church leaders 
summoned, significantly, to Lambeth Palace, the headquarters of the 
Church of England, and under the auspices of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. The invited were the Archbishop of York; the Bishop of 
Chichester; the Rev Prebendary W Wilson Cash; the Rev Canon Tissington 
Tatlow; the Very Rev Archibald Main, Moderator of the Church of 
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Scotland; the Rev M. E. Aubrey, General Secretary of the Baptist Union of 
England and Vales; the Rev SM Berry, General Secretary of the 
Congregational Union of England and Vales; the Rev W. T. Elmslie, 
Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of England, and the Rev John 
Roberts, Secretary of the Calvinistic Church of Vales. Macmillan 
explained to this select group that although he recognised that they 
were the acknowledged leaders of the Churches in Britain, his invitation 
had been extended to each as an individual: 
I realize that the Christian Church cannot be used as an organ of 
propaganda. It is in its essential nature ecumenical and supra- 
national. But I trust that as individuals you will be ready and 
anxious to help us. (12) 
MacMillan enquired if the Church leaders had considered the 
advisability of a Manifesto in which the Churches publicly declared 
their attitude to the war. Although MacMillan stressed that the issue of 
such a Manifesto was not the concern of the Ministry, he added his 
opinion that it would prove valuable and asked that they keep him 
informed of any action they took in this direction. MacMillan's address 
specifically clarified two ways in which the Ministry sought the 
cooperation of the Churches. The Churches were clearly regarded as 
important channels for disseminating the Ministry's propaganda: 
It is very important that accurate information as to the issues at 
stake should be made available for the clergy and ministry of the 
Churches and to church members. 
The Churches were also expected to make distinct the ethical nature of 
the British struggle: 
It is the special task of the Christian Churches to help the nation 
to keep clear the spiritual and moral issues that are involved in 
all our efforts. 
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In other words, the Churches were required to support the idea of the 
war as a crusade, a task in which the Ministry willingly provided full 
guidance: 
Suggestions as to ways and means by which the Ministry can assist 
the clergy, ministers and Christian laity of the country in 
promoting these ends have been prepared and will be laid before you 
for your consideration. (13) 
Not only Church leaders were summoned to Lambeth for special 
meetings with the Ministry of Information. The cooperation of all those 
thought to wield religious influence was sought. Further meetings were 
arranged for the editors and journalists of religious publications and 
for about one hundred leaders of missionary organisations. (14) 
'A Directive Letter to the Clergy and Others', issued on July 5 
1940, revealed that during his period as Minister of Information Duff 
Cooper had no reservations about characterising the conflict as a 
religious war. (15) Crude exploitation of the theme was prevented by the 
staffing of Religions Division with clerics who worked largely through 
the Churches and maintained a natural concern for the integrity of the 
Christian faith and its Churches, fully aware as well that should the 
Church be compromised, so would its propaganda value. They were thus 
reluctant to label the war a crusade. In 1941 the Religions Division 
stated in 'Religious Propaganda at home', that "to speak of a Christian 
crusade is dangerously misleading. " However, although the preferred 
course of action was to make a strong affirmation of Britain's 
Christianity, a Christian perspective of the war was argued to be 
justifiable: "You cannot spread Christianity by the sword, but you can 
defend a society in which Christian principles are allowed scope and in 
which there is freedom of thought and worship. "(16) By 1944 Religions 
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Division were arguing that the Christian interpretation given the war in 
Allied propaganda was fully justifiable, although it was conceded not to 
be a crusade: 
The war against Nazism, though not a crusade for Christianity, 
raised important moral and spiritual issues; a victory for Germany, 
with its declared hostility to the Christian ideal, would be a 
catastrophe for Christendom. A Christian interpretation of the war 
was therefore a legitimate and genuine part of the work of 
information, at home and abroad. (17) 
The British 'crusade' actually made an exceedingly slow start. The 
'Phoney War' meant there was no call for an immediate response to 
MacMillan's suggestion of a 'Manifesto' declaration and Britain's 
religious propaganda was practically dormant until spurred into activity 
by a Christian drive in German propaganda. As a Ministry of 
Information memorandum succinctly reasoned: "The Nazis fear religion. 
That is a sign that they regard religion as a dangerous power. That is 
reason enough to launch a systematic religious propaganda. "(18) 
Ultimately, it was the success of religious propaganda which 
overcame the 'scruples' surrounding its use. Moreover, Religions 
Division was not, as some had originally feared, looked upon as a 
department for expoiting the Church. As the Division grew in confidence 
it perceived itself as genuinely appreciated in Church circles and 
viewed the initial caution as overdone, referring to the "extreme, even 
excessive, sensitiveness" of the early planning memoranda in avoiding 
the impression that the Churches were being used for merely political 
ends. (19) 
Religions Division was made up of four sections, Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish, the latter being added in 1941 and aimed 
primarily at cultivating the influential Jewish community in the 
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USA. (20) The Division enjoyed good working relations with the religious 
press and had secured the full time services of Nr Barnes of the Roman 
Catholic publication the Tablet. Missionary Societies were originally 
intended to be incorporated into the Division's work, but in view of the 
complex organisation of mission work it was recommended that a special 
section, distinct from the Religions Division, should be set up to act 
as a general liaison between the missionary societies and all the 
interested government departments. In practice, however, a liaison 
section was found to be unnecessary. The detailed plans and suggestions 
for the missionary field proved too elaborate and many were not followed 
up. This proved no great loss as it evolved that the original scheme had 
over-stressed the missionary side of the work. (21) 
The alliance with Soviet Russia, caused by Hitler's invasion of that 
country, gave British religious propaganda a whole new impetus. The work 
of Religions Division had always been seen as concentrated on the 
overseas field and consisted mainly in emphasising the Christian nature 
of the British nation. (22) The new alliance with, an atheist power made 
it yet more imperative to emphasise British Christianity, especially as 
Britain was now confronted with German claims to be leading a crusade to 
defend Europe from Godless Bolshevism. The alliance with Russia was a 
major turn of events which required deep consideration and analysis from 
the propaganda point of view. The religious dimension of the problem 
presented the Religions Division with a quandary. It was clearly 
necessary not to undermine Government support for Russia by condemning 
that State's atheism. Yet it was equally important to try and counter 
the inevitable criticism from a wide variety of religious sources 
without appearing to be indifferent, or, worse still, expediently 
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avoiding, the plight of Christianity in Russia. The initial British 
reaction was thus to stress that nothing had changed apart from the fact 
that Russia, owing to German aggression, now stood with the Allies in 
opposition to Hitler. Britain still opposed Communism and still fought 
for Christianity: 
Aggression is aggression even when committed against an atheist 
state. We have not altered our opposition to Communism. We lend our 
aid not to Communism but to the Russian victims of Nazi aggression. 
The policy of the Government defined by the Prime Minister can be 
wholeheartedly accepted by Christians. Our business partnership with 
Russia is strictly limited; it has one aim only: the defeat of 
Hitler. 
What remains of our claim to be fighting for Christian 
civilisation? The claim remains as before. We are fighting to retain 
the spiritual heritage of the West. Although many feel, especially 
on the Continent, that this spiritual heritage is threatened by 
Communism, there is no doubt that it is actually threatened at the 
moment by Nazi Germany. (23) 
Perhaps even more significant, however, was the whole new emphasis 
put on Christianity in home propaganda, particularly when the Red Army 
defied Hitler's forces and instead of disintegrating beneath the Nazi 
onslaught, as predicted in the West, courageously fought back, to the 
astonishment of Western governments and the applause of Western peoples. 
The admiration of the British people for the Soviet stand led to an 
interest in all things Russian which alarmed conservative authority at 
home. This alarm was further compounded by the Ministry of Information's 
policy of promoting the Anglo-Soviet alliance, leading certain figures 
within the Ministry to search for a means of tempering British 
enthuthiasm for her Communist allies. 
The Ministry had anticipated that an alliance with the S. U. would 
pose problems for British propaganda and, aware beforehand that Germany 
planned to attack Russia, requested guidance from the Prime Minister. 
Churchill's reply that "Germany should be represented as an insatiable 
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tyrant that has attacked Russia in order to obtain materials for 
carrying on the war", failed to provide any adequate direction. (24) The 
required attitude was much more firmly indicated in a note sent to Duff 
Cooper by the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, summarising a discussion 
with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador: 
The Ambassador would understand how deeply was the dislike of 
Communism rooted in this country. Nothing could be more unfortunate 
than if the impression was ever to get abroad that, in a desire to 
promote better Anglo-Russian understanding... H. M. Government were 
lending itself to the popularising of Communist creeds, to which in 
fact it was strongly opposed. M. Maisky said that he fully 
understood this point... (25) 
Eden's words served both to warn Maisky that Russia should not expect 
unbounded enthuthiasm from Britain and defined for the Ministry the 
public attitude to be promoted. The fear of a positive public response 
to the S. U. was revealed when Maisky suggested that no harm could be 
done by the dissemination of culturally focused information. Duff Cooper 
was not so certain: "It is difficult to see how we could boost modern 
Russian culture without implying some approval of the experiment that 
has been going on there for these last 24 years. "(26) Subsequent 
propaganda emphasised pre-Revolutionary Russian cultural achievement. 
While the Ministry were willing to comply with Eden's directive, 
popular demand for up to date information about Russia proved 
insatiable, more interest being shown in Russia than in all the other 
Allies put together. Attempts to satisfy the demand "by interesting but 
inocuous issues of geographical, historical and economic backgrounds', 
proved futile: "the public are demanding stronger food. "(27) The 
Ministry were forced to act more vigorously in their promotion of the 
Anglo-Soviet relationship because of, firstly, growing public suspicion 
that the Government was not enthuthiastic about Russia and was not 
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providing her with full support; and secondly, left-wing speakers were 
supplying the public demand for information about Russia, conveying a 
more favourable impression than the Ministry desired and winning 
themselves popularity in the process. 
The Ministry's response to this situation was to try and make it 
appear that the Government was whole-heartedly behind Russia and at the 
same time attempt "to curb exuberant pro-Soviet propaganda from the 
Left", by excluding Communist speakers and trying "to prevent iniative 
from falling or remaining in the hands of the Communist Party. " These 
efforts, however, created yet more problems. Testimony from the regional 
officers regarding the rulings against Communist speakers revealed that 
not only was a great deal of confusion caused, but their own work was 
rendered less efficient. (28) Without resort to the Communists it was 
difficult to meet the demand for speakers on the S. U. and the Ministry, 
conceding that it was "woefully short of people who can speak at all on 
Rusia", tried to, encourage Conservative speakers to tackle the subject: 
"The effect of factual talks by them stressing the support which this 
country is affording to Russia can scarcely be overestimated or over 
valued. "(29) Clearly identifying themselves with the Conservative 
Party, it was the opinion of the Ministry that Tory activity in this 
sphere would "signify our support and admiration of the Russian war 
effort. "(30) However, despite associating themselves with the Tory 
Party, the Ministry could not persuade its members to speak favourably 
about Russia. Although Conservative Party Headquarters expressed itself 
as ready and willing to cooperate, the only M. P. approached flatly 
refused. 
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To convince a suspicious public that its attitude toward Russia was 
sincere, while at the same time effecting some control over public 
attitudes towards that country, the Ministry decided it must steal the 
Communist's thunder: The thunder shall be stolen from the left-wing 
Communists by outdoing them in pro-Russia propaganda on lines which may 
be suitably controlled. " This policy was very deliberately aimed at 
allaying the suspicions of the lower orders, unfortunately for the 
Ministry it had the inadvertent effect of exciting those of the upper. 
An enquiry from no less a place than 10 Downing Street itself requested 
the Ministry to comment on a report from a Scottish whip which stated; 
"The British Communist Party have cashed in on the universal admiration 
and sympathy for the Russian people in their great stand. Films 
displayed by the Ministry of Information giving a colourful portrayal of 
life in Soviet Russia have served to change many people's ideas about 
Communism. "(31) Specifically drawing the Ministry's attention to the 
latter sentence, it was clear that Downing Street's concern was that 
rather than stealing the left's thunder, Ministry actions were actually 
enhancing it. The Prime Minister's apprehensions about Russia's 
popularity were already well known in the Ministry fom early in 
September 1941 when the Director General had reported to the Policy 
Committee that Churchill wanted the Ministry to consider what action was 
required to counter the present tendency of the British public to forget 
the dangers of Communism in enthusiasm over the Russian resistance to 
the Mazis. (32) 
While Churchill's fears were specifically concerned with Communism, 
the Tory Party in general feared that its political opposition, the 
Labour Party, would prove the major beneficiary of Ministry activity, as 
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the Ministry was itself aware: "There are not wanting signs that the 
Labour Party, is exploiting these Anglo-Soviet weeks for its own 
political advantage, or at all events that the Conservative Party is 
under the nervous apprehension that this is what the Labour Party is, in 
fact, doing. "(33) 
The fact that the war would inevitably bring change was recognised 
by those in power, as was the need. Change that would alleviate the 
gravest social evils was encouraged, because their remedy was seen as 
safeguarding British society from the discontent which breeds 
revolution, that is from any real change. Changes to the actual 
structure of British society would not be tolerated. The fear that the 
British nation in its desire for change might be tempted by the lure of 
Marxism became a significant factor in policy making during the Second 
World War. To the extent that the British authorities on the whole did 
not understand Communism, confused it with Socialism and even with 
Conservative remedies for the alleviation of social ills, their reaction 
against it was motivated as much by fear of change itself as by the 
substance of revolutionary doctrines. The fundamental misunderstanding 
of the theoretical basis of Marxist/Socialist doctrine and the 
irrational fears common amongst British policymakers when Communism was 
the subject, were illustrated by the considerations of RH Parker, 
Director of the Home Publicity Division of the Ministry of Information, 
in a memorandum on the necessary "Policy Toward Communism": 
Communism began to be in force in the extreme Vest of Europe 
after the destruction of the Russian monarchy in 1915. Since that 
time it has been slowly and continuously increasing. Before this war 
there were one and several crypto communist Members of Parliament. 
Many of the tenets of Bolshevism are identical with those of 
Socialism, and many more people hold these tenets and are so minded, 
than subscribe formally to the creeds. Even the Conservative Party 
has accepted many articles of pure socialism into its programme. 
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Weighty opinion anticipates that much of the War-control business 
will survive the Armistice, and some of it will survive 
permanently. (34) 
Parker's assessment of the domestic situation revealed that 
conservative opinion was not concerned with subversion and fifth 
columns, but the prevalent trends they perceived within British 
political life as leading inexorably towards socialism. British 
propaganda had consistently promoted the British way of life as far 
superior to the Russian system; yet when the two had been put to the 
test by the Nazis, the British Empire had disintegrated while all the 
world thrilled to the courage of the Red Army. The fear was that the 
example of Russia was not only undermining the veracity of home 
propaganda which had for so long denigrated that country, but was 
stimulating tendencies within Britain to see socialism as a valid 
alternative to the present British system: 
Before 1914 there was very little State assistance for the 
individual citizen, and when people were forced to look to it, they 
did so with repugnance. Control and National Service introduced by 
the last war familiarised the public mind to the idea of State 
provision for essential contingencies: and the more this was 
afforded, before and after each general election, the more this 
became part of the habitual public expectation. The unemployment 
benefit at once consolidated previous and subtended future history. 
It may be that the war did no more than accelerate this conception 
of a general sharing in the common wealth, but it certainly has 
accelerated it: the country now expects the Government to take 
measure over everything, and to arrange everything, and the general 
demand is not for freedom of choice but for the issue of orders. It 
is not impossible, but it is difficult to justify a system of 
individualism, uncontrolled save by taxation, which has to be 
violently abandoned at each war. The number of young persons who 
demand this justification has augmented. It must be remembered, too, 
that whereas the rich believe that some portion of their wealth will 
avail them in the latter end, and the poor that there will always be 
work and wages and the dole, the intelligent middle class knows that 
it is ruined, and has nothing to look forward to except from the 
State. It is the middle class which makes revolutions -the Danton, 
the Mirabeau, the hungry clever men without hope, not the Karats. 
They exploit them. 
I judge, therefore, that even before the entry of Russia into 
the war the nation was vaguely ripening to a conception that 
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Socialism was either a reasonable alternative to the pre-war 
democratic theory, or a logical sequence to war measures. At the 
moment the dominant is simply that of sharing, not of equal shares, 
but of some share in the commodity for all. Various Ministers, 
including Lord Woolton, have made use of this. But public opinion is 
only immobile when it is dead. It is certainly not dead today; it 
must, therefore, be on the move. 
At this climacteric the U. S. S. R. was attacked by Hitler, and 
instead of collapsing as a cranky political machine based upon 
illogic and phantasy (for as such it was authoritatively described) 
should, it has till now stemmed the onslaught of Nazism, forseen its 
intentions, prepared against them, and is the first to succeed 
against it face to face on the earth. Whatever it may have thought 
before, the public mind can no longer regard Communism, on the facts 
visible to it, as either incompetent or unpractical. By comparison 
with other regimes, on the evidence before the public, Communism has 
produced a superior system, the only system that has so far 
countervailed Nazism. In the absence of evidence to the contrary I 
apprehend that the mobile mind may at its Left extreme now believe 
that Communism is the justified system of political life, and that 
there may be at the centre a strong tendency to acquiesce in it. (35) 
Parker submitted that "the political theory of Communism has now 
both an audience and an occasion, and that it is necessary to 
counterpoise it. "(36) Parker believed immediate action was the 
solution, arguing that the public mind was still too busy with the war 
and its private troubles to have set into a conviction. He considered 
that should the situation be allowed to develop further, its arrest 
would require a crusade and, "A crusade necessarily implies warfare. " 
Rather than a future crusade against Communism, Parker saw a solution to 
the problem in presenting the current war as a crusade in order to 
divert public thought away from Communism and occupy it instead with 
divine inspiration. The idea of a crusade was not to be be the sole 
propaganda theme, although it was to be the main one. It was to be 
supported by the more obvious forms of propaganda, "for purposes of 
insurance. " Parker suggested that it was necessary "to canalise the 
public mind by distinguishing and constantly emphasising the difference 
between Russia and Bolshevism, by stating that what is necessary for the 
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Slav temperament, which neither needs organization, nor cares about it, and 
which is fantastic and poetic upon its outlook upon life, is not appropriate to 
the Anglo-Saxons who are matter of fact, disinterested in political theories, 
except where they show a patent utility. " The virtues and advantages of British 
democracy were, as always, to be stressed, plus, while "we need not tell the 
public again that as Hiltler has his Gestapo so Stalin has his Ogpu... we need 
never let them forget it "(37) 
Parker was quite sure that the British people could be brought to hate 
Communism. Developing the theme that an Englishman's home is his castle, Parker 
argued that: "He automatically wishes, therefore, to keep it comfortable: he 
hates Nazism, and can be brought to hate Communism, because of their 
interference with his peace, his privacy, his comfort... " He was equally 
convinced that ensured a minimum standard of living, the British would not risk 
losing what they had by trying to gain more: "So long as there is a chicken in 
the pot there is no revolution in the State: and a man who is sure of that 
chicken next Sunday, and all Sundays, will not raise the Red Flag to make the 
chicken a turkey. The Englishman is not an idealist ... 11(38) 
Although he maintained that the Englishman was not an idealist, Parker 
still looked to the realm of ideas to combat Communism. Moreover it was clear 
that he was not entirely convinced as to the efficacy and credibility of the 
traditional forms of domestic propaganda and, as Bevin was to do in the coming 
Cold Var, Parker sought spiritual reinforcement. He wanted that the already 
approved proposal of promoting the war as a Christian crusade now be 
implemented as a means of safeguarding the British populace from the appeal of 
Communism: 
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Direct propaganda is scarcely ever effective propaganda, except in 
buying and selling. In England, particularly, it excites suspicion of itself 
but anywhere it excites controversy and breeds fanatics, missionaries, 
converts and holy wars. Oblique propaganda works another way. It fills the 
vacant mind and prevents, therfore, devils from entering in. It supplies 
the answers which lie dormant till a question evokes them; and the 
question then rebounds for the most part, and falls blunted. 
The Board has already approved in principle the Idea for the War as 
a Crusade which, founded on a minute submitted by the Director Home 
Division to the Planning Committee, embodied much older, profounder and 
better thought by other members of the Administration, and this may be 
both a favourable and an appropriate time to launch it in order to oppose 
an Idea with an Idea, to put in a Belief to occupy the minds of men 
against a Belief. (39) 
Parker saw a crusade as an alternative to dissident thought, a bulwark 
against Communism, and a means of inspiration giving the ordinary soldier a 
cause for which to die. He wanted the war projected in Manichaean terms: "Good 
must conquer evil. " Parker could not believe that men would willingly give up 
their lives for the ideal of democracy, he believed that deeper inspiration was 
required: "No one can really love democracy to the extent of dying for it, any 
more than one can love Geography or Theolgy. Divinity is another matter. "(40) 
When Russian popularity started the alarm bells of revolution, when the war 
effort needed inspiration, Christianity was called to the front. 
The British Government deliberately sought Christian endorsement of its 
political creed and actions, but it would not tolerate Christian intervention, 
nor an independent Christian voice, in what it regarded as the functions of 
government. The spiritual realm was expected to support the political one, and 
at the same time remain decidedly subordinate to it. Although the Church was 
desirous of securing Christian influence in political life, it had no desire to 
usurp political power. Its chief concern was survival and the restoration of 
its spiritual power, which the advance of secularism had so severely eroded. 
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The war, and afterwards the anti-Communist crusade of the West against the 
East, offered the Christian Churches opportunities to re-assert their spiritual 
power, but they were also means by which spiritual authority could be 
compromised by submitting itself to its secular counterpart. The revolution to 
establish a new earthly order was confronted by the counter-revolution which 
sought to preserve the status quo. The ensuing conflict divided nations left to 
right and the world East to West; the same was true of the Churches. The Cold 
War which divided the nations, also divided the Churches. 
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Communists", Ryan noted that "it cannot simply be dammed. " Ryan 
suggested that they could not "do anything either way about this 
curiosity", as "our own experts seem to know very little about how the 
wheels go round in Russia", and they could not afford to upset the 
Kremlin by critical publicity. He further submitted that with the 
battle raging, the public were in no mood to be reminded that "Communism 
is as oppressive, and as alien to our ideas of right and wrong as is 
Nazism. " In order to "avoid putting out propaganda that listeners won't 
swallow", Ryan suggested finding out whether professional Commumnists 
were active among the workers, what they were saying, and how the 
workers were reacting. He also thought it would help if Ministers made 
references in their speeches to the "deep differences between our way of 
life and the Russian. " September 4,1941; IMF 1 676. 
33. Ibid, Parker to Gates, November 10 1941. 
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35. Ibid. Parker was known as Judge Parker because of his judicial 
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36. Ibid. 
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38. Ibid, Observations by Parker further to a paper he submitted July 13 
1941, on necessity of deciding and setting a course of interpretation 
about Russia. 
39. Ibid, "Secret Memorandum: Policy Toward Communism", Henry Maxwell 
commenting on Parker's deliberations agreed that for the first time in 
this country the political theory of Communism had both an audience and 
an occasion and that the tendency to extremism could be countered in one 
of two ways, by downright repression or by the submission of an 
alternative programme which would command public confidence. Observing 
the unwisdon of criticising Russian achievement at just that moment, 
"when it may well prove that the unparallelled sacrifice of the Russian 
people has saved that civilised world which Communism was particularly 
supposed to be out to destroy. " Maxwell agreed with Parker's conclusions 
that the only method they could employ was that of oblique propaganda 
designed to fill the vacant mind and to supply the answers to as yet 
unformed questions. Maxwell was himself of the opinion that the swing 
towards Bolshevism was much reduced now that Russia was in the war: "Had 
she remained aloof there might have been a tendency to attribute this to 
the superior wisdom of Communist foreign policy, and the organical 
strength of the Communist state. It has now been revealed that ideology 
is no shield against aggression, and the hideous sufferings of the 
Russian people prove to all the world that an authoritarian Government 
is just as powerless to save its people from the fury of the aggressor 
as is the most stable of the capitalist powers. " September 3 1941. 
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40. Ibid. On September 9,1941, Parker sent another copy of his August 
12 paper on Communism to the Ministry of Information Director General 
noting that the time was then particularly favourable for launching the 
spiritual crusade. He also noted the need "to keep before the public 
mind the Draconic method of rule in the Soviet Republic and the denial 
of liberty to individuals equally with the German denial, and equally 
repugnant to ourselves. " Commenting on the difficulty of handling the 
issue with subtlety, he suggested as a modus operandi that, "perhaps the 
Executive Board could issue a directive to all Divisions to produce a 
programme on these lines within the ambit of their own 
responsibilities... the Executive Board would then decide for or 
against each one, and construct some machinery for their co-ordination 
where necessary... " IMF 1 676. 
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As the prospect of an Allied victory appeared more assured, each of 
the Allies gave increasing thought to its own postwar interests. A 
similar process took place within the Churches. During the war the 
Churches discovered how powerful and effective a force they could be, 
particularly when they cooperated nationally and internationally and 
enjoyed Government support. At the beginning of the war the British 
Government sought to identify their cause with that of Christianity and 
encouraged Church leaders to speak out in support of the war effort. On 
December 21 1940 the Tim published a joint declaration from the 
Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Westminster and the Moderator of the 
Free Churches. The statement, "The Christian Basis for Peace", was 
widely used in the Ministry's propaganda, as RR Williams of Religions 
Division noted: "we have given very wide publicity to the statement in 
all parts of the world, as we consider it excellent propaganda and the 
kind of outlook which might easily draw to our side the most 
constructive elements in the various European countries-U) Churchill's 
entrenched opposition to the Ministry of Information issuing any kind of 
declaration of postwar aims meant that despite using the statement, the 
Ministry were unable to give it their official sanction, as Williams 
further observed: "The Ministry certainly is in no position to take an 
official attitude in the matter. It is too dangerously near a statement 
of war aims for us to be in any way committed. "(2) "The Christian Basis 
for Peace" spoke of the religious and ethical foundations of a future 
peace and included a recommendation for the abolition of material 
inequality and a fair distribution of the earth's resources. The 
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prevailing feeling in the Minstry was that it was just such a statement 
as was needed: 
Propaganda succeeds best when it is directed to a clearly defined 
object. Vague generalizations are comparatively ineffective... "In 
time of war the progressive elements are eager to see the ideals for 
which the nation is fighting translated into concrete pledges of 
Government action at home and abroad. No one claims that the 
present social system is perfect. One effective remedy for possible 
discontent and disaffection in this country would be the adoption of 
a striking social policy. (3) 
Bath Duff Cooper and Sir John Reith urged the Government to make 
"constructive statements", but neither Chamberlain nor Churchill were 
willing to oblige. By 1941 public interest in the postwar world had 
already gathered considerable momentum. In the interests of morale and 
the war effort the Ministry would willingly have joined the debate which 
was both an opportunity and a challenge for-its propaganda. The Prime 
Minister, however, not only refused to make a statement on war aims, he 
wanted complete silence, a stance which was at once untenable and 
unrealistic and unable to prevent the subject retaining its grip on the 
public imagination. Meanwhile the need to join the debate was urged 
upon the Ministry from a variety of sources, not least its own regional 
information officers. (4) 
Although remaining apparently aloof from participation in the 
debate, in December 1942 the Ministry provided a blaze of publicity 
for the Beveridge Report. As with "The Christian Basis far Peace", 
the Ministry used the Report for propaganda purposes without 
directly associating itself with it. The enormous public response to 
the Beveridge Report surprised the Government which realized it had 
clearly underestimated the strength of popular feeling an the 
question. There was, moreover, fear that this sentiment was open to 
exploitation by the left. In March 1943, Sir John Anderson wrote to the 
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Minister of Information advising him of the concern expressed at a meeting of 
the Home Front Ministers about the extent to which, in matters of postwar 
reconstruction, the field of public discussion had been left open to extremists: 
"It was pointed out that on various postwar topics extreme views seem to be 
catching the public imagination; and it was thought to be high time that the 
balance should be redressed by gaining a hearing for more moderate and realist 
views. "(5) 
Church views inevitably and naturally fell into this latter category. The 
Religions Division, staffed as it was by churchmen, shared the intense interest 
of both the Ministry and of Church leaders in postwar matters, equalling the 
determination of the latter that Christianity should play a prominent role. One 
of the main considerations behind the formation of a Religions Division in the 
Ministry of Information was the recognition that Churches were a powerful 
influence whose help should be sought in times of national and world crisis. (6) 
The British Churches had responded willingly in support of the war effort and 
wanted to retain the enhanced position they had gained in the nation's life by 
playing an equally significant role in reconstruction. In August 1943 Hugh 
Martin argued that the changing war situation necessitated a new propaganda 
approach on the part of Religions Division: 
Men's minds are on postwar issues. Even from the point of view of keeping 
them efficiently in the war we must now talk largely in postwar terms. 
This is true whether we are concerned with keeping people in good heart at 
home or with securing the continued wholehearted cooperation of our 
allies. (7) 
During the early part of the war the aims of the Religions Division were 
decidedly short term, but as early as May 1943 reconstruction had become an 
important consideration in the formulation of Division propaganda: 
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The immediate aim of religious propaganda from Great Britain is to 
contribute to the disintegration of the German war machine and therefore 
to hasten victory. From the long term point of view it looks ahead and 
endeavours to prepare for reconstruction. The more distant aim may modify 
the means whereby the first aim is to be accomplished. (8) 
Martin was determined that there should be a role for the Church in 
reconstruction. He wanted Religions Division to present what responsible 
leaders and representative bodies in the Churches were saying about postwar 
plans. Claiming that the world wanted to know what were British intentions, 
what was Britain going to do with victory, Martin declared, "In the total 
answer, the Church must not be left out. "(9) Martin was not arguing for the 
Church to have an independent voice in reconstruction. He wanted Religions 
Division to show the religious world that the British Churches were equally as 
determined as the British Government on winning complete military victory and 
on the establishment of a juster, freer, more peaceful world: "This involves 
keeping up-to-date the story of religious persecution to remind people of the 
kind of enemy we have to face and as a counter to premature peace moves. It 
also involves the introduction of a new emphasis on reconstruction. " 
Stressing the necessity of providing Religions Division with a role in the 
reconstruction debate, Martin pointed out that religious circles throughout the 
world, especially in the USA and Latin America with twenty Roman Catholic 
Republics, were not only intensely interested in peace prospects and 
reconstruction, but also intensely anxious. He pointed to the political 
Importance of religion in the Orthodox Balkan countries, noting that , "Axis 
propaganda has always 'plugged' the materialistic-capitalist outlook of Britain 
and it is now hard at work suggesting that the alliance with Russia means a 
peace which will threaten the future of Christianity in Europe and the world. " 
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He strengthened his case yet further by stressing that in many of the liberated 
countries the Protestant and Catholic Churches would be found to be about the 
only organized survival from the past. Cooperation with them and their 
goodwill would be highly important. Here the links formed by Religions 
Division with Christian leaders in occupied lands, and with refugee governments, 
could prove of value. Martin pointed to the process already begun in the 
dealing of Religions Division with the French Protestant Church in North Africa. 
Completing his argument, Martin declared, "To sum up... Religions Division should 
now be encouraged to meet the new situation by developments in the realm of 
reconstruction. " (10) 
In fact both Religions Division and the Church looked far beyond the 
period of reconstruction, forseeing a much more significant role for religion in 
the future life of the nation, and indeed the world. By 1944 reconstruction and 
continuity were primary concerns within the Division, although their envisaged 
role was mainly connected with overseas publicity, thought unnecessary on the 
home front once peace was attained, as the Division's Director posited: "it is 
difficult to imagine that there would be any necessity for such activities in 
peacetime. " (11) In June 1944, Kenneth Maclennan presented a memorandum on 
"British Overseas Publicity: Peacetime Needs", which argued that it would always 
be in the interests of Great Britain that religious bodies in other countries 
should be interested in the religious life of Great Britain, while the 
cooperation thereby developed would itself be a useful by-product of immediate 
service to international cooperation. Maclennan explained how wartime 
developments and changes in the international and military situation had 
contributed to a gradual modification in the aims of Religions Division. Many 
t 
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of the nations to which publicity was directed had themselves joined the United 
Nations and generally shared Britain's military aims. The interest of religious 
publicity had therefore become centred in the projection overseas of British 
religious life with an increasing emphasis on the contribution of the Britsh 
Churches to national and international reconstruction: 
The prominent themes in this projection are (i) the vitality and 
adaptability of British religious institutions (ii) evidence of 
constructive planning both in the reform of church institutions and in the 
working out of the Christian contribution towards general social 
reconstruction (iii) evidence of interest in and concern for the Churches 
of other countries on the part of the British Churches... It is clearly 
along the lines of this long term publicity that the peacetime future of 
British religious publicity lies. (12) 
Plans for Religions Division exceeded simply remaining a department 
within the Ministry, in whatever form it migh be retained after the war. 
Because the overseas work of the Minstry was carried out in close consultation 
with the Foreign Office, and because good relations with it were essential for 
the overseas tasks of Religions Division, the clergy working there necessarily 
formed a close working relationship with that crucial Department of State. 
Moreover it was recognised that each could work to the advantage of the other. 
Seeing Christianity as a powerful cohesive force which could be used to promote 
British interests, Maclennan felt the Foreign Office should be supportive of the 
Churches as they possessed considerable potential for aiding British policy. 
Describing the Church as an international entity able to promote international 
cooperation and help secure the peace, Maclennan argued that there were 
extensive grounds for paying attention to religious publicity: 
In this connection it must be remembered that the Christian Church, 
Catholic and Protestant, is the oldest international society in existence 
and although its fabric has been partly weakened by the acids of 
modernity there remains throughout the world a network of religious 
contacts of very considerable importance. 
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On the Roman Catholic side the network finds its centre in Rome. 
Contacts are between territorial churches and the centre at the Vatican. 
The figure of the spokes of a wheel has often been used. There has not 
been a great deal of contact between e. g. the Catholics of Britain and the 
Catholics in America, but in this case and in several similar cases such 
contacts have been greatly developed through the work of this Division 
during the war, much to the advantage of British prestige and publicity. 
On the Protestant side links between British and overseas Churches 
takes a number of forms. 
1. The British Churches are linked up with the World Council of Churches 
(the so-called Ecumenical Movement) this type of contact is roughly 
comparable to the Catholic pattern (with Geneva replacing Rome as the 
centre). But there is much more international contact direct from country 
to country in the Ecumenical Movement than in the Church of Rome. The 
whole Ecumenical Movement is a factor of real importance which British 
foreign policy must take note of for the coming decade. 
2. Various denominations in Britain have important contacts with their 
opposite numbers throughout the world. For example the Church of England 
has its network of contacts through the Anglican Communion, the Baptists 
have the Baptist World Alliance, the Church of Scotland has the 
Presbyterian Alliance, the British Methodists have strong links with 
American Methodists. 
3. All these Churches (and for that matter the Catholics as well) have 
important commitments in missionary work in backward countries. In 
peacetime there are something like 10,000 missionaries overseas, roughly 
8,000 Protestant and 2,000 Catholic. 
Apart from the fact that these old and well established links provide 
a fertile field for the maintenance and development of interest in Great 
Britain there is a special reason for strengthening them in the immediate 
postwar period. On any showing the future peace of the world depends on 
international cooperation, especially on that between Britain, America, 
Russia and China. The World Christian Movement is thoroughly accustomed 
to the idea of international cooperation and in many countries e. g. 
America, it is the Christian Churches which are giving the lead to the 
general population in the demand for an international organisation for 
security. It is clearly much to the interest of Great Britain that this 
world wide, though at present inadequately organised force, should have 
full scope as an influence for international cooperation for all 
purposes. (13) 
Maclennan was aware of the Foreign Office preference for the Churches to 
act independently in order that it not be left open to the criticism that it 
used Christianity for political ends. In discussing the limits of official and 
voluntary efforts in this sphere, Maclennan observed that once the restrictions 
of wartime were eliminated a great deal of contact between British religion and 
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that of other countries, at least on the Protestant side, would take place 
naturally without Government support. Prior to that, however, there might be an 
intervening period when contact would not be possible without some Government 
assistance. This point had already been put to Foreign Secretary Eden by the 
British Churches which, in return, had received an encouraging reply. 
In fact, Maclennan anticipated, and clearly wanted, indefinite cooperation 
and involvement between Church and Government over religious publicity. He 
believed that there was reason to believe that even in peacetime British 
religious publicity would benefit from a measure of Government support as many 
wartime contacts, especially on the Catholic side, were considered likely to 
collapse unless officially supported for some time to come. Discussing the 
possible channels for British religious publicity overseas, Maclennan suggested 
that "both the British agencies and the British representatives of international 
agencies might cable much more news abroad if it were encouraged by some 
financial assistance... " He also suggested the large number of religious books 
and periodicals distributed free through Government sources to churchmen in 
America, the Dominions and other countries might continue in peacetime. 
Maclennan knew that Government financing was a delicate matter, but it was 
equally an activity which he believed should be continued, particularly in the 
case of intervisitation: "throughout the war this has proved the most fruitful 
of all forms of international religious contact which includes the sending of 
British Churchmen to other countries and the welcoming of foreign Churchmen to 
this country. Vhile it would be an entirely new departure for the Government 
to subsidise such intervisitations it is quite possible that assistance in this 
field would be welcomed and would be extremely fruitful"(14) 
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Maclennan proposed official action be instituted in the field of 
ecclesiastic relations, suggesting that the most suitable body to supervise such 
a wide field of publicity would be an expert section on religion at the British 
Council. The British Council lacked any previous experience with the subject, a 
fact of which Maclennan disapproved and sought to rectify: "So far the British 
Council has not touched religion, but it is quite inappropriate that a body 
which exists to project the culture of Britain overseas should ignore the whole 
religious side of British life. " Moreover, Maclennan considered that the 
"Churches would not feel the same difficulty about cooperating with the British 
Council as they might about cooperating with the Government. " He recognised 
that direct cooperation with the Government was now much more possible than it 
had been in the past: "The Churches have become accustomed to the existence of 
Religions Division and on the whole have welcomed it. " So successful, in fact, 
had the wartime alliance between the Churches and the Government proven, that 
in January 1945 the Rev RR Williams, a specialist in the Protestant Section of 
the Division, recommended that "plans should be made for a small office to be 
opened, preferably at the Foreign Office, which in substance, and perhaps in 
name could be an Overseas Religious Relations Branch. "(15) 
Kenneth Grubb, the Controller of Overseas Propaganda, clearly preferred 
this latter suggestion to association with the British Council. In a letter 
which stressed the value of Religions Division and the part played in British 
history and in contemporary British thought by religion, Grubb advised David 
Scott of the Foreign Office that on the one hand the British Council had a 
wider geographical coverage than had the Foreign Office, but: 
On the other hand, the desire of the religious bodies themselves to pursue 
their own international connections is a spontaneous one and they need, 
§2 
not so much stimulation, as some guidance and help which would seem most 
naturally to come from the Foreign Office. I think it is true to say that 
this Ministry enjoys to a considerable degree the confidence of leading 
dignitaries of the British Churches and it is probable that religious 
leaders would feel more confidence in dealing with the F. O. itself than 
with the British Council. (16) 
Scott also thought the Foreign Office to be the more appropriate body to deal 
with the matter than the British Council, which he hoped would "not attempt to 
harness religion to its chariot. " (17) Scott favoured the Churches being left to 
maintain their own connections abroad with help and guidance from the Foreign 
Office, adding that of course this applied only should such help and guidance be 
wanted, as an entitlement available to any British organisation. In the postwar 
period the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations always sought Foreign 
Office guidance in the conduct of international ecclesiastical affairs, as a 
means of ensuring that Church policy remained in line with that of the Foreign 
Office. 
During the war Herbert Vaddams, a Church of England minister who worked 
for the Religions Division and subsequently was appointed secretary to the 
Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, perceived a coincidence of 
interests and the advantage of cooperation between Government and Church. In a 
confidential memorandum prepared for the Peace Aims Group, a sub-committee of 
the Russia Committee, in 1944, Waddams developed the theme that the problem of 
reconstruction could "legitimately be termed a spiritual problem. "(18) Vaddams 
argued that without the spiritual element, purely social, economic and political 
measures could not succeed. Church power could act as a complement to 
political power by providing the common ideal that was needed to unite men in a 
lasting bond of friendship: 
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Part of this problem is purely political, that is to say it depends on the 
political intentions and actions of the allied powers. With this we are 
not concerned as such. There remains a vast field in which the Church 
could and ought to play a fruitful part. Our experience in this war has 
conclusively shown how closely political objectives are related to 
religious beliefs. For purposes of work the two may be separated, but 
they must go hand in hand and must not be allowed to be contradictory in 
any particular. The religious and the political must be two aspects of the 
same activity. 
This statement was a very important indicator of the type of relationship 
many leading churchmen desired with the State. Also of significance was the 
stress placed by Waddams on the potential of the Churches in constructing and 
rebuilding the war torn world: 
In Europe today the Churches are the only organised bodies which have 
consistently and successfully resisted the National-Socialist 
weltanschauung, and its practical application. This means that there are 
numbers of people whose cooperation is assured, if they are rightly 
approached... 
In many cases the clergy and bishops of the various Churches have 
become the leaders of their people in quite a new way. Because the Church 
has alone remained of all the peoples' organisations, it is through the 
Church that the people have expressed themselves. This leadership should 
be used and encouraged, as it would form a continuity of great value and 
because the people have learnt to trust the Church. 
Waddams claimed that the Church would have two main objects which would be 
equally beneficial to the Allies: 
The first would be to make a real and lasting contribution to European and 
world cooperation by throwing the influence of Christianity into the 
scales for this purpose. The second would be to give the Churches the 
place of leadership in the future outlook of Christians and non-Christians 
alike. This of course does not mean control by the Churches of practical 
plans after the war. It means that the Churches should establish 
themselves as the places to which men look for their purpose in life, and 
for the provision of moral standards. This is of the utmost importance 
both for the world, and also for the Churches. There is a great 
opportunity for Christianity to reclaim its proper place in the popular 
mind, and by doing so exercise a decisive influence on policy and 
behaviour. Moreover if the Allies are ready to allow the Churches 
sufficient scope, that in itself would be a great step in destroying 
suspicion and in assuring Europe as a whole of the sincerity of their 
intentions. 
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Waddams was convinced that, "... the end of the war will see a condition 
which may prove decisive for the Church in the future. There will be a gap 
into which the Churches can and must step, for if they fail to do so the chance 
may never again recur. " Vaddams envisaged a world organisation of Churches 
which would include the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox. He realized that in 
practice there would have to be some division of action between Protestant and 
Catholic, "but they must both be executing a common policy and must both be 
aiming at precisely the same thing. " Waddams wanted the Churches to be ready 
to seize the Iniative: 
But the Churches themselves must be prepared immediately to seize 
any chance that occurs. It will of course be vital that the main 
Christian bodies should act together, and that they would have an agreed 
course of action... The World Council of Churches provides for a certain 
amount of practical joint action on the part of the Protestant world, but 
of course in a matter of this kind the cooperation of Roman Catholics and 
Orthodox in an official capacity is essential. If anything is to be done 
on a really useful scale the Vatican will have to be consulted and its 
active support will be a sine qua non of success. 
With this memorandum, Waddams included 'Suggestions for the Agenda of a 
Meeting between Roman Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants. ' Waddams recognised 
that vital to his plans for the Church was cooperation by the main Christian 
bodies, Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic, on an agreed course of action, 
regardless of doctrinal differences: "Perhaps there is no need at this time of 
day to draw attention to the drawbacks and disadvantages of schism. But so 
many opportunities have been lost in the past that the point must be emphasised 
again and again. " Waddams recommended immediate discussions, suggesting that 
the Roman Catholic organisation Sword of the Spirit and the Protestant Religion 
and Life afforded sufficient ground an which to begin. Eventually Waddams hoped 
to see the "establishment of a permanent body either privately or publicly, 
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representing all the Churches, to act together and to take advantage of every 
opportunity that offers. " 
Significantly, while Vaddams emphasised that his projected role for the 
Church would complement political power, he was equally emphatic that it would 
not usurp it. His proposed agenda stipulated that there was to be: 
"careful dissociation of the Churches from any attempt to get political 
power for themselves, either in general, or in particular countries. This 
is important, and where possible should be clearly shown by the leaders of 
the Churches, especially the Vatican and the Orthodox Churches in the 
Balkans. 
Vaddams pointed to one particularly significant reason why political authority 
should promote the cause of Christianity and the Churches in the postwar 
period, they all shared a common foe: 
During the past 25 years the great cry in Europe has been the danger for 
Christianity of Communism. I cannot think that this cry really represents 
the chief problems for the Christian Churches, in that Communism seems to 
me to be merely one expression of a larger condition. It appears to me 
that the cry of Bolshevism has misled many people, and prevented them 
from coming to an accurate diagnosis. Communism, however, does represent 
in a strong form a tendency which is clearly to be discerned in almost 
every country of Europe; this is a tendency to cut adrift from the 
Christian faith and Christian doctrine of man and to trust in a secular 
materialism, political and scientific, which is supported by a half-baked, 
half agnostic philosophy (if it may be dignified by such a name). But the 
adherents of this view are not by any means necessarily or chiefly 
communists. 
This whole attitude would appear to be a very damaging one for all 
the Churches, in that it undermines the traditional outlook on which 
European culture has rested for many hundreds of years -a readiness to 
accept the truth of Christianity, however badly the Christian life was 
lived in practice. Apart too from the specifically Christian side this new 
attitude is essentially destructive, in spite of the fact that it almost 
always claims to be constructive. Its very essence involves the removal 
of the rock on which the house is built, and in the long or short run this 
must mean catastrophe. 
While Waddams saw materialism in general as posing the greatest threat to 
Christianity, there seems little doubt that the Foreign Office would have 
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interpreted Vaddam's memorandum as proposing Christianity as an antidote to 
Communism. His claim that the war had not only raised the Churches into a 
leading role, but had forced people to think, "What are the things which really 
matter in life? ", and possibly re-evaluate things spiritual, was also a warning: 
These people are not necessarily Christians, but they have learnt to look 
to the Church for guidance and inspiration. If, after the war, the 
Churches do not seem to them to justify this attitude, Christianity will be 
replaced by the prophets of the new age. (19) 
Although Vaddams included all the emerging secular forces when he spoke 
of the "prophets of the new age", in the Foreign Office these were most 
commonly perceived as Communists, and Waddams in fact was effectively giving 
warning that should the Church not receive sufficient support to retain the 
elevated position it had attained during the war, then the faith currently 
residing in Christianity could be transferred to Communism. 
In order to prevent the alienation of the Church from the working classes, 
the Churches always tried to dissociate themselves from political anti- 
Communism and the traditional establishment opposition to working class 
movements. That Communism was viewed by the Church as a rival faith meant 
that the Churches were naturally anti-Communist. Theoretically this was 
confined to the spiritual sphere, but in practice it extended also to the 
political, where it manifested itself in many ways. Most Churches, and 
churchmen, were essentially conservative and as equally opposed to Communism as 
a political force as an ideological. The concern of the Churches not to be 
identified with reaction, which they feared would lose them the working class 
support they needed to promote a religious revival, meant the Churches effected 
a distinction between spiritual and political anti-Communism. In theory the 
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distinction might have been valid, but in practice it proved impossible to 
maintain. The traditional and inherent anti-Communism of the Churches proved 
impossible to suppress, even during the war when military success seemed to 
depend on the alliance with Russia. As victory grew more assured, the anti- 
Communist bias of the Churches reasserted itself ever more fiercely. 
On January 12,1944, the Christian News Letter began in the by now familar 
wartime pattern of praising Russian achievements; but the usual tempering with 
suggestive criticisms was replaced by a strident warning that while reform was 
needed at home, the Russian way meant disaster. First praising Russian 
achievements, then subtley instilling doubts about Russian intentions, the 
article went on to draw a frightening picture of despairing masses and mob 
rule, concluding with the proposition that any changes which needed to be 
instituted in the European order should be based on the Christian tradition; 
Communism could mean only annihilation: 
It is not difficult to understand that millions in Europe are 
fascinated by Russia. The astonishing vitality of the Russian people, the 
extraordinary sacrifices they make for the common cause, the remarkable 
unity which they show, the independence and skill of their foreign policy 
and propaganda, the impression made by the Russian prisoners of war and 
Russian workers, all these things have helped to change the mental picture 
which continental Europeans had of 'bolshevism'. No propaganda is 
powerful enough to succeed against such facts. 
The fascination is perhaps increased by the mystery which surrounds 
Russia. The dialectical tension and the contradictions in Soviet policy 
baffle anyone who tries to understand it, and make it impossible to arrive 
at a balanced judgement about the real significance of Russia's role in the 
present and in the future. 
But however complicated the Russian situation may be, for the 
proletarianised masses it represents something very simple: namely, a 
working alternative to their present slavery. For them Russia becomes 
increasingly the country which offers what they want most: liberty and 
social justice. 
This is true in the occupied countries, where communism plays a great 
role in the resistance movement. It is becoming increasingly true in 
Germany, where the processes of proletarianisation is going on at a 
terrifying speed and where the policy of an understanding with Russia is 
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making headway, especially, but not exclusively, in the army. Russian 
propaganda is making very clever use of this mood. The promises it makes 
seem far more concrete than anything which comes from the West. The 
possibility of a landslide towards the East would not be a great danger if 
it were certain that Russia will be a constructive element in the European 
situation. But this is by no means certain. If Russia is left alone in 
Europe, the temptation to dominate and exploit the situation will be 
strong. For the sake of the future it is essential that the Russian way 
out should not become the only way out. 
But there is more. The turning of the proletarian masses toward 
Russia is not merely based on their desire for social justice, but also on 
their despair. Their interest in Russia is to a large extent their 
interest in the overthrow of all remnants of the traditional social and 
political order. It is clear that radical changes must take place in that 
order; but they should take place on the basis of the fundamental European 
tradition which is Christian and, therefore, personalistic and anti- 
totalitarian. For Europe as a whole to adopt the solution which these 
masses consider as the Russian solution would be to commit suicide. (20) 
Fear of partisan movements and the fact that in the anticipated postwar 
chaos they might prove the only effective centres of organisation capable of 
establishing order had long been a subject of concern in the Foreign Office. (21) 
By mid-1944 fear of the partisan movements was being publicly expressed in 
Christian circles. The subject was further addressed in the Christian News 
Letter on May 31, in a discussion on the future of Europe which quoted Major- 
General Fuller, a one-time friend of Mosley and supporter of the British Union 
of Fascists: 
Whatever recovery may be possible there will be large shifts in the 
foundation of society. New classes are emerging to displace the old. 
There are wide areas where, as Major Fuller says in the New English Weekly 
"the new and rising middle-class is composed of war profiteers and black 
marketeers. Extortion, bribery, cheating and thieving are the elements of 
the new morality, consequently the honest and law-abiding go to the wall. 
Nevertheless, these thieves and extortioners are not the most powerful 
element in the new social order for they are outclassed by the partisans - 
the rising aristocracy. These are violent men, men of a new feudal order. 
To them might is unquestioned right. What they want they take. (22) 
To which the Christian News Letter added the endorsement: 
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The governing factor in the social order, as they understand it, is the 
rifle. (23) 
This attack on the partisan movement brought an angry response from 
Religion and the People, but one also of dismay as it saw that the sentiments 
expressed were not isolated phenomena but actually represented an important 
section of Church opinion: 
'Why then this cowardly abuse of men who fight? 
If the Christian News Letter were to publish an article stating that 
the British Army represented a new modern banditry which believed that 
might was right and that the governing factor in society was the rifle it 
would lose all its episcopal support and most of the rest. How then is it 
able to say that men who support the British Army and its Allies in anti- 
fascist war, the partisan forces of Europe, are of this kind? 
The answer is simple. It is that the deadly fear of the 
'Underground' that inhabits the Christian News Letter is reflected in many 
religious circles. The men who have taken arms because they feel that 
right must be supported by 'might' (even if the might is as inadequate as 
is so much badly armed partisan 'might') may demonstrate an independence 
in post-war Europe a trifle too vigorous for the Christian News 
Letter. (24) 
The Christian News Letter was the official publication of the Christian 
Frontier Council, established during the war by Dr JH Oldham CBE under the 
chairmanship of Sir Walter Moberly. The group was small and during the war 
most of its members were Under-Secretaries in the war departments, or engaged 
in Parliament or public life. One of its office holders was Kenneth Grubb, 
Controller of Overseas Propaganda in the Ministry of Information. The idea 
behind the Council, according to Grubb's autobiography, "was that the Church 
failed to influence the institutions of society because it addressed them from 
the outside. The fruitful approach was not the official pronouncements of 
Church bodies, but the work and witness of laymen and laywomen... they were on 
the frontier between the Church and the World. "(25) Religion and the People 
pointed out that the Christian News Letter was published by the Christian 
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Frontier Council which was officially linked, and reported to, the 
British Council of Churches, and observed: "Vhat it now discloses is 
more than a temporary aberration. It is symptomatic of a deep rooted 
paralysis among influential people. " 
The growing pessimism of Religion and the People as anti-Communist 
and anti-Soviet views regained ascendancy among churchmen was fully 
justified. For the sake of the war effort most leading churchmen had 
obliged the Government by speaking in favour of Russia or maintaining a 
discreet silence. When victory was assured and postwar objectives took 
priority over military ones, fear and suspicion of Russia replaced the 
previous praise and apparent understanding. In October 1944, Dr Bell, 
the Bishop of Chichester, wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury, William 
Temple, concerning a discussion with Herbert Waddams, then working for 
Religions Division and destined to be appointed Secretary of the 
influential Church of England Council on Foreign Relations: 
We discussed the Russian question generally, and I was glad to 
find that Waddams took the view that Russia is the big question mark 
over Europe; and that while it is of first class importance that the 
British and the Americans should be in full harmony with Russia in 
war and peace, nothing was gained by appeasing Russia. On the 
contrary it was of the utmost importance to say to Russia very 
plainly indeed what we objected to in a foreign policy, e. g. with 
regard to the Baltic States and Poland and Yugoslavia, and so forth. 
Russia understood strong language, and mistook politeness for 
weakness. (26) 
Despite his recognition that postwar cooperation was essential 
to a continuing peace, Bell's attitude to Russia was distinctly 
hostile and he saw that country as the priority postwar problem. 
Bell's hostiltiy was further revealed one month later at a World 
Council of Churches 'Peace Aims Group' meeting. In response to 
concern over the future of the Russian Institute at Paris, Bell 
retorted: "I would put the question this way: are the European 
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nations afraid of Russia or do they want to cooperate? In Sweden they were 
very much alarmed at the way in which Britain had fallen in love with Russia. 
People still do ask why we are friends with Russia. "(27) 
By the end of the war the growing disillusion perceptible in the pages of 
Religion and the People as clerical anti-Communism expressed itself through 
opposition to the postwar liberation and progressive movements and hostile 
gestures to the Soviet Union was fully realised with two events involving 
leading dignitaries of the Church of England. These two events occuring when 
they did, were seen as critical indicators that the Church's wartime attitude 
was not only insincere, but dictated entirely by political circumstances, as 
Religion and the People commented: 
The foreign politics of the Church of England are always worth 
watching and are often important. They are conducted in a variety of ways 
- sometimes through the visits of Bishops, sometimes through the semi- 
official 'Church of England Council for Foreign Relations. ' 
It would be difficult to deny that between the wars the foreign 
policy of Canterbury was not wholly unlike that of Downing Street. It was 
anti-Russian and anti-Communist. Even though it found some difficulty in 
following Mr Chamberlain wholeheartedly - Hitler's policy with regard to 
the churches being a great embarassment - there was no open breach and 
relatively few sermons were preached atracking the German concentration 
camps. 
The war has brought a change. As the State has found a 
rapprochement with the Kremlin so Dr Garbett has visited the Patriarch. 
The foreign policy of the Church of England is now pro-Soviet and anti- 
fascist. 
Does this come from conviction? Or is it simply the belated following 
of Downing Street? 
In considering the answer to this conundrum two recent events should 
be noted. Despite the difficulties that have arisen over the creation of a 
new Government of Poland as agreed at Crimea, it must be obvious to all 
that the days of the London Polish Government now being attacked by its 
recent premier, Mickolaycyz, are numbered. It is at this juncture that the 
secretary of the Church of England Council for Foreign Relations, Canon 
Douglas, chooses to accept at its hands the Order of Polish Restitution. 
In Greece things go from bad to worse. The agreement which ended 
the Civil War is broken to the despite of E. A. M. The Regent installs a new 
government of the right. 
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At this juncture there flies to Athens the Archbishop of York, 
bearing a message from himself and his brother of Canterbury. Friendly 
calls are, no doubt, all to the good. But was the occasion used to press 
for the release of those Greeks who fought the Germans and are now 
imprisoned contrary to the recent agreement? (28) 
The doubt evident in the questioning of the motives underlying the Archbishop's 
Greek visit were fully justified as the trip was intended to signify the British 
government's full support for the right-wing regime of Archbishop Damaskinos. 
Moreover, on his return to Britain, Garbett very deliberately reinforced British 
propaganda concerning the internal affairs of Greece. (29) Equally symbolic, and 
intentionally so, of the changing attitudes of Government and Church, was 
Douglas's acceptance of the Polish Order, as he made quite clear in a letter to 
the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
Informing Fisher that the Foreign Office approved the Polish President's 
wish to decorate himself and the other nominee, the Roman Catholic Bishop 
Matthew, Douglas revealed his belief that it would be a gesture which would 
strengthen Matthew's difficult position in the British Roman Catholic complex 
and be a sign to Moscow, "that while eager to win their trust and friendship 
and while we eschew intervention in political issues as such we are not ready 
to give them carte blanche to do what they like with other Christian religio- 
nationalities. " Douglas implied that this was equally the intent of the Foreign 
Office: "That the F. O. would not be sorry that they should receive such a hint 
is the reason, I imagine, for its approval of the Polish President's wish to 
confer an order upon Bishop Matthew and myself at this Juncture. "(30) The 
attitude of the Foreign Office was clearly an important consideration in 
Fisher's approval of Douglas's accepting the decoration. The Archbishop's 
chaplain informed Douglas that provided the Foreign Office authorities had 
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consented, then Fisher thought it was all to the good that Douglas 
accept the honour. (31) 
The early intent of the Church to be an active participant in the 
postwar world, and the nature of its participation, was clearly revealed 
in the formation and development of the Committee for the Reconstruction 
of Europe. The decision of the Church to maintain and promote the new 
and political network of relationships built up during the course, and 
because of, the war, was evident not only in Religions Division but in 
the activity of ranking churchmen. In 1943 Canon CE Raven and Dr 
Hilderbrandt formed the Christian International Service, an 
interdenominational body, aiming at the creation of an informed 
Christian opinion on international relationships and the re- 
establishment of true fellowship between Christians of all nations. 
Hilderbrandt sought the advice of Bishop Bell, ardently anti-Soviet as 
well as anti-Communist, in drafting the aims of the service. Through 
his efforts the Service became connected with the British Council of 
Churches and there eventually emerged in 1944 the Committee for the 
Reconstruction of Europe, CRE. 
The vast field of material reconstruction and the resettlement of 
displaced persons was the responsibility of UNRRA, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. CRE concerned itself with 
spiritual reconstruction and the rebuilding of Christian church life 
collaborating with the Department of Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid 
set up by the WCC in Geneva which coordinated the contributions from the 
various CRE committees existing in Britain and America and a number of 
neutral countries. 
- 74 - 
Vhile no discrimination was made between European Churches in the 
Reconstruction appeal and programme, Bishop Bell was deeply involved in 
the British venture, and his interest was directed mainly towards 
Germany. As soon as hostilities ended in May 1945, he began discussing 
with the authorities the possibility of renewing contacts with the 
German Church, pointing out the necessity of forestalling any moves by 
the Russian Communists and of employing all the latent Christian 
resources of Germany in rebuilding and re-educating the country. (32) 
Although not quite as explicit as Bishop Bell, a similar sentiment 
was more than implicit in a CRE pamphlet explaining its aims and 
appealing for help: 
YOU can share in the Christian Reconstruction of Europe. THIS IS A 
CHALLENGE TO YOU. Unless Christians everywhere realize their 
responsibilities and act together, non-Christian influences may 
shape the post-war reconstruction of the world. 
You, as a Christian, can share in combating these influences. Moral 
leadership everywhere must be strengthened and extended. 
Constructive action, inspired by faith and understanding, must be 
taken against the destructive forces now at work in Europe. 
Men have died for the peace and happiness of the world. For this we 
must live, work and pray, giving all that we have to offer, whether 
of money or of service. (33) 
The only non-Christian forces in a position to influence the shape 
of Europe were the Soviet Communists liberating Eastern Europe from the 
Nazis and the indigenous resistance movements in which Communists had 
played a major role in actively opposing Nazi occupation. The CRE 
appeal was effectively a summons to the Christian forces in Europe to 
mobilise against the Communists. 
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The anti-Soviet, anti-Communist nature of ecclesiastical 
reconstruction at the end of the war, was equally evident in the 
ecclesiastical pursuit of a peace-time role in political affairs. The 
need to counter Nazism with a coherent ideology had given the Christian 
Churches an important wartime role. In the postwar world a similar need 
was perceived with regard to Communism. Government policy to enroll all 
British institutions in their efforts to contain Communism, including 
the Trades Union Congress, made Church involvement virtually 
unavoidable. (34) Not that the Church wished to avoid an active role in 
the polical life of the nation. Its wartime experience had revealed to 
the Church how it could pursue an active political role which, without 
apparently compromising its spirituality, enhanced its power and 
influence at home and abroad. If the Church's traditional anti- 
Communism made it a natural ally of the Government, it was its postwar 
ambitions which made it a fellow combatant in opposition to the Soviet 
Union. At the end of the war, Religions Division, which was mainly 
composed of Churchmen anyway, and the Church, were equally eager to 
maintain the ecclesiastical network of communications established during 
the war and continue to expand and construct a postwar role on the 
foundations of the Church's wartime activities. 
The Church recognised that the postwar period would be one of 
distress and disorganisation, with people looking for a lead out of the 
vacuum created by the war. It foresaw tremendous opportunities for the 
renewal of Christian life, bringing hope out of chaos, and for the re- 
establishing of the Church as a viable institution in the community, 
participating in its reconstruction and revitalization. Farther afield, 
the war had revealed the international desire for a new order. The 
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Church, its own ties renewed and strengthened because of the war, was 
determined to secure its place in that new order. This was particularly 
illustrated by the attitudes within the Church of England Committee for 
Foreign Relations. This body performed the same role for the Church as 
the Foreign Office did for the State, and from its inception it had 
sought to ensure that its functions were, if not complimentary, at least 
in no way opposed to that of its secular counterpart. 
CFR's origins stretched back to the impetus given the Ecumenical 
Movement by the First World War. A Committee on Relations with Foreign 
Churches had been appointed on January 19,1926. In its report to the 
Church Assembly in October 1926, it observed that the circumstances of 
recent years had given the Church of England a prestige and position of 
influence, leading to approaches from many other Churches. The 
Committee considered it desirable to emphasise the wide reaching 
character of this intercourse, and the great importance that it must 
have for the mutual relations of different countries of Europe with one 
another. Like the Ecumenical Movement, the Committee was inspired by 
the League of Nations, which it observed was bringing the civilised 
nations of the world into much closer intercourse with one another, and 
it was certainly as important that there should be an equally determined 
attempt made to create closer spiritual union between the different 
religious bodies throughout the Christian world. (35) 
CFR superceded the Eastern Churches Committee, which was chairmanned 
by Bishop Gore before his death, coming into being on February 5,1932, 
. when the Church Assembly passed a 
resolution on the motion of the Bishop 
- of Gloucester, seconded by the Dean of Chichester, requesting the 
Archbishops of Canterbury and York to appoint a Council on the relations 
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between the Church of England and foreign Churches, with the power to 
issue such reports as was considered desirable. It was thought that in 
view of the general movement towards fuller Christian Unity in every 
part of the world and of the interest increasingly shown by many foreign 
Churches in the position of the Church of England, that the time had 
come when relations between the Church of England and these foreign 
Churches should be regarded as a concern of the whole Church and not 
only of various voluntary societies within it. A Council appointed at 
the request of the Church Assembly and in close connection with the 
Assembly could either itself authorise and arrange conferences, 
commissions or conversations between Church representatives, or be aware 
of, and interested in, such opportunities of intercourse and could issue 
reports thereon for the information of the Church. 
The proposed, Council would not be concerned with the relations of 
the Churches in the United Kingdom or in the Mission Field; nor was it 
to be regarded as removing from the Archbishop the authority and 
responsibility in such matters which properly belonged to the office he 
held. The work of the Council was largely to be done by Committees 
dealing with special branches of a subject and reporting to the whole 
Council. The Council as a whole was intended to meet but infrequently 
through the year, 
The Archbishop of Canterbury felt it better that the active members 
of the Eastern Churches Committee became a sub-committee of CFR, if they 
wished. In November 1932, Cosmo Lang asked JA Douglas to become one of 
the secretaries, urging that it would be a position of real 
importance. (36) Douglas had already developed a wide circle of contacts 
with other Churches, particularly the Orthodox. At the beginning of the 
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World War II, Douglas volunteered his services and contacts, and those 
of CFR, to the Ministry of Information. He was very concerned that 
there be an Anglican element in the Religions Division. However, 
Douglas was always careful not to compromise the suprapolitical role of 
the Church, in theory if not in practice. This was also illustrated in 
the nature of the relationship which CFR, under his guidance, developed 
with the Foreign Office. A member of the Foreign Office was invited 
onto the Council, to act in their individual capacity; but also intended 
as an unofficial liaison between the two bodies. Sir Stephen Gaselee 
was the first Foreign Office member of CFR, accepting nomination from 
Archbishop Lang in 1933. Following his death in 1943, Douglas wrote to 
Mr Perowne, explaining Gaselee's role and asking that he replace him: 
We found him a great help to us in intimating from time to time what 
would be the mind of relevant officials in the Foreign Office to 
some matters upon which the Council was called on to advise his 
Grace. His death has been a great loss to us: for we have no one to 
act as unofficial link between the Council and the Foreign 
Office. (37) 
Douglas advised Perowne that if he were willing to accept a place, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury would then write offering a place. Perowne 
consulted his Foreign Office superiors, who saw the situation as being 
entirely to their advantage, as Xr Loxley observed: 
I understand from Mr Perowne that the Foreign Office 
representative's functions are mainly to act as liaison officer 
between the Foreign Office and the Council so that the latter may be 
able to find out if its ideas and projects are in harmony with our 
policy. The Foreign Office representative may also be able at times 
to prevent the Council from going off along the wrong lines. It 
therefore seems to me to be useful that the Foreign Office should be 
represented on the Council and if Mr Perowne is willing to act I 
would be in favour of his doing so. (38) 
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On November 11,1943, William Temple officially asked Perowne to 
accept a place on CFR, and on November 15 Perowne responded with his 
acceptance of the proposal. (39) 
During the war, Foreign Office and Ministry of Information officials 
had concerned themselves very much with Church affairs, becoming active 
committee members on CFR and WCC committees. This was a situation 
Douglas sought to perpetuate and extend in the post-war period. In 
February 1945, he wrote to the new Archbishop at that time, Fisher, 
asking him to appoint public figures, peers and M. P. s, as Douglas was 
concerned to have an element with influence in secular affairs on the 
Council. Douglas viewed the matter as important, particularly in view 
of the difficult and delicate problems which he envisaged the Council 
would soon be dealing with, such as the Baltic States, Poland and the 
Balkans. (40) 
In March 1945, Douglas advised Ian White-Thompson that an overhaul 
of CFR was urgent. (41) There were many who agreed. But that overhaul 
was to deprive Douglas of the secretaryship. In a letter to the Bishop 
of Gloucester, who was retiring as Chairman of CFR, Fisher had expressed 
the necessity of Douglas continuing as Secretary because of his 
knowledge and experience: "but I now find a good deal of criticism that 
he likes to have fingers in too many pies and is inclined to intrigue 
and pull strings. "(42) It was complained that it was easy to get 
Douglas's opinion, but not that of CFR. The question of Douglas's 
retirement was raised. with him by Fisher who, acknowledging that the 
Council had largely been his creation, and been dependent upon him at 
every stage, told him that he was irreplaceable; but if he were 
intending to retire it would be better for him to go then: the end of 
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the war and the beginning of a new chapter would make it much better for 
the new secretary. (43) 
Douglas was reluctant to give up his post. He told Fisher that he 
saw the duties of CFR as analogous to the Foreign Office, to advise, not 
to interfere, and although he liked and valued his mooted successor, 
Herbert Waddams, he considered him neither ripe nor well equipped at 
present to take over the secretaryship. He suggested that Dakin, 
another potential successor to Douglas,, and Waddams become Assistant 
Secretaries to himself. (44) 
This was opposed by the Bishop of Chichester who was to become CFR's 
new chairman and wanted that the chairmanship and the Secretaryship 
should change simultaneously. (45) Bell also considered that he and 
Waddams would work well together, for significant reasons. They both 
agreed that the big question mark over Europe was Russia, as Bell 
informed William Temple as early as October 1944. (46) This attitude on 
the part of both Chairman and Secretary was of the utmost importance in 
facilitating relations between CFR and the Foreign Office in the post- 
war period. 
Bell's own appointment had initially aroused opposition within the 
Council, as there were those who feared he was not the right man and 
that he would be too inclined to rope them into his own 
enthuthiasms. (47) The Chairmanship was thus first offered to the Bishop 
of Winchester, with the Bishop of Derby as next choice should he 
refuse. (48) The Bishop of Winchester, however, insisted that Bell was 
best equipped for the job. (49) 
Bell certainly had plans for CFR. Within a week of being asked to 
accept the Chairmanship, Bell was telling the Archbishop that he wanted 
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an increased budget in view of the future role the Church of England 
would be playing. He stated that the European countries looked to 
Britain for moral leadership and the Churches looked to the Church of 
England with peculiar hope for all the encouragement and support that 
could be given. (50) Another indication of his plans for the Church was 
his desire that it employ Kenneth Grubb. 
Grubb had already in 1944 accepted the Presidency of the Church 
Missionary Society. He had considered himself of insufficiently pre- 
eminent standing, but William Temple had impressed upon him "the new 
type of competence which the Church must seek in its practicing 
laity". (51) Temple subsequently summoned Grubb again and explained to 
him that for some time after the war it would not be clear who would 
emerge from the laity with the time and the disposition to serve the 
Church actively and he urged Grubb not to limit himself to CMS but to 
accept other posts if such came his way. (52) This Grubb did; not only 
in the Church of England but also the World Council of Churches where 
Temple's views were shared by Visser It Hooft. Some years later, 
speaking of the urgent need after World War II for the Churches to 
concern themselves intelligently and seriously wih international 
affairs, It Hooft gave expression to what had then been the 
ecclesiastical perception of the new situation. With reference to 
Grubb's role in CCIA, It Hooft stated: "This could only be done if men 
could be found who had clear Christian convictions themselves and who 
had also a sufficient knowledge of international affairs to be taken 
seriously by the statesmen and the international civil servants. "(53) 
It was for just such reasons that at the beginning of February 1945 
Bell suggested Grubb as an ideal chief of staff to Fisher, adding that 
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he had been offered an Under-Secretaryship at the Foreign Office but had 
so far refused it. Bell noted that Grubb would need a pretty good 
salary, around £2000, but he was confident the Church could find that 
without difficulty. He added that Grubb was very keen on the Church of 
England. (54) 
One year later. In February 1946, Bell was still urging Fisher to 
secure a position for Grubb within the Church. To this end he sent the 
Archbishop a memorandum on Grubb, with a covering letter which noted 
that he knew Anthony Eden well and the Prime Minister. He had now been 
offered the position of Assistant Secretary General to the United 
Nations. This meant a salary of £5000 and living in the United States. 
Bell felt it would be better if Grubb remained in England and worked for 
the Church, as this would make a great difference in the influence of 
the Church. He then suggested a salary of between two and three 
thousand pounds. (55) Bell's proposal was closely followed by a 
suggestion from the Christian Frontier that Grubb be made Secretary of 
the British Council of Churches, although it was conceded that the 
salary might create opposition, especially from those with left 
tendencies, the free Churches not being used to such salaries. (56) 
Subsequent to this, Grubb wrote himself to Fisher, asking advice. 
He told the Archbishop that he regarded the United Nations position as 
meaning exile in the United States and as leading nowhere, as the 
Secretary-General's position would always be a political appointment. 
He added that he had been told that he was needed more at home in Church 
work than in America: there were opinions that Britain could recover a 
real position of spiritual leadership and there must be men who could 
work to that end. (57) Fisher himself was as keen as Bell to employ 
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Grubb. The problem was the salary. (58) Unable to afford Grubb as a 
full time employee, the Church still benefitted from his services in a 
number of capacities, including that of publicity officer to the Church 
Assembly. (59) Grubb committed himself to promoting the Church in the 
secular realm and, despite his sometimes exasperated view of 
ecclesiastical leaders and church affairs, he remained deeply involved 
with both. 
The concern of the Church to exert an influence in the international 
sphere was demonstrated by its desire to be represented on the British 
Council, an important part of the British publicity machine. In Kay 
1945 the Bishops in Egypt, the Sudan, Iran and Jerusalem, with the 
support of the Bishop of Gibraltar, urged Dr AC Craig, Secretary of the 
British Council of Churches, to take the opportunities of vacancies in 
the British Council to get in men who would exert a Christian influence: 
"Ve noted that the British Council has not always associated itself with 
the Christian Church in these lands, and that the impression often given 
is that the Council seeks to propagate British culture and civilisation 
without acknowledgement of its Christian connection. "(60) 
Craig consulted the Archbishop of Canterbury about the matter, also 
advising him that the British Council of Churches was considering adding 
to their staff Ian McMaster who they considered to have "abilities of a 
certain kind above the average". Of yet more significance was the fact 
that he worked for the Foreign Office and was in charge of the section 
of the Research Department concerned with relations with the 
Vatican. (61) 
The question of the British Council was raised unofficially with 
Grubb by the Reverend Hugh Martin. Stipulating that Grubb's name was 
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not to be quoted, Martin subsequently informed the Archbishop that the 
situation was delicate, but the British Council was being reorganized. 
The British Council was under the control of the Foreign Office and 
likely to be even more closely related in future; the Foreign Office 
official in charge was Montague Pollock. After discussing the set up, 
Martin and Grubb agreed that the best approach would be direct to the 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs through the Archbishop, rather than going 
to any subordinate or to the British Council itself. Martin stressed 
that the matter was one of high policy and change could only be secured 
by interference from a very high quarter. (62) 
Following this Fisher consulted Grubb personally, and afterwards 
advised Craig that nothing could be done until there was a new 
Government and the set up of the British Council clarified. (63) The 
episode revealed the widespread concern within Church circles generally 
both to get active Christians into positions of influence in secular 
bodies of influence and to secure the services of men of affairs, that 
the Church might exert an increased influence in the corridors of power. 
Vhat seemed not to be considered was that such a transaction would be a 
two way process, with those same people exerting influence within the 
Church for purely secular or political reasons. Moreover, while the 
Church no doubt welcomed political advice which prevented it from 
accidentally transgressing Government policy and kept it on the right 
lines, this inevitably allowed a degree of direction and control which 
compromised the Church's suprapolitical status and undermined any 
attempt it made to keep distinct spiritual anti-Communism from the 
political version. Certainly the records of CFR committee meetings 
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illustrate that lay elements whose world view was stronly secular, urged 
actions on the Church to this effect. 
In their attacks on Communism, both Primates tried to convey a 
concept of a spiritual struggle which was at once separate and above the 
political anti-Communist campaign. Moreover, they made a distinction 
between Marxian Communism and Christian Communism which hardline anti- 
Communists completely rejected, the Foreign Office Included. The 
Foreign Office early realized that religion would play an important role 
in its opposition to Communism and the Soviet Union. In the Communist 
regimes it was seen that religion was a means of reconciliation, but it 
was also the main source of keeping opposition to the new regimes alive 
and active, as the Roman Catholic Church demonstrated., The Foreign 
Office through its Missions, and with the aid of Anglican dignitaries, 
sought to establish relations with elements in the Orthodox community 
which were opposed to their new Governments. 
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arrived in Athens on April 18,1945. On April 20, Leeper informed the Foreign 
Office that, "The Regent observed to me at lunch that now he had the moral 
support of the Anglican Church he could do without my help for three days. I 
replied that this period of repose would give me time to reflect on the next 
troublesome questions to which I might have to call his non-ecclesiastical 
attention. " 
The two Archbishops had many informal talks together, in which the Regent 
impressed upon Garbett his fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union and his 
belief that it was using the Russian Church to extend its influence in the 
Balkans. The search for a solution to the problem of Russian influence was the 
subject for discussion when Garbett made a return visit to the Regent in June 
1945. Subsequently information from Garbett's visits was forwarded to the 
Prime Minister by the Foreign Office, which, Garbett was informed, was received 
with thanks as most interesting. (Minute, July 1945; FO 371 47854. The nature 
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intervention. 
4. The need of food for the villages. 
5. Intimidation still present in the remoter districts. 
6. Personally I feel we ought to remain in Greece for a long period. This 
I believe is the wish of the more responsible people. (Garbett's Travel 
Diary) 
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force as an enterprising or an enthusiastic one, ready to spend and be spent in 
the worldwide extension of the Kingdom of God. " (p 154) Grubb admitted in his 
autobigraphy to anti-clerical tendencies, and he was unable to resist inserting 
not a few patronising, although humorous, comments. On the numerous 
conferences he had to attend, Grubb remarked: "In Church government one 
constantly encounters people of great piety and virtue; few things are more 
trying to the nerves. Meeting is at best wearisome, and meeting the good 
exhausting. "(p 224) Discussing the VCC he noted: "But ecclesiastics can be 
oppressive en masse. Like manure they are pungent in a heap but beneficial 
when spread. " (p 173) Discussing Church Unity, he stated: "Fear is a more 
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Edmund Burke, oughts on the Cause of the Present Discontent, 1770) On the 
importance of right and close relations between the clergy and laity, Grubb 
added: "I do not speak of bishops because, although most devoted and able, they 
are enigmatic, and it is well to regard them with caution. If a man has a 
serious discussion with a bishop, it should not be a deux but with a witness, 
say, one's solicitor, accountant, or psychiatrist, in attendance. "(p 220) 
Grubb also commented on the two men who most wished to have him working 
for the Church. He thought Bell a great man, one of devotion and integrity to 
whom he owed much, one to be respected with regard to Church unity, but not to 
be consulted on the mission of the Church: 
He was by no means easy to work with. He was a vigorous man of peace, 
and such men like to have their own way. If he did not secure it, he 
would go off on his own, ignore his colleagues and navigate his own canoe, 
sometimes landing on the rocks. He would not scruple to take up the time 
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of very busy people with a proposal which, it was obvious, would be 
soundly defeated in the end. He would similarly initiate schemes without 
discovering that others had worked on them, or without reference to their 
findings. For George Bell the value of a proposal rested not simply on 
its merits, but on the fact that he had thought of it. (p172) 
Grubb recorded a debt of gratitude to Fisher for encouraging and helping 
him play a part in the central affairs of the Church, and recalled the 
Archbishop's early career as the youngest ever Headmaster at Repton: 
He preserved both his schoolmasterly and his masterly bearing and grasp 
to the end. He gave every appearance of enjoying such onerous tasks as 
the Church Assembly and all its business. He was rarely at a loss in the 
chair, and his rulings were prompt, clear and decisive. He readily 
controlled an awkward crisis; he could easily have settled an earthquake; 
he commanded where he could not reason. He did sometimes give the 
impression that the laity as much as the clergy were the paid servants of 
the Church and therefore bound to accept his behests. This is a small 
thing; Fisher would have risen quickly if tempestuously to the top in any 
profession or business. He communicated his mind without havering or 
ambiguity, and this is all-important when one must decide or drown. The 
forthrightness or (as I once heard it described wittily but most unfairly) 
the forthwrongness of his public statements was criticised, often by the 
same folk who grumbled that he gave no leadership. When I held office in 
the Assembly, I never had occasion to complain of lack of consultation on 
matters which concerned the House of Laity. (p 209) 
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As World War II drew to a close, fears of Russia began to reassert 
themselves in the United States, particularly where there was concern over 
Poland, as in the Roman Catholic community, and a refusal to view the issue 
within the larger context of Allied relations and pre-1939 Polish-Russian 
relations. Roosevelt realised that unless something could be done to reassure 
Catholics about Russia, his wartime concensus might collapse, isolationism would 
revive, and the Senate could even defeat plans for a United Nations, to say 
nothing of the defection of Polish-American voters from the Democratic Party. 
Already in late 1944 the Catholic Association for International Peace and the 
bishops had condemned plans for the United nations because it gave too much 
power to the Communists. During the war, partly because of domestic 
considerations, Roosevelt concentrated a great deal of effort on cultivating 
Vatican-Moscow relations. In contrast, Britain had sought to rehabilitate 
Russia's reputation among the religious by concentrating on the actual situation 
within Russia, the growing freedom of the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
religious revival of the Russian people. 
The attitude of the British, whose own history included a rejection of 
Papal interference in national affairs, was that the exclusion of the Roman 
Catholic Church from Soviet territiory did not constitute a rejection of 
Christianity. This very argument was submitted to the Pope by His Majesty's 
Minister to the Holy See. The latter had been urging the Pope "most earnestly 
and strongly not to condemn the Russians, at any rate by name. For I said this 
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would have the worst possible effect in Moscow, and only slightly less 
unfavourable repercussions in London, and probably Washington. " Osborne bluntly 
told the Pope that, "A specific denunciation of alleged Russian misdeeds would 
be compared with the absence of any specific condemnation of German crimes 
against the populations of the Occupied Countries. " Osborne had no information 
on Russian conduct in Eastern Europe. "but I was quite certain that nothing the 
Russians might do could approach the atrocities committed by the Germans in 
many lands. To this His Holiness did not demur. "(l) 
The Pope went on to talk of Bolshevist atheism and the repression of the 
Catholic Church in Russia, where, he said, there was only one Catholic priest 
left, an American father at Moscow. Osborne responded with the fact that the 
Russian Orthodox Church would be the representative of Christianity in Russia, 
that it must be accepted as such, and that the government's preference for the 
Orthodox faith rather than the Catholic did not indicate atheism: 
I reminded him of the recent official revival of the Orthodox Russian 
Church and said that this constituted an official repudiation of the 
atheism plank in the Constitution, even if, failing proof to the contrary, 
it might by some be regarded as only a temporary political expedient. But 
I did not disguise from him that I anticipated that, whatever latitude or 
encouragement were given to the Orthodox Church in Russia, the Catholic 
Church would not be given similar sanction. Religion in Russia was to be, 
like everything else, of a strictly nationalist brand. But, I pointed out, 
a distinction must be drawn between the rejection and the oppression of 
Christianity and of the Catholic Church. The latter was not the sole 
representative of Christianity, and if a country, or a Government, elected 
to discourage the Catholic faith in favour of its own particular brand of 
Christianity, this was not at all to foster atheism. The Pope took this 
argument, on which I insisted strongly, quite well. (2) 
This was the course of action England had followed during the Reformation of 
Henry VIII. While the fact that British history was the discouragement of the 
Catholic faith in favour of its own national brand of Christianity possibly 
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influenced Osborne, the fact that a rapprochement between the Vatican and 
Moscow would not necessarily be in British interests certainly did. 
While a working cooperative relationship between Moscow and Rome, which 
would necessarily affect the balance of power, might not prove beneficial to 
British interests, a nationalist church supporting the Communist regime was an 
equally threatening development. The potential of a resurgent Panslavism was 
viewed with some concern by both Protestant and Catholic churchmen during the 
war itself. An article in the Tablet in September 1943 articulated the Catholic 
fear of Panslavism. Arguing that it would be impossible to achieve any 
understanding among Slav people under Russian presidency so long as the 
Russian church was thrust into the background by an official atheism of 
Germano-Hebrew origin, " the article went on to predict incalculable consequences 
should the church become allied with the state: 
We should do well to recognise that the radical changes which 
Russian Communist ideology has undergone, and its transformation into a 
fiery national patriotism, have narrowed the gulf separating the messianic 
spirit of Communism from the messianic spirit of the Orthodox Church. The 
tradition of "Holy Russia" with an inspired mission toward mankind is 
ancient and ingrained. Under the stress of some intense emotion such as 
that of the present moment the Orthodox conception of a messianic Russia 
might well merge with the Marxist conception of a messianic proletariat, 
effecting a fusion of ideas the consequences of which would be 
incalculable. In the compressed space of twenty-five years the Russian 
Communist Party has passsed through a process of schism and reform 
resembling that experienced by the Church only over a period of centuries, 
but the processes have been similar. The "Old Bolsheviks" who 
anathematised the reformer Stalin in 1936 corresponded exactly to the "Old 
Believers" who anathematised the reformer Nikon in 1666. The extreme self- 
abasement and immolation of the schismatics of 1936 were an expression of 
morbid religious, fanaticism of which Church history provides many 
instances. The canonisation of Lenin, the worship of Stalin as a near 
divinity (which Beatrice and Sydney Webb regarded as a grave 
psychological danger) are significant facts with which we have to reckon. 
To all intents and purposes Stalin occupies today the position as the 
former Tsars, and it is in this capacity that he enthrones or deposes 
Patriarchs. Who knows but that we may yet see the erstwhile seminarist of 
Tiflis receiving blessing at the hands of the Patriarch he has created? It 
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would not be more fantastic than many other happenings in Russia since 
1917. (3) 
Protestant concern was voiced by the secretary of the Church of England 
Council on Foreign Relations, Canon Douglas, an expert on the Orthodox Churches 
in Eastern Europe and an intimate of many of their leaders. Douglas wrote to 
the Archbishop of York in August 1943, shortly before his departure to visit 
the Patriarch of the Russian Church, a lengthy missive discussing "the whole 
problem of British relations with U. S. S. R. and of the relations of the Russian 
Church with the regime of the U. S. S. R. ": 
The most difficult of all problems is the growing panslavism of 
U. S. S. R. Panslavism has been in Russia since Russia began - c/o the 
Messianic vision that Russia is to remodel the world crusade fashion which 
lies behind 'Moscow the Third Rome. ' There are very definite signs that 
Stalin is envisaged as realising the dream of Ivan the Terrible of his 
Tsardom - Peter the Great, Katharine, Nicolas 1st etc. The new Soviet 
Socialist Russia has the Messianic vision to make the world what it should 
be. Unless I am mistaken, this type of panslavism is the dynamic in the 
idealist U. S. S. R. weltanschauung of today. It will appeal in a way to the 
Orthodox Russian who accepts Communism and its allure will make him, 
enthuthiastic and will have an effect upon non-Communist Russian Orthodox. 
Its scope probably at present very definitely includes not only Orthodox 
Balkan religio-nationalists (Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Greeks) but the 
Latin Poles and Czechs and Croats etc: and it has its eye on 
Constantinople. 
If the above is correct, at least it is what even before the war 
showed forth such as Abp Stefan of Sofia and Micolai Velimirovic 
anticipated: and without precisioning this detail or the other the Poles 
and Serbs are convinced that the U. S. S. R. is going out for panslavism. 
For such a programme the influence of the Orthodox Church might be a 
very important factor. The Turks here appear to me to be hugely suspicious 
of the rapprochement of the U. S. S. R. regime with the Russian Church. (4) 
Douglas lamented to Garbett that, "The English layman in general and our 
F. O. people in particular scarcely give a thought to the power and the influence 
of Orthodoxy as a religio-nationality in Russia. " In fact the'Foreign Office had 
already been alerted to the threat of panslavism by an informant passing on the 
views of "three shrewd continental observers. " Although the Foreign Office 
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sought to conceal the identity of their informant, telling the Ministry that "no 
clue should be given as to authorship, " the style and substance of the letter, 
particularly the concern for the future of Germany and the fear of Communist 
control of Europe after the war, strongly suggest George Bell, the Bishop of 
Chichester. Apart from the special interest in Germany, the letter represented 
certain convictions common to Bell and other clergymen of his ilk who saw the 
need for change but feared revolution. Despite their recognition that the Church 
had betrayed the social content of the Gospel, and their deep desire to see a 
new and more just society, these same clergy were, traditionally and bitterly 
anti-Communist and opposed any reforms, and certainly any new order, in which 
there was any hint of Communism. 
Following the Anglo-Soviet alliance, Bell had hastily returned from a trip 
to Europe expressing apprehension and misgivings about the SU. The fact that 
Bell's attitude toward Germany made him a figure of some controversy during the 
war, and that the Government did not want clerical warnings undermining the 
Anglo-Soviet alliance at that juncture, would make disclosure of him as a 
Foreign Office source unwise should he have been the one responsible for 
proclaiming panslavism as "the real menace of the future. " 
Relating the fears of three "informed" observers of Russia, the unnamed 
source stated: 
All three men are gravely concerned about the Slav peril. One of them 
suggests that a further reason why the disarmament sine die of Germany is 
foolish is that Hitler is uniting the Slav countries against him as 
Napoleon united Germany and Italy (to our present sorrow), and that pan- 
Slavism is the real menace of the future. The future in question may not 
be so very far distant, as Communism is very active underground in all the 
Balkan countries (not to mention France, Germany and Switzerland). (5) 
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Throughout the war the Foreign Office Research Department, hereafter, 
referred to as F. O. R. D., maintained careful observation of the progress of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in its relations with the Soviet regime and with its 
sister Orthodox churches. Indications that it was attempting to reforge old 
links with other Orthodox communities were monitored, recorded and analysed. In 
the conditions of the German occupation there could clearly be no significant 
responses from the beleaguered Orthodox churches, yet any minor manifestation 
of support from them for the Russian Church was duly noted. When the Soviet 
government officially recognised the Russian Orthodox Church, detailed attention 
was focused on the Orthodox communities around the world. The Foreign Office 
Research Department, F. O. R. D., regarded the calling of a Sobor (assembly) of 
Bishops to elect a Patriarch and set up a Holy Synod as politically significant 
and the world-wide response generated was meticulously scrutinised. 
At that time it was a move generally welcomed by the other Allies who 
wanted Russia to assume a more tolerant attitude toward religion. The Axis on 
the other hand sought to discredit the move and F. O. R. D. noted that German 
sources were "at pains to dig up some pronouncements from obscure Serb priests 
to the effect that the Soviets were trying to practice a piece of sly deception 
on God himself. "(6) F. O. R. D. observed that the move had disturbed the 
Roumanians, with the press genuinely anticipating a resulting spread of Soviet 
influence in the Balkans. F. O. R. D. quoted two Roumanian publications: Viata 
which took the line that Stalin was out to convince the public that Russia was 
not a danger to the world, and, like other nations, had religious, moral and 
social sentiments, but pointed out that it was not so much Bolshevism that the 
European nations feared as Russian imperialism; and Curentul which stated: 
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"Panorthodoxy, with a judicious admixture of Panslavism, even if it has no 
decisive success, will at any rate disarm the resistance of Orthodox 
believers. " (7) 
The possibility that the Soviet Government intended to use the Church as a 
means of extending their influence in the Middle East was discussed in a 
despatch from Cairo by Mr Shone. (8) The Foreign Office was certainly concerned 
about the possible use of the Orthodox Church to spread Soviet influence. 
During the most intense years of the Cold War, when the Russian Church gave its 
support to the Communist peace campaign, the British Foreign Office 
unequivocally proclaimed that Church a tool of the Soviet government, a servant 
of Russian foreign policy rather than of the Lord. Yet in the immediate 
postwar situation Foreign Office attitudes toward the Russian Church 
vacillitated considerably and it was clearly unsure whether to view it as a 
potential ally of the Russian state or a potential focus for dissent against it. 
Aware of the many possibilities for exploiting religious susceptibilities and 
affiliations in the ideological chaos of the postwar world, where the churches 
remained major sources of cohesion and comfort, and fully conscious of its own 
manipulation of these institutions and the people within them, the Foreign 
Office was understandably suspicious of the Russian Church's relationship with 
the Soviet regime. 
In contradiction to this suspicion stood two factors. Firstly, the 
traditional opposition of Christianity to Communism made the Church the most 
natural centre for organised opposition to the Soviet regime. Secondly, for the 
Communist government to use the Church would be a contradiction which would 
reflect badly on the Marxian principles on which its authority was founded. 
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However, the Foreign Office knew only too well that neither ecclesiastical nor 
secular authorities were immune from compromise. The Foreign Office dilemma 
was assessing whether the Russian Church would become the focus for the 
dissident elements within the Soviet Union, or a vehicle for Soviet policies, 
attracting believers and reconciling the discontent. 
Observers acknowledged that the re-establishing of its position in the 
Orthodox community of Churches was a legitimate and understandable activity on 
the part of the Russian Church. Visiting British ecclesiastics noted the sincere 
desire of the Russian hierarchy to form a relationship with the Church of 
England and recognised their genuine need to have contact with those sister 
Churches from which it had been excluded for so long. Nonetheless, whether it 
was an incidental corollary or a deliberate plan, the resumption by the Russian 
Church of an active role in the life of the nation was an asset to the 
Communist regime both internally and externally. Foreign Office reservations 
about the Russian Church were exacerbated further by its transactions in the 
international domain, although the sending and receiving of ecclesiastical 
dignitaries, the exchange of clerical delegations, the expressions of friendship 
and support and the moving towards unity with sister Orthodox Churches, were 
no different in substance or intent from the activities pursued by the western 
Churches, particualrly the Church of England. One aspect of this ecclesiastical 
diplomacy particularly relevant to the postwar situation, was that when in May 
1945 the Russian Patriarch Alexei visited the heads of the Orthodox Churches, 
he went to Teheran, Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem and Cairo. Significantly, he did 
not go to Greece. Stalin and Churchill had made a wartime agreement that 
Greece was to be in the British sphere of influence. Instead, the Archbishop of 
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York went to Greece, part of an exercise intended to reinforce the political 
power of the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, a British protege. 
Initially there was uncertainty in the Foreign Office as to whether the 
Russian Church was responding to ecclesiastical considerations or Government 
pressure in its resumption of an active role in international Orthodox affairs 
and the seeking of reconciliation with religious communities of dissident 
emigres. (9) The British Embassy in Moscow, however, had little esteem for the 
Russian Church and always viewed its activities from a political perspective. 
When in the summer of 1945 the Foreign Office enquired from the Eastern 
embassies what were their views on the rejuvenation of the Greek Patriarchate 
at Constantinople, the Moscow Embassy made explicit the political role which it 
perceived the Russian Church to have assumed: 
While there is no doubt that the Orthodox religion in this country is 
still a living and independent force, which the Soviet Government failed to 
destroy, the present working arrangements certainly provide for the 
traditional subordination of the Russian Church in all matters of foreign 
policy to the interests of the State. The Soviet Government must be well 
aware of the important role which the Orthodox Church plays throughout 
South Eastern Europe and in the Levant, and although of course "democratic 
forces, " in the Soviet sense of the word are those to which Moscow appeals 
in the first place, the Soviet Government are most unlikely to ignore the 
possibility of influencing opinion through religious channels likewise. As 
the new Syrian Minister, who was in Syria during Patriarch Aleksei's (sic) 
visit, noticed when calling on him here, His Beatitude cuts a far greater 
figure abroad than at home. The prestige abroad of the Russian Church as 
the biggest of all Orthodox churches is certainly being fostered in this 
and other ways, such as the successive visits of prelates from other 
Orthodox countries which have been going on ever since the Grand Assembly 
for Aleksei's enthronement in February. 
It therefore seems unlikely that Soviet foreign policy will overlook 
the possibilities of the Patriarchate at Constantinople. (10) 
The Embassy remarked that the Russian press had given no indication of 
the line that the Church might take, it doubted, however, that the Government 
would think it good tactics to bring all the Orthodox Churches under the wing 
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of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Embassy considered that the Government would 
rather rely on "the traditional Communist technique" of infiltration, with the 
aim of ensuring that the present Patriarch should be succeeded by someone who 
enjoyed their confidence. The Patriarchate could then be used to combat 
opposition to the SU throughout the Orthodox world. The embassy was wary of 
the proposals which had been put forward for counter-action, opposing a scheme 
outlined by the Athens chancery which it predicted would mean a collision with 
the Russians, "and on present showing Moscow would probably come out of it 
better than Athens. " Moscow advised letting events take their course, confident 
that the hand of the Soviet Government would prove sufficiently conspicuous to 
prevent effective influence being established: 
Closer contact between the Moscow Patriarchate and the other Patriarchates 
is an inevitable development; and while we should certainly watch it 
carefully and remember that the Moscow Patriarchate is in effect an organ 
of the Soviet Government, it would we think be bad tactics for us to 
openly stand out against it. The Moscow Patriarchate has its weaknesses 
and shortcomings and these will become increasingly evident to the 
Orthodox Churches of South Eastern Europe and the Levant as contacts 
increase. We think we can leave it to them to prevent undue Russian 
penetration, without ourselves encouraging a direct conflict between our 
own proteges in Athens and possibly Istanbul and the proteges of the 
Soviet Government. (11) 
This advice was to prove entirely superfluous as the Foreign Office did all it 
could, albeit indirectly and clandestinely, to promote ecclesiastic opposition 
within the Orthodox Churches to Russian influence, while the Americans for their 
part directly promoted an Orthodox opposition to the Russian Church much in the 
same way as had Hitler in preparation for his invasion of Russia. 
The warnings about the Russian Church were circulated to other British 
embassies around the world. In August 1945 the Foreign Office informed the 
British Consulate in Yew York that the dominant note in reports from all 
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Moscow missions established a coincidence of interest between the Soviet state 
and the Russian Church. This was defined as: 
a) closer relations with the Slav nations; 
b) the spread of Soviet influence in the Near and Middle East; 
c) a design to put pressure on Turkey to restore the former prestige and 
dignity of the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (including the 
return of Santa Sophia); 
d) the proposal to call as soon as possible an Oecumenical Council of all 
"freedom loving Christians"; 
e) the reconciliation with the Moscow Patriarchate of the dissident 
Russian Orthodox communities in exile; 
f) and exposure of the alleged relationship between the Catholic Church 
and Fascism. (12) 
The Foreign Office continued its surveillance of the Russian Church, 
maintaining a watchful eye on developments in Asia, particularly India, and the 
Americas, particularly the USA. Although the Moscow Embassy was unable to 
furnish the Foreign Office with definitive proof that the Patriarch and his 
clerical colleagues were acting as agents of the Communist regime, its hostile 
reports fuelled suspicion. Responding to a May 1948 article in the Journal of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, entitled 'Heritage of the Apostle Thomas' on the 
Christian Church in India, the embassy declared it impossible not to suspect 
the "impartiality" of the Moscow Patriarchate's love for its little sister in 
India. It concluded that the establishment of close relations between the Church 
of St Thomas and the "Russian dominated Orthodox Church" would be a useful 
channel for the penetration of Russian influence into India. (13) 
An area of special concern to the Foreign Office was the US where wartime 
enthuthiasm for Russia had given an extra impetus to the potential 
reconciliation of the Russian Orthodox Church in America with the Russian 
Patriarchate. This was regarded with foreboding by the Foreign Office which in 
the immediate postwar period saw the extension of any Russian influence in that 
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vicinity as alarming. In the early postwar period, and even before the war had 
ended, the Foreign Office feared that the US might form a working relationship 
with the SU, and saw its task as leading America into an opposition to the SU 
which would safeguard Europe, and the British Empire, from potential Russian 
domination. The British had an ally in the American Episcopal Church which was 
equally suspicious of the Russian Church, taking a very low view of Russian 
activities in Yugoslavia and the Balkans generally and tending to fear the 
worst, particularly as most Orthodox communities were destitute and it was 
feared that any offer by the Russians to underwrite them would be gratefully 
accepted. 
The American Episcopal Church facilitated British observation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in the US. In April 1945 a Canon Vest from the 
Episcopalian Church provided the British Consulate in New York with 
confidential documents of a meeting between the Advisory Council on Foreign 
Relations of the Protestant Episcopal Church and Metropolitan Benjamin, the Head 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in the US. These revealed that while the Russian 
Church in America was only prepared to return to the Mother Russian Church on 
its own terms, it was "Genuinely desirous of doing so. "(14) This desire for 
reconciliation received further confirmation in October 1945 when the New York 
consulate sought information about the progress of the negotiations between the 
two Churches from a man named Gregorieff, the son of a former imperial Russian 
diplomat then attached to an Orthodox theological seminary in New York. He 
stated that the American bishops wanted reunion for religious reasons and would 
welcome it whole heartedly if they could be sure that there were no political 
strings attached. (15) Despite all indications pointing the other way in 
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Gregorieff's opinion, he thought that the American Orthodox community would fall 
into line if only they were allowed to keep at least the outward appearance of 
autonomy. 
The movement towards reconciliation continued with new prospects emerging 
from the Cleveland Synod of November 26 to 29 1946, where the Ecclesiastical 
Assembly recognised the Patriarch of Moscow as, its spiritual head, voting 187 
to 61 to retain the new allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchy and renouncing its 
previous allegiance to the anti-Soviet Karlovitz Council, while at the same time 
preserving Amercican ecclesiastical autonomy and administrative independence. 
Details were to be agreed between the Metropolitan Theophilus of San Francisco 
and Metropolitan Gregory of Leningrad and Novgorod. (16) Shortly after this the 
Patriarch of Moscow cabled the Metropolitan Council of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in America, rescinding the degree of suspension imposed some ten years 
previously, and agreeing in principle to the request for autonomy. (17) The 
deteriorating relations between the US and the SU, however, combined with 
mounting American anti-Communism, clearly had an effect on the delicate 
negotiations. Prior to Metropolitan Gregory's arrival there was some 
controversy as to the purpose of his visit. Mgr Fulton J Sheen, Professor of 
Philosophy in the Roman Catholic University of Washington, charged the Russian 
prelate with being a "professor of atheism at the Soviet Atheistic College" and 
his visit "an attempt to win over the Russian Orthodox Church in the United 
States for Stalin. "(18) 
In mid-November 1947 the Metropolitan Gregory left the US without having 
been able to bring about the unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
America with that of Moscow, bringing it under the hegemony of the Moscow 
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Patriarch. The main stumbling block had been the insistence of the Metropolitan 
Theophilus of San Francisco upon the independent appointment of American 
bishops. The Metropolitan Gregory stated on the eve of his departure: "The 
American bishops want complete freedom in the matter of the appointment of 
bishops and also demand that their Council of Bishops should constitute a 
supreme tribunal. " He added that influences antagonistic to the U. S. S. R. had 
prevented negotiations from reaching a satisfactory conclusion. (19) The 
Metropolitan Theophilus in a rare public statement confirmed that the schism in 
the Church remained as wide as ever and asserted that the Orthodox Church in 
Russia had sought to use the Orthodox Church in America "as an instrument for 
Communist propaganda and espionage, " adding that, "the words of members of the 
Church cannot be trusted. "(20) 
It was with evident satisfaction that the British Ambassador in 
Washington reported to the Foreign Secretary that the prospects of 
reconciliation between the Russian and American Orthodox Churches had been 
effaced by "the independent and anti-communist attitude of the Metropolitan 
Theophilus, which appears to have the support of Archbishop Leonty of Chicago 
and other American bishops. " Halifax was pleased to inform Bevin that: "The 
possibility of increased Soviet influence over the great majority of the 
Orthodox communicants in this country, who are alleged to number over one 
million, thus seems to have been eliminated for the present. "(21) 
By the time the negotiations took place the chances of their reaching a 
successful conclusion in the hardening Cold War atmosphere were remote. 
Moreover, the chief negotiator on the American side, the Metropolitan 
Theophilus, was deeply involved in American sponsored opposition to the Russian 
- 114 - 
Orthodox Church. Shortly after the conclusion of the war, several Russian 
prelates abroad who refused to obey the Patriarch of Moscow met in Munich in 
the American zone of Germany. Twenty-six bishops were present or represented. 
The leader of the group, Metropolitan Anastasius, presided. These bishops issued 
a declaration which stated their belief that Patriarch Alexei was a willing tool 
of the Godless state and any obedience to him was pronounced impossible for 
free and conscientious men. Amongst those who signed the declaration were two 
recently consecrated bishops, Alexander Lovcki, administrator of the Orthodox 
chapels in the D. P. 's camps in the American zone; and Nathaniel Lvov, a similar 
administrator in the British zone. This same year, 1946, well prior to his 
critical negotiations with Metropolitan Gregory, Metropolitan Theophilus, 
according to the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Vitalius, the Munich synod's 
representative in the USA, tried to persuade Metropolitan Anastasius to retire 
and hand over all the Russian parishes abroad to him. Anastasius refused. (22) 
Analysing the make-up of the group and its implications, Serge Bolshakoff, 
a Russian emigre living in England and an expert on the Orthodox Church, noted 
in his monthly Bulletin, a commentary on religious affairs, that: 
Besides these refugees who have no regularly constituted dioceses and 
who fled from the Red Army for reasons well known to those who know 
their war history, this Declaration will certainly be approved by those 
Russian prelates in the USA, Canada, Brazil and China, who support 
Metropolitan Anastasius. They are eight in North America, three in China 
and one in Brazil. All these prelates and their clergy are irreconcilably 
opposed to the Soviet regime and everything it implies. This group is 
large and probably constitutes the majority of the Russians abroad. Its 
bulk lies in the D. P. camps and in America, where anti-Sovietism is 
growing fast. (23) 
When the Orthodox Church in the US rejected the conditions offered them by 
the Russian Patriarch, Bolshakoff observed that the American hierarchy were 
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moving to assume the leadership of the anti-Patriarch churchmen abroad and to 
replace in that respect the Metropolitan Anastasius and his Munich Synod which 
lacked funds, territory and influence. Although in 1946 Anastasius had resisted 
the attempts of Theophilus to have him retire and pass to him the Russian 
parishes abroad, it made little difference. The Japanese Orthodox Church had in 
1946 been unable to enter into contact with the Russian Patriarch because of 
the American authorities opposition, and it was passed into the jurisdiction of 
Theophilus. In 1947 the Orthodox Latvian Bishop of Riga, John, with his clergy 
and laity in Germany, requested Theophilus to receive them into his 
jurisdiction, prior even to their arrival in America. Subsequently a good many 
clergy and laity abroad looked towards Theophilus as their Primate. 
Not unnaturally Theophilus enjoyed American Roman Catholic support for his 
acts. The Lamp, a well known American Catholic monthly, stated in its January 
1948 issue: "The opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church in Korth America to 
obeisance to a Soviet controlled Patriarch of Moscow deserves our sympathy and 
praise, and our hope that ultimately this body may seek its salvation within 
the portals ever held wide open for its entrance. "(24) 
Troubles similar to those of the American Russian Orthodox Church 
confronted other Orthodox groups in America, encouraged by America's 
predilection for supporting dissident clergy hostile to the East European 
Communist regimes. The fact that these clerics had often supported the Nazis 
did not deter the Americans, although it outraged many others. Under the 
heading "The Whereabouts of a Traitor", Religion and the People revealed a 
similar situation developing in the American zone with Ukranian Orthodox as had 
happened with the Karlovci Council: 
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It will be remembered that when Hitler invaded the Ukraine, the 
Archbishop Polikarp Sikorski attacked both the Soviet Government and the 
Orthodox Church, called on the people to work for Hitler who, he said, was 
going to give them religious liberty, and established a Ukranian 
Autocephalous Church. Polikarp Sikorski is now running his autocephalous 
church, composed mainly of D. P. s from Munich, in the American Zone. He 
claims the support of twelve Bishops, 400 clergy and 15,000 laity. The 
Americans have provided buildings, and Polikarp has been able to open a 
Theological College and a Ukranian Institute and to establish 
publications. (25) 
One other dissident community the British and the Americans sought to keep in 
active opposition to the Russian Church was the Paris Theological Seminary. 
Following a course very similar to that of their Orthodox brethren in America, 
the Russian emigres in Paris in the immediate aftermath of the war seemed 
likely to return to the allegiance with Moscow and an Exarch was appointed by 
the Russian Patriarch. A revolt in the right-wing of the Paris emigres, who 
refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarch, was supported by 
the Patriarch of Constantinople, a British protege, who appointed the leader of 
the dissidents as his own Exarch for the parishes in Western Europe. (26) This 
inevitably put Moscow and Constantinople in direct conflict. Another Orthodox 
Church which did not return to the Moscow obedience was that of Finland, which 
also established relations with Constantinople. (27) 
The Foreign Office did not only use its proteges in the Orthodox Church to 
ferment opposition to the Russian Church, it used its own established Church. 
Moreover, at a time when the Foreign Office and the Church of England were both 
distancing themselves from the Vatican publicly, the Foreign Office used the 
Anglican Church to promote relations between the Orthodox Churches and the 
Roman Catholic Church in Eastern Europe with the intention of creating a 
powerful religious alliance working against the Communst regimes. 
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Not long after the dissident Russian Orthodox bishops in opposition to 
Moscow met in Munich, the Bishop of Hereford, Dr Parsons, paid an official visit 
to the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia with which the Church of England was in 
friendly relations. Dr Parsons was accompanied by the Rev Herbert Waddams, now 
secretary of the Church of England Council of Foreign Relations and very much 
involved in promoting Protestant ecumenicity through the World Council of 
Churches. During the war, Waddams had stressed the importance of postwar 
cooperation between Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholics. Waddams was 
firmly committed to the belief that political objectives were closely related to 
religious beliefs and that they should cooperate and be two aspects of the same 
activity. To ensure the development of this type of working relationship, 
Vaddams advocated that the Churches should immediately seize any chance that 
occurred and, moreover, it was of course "vital that the main Christian bodies 
should act together, and that they should have an agreed course of action... The 
World Council of Churches provides for a certain amount of practical joint 
action on the part of the Protestant world, but of course in a matter of this 
kind the cooperation of Roman Catholics and Orthodox in an official capacity is 
essential. If anything is to be done on a really useful scale the Vatican will 
have to be consulted and its active support will be a sine qua non of 
success. " (28) 
In the early postwar period the association of the Vatican with fascism 
and reaction made it unwise for a Church such as the Church of England, which 
was trying to cultivate popular support among the working classes, to seem to 
be openly collaborating against Russia. In Yugoslavia where the Catholic Church 
had been seriously implicated in the forced conversions and massacre of 
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thousands of Orthodox believers during the war, open collaboration with that 
Church of any sort was impossible. The only form of collaboration Waddams could 
possibly hope to promote at that time would necessarily have to be clandestine, 
as seems undoubtedly to have been the intent of the Yugoslav visit. In his 
report on the bishop's visit, George Clutton advised the Foreign Secretary that 
"both Dr Parsons and Monsignor Hurley, the Regent of the Apostolic Munciature 
at Belgrade, expressed the desire to meet each other in order not merely to 
exchange courtesies but to share views regarding the religious situation in this 
country. "(29) 
According to a confidential report submitted by Glutton to Bevin, the 
Bishop of Hereford's visit had been intended to have no political significance 
of any kind. The purpose of the Archbishop of Canterbury in sending the Bishop 
to Yugoslavia was solely to renew the ties of friendship which existed before 
the war between the Anglican and the Serb Orthodox Churches. Relations with 
the Acting Patriarch had been strengthened during the course of the war when 
the Foreign Office had in 1944 facilitated the sending of a "wisely worded" 
message from the Archbishop of York. Even before the Bishop's departure from 
England, however, it became clear that political considerations would inevitably 
be significant: 
It became clear, however, even before the Bishop's arrival, that his visit 
might not be entirely without political implication. The Yugoslav 
Government had, early in April, readily expressed their agreement to the 
bishop's visit. On Easter Sunday, however, the Synod of the Serbian Church 
issued a Pastoral Letter in terms distinctly critical of the Government... 
it raised possibilities of an open breach between the Church and the 
Government, and seems to have caused the latter to reconsider their 
approval of the bishop's visit... At the same time the office of the 
Patriarchate let fall pretty broad hints that the bishop's arrival would 
occasion demonstrations of pro-British sentiment. (30) 
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Despite the sensitivity of the situation the British authorities determined 
to proceed with the visit, and the British Embassy in Yugoslavia applied 
repeated pressure to the by then reluctant Yugoslav administration "to secure 
from them a statement that no inconvenience would be caused by the 
postponement of the bishop's visit from the 10th to the 24th of May. "(31) 
Clutton's report indicated that the "very impressive demonstration which must 
have been extremely unwelcome to the Yugoslav Government, " had been, if not 
organised at least welcomed by the Serb Orthodox Church which clearly relished 
the prospect of political martyrdom: "The Acting Patriarch was indeed 
confidently and cheerfully predicting that he and most of his clergy would be 
arrested, but probably not until the bishop had departed. " Clutton was himself 
well pleased with events, assessing the visit as a "resounding success... The 
visit demonstrated beyond any doubt that the extreme pro-British feeling of the 
great mass of the Yugoslav people continues to survive the consistent anti- 
British propaganda of the Yugoslav Government... At least the visit must have 
given the Yugoslav Government cause to realise that in following an anti- 
British policy they are acting in flat contradiction to the wishes of the 
Yugoslav people. " 
Glutton arranged for the Bishop of Hereford to meet the Apostolic Nuncio 
on the "neutral ground" of the embassy, expressing concern over the possible 
reaction of the bishop's host, the Acting Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church, 
and the possibility of a political and undesirable interpretation by the 
Yugoslav authorities should they learn about such a meeting. While Parsons 
concealed the meeting from the' Yugoslav authorities, he made a point of telling 
the Patriarch that it was to take place, as Clutton informed Bevin: 
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Dr Parsons felt bound to inform the Acting Patriarch of this meeting 
and the reactions of the Metropolitan Joseph were interesting. He was 
extremely pleased at the idea, but begged Dr Parsons to warn Bishop Hurley 
that all his movements and every activity of the Munciature were being 
watched by the secret police. He then said that when Bishop Sergei of 
Kirovgorod had visited Yugoslavia he had brought with him a message from 
the Patriarch of Moscow expressing his wish that the Serbian Church 
should associate itself with the Russian Church in denouncing the Catholic 
Church. The Metropolitan would, however, have nothing to do with such a 
proposal and informed Bishop Sergei that the Serbian Church, having lived 
side by side with the Catholic Church for centuries, knew what the 
Catholic Church stood for, whereas the Russian Church knew nothing 
whatsoever about the matter. 
More interesting still, the Metropolitan informed Dr Parsons that 
what the Yugoslav Government feared most was a rapprochement or coalition 
between the Orthodox and Catholic churches. All their efforts were 
directed on keeping these two powerful influences in Yugoslav life apart. 
At present such a coalition was not practical politics, but he, the 
Metropolitan, had the matter well in mind, and when the time was ripe he 
would take the necessary action. (32) 
Glutton, fully aware of the inherent political repercussions of the Patriarch's 
words, noted in this same report that: "These remarks reached me at the same 
time as a confidential report from His Majesty's Consul at Sarajevo in which 
extremely circumstantial details were given of an underground movement in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina with connections in Zagreb and Belgrade for the 
formation of a coalition of representatives of the Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem 
Churches. The aim of the combination was to force a new general election in an 
attempt to obtain a different and non-communist regime. " This particular 
report was being sent under a separate cover, while the despatch about Parson's 
negotiations was being sent to the British missions at Prague, Moscow and the 
Holy See, as well as the Foreign Office. 
The political importance of these religious negotiations to the Foreign 
Office was indicated not only by the presence and participation of Waddams, but 
also by the fact that his subsequent report on the proceedings was given a "top 
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secret" designation within the Foreign Office. Waddams' report was more 
detailed than that of Clutton, illustrating the leading role which he had played 
in the talks: 
After lunch we had a long talk with Joseph with Father Lukovic as 
interpreter. We discussed three main topics, the Russians, the Roman 
Catholics and relation of the Orthodox to the political situation. 
With regard to the Russians he said that Bishop Sergei had come with 
a proposal that the Serb Orthodox Church should join the Russian in a 
campaign against the Roman Catholics. They had been refused... the 
Metropolitan had told him to his face that it was impertinence for his to 
try to teach the Serbs how to deal with Roman Catholics... 
The Metropolitan informed us that although nothing had been said 
openly, there was a campaign for the submission of the Serb Orthodox 
Church to Moscow. The Serb Church would regard this as a form of Papalism 
and would not consent to anything of the kind... 
The Metropolitan expressed his doubts as to what the Russian 
Patriarch Alexei was doing in Bulgaria. He suspected that the Church was 
being used as an instrument of Soviet politics to strike towards an outlet 
in the Mediterranean and that the doings in Macedonia were connected with 
this and had the secret support of the Russian Church. 
On the subject of the Roman Catholics, we informed the Metropolitan 
that we were proposing to have a talk with the Papal representative. He 
asked us to warn him that all Roman Catholic activities were closely 
watched, and that above all things the Government were frightened of a 
rapprochement between Orthodox and Roman Catholic. In particular any 
movements in this direction were the subject of the vigilance of the 
authorities. There had been terrible events in the past for which the 
Roman Catholics were not without responsibility, but the Orthodox were 
very careful not to attack them in any way. But the moment for cooperation 
and common action had not come, the time was not yet ripe. 
I was very much impressed by the positive and enlightened attitude 
of the Metropolitan on the subject of the relations with the Roman 
Catholics. I am inclined to believe he will be ready to cooperate when 
such action becomes practical politics. At present it seems that in this 
field, as in others, his hands are to some extent tied by the opinion of 
his people. 
We spoke of the dangers of the Orthodox Church being forced into 
opposition on political rather than religious grounds. The Metropolitan 
showed himself completely alive to this danger, and strongly emphasised 
his determination that the Church should not be identified either with the 
right or with the left... 
I then spoke of the attitude of the Church of England on relations 
with the Orthodox. I said that in matters which were between the Orthodox, 
we could not and did not want to interfere. What we did want to do was to 
keep the connection open so far as possible with all the Orthodox, 
Russian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Serb, and to nourish friendly relations 
and understanding. 
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... I emphasised the contributions which Churches could make to 
international confidence and mutual trust... (33) 
The enlightened attitude which impressed Waddams would have horrified the 
Serb Orthodox faithful and aroused the most intense anger of the Serb nation. 
There was irony in the fact that the Acting Patriarch's attitude to the Roman 
Catholics was, however, no different to that of Tito who, like the Patriarch 
knew that public association with the Roman Catholic Church, no matter how 
necessary for the long term stability of the country, was at that moment 
impossible owing to the overwhelmingly hostile attitude of the Yugoslav people. 
Like the Acting Patriarch, however, Tito was quite prepared to enter into 
relations with that Church at some future time for his own political 
advantage. (34) 
It was obvious from the above discussion that the Serb Orthodox Church 
was as aware as was the Church of England of the need to appear politically 
independent. Yet the substance of their talks clearly indicated the hostility 
existing between Church and State in the domestic sphere along with opposition 
to the SU in the international sphere. The stress which both Vaddams and the 
Metropolitan placed on the necessity of cooperation with the Roman Catholics 
revealed that when Waddams spoke of the Churches' contribution to international 
confidence and mutual trust, he meant in the Vest and did not include the 
Communist regimes on which the Vatican had already declared the cold war. It 
was because the Vatican had declared the cold war in its relations with the 
Communist regimes at a time when the official public policy of the Western 
powers was cooperation and friendship with those regimes that the Church of 
England could not openly pursue the type of cooperation which it was suggesting 
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through its official delegation to Yugoslavia to the Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic authorities there. 
It was significant, however, that after the delegation had 
ascertained the willingness of those authorities to cooperate for what 
were clearly political activities, and the British Legation to the Holy 
See was so informed by the embassy in Belgrade, shortly afterwards His 
Majesty's Minister to the Holy See returned to England to discuss 
collaboration of the Churches against Communism. Prior to his arrival in 
England, Osborne wrote to JV Perowne, the Foreign Office representative 
on the Church of England Committee on Foreign Relations, stating, "I 
should like to have a talk with someone on your Anglican Committee about 
a rather delicate question, the fact that it is left to the Pope to 
defend Christianity against marxian materialism and the Russian anti- 
religious campaign... "(35) Osborne had a particular interest in seeing 
the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell, a fierce opponent of Communism 
and the SU with whom Osborne had had previous contact: "I saw him when I 
was briefly home in 1943 and he had ideas about collaboration between 
the churches in the making of the peace. He might also have ideas about 
the collaboration against the common menace of marxism. " 
Although Perowne replied to Osborne that he could easily arrange a 
meeting such as that suggested, he advised him that it was not within 
his official competence and he had referred the matter to those more 
qualified to consider it. (36) Indicating just how important this 
matter of church cooperation against Communism was becoming, within 
a week of his initial reply to Osborne, Perowne contacted him again 
telling him that Christopher Warner would be gald to discuss his 
idea and would he therefore get into direct touch with him. (37) 
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The subject was clearly one for the higher echeleons and for face to face 
discussion rather than correspondence. A meeting was swiftly arranged and 
executed. There was no record in the Foreign Office file of what took place 
between Osborne and Warner. However, within four days of his telling Osborne 
to contact Warner, Ferowne informed Warner that Osborne had told him what had 
been arranged following their meeting and that he himself had subsequently 
taken the opportunity of a meeting of the Archbishop's Council the previous day 
to tell the Bishop of Chichester that Osborne had something he would like to 
discuss with him in his "personal capacity. " Bell's response had been entirely 
favourable, and Perowne told Osborne that the Bishop had expressed his 
delight. (38) Two weeks later Warner contacted Osborne in Rome enquiring as to 
his meeting with Bell about anti-Communism. (39) All further correspondence 
regarding the collaboration of the Churches against Communism was retained by 
the Foreign Office. 
These clandestine negotiations between the Church of England, the Serb 
Orthodox, and the Roman Catholics, plus the involvement of the F. O. and His 
Majesty's Minister to the Holy See, were given an extra significance in light of 
the fact that the previous April President Truman had secretly written to the 
Pope announcing his decision to return Myron Taylor to Rome as his personal 
representative, as he had been for Roosevelt during World War II. Truman had 
written, "We must employ every resource at our command to bring to this sadly 
troubled world an enduring peace, and no peace can be permanent which is not 
based on Christian principles. " (40) In his reply one month later, the Pope 
observed that peace would be found "only in the light of God's revelation given 
to men through his eternal beloved Son. The Pontiff added that "a prime task 
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before the world's leaders is to lift the darkness of selfishness, of distrust, 
of hate and irreligion, and let men see the joyous brightness of the Mount of 
Beatitudes. "(41) In another letter in November of the same year, Truman 
described his personal envoy as "the channel of communications for views which 
you and I may wish to exchange in the interest of a stable and enduring peace 
among all peoples. " That the SU was an atheist state and the correspondence 
was conducted secretly at that time, invested the elevated language with an 
interesting dimension. 
By this time in 1946, when the western powers moved into closer, although 
clandestine, relations with the Vatican, the hostility and emnity between it and 
the SU was openly expressed. The deteriorating relations between Moscow and 
Rome had been the subject of newspaper comment as early as the spring of 1944. 
The Sunday Observer had drawn attention to the doctrinal conflict between the 
Orthodox Patriarch and the Pope in April 1944, "Vatican Challenged By Russian 
Church: Patriarch Attacks Doctrine"; in August 1944 the same newspaper 
commented on the increasing Papal opposition to the SU, "The Vatican's Attitude 
to Russia hardens. "(42) By mid-1946 the British press were not only revealing 
the extent of the conflict between Vatican and Kremlin, but were reflecting in 
the process the difficulty for the Western powers to openly ally themselves 
with the Vatican or give any open support to its anti-Communist crusade. On 
July 16,1946 the Observer launched a fierce attack on the Papacy in which it 
critically exposed Vatican policies, equated the Pope with Stalin, and declared 
the former to be the greater threat to Europe: 
One result of the recent elections in Western Europe is the emergence 
of a virtual Western bloc under Vatican leadership. Many believed that 
after all its deals with Nazism and Fascism the Vatican's political role in 
post-Fascist Europe would be negligible. This belief, too, has now been 
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refuted by facts. Both Stalin and the Pope have shown just enough 
opportunism and tactical flexibility to make people forget some unpleasant 
'episodes' in their records. Both have also been able to derive political 
profit from the blood and tears of their devoted followers who have 
shirked no sacrifice in challenging and sapping Hitler's "new order" 
(though it is only fair to say that the Communist contribution to the 
overthrow of that "order" has been incomparably greater than that of 
Catholicism. ) 
And now Vatican and Comintern are arrayed against each other in 
almost every country on the Continent. Which has the greater chance to 
sway Europe ideologically in the next five or ten years? My own guess is 
that it is the Vatican. (43) 
In a lengthy analysis of the European situation the Economist was as 
condemnatory of the Vatican anti-Communist crusade as the Observer had been. 
However, the Economist predicted that although the working class might not want 
direction from Moscow, they would prefer it to that of Rome. 
All the parties disclaim "clericalism, " yet the influence of the 
Catholic hierarchy and the priesthood on the leaders and the voters in the 
Catholic parties is inevitably very great and is almost invariably 
exercised in a strongly conservative sense. The leaders of the Church are 
also intent on emphasising one issue in Christian politics that is bound 
to increase the Catholic parties' conservatism. That issue is anti- 
Communism. Russian policy in Eastern Europe and Communist tactics in the 
West have, of course, vastly added to the number of people ready to rally 
to an anti-Communist crusade. The fact remains that such a crusade is 
still the illiberal reactionary and potentially Fascist force which it was 
under Hitler - and still is under Franco. In France and Italy the Catholics 
fought the elections primarily as anti-Communists and now have behind 
them the inchoate and in part reactionary following that the cry of anti- 
Communism usually rallies. The worker may not relish direction from 
Moscow, but he prefers it to Rome. (44) 
Working class opposition to the Vatican and support for the S. U., which 
persisted well into the postwar period, made it necessary for both government 
and church to conduct their early cold war operations circumspectly. -Church 
awareness of, and concern about, this pro-Soviet sentiment was demonstrated by 
a warning from the Archbishop of York to his F. O. friend Pat Dean. Of particular 
note was the Archbishop's worry that the authorities might not appreciate the 
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extent and strength of this sentiment. Equally noteworthy was that following 
his wartime activities on behalf of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of 
Information, the Archbishop now revealed himself as still active on behalf of 
the Foreign Office, this time in the domestic sphere. The information supplied 
by the Archbishop was regarded as sufficiently important to be reported by Dean 
directly to Christopher Varner: 
I saw the Archbishop of York recently. He has been going about a 
good deal in the North of England and the Midlands, visiting steelworks 
and other big factories, and he told me something which may be of interest 
to you. He said that he found in the South of England that people were 
saying that there had been a considerable swing against the Russians 
recently, and that they were much more unpopular than they were several 
months or a year ago. He thought that the same was true of the propertied 
classes and people like shop owners in the North and in the Midlands. He 
was absolutely convinced, however, that this was not true as regards the 
great mass of men and women in big industrial centres, particularly in 
large factories. These people were as strongly in favour of the Soviet 
Union as they ever had been, and regarded any criticism of the Soviet 
authorities or the Soviet Union as due purely to class prejudice. The 
Archbishop said he thought a number of people in official and semi- 
official places had got a mistaken idea about the position and this seemed 
to him rather dangerous-(45) 
Dean added that the Archbishop's information was endorsed by his own 
brother-in-law, a parson in Sunderland who told him that the dock workers there 
were all firmly and completely in favour of the SU. They were of the opinion 
that the Soviet armies won the war and were very bitter if any contrary 
argument were advanced. Dean understood the number of people concerned to be 
"in reality very large, as these beliefs are widespread through the industrial 
North and midlands. " 
The Archbishop's warning was considered very important, warner commented, 
"This is certainly worth knowing and the Archbishop's is likely to be very good 
evidence. "(46) A note written on Dean's memorandum indicated that the Private 
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Secretary at No 10 was being asked if the Prime Minister would like to see it. 
The fact that the SU retained a grip on the popular mind was of concern to the 
Foreign Office which knew such must be eradicated in order to generate support 
for its own anti-Soviet, anti-Communist policies which aimed at an economic, 
political and military alliance of the West against the East. Until such a time 
as public opinion would support such policies, the Foreign Office had not only 
to conceal their pursuit and not appear provocative or unfriendly toward Russia. 
Of necessity it had to display a public adherence to the wartime promises of 
continued cooperation and goodwill between the three big powers. An alliance of 
the Foreign Office with the Vatican directed against the SU would certainly 
arouse an adverse public reaction. The unwisdom of official cooperation with 
Roman Catholicism and the Vatican was quite clearly perceived within the 
Foreign Office. 
Foreign office policy was thus to remain aloof from the Vatican-Kremlin 
conflict and not appear to be taking either side. (48) Although the Foreign 
Office was traditionally and overwhelmingly opposed to the Soviet Union and to 
Communism, there was not a great deal of sympathy within it for the Vatican. 
There remained in the Foreign Office a residue of resentment owing to the 
Pope's perceived affinity for Germany, where he was formerly the Nuncio, during 
the war, and his failure to repudiate and condemn Nazism. His Majesty's 
Minister to the Holy See tried his best to explain and justify those Papal 
policies to which he knew his Foreign Office colleagues objected. In his 1945 
Annual Review, Osborne defended the Pope for not condemning Nazi crimes. 
Conceding that the Papal weapons of excommunication and martyrdom were the 
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strongest in the world and that the Pope had failed to use them, Osborne 
argued that this failure was owing to the Pope's hope to become a mediator 
acceptable to both sides. The Pope felt that he had condemned Nazi crimes and 
that any more specific condemnation would have exposed German Roman Catholics 
to savage reprisals and the cruel dilemma of choosing between their conflicting 
loyalties to their country and their religion. (49) Such considerations were 
not, however, to deter the Pope from placing Eastern European Catholics in a 
similar dilemma when in the midst of the Cold War he issued an excommunication 
decree on all Catholics who supported Communism. 
Osborne's advocacy of collaboration with the Vatican against Communism 
revived criticism of the Pope's attitude toward Fascism and Nazism. Implying 
that the Pope was an unreliable ally seeking only Vatican interest, Sir 0 Harvey 
stated that the Pope was all things to all men whe were not Communists. 
Moreover, it was felt that while he maintained his associations with those 
elements who had opposed the allies in the previous war, his support of the 
anti-Communist cause was of no value: "What we feel is that all the Pope's anti- 
Communist propaganda would be more convincing if he had a more positive line 
to show as regards the Nazis and Fascists, their heirs and assigns and those 
who collaborated with them. "(50) In reply, Osborne denied that the Pope faced 
both ways, and repeated the theme that Pius had wanted to be a mediator, his 
"meticulous and seemingly pusillaminous neutrality during the war is to be found 
in his abiding hope of being able to shorten the war and all its horrors and 
sufferings by mediation at the right moment. "(51) 
Osborne insisted that the Pope had had to remain above the conflict during 
the war. However, it was not just the Pope's wartime record which made the 
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Foreign Office wary of him, his postwar associations rendered the Foreign 
Office equally reluctant to be too closely linked officially with the Vatican. 
Harvey had questioned why the Pope had not "ceased to be tender to the 
collaborators, " including Archbishop Stepinac of Yugoslavia, a known 
collaborationist. Osborne evaded trying to justify a course which had deeply 
offended those who had strove so hard to defeat the very forces which the Pope 
in his obsession with the defeat of Communism was now rehabilitating, and 
claimed that it was impossible for a layman or a non-Catholic to form a valid 
judgement of Papal policy or of the Vatican: "They reckon in centuries and plan 
for eternity and this inevitably renders their policy inscrutable, confusing 
and, on occasion, reprehensible to time-conditioned minds. " 
Like the Foreign Office, although willing to treat with the Vatican 
privately, the Church of England maintained a public distance. Moreover, while 
the Vatican was loudly denouncing Russia and actively opposing Communism, the 
Church of England was following the Government's official line of advocating 
friendship with and understanding of Russia and avoiding hearty denunciations 
of Communism for fear of appearing reactionary and alienating the working 
classes. This policy did not please everyone, and the Archbishop of Canterbury 
found himself the recipient of letters questioning the lack of zeal shown by the 
Church in the fight against Communism, especially in contrast to the Roman 
Catholics. Dame Beatrice Lyall argued that this factor was causing the Anglican 
Church to lose people who feared the Communist menace to the Roman Church: 
"Our Church up to date has shown a very obvious timidity in saying, or doing 
anything, that could even remotely be construed into criticism of Russia or her 
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vassal states. " The letter appealed for guidance and instruction in the matter, 
adding that to many such appeared long overdue. (52) 
In fact, shortly before Dame Beatrice voiced this complaint, the Archbishop 
had roundly abused the SU in Canada, taking a totally contradictory line to that 
he adopted before the British public. Speaking in the Winnipeg Auditorium on 
September 4,1946 Fisher said: "The evils of the world all stem from fear, pride 
and greed, and Russia, so far as anyone can read her mind, is possessed of all 
three, and they are all urging her along the course she seems to have chosen.... 
She has tied them all to a political creed. " 
Although this was a controversial and a new line of argument on the part 
of the Archbishop, the British press reports of his speeches in Canada neither 
reported nor commented on these words. Such was not the case in Canada where 
one church newspaper, the Anglican Outlook, not only commented on the speech, 
but juxtaposed it to previous utterances on Russia from Lambeth, and then wrote: 
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that these statements and 
changes have something to do with an external political situation. The 
last statement is a very serious indictment to make against a country that 
has just suffered the terrific cost of a modern war, with losses reckoned 
in millions of men, women and children, and in the destruction of tens of 
thousands of farms, homes and towns... It would seem a pity that a 
visiting Archbishop gave the Press the opportunity to headline him as 
saying that 'fear, pride and greed guide Soviet creed, ' while ignoring the 
fact that he said that the democracies were not free from these evils - 
especially as he supplied absolutely no evidence for his contention. This 
makes it difficult to deny that there is a certain relation between the 
utterances of highly placed spokesmen and the dominant views of the State 
in which they are expressed. In other words, the Church of England, 
through its Archbishop of Canterbury, follows closely the line of the 
British Foreign Office in its utterances, and so lends itself by its 
deliberate policy to the greatest smear campaign on this continent against 
a country that not so long ago was a welcome ally, even though following a 
different political and economic creed. (53) 
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Unaware until some months afterwards of the substance of the views 
expressed by the Archbishop in Canada, Religion and the People 
commented, "The Press reports of the speeches of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury in Canada in September, 1946, omitted to point out that he 
took the opportunity of being in a country which had been swept by the 
hysteria of the atomic espionage episode to make clear - as he has not 
in this country - his real views on Russia. (54)" Abroad the traditional 
hostility of Britain to Russia was a known and accepted fact, and the 
Foreign Office had no need to conceal its desire to present Russia as an 
aggressive danger to world peace, as it did at home. Fisher's trip came 
some months after Churchill's Fulton speech, and his words, 
significantly, endorsed those of the ex-prime minister. Back in England, 
however, he continued to endorse the still official Foreign Office line 
of friendship with the Soviet Union being a prerequisite of the world 
peace actively sought by the Allies. This was illustrated by his reply 
to Dame Beatrice, made following his trip to Canada and his public 
attack there on the Soviet Union: 
The Roman Catholic Church has declared open war on Russia as the 
seat of Communism, but the following facts should be borne in mind. 
If there is to be a war against Russia the Vatican will not have 
to fight it. In this country the first thing is to do everything in 
our power to lead Russia into the ways of cooperation with other 
nations. It is perfectly true that we may fail, and that there may be 
another war. For myself I. do not believe that there is any imminent 
danger of. that, and I think that by slow degress and with unsteady 
steps Russia is becoming more sensitive to Western opinion. Stalin's 
recent answers give some hope of that. At any rate at present our 
national duty is two fold: to stand firm for our own principles and 
to try to reconcile Russia. This precisely is what Bevin is trying 
admirably to do. It would be a grievous thing if the Church here 
made his task harder by coming out with provocative denunciations of 
Russia. (55) 
Fisher pointed out another factor which, because of the 
secret negotiations which the CFR had recently conducted 
-133- 
in Yugoslavia, was equally deceptive and misleading. Although the Church, 
through its Council on Foreign Relations, was at that time actively 
collaborating with the Serb Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches in 
Yugoslavia in an attempt to oppose Russia and contain the influence of the 
Russian Church, Fisher claimed that the Anglican Church was constrained from 
criticism of Russia because of its relations with the Russian Church: "Our duty 
is to try to increase our connexions with the Patriarch of Moscow and help that 
Church as much as we can. To denounce Russia would close our doors of access to 
the Russian Orthodox Church. " Fisher's concern for the Orthodox Church, which he 
stated the Vatican did not have, pointing to its forcible conversions of the 
Orthodox in Croatia during the war, had not, however, deterred him from 
attacking Russia in Canada. 
From defending the Church of England to Lyall, Fisher moved to attack the 
Roman Catholic Church. Earlier in his reply, Fisher had said that there was no 
need to attack Communism since it had so little influence and was losing a good 
deal of what it had. His attitude to Catholicism was different, it was there 
that Fisher perceived the most insidious threat: 
As I know, the Vatican would very much like our Church and others to rank 
ourselves in this matter behind the Church of Rome as the great defender 
of liberty, but so far as liberty goes Rome itself has a by no means 
unsullied record. I mentioned Yugoslavia just now. When the Italians were 
in occupation of Abyssinia the Roman Church seized the opportunity to do 
everything in their power to convert the Abyssinians from their 
traditional faith to Roman Catholicism. As a result they are hated now 
throughout Abyssinia and the churches they built for the people they were 
to impress into their ranks now stand empty and deserted. It is only 
natural that the Vatican should wish to lead a crusade to defend its own 
members. Our duty is to defend religious liberty wherever it needs defence 
and that is often enough against the Roman Church itself. 
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Concluding his defence, Fisher drew an analogy between Church and State 
to illustrate the independence of the Church and its preferred avoidance of 
political involvement: "So like Bevin in the political world we go on our own 
way in the ecclesiastical world standing firmly for our principles and, as I 
have said, Church leaders are constantly reaffirming them against the practices 
of Russia and their subordinates; but we cannot convert it into a political cry, 
nor can we accept Rome as a champion of liberty. " 
Neither Dame Beatrice Lyall nor the friend for whom she had first written, 
Mrs Marriott, were satisfied with Fisher's reply; they accused the Church of 
England of choosing the "expedient" rather than the "right" as had the Roman 
Catholic Church, accepting even persecution. Nor, they argued, did the Church of 
England need to follow Rome, it could lead. They countered Fisher's arguments, 
noting particularly that althought the Vatican would not fight in the next war, 
Roman Catholics would. Dame Beatrice acknowledged the precarious position of 
the Orthodox Church, but asked if ignoring and acquiesing in what was being 
perpetrated helped. She concluded by refuting the claim that Stalin was moving 
toward the West in sensitivity, such, she stated, had been proven false by 
recent events. (56) 
Fisher chose not to answer the points raised in this rebuffal of his first 
letter, but counter-attacked by concentrating criticism on the Holy See: 
Between the Vatican and Moscow there is openly declared war. That is 
understandable. The Soviet has made an open attack upon the Roman Church 
in many ways and the Roman Church has openly attacked the Soviet. Here is 
a clash between two systems which are both totalitarian in spirit and 
method. I would suggest that the position of the Church of England does 
not rest just on expediency, though it does take account of all the factors 
in the present position. It does rest on Christian principle. (57) 
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Fisher's repudiation of the methods of the Roman Church did not, however, 
signify a repudiation of its aims, the countering of Communist influence, a 
process in which the Church of England was itself thoroughly implicated. In the 
British mobilisation of religious forces to contain Communist, while spreading 
British, influence, it was considered more effective to operate covertly. In 
particular, it was considered inadvisable to be competing with the Russian 
Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe. This point was emphasised in early 1947 by 
the East European missions when the Foreign Office sounded their response to 
the possibility of the Archbishop of York making a religious cum diplomatic 
visit to their domains. In principle the idea was fully endorsed, the times, 
however, were not felt to be propitious. It was advised that the existing 
circumstances would render the visit counter-productive. Mr Sarrel, the British 
representative in Bucharest, noted that the proposed dates for the Bulgarian 
visit would coincide with that of a Russian delegation. Although this might 
have been intended by the Foreign Office, Mr Sarrel advised against it: "it is 
clearly important that the visits should not clash, and that we should avoid 
any appearance of competing with the Russian Orthodox Church. "(58) 
The representative in Sofia, JC Sterndale Bennett was even more explicit 
in his opposition, although not in the official despatch which was written to be 
shown to the Church of England, as he explained in a private letter to Varner: 
I have borne in mind not only the fear expressed by the Foreign 
Office that a visit of a Church of England Hierarch to Bulgaria might be 
taken as approval of the present political regime, but also the desire of 
His Majesty's Government as expressed in paragraph 8 of Foreign Office 
despatch no 91 Secret (N4242/710/63) of April 14, not to appear too 
prominently in the role of "official opposition" to the local Government. I 
think that at a later stage a visit of the kind proposed might provide a 
most useful encouragement to the Opposition, but from this point of view I 
think that it is premature at present. I would rather wait till we have 
got rid of the major obstacle to Bulgaria's freedom i. e. the outward sign 
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of Russian control in the shape of the presence of Russian armed 
forces. (59) 
At this juncture political reasons inveighed against the Archbishop's 
visit, but within a very short time the balance was to change and political 
circumstances were to dictate that such a visit would, after all, be in the 
British interest. On June 6,1947 Herbert Waddams, CFR secretary, called in 
person at the Foreign Office to inform them that the Dean of Canterbury might 
be going to the Balkans in the summer. Waddams told the Foreign Office that he 
regarded the visit as undesirable and that the Archbishop of Canterbury would 
be glad of any arguments the Foreign Office could suggest for use in persuading 
the Dean to cancel his plans. The Foreign Office offered, as carrying some 
weight, the adverse responses of their own missions to the recent exploration 
of the question whether it would be desirable for a bishop of the established 
Church to visit the Churches of Roumania and Bulgaria. The Foreign Office 
further advised that it be pointed out to the Dean that his presence would be 
politically exploited to give the impression that these regimes had the support 
of the Church of England, detailing excessively brutal practices allegedly 
employed by the governments of Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and warning, 
confidentially, that H. M. G. might shortly be publishing some rather horrifying 
facts about the Bulgarian regime, asking: "Could the Dean really wish to pay a 
friendly visit to a Government whose officers are allowed to use the most 
abominable tortures in interrogating prisoners and to threaten with death 
anyone who dares to question their policy? "(60) 
The Foreign office were opposed to Johnson's proposed visit because they 
knew he would take a sympathetic view of the developments in these countries. 
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Sir Orme Sargent informed Fisher that he opposed Johnson's visiting Hungary 
because the coalition government was under Communist domination, while the use 
of the police had instilled such fear into the anti-Communists that they were 
now incapable of resistance: "I hope therefore that the Dean of Canterbury is 
not thinking of going to Hungary or that if he does he will not allow himself 
to be used to cover up and approve what is going on. "(61) 
Foreign Office consternation at the prospect of the Dean visiting Eastern 
Europe was sufficiently aroused that when they received an enquiry from Johnson 
an July 15 regarding the necessary procedure for obtaining visas for Hungary, 
they fervently hoped it was for a trip in lieu of and not in addition to the 
one of which Vaddams had warned them. (62) The Foreign Office did not consider 
that the Dean would deliberately set out to contradict their propaganda picture 
of these regimes, the fear was that he would do it accidentally: 
From what I have heard about the Dean and Mr D'Eye they are likely, 
quite ingenuously, to declare themselves in favour of all kinds of policies 
at present being pursued by the Governments of the countries concerned, 
and their visit may therefore cause us some embarrassment... I therefore 
think we should reply to the Dean and Mr D'Eye by informing them that, 
until the Peace Treaty is ratified, the Soviet authorities will only 
consider the grant of entry permits if there are urgent compassionate 
reason for the visit, etc. (63) 
This was quite clearly a ruse to prevent the Dean's visit going ahead, and there 
was concern that should this obstructionism become public, the Foreign Office 
might find itself equally embarrassed; nonetheless, the attempt was considered 
worthwhile: 
There is one drawback to this course, that if the Dean makes a fuss 
by writing to the Times or in some other way, and we eventually have to 
put his application forward, I have little doubt the Russians will grant 
the permit with alacrity, since they have found his presence within their 
orbit useful in the past. We may then be made to look rather silly. I 
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nevertheless think it is worth trying to put the Dean and his friend 
off... (64) 
The attempts to deter the Dean proved unsuccessful, as the Archbishop had 
anticipated when he informed Sargent that he would try to confine the Dean to 
visiting Czechoslovakia, but without using the Foreign Office arguments as he 
suspected they would only incite Johnson to go to prove how wrong they all 
were. (65) Fisher told Johnson that the weight of opinion, including 
authoritative sources in the Foreign Office and the British Ambassador in 
Yugoslavia, Charles Peake, counselled against a visit to the specified countries 
by an English ecclesiastic, owing to the unsettled political position and, more 
particularly, the very difficult relations existing between Church and 
authorities. The Archbishop averred that experience had shown that the existing 
difficulties of the Church were increased by Anglican visits and that the 
Archbishop of York was himself refraining from a trip to Yugoslavia and 
confining himself, at the most, to a trip to Czechoslovakia. The increased 
difficulties of which Fisher remarked, was a reference to the demonstrations 
which attended the Bishop of Herford's vist to Yugoslavia the previous year. 
These, however, had not been unwelcome to the British authorities, as was 
confirmed when Charles Peake subsequently invited the Archbishop of York to 
make an official visit to him the following year. 
The Archbishop had accepted the invitation, but, although reluctant to 
relinquish his plans, was prepared to do so if the Foreign Office so requested. 
On learning of the prospective visit of the Dean, however, the Archbishop of 
York suggested to Orme Sargent in the July the possibility of using his visit 
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as an excuse to head off that of the Dean of Canterbury, as a Foreign Office 
minute observed: 
The Archbishop has apparently been invited by Mr Peake to go to 
Yugoslavia. The Archbishop would be quite prepared to go if we advise it 
in which case he would go also to Vienna and Budapest and could take the 
line with the Dean that in view of his own visit to Belgrade the Dean's 
visit to the Balkans would be unnecessary or inappropriate. (66) 
Christopher Warner supported Garbett's proposal, noting that the Archbishop was 
"first class" and realised "that he would have to be very careful in Yugoslavia, " 
an oblique reference to the previous Anglican discussions there about the 
planned collaboration of the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic. The proposal was 
further endorsed, "wholeheartedly, " by the State Department: "Anything to keep 
the Dean away must be tried! "(67) 
The Dean was not to be kept away. As Fisher had predicted, the efforts to 
prevent his going but fuelled his determination and in a letter to Fisher, which 
was almost a reprimand, he argued that Christians had a duty beyond obedience 
to the Foreign Office: 
... to tell the truth of ourselves, 
to seek the truth from them, to break 
down the barriers of fears and suspicions, to show that our Church is a 
truly Christian Church, to prevent so far as I can the drift to fresh 
disasters and new wars. On this my conscience stands, and I cannot 
compromise with it. 
In all humbleness I do suggest to you that "diplomacy" in the Foreign 
Office sense is not the guide for Christians and our Christian Church. We 
have seen what it has done during the past thirty years. We see what it is 
doing today. The results are with us at this moment. Their painful 
evidence is only too apparent in your letter. At all costs new endeavours 
must be made to break the viciousness of the present circle. Perhaps I 
can do little or nothing, but at least I feel I must try to do what lies in 
my power. (68) 
Johnson was completely sincere in his commitment, but he understood the 
Foreign Office mind sufficiently to know that his arguments would carry as 
little weight with the Foreign Office and the Archbishop as theirs had with 
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him. He thus posited a further consideration for the Archbishop, knowing that 
the Foreign Office would not wish it to be revealed that they had sought to 
prevent his goodwill mission: 
If, for example, it became known, as it must, that I was not 
permitted to visit these countries because of undue pressure from the 
Foreign Office and yourself, it would have a world wide publicity and 
significance of the gravest kind, and do immense harm in the Church and 
to our country. It could be interpreted only in one way - that we wished 
to enlarge the distress and suspicion, that forces here were working for a 
deeper cleavage between these new countries and ourselves. Such is the 
very opposite I an convinced of what we ought to do. I believe that these 
new countries of Eastern Europe can be a bridge between East and Vest 
instead of a barrier. (69) 
This consideration probably proved the most effective part of Johnson's 
argument, because it threatened to reveal official attitudes which the 
authorities at that time preferred to keep concealed. 
Unable to prevent the journey, the Foreign Office determined to render it 
ineffective. On August 5,1947. Budapest was informed that the Archbishop of 
York would probably visit Belgrade in October and would be prepared, if so 
advised, to go on to Hungary. Warning Budapest that the Dean of Canterbury was 
also very anxious to visit Hungary, and that the Foreign Office might not be 
able to dissuade him, the suggestion was made that it might be advisable for 
the Archbishop to follow the Dean and try to counteract the impression that his 
strong pro-Soviet sympathies were representative. The Foreign Office asked 
Budapest's views as to the desirability of a visit by the Archbishop, whether or 
not he were preceded by the Dean. The response to the Archbishop's proposed 
visit, now that there was a prospect of the Dean of Canterbury being loosed in 
the region, was entirely favourable. On August 22. Sargent informed Garbett that 
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"we are all in favour of your visit to Yugoslavia and Hungary if you feel able 
to undertake it. "(70) 
Referring back to a recent conversation between himself and the 
Archbishop, Sargent advised Garbett that it had been announced in the Hungarian 
press that Johnson had been due to arrive in Hungary on August 19 as the guest 
of the Hungarian Women's Democratic Association: "It is, of course, probable, 
that considerable propaganda use will be made of the Dean's visit. It is certain 
to be used as a sort of election stunt, to show that the clergy in England 
sympathise with the Hungarian Government. Anything that you could do to 
counteract the impression that the Dean's strong pro-Soviet views are 
representative would be well worthwhile. We must of course leave the decision 
to you... " (71) 
Johnson and D'Eye had been invited to Hungary primarily to observe the 
manner in which the elections were conducted. (72) The Foreign Office clearly 
wanted their credibility as independent observers undermined. Sargent asked 
the Archbishop was there no means of discrediting the Dean's prestige and 
representative capacity as a leading churchman: 
I suppose there is no way by which you could get some disclaimer 
made publicly of the Dean's representative capacity, supposing the 
communists make use of his presence as a really important electioneering 
device in their favour? It occurs to me that perhaps some representative 
Anglican society or one of the episcopal bench might write to the 
newspapers. We could then almost certainly guarantee that the British 
Broadcasting Corporation would refer to it in their Hungarian broadcasts, 
which have a considerable effect in Hungary. (73) 
Agreeing with Sargent about the nuisance value of the Dean, Garbett informed 
him that he was consulting the Archbishop of Canterbury to arrange an official 
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disclaimer; adding that he would be later asking the Foreign Office for its help 
with regard to his trips to Prague and Belgrade. (74) 
Johnson's tour of the Balkans was carefully monitored by the Foreign 
Office through their missions. The British Political Mission to Hungary sent a 
detailed report of Johnson's speeches, the responses to them, the receptions he 
attended and virtually every movement he made. The verdict they delivered on 
his visit was by no means damning: "All in all, our feeling is that, although 
the visit was made good use of by his hosts, his remarks and activities did no 
great harm. "(75) Prague's observations lead them to an equally innocuous 
conclusion. Ambassador Nichols doubted that the "nonsense" Johnson talked had 
any great effect, although he suspected that the public probably over-rated his 
significance, it being said that a large number confused him with the 
Archbishop of Canterbury. (76) Even Charles Peake, who made no attempt to 
conceal his personal contempt for and dislike of the Dean, had to concede that 
the Dean inflicted no damage: "I do not think such Yugoslav officials as have 
talked to me about him regard him as serious in any way. Indeed they hardly 
bothered to conceal their smiles. On the other hand, they have not neglected his 
value as 'a turn'. " (77 ) 
Peake, a correspondent of both Archbishops, had a strong aversion to the 
Dean and complained that his visit, "induced in me a tendency to lowness of 
spirits which I find difficulty in resisting... I do not think that he took in 
anything that I told him. At all events the fixed smile of benevolent 
superiority which informed his features never relaxed... the impression he left 
on all of us was one of vanity and complacency quite out of the ordinary. "(78) 
Peake had suggested to Johnson that he might care to come and see him and talk 
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over his impressions before leaving the country, adding that it might be useful 
to do so before giving a press conference. Despite the intent behind such a 
request being quite clear, Johnson did agree; although he only offered to 
consider a second suggestion from Peake, who advised that if he were proposing 
to talk about religious questions it would be courteous to call upon the 
Patriarch Gavrilo beforehand. Gavrilo, intensely anti-Communist and vey pro- 
British and with whom Peake had established a confidential relationship, was a 
strong opponent of the Tito regime, which he constantly accused of religious 
persecution. Johnson explained to Peake that he had no wish to be drawn into 
religious controversy of any kind. Peake subsequently informed the F. O. that 
Johnson had made no attempt to see the Patriarch. This, however, was 
contradicted by a later report from the Archbishop of York who stated that he 
was told by Gavrilo that he had refused Johnson an interview, pleading 
indisposition, because he did not agree with the views expressed in his 
addresses to the Yugoslav people. (79) 
Peake's report to the Foreign Office charged Johnson with talking like any 
Yugoslav Communist, "making plentiful use of threadbare cliches and catch 
phrases which are common currency of speech in Communist circles in Belgrade. " 
Johnson was confronted by an embassy staff member over a statement published 
in the press that the Foreign Secretary had been put into office by the 
Conservative Party "as a mask. " The Dean was not alone in this view which had 
many Labour Party adherents who perceived more toryism than socialism in 
Bevin's policies. Nonetheless, the remark had been made off the record and the 
Dean was distressed that it had been published, although he made no attempt to 
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retract or disavow the statement, but he was exceedingly critical of the press 
for using it. 
Peake dismissed the activities of the Dean to the Yugoslavs with the line, 
common in England, that he was an old eccentric, regarded with charity at home, 
but not taken seriously. This was not the opinion of Peake's Czechoslovakian 
counterpart, Nichols, who reported from Prague that when he first net Johnson 
he gained the impression that he was by no means a fool, an opinion to which 
he held following Johnson's departure. Nichols succinctly remarked why British 
officialdom viewed the Dean with so much hostility: "In fact, it is not so much 
what he says that is so tiresome as that it is said by a man in his 
position. "(80) This was supported by the fact that, as all the reports from the 
various missions made quite clear, Johnson's addresses were far from subversive. 
Johnson's message was essentially that of the benefits to be derived from 
real East-West friendship and cooperation. Speaking only months prior to the 
Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia, presented with a doctorate by the John 
Hus Theo]iical Faculty of the Charles University in Prague, Johnson told his 
audience that Czechoslovakia was fortunate to be situated half-way between East 
amd Vest. This meant that she could and did benefit from the spiritual heritage 
of the West and the material benefits now conveyed to humanity by the East. The 
Western democracies supplied those personal liberties of speech, right of 
association, and political and religious convictions which constituted the 
special glory of the Western tradition; from the East came the right to enjoy 
leisure, freedom to live under a planned economy - in fact all the material 
freedoms without which the spiritual liberties were empty and meaningless. 
Nichols reported to the Foreign Office that Johnson "spoke technically well and 
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gave every appearance of sincerity. " The Foreign Office responded with derision. 
Next to this section of the Nichols' despatch, RMA Hankey had penned five 
exclamation marks and inscribed "? other way round?!? ", crossed it out and put at 
the top "Shocking old ass! RMAH. "(81) 
Whatever illusions governed Johnson's perceptions of Communism in Eastern 
Europe, still his message of East-West cooperation was supposedly the aim of 
the British authorities in this period, with its non-achievement subsequently 
attributed at home to the recalcitrance of the Russians with their unreasonable 
suspicions. Yet it was very clear that the Foreign Office did not want an 
English cleric of Johnson's position disseminating a message of East-West 
friendship as though it were endorsed by the Church of England. Rather than 
East-West friendship, the Foreign Office sought to ferment dissent and 
resistance to the new regimes among the indigenous peoples of Eastern Europe. 
A potential ally in this quest were the indigenous Churches and to encourage 
their trust and support the Foreign Office did not want an important Anglican 
cleric speaking in the opposite vein, telling them that the people of Britain 
sympathised with and applauded the Communist experiment. 
Johnson encountered clerical opposition and hostility to the new regimes 
in Eastern Europe, and also to his support for them. He wrote of one such 
experience to his wife, Nowell, telling her also that the situation in the 
Balkans was very different from that inferred in home propaganda: 
The talk about violence and oppression is absurd. We travel 
everywhere and attend meetings. Speech is entirely free. Men criticise the 
government fiercely and openly but with no violence on either side... The 
women's movement is most inspiring... We heard the Communist Party 
meeting and a good meeting of the Opposition Party on Sunday - all 
perfectly free to speak as they liked and the latter openly attacking the 
government. The Pastor at whose church I spoke did not care for my 
attitude or my service and in his prayer at the end prayed for "our 
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soldiers still in slavery in Russia... and may the old days return. " Our 
people were very vexed. At the vicarage afterwards the daughter said to 
D'Eye we have no vote no freedom. But the Minister was openly fascist and 
was imprisoned after the war as a fascist. It is not unnatural that such 
should be disenfranchised. (82) 
Johnson was not blind to the shortcomings of the new regimes and was 
worried by what he called dangerous undercurrents. Nevertheless, painfully aware 
of their struggle for survival, the baneful effects of the East-Vest divide and 
the ubiquitous fear of war, Johnson's views were overwhelmingly tempered by 
sympathy and toleration. Even moreso because he held the attitude of the West 
greatly responsible for contributing to the less palatable aspects'which he 
believed could have been overcome with Western aid. To Sir John Boyd Orr of 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the U. N., Johnson wrote: 
I have just returned from nine weeks strenuous travel in Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and all six republics of Yugo-slavia and Bulgaria. 
I was able to travel far and see much. There is a wonderful throb of new 
life, but unfortunately all countries are terribly crippled for lack of 
machines and tools. America could have lasting gratitude from Eastern 
Europe had she out of her plenty traded at this critical moment with the 
new countries. Instead she earns despite and suspicion to put it very 
mildly. She is terribly afraid that America means war. (83) 
At a time when the West was formulating a propaganda image of an aggressive 
East bent on eventual world domination, this ubiquitous, tangible fear of war 
prevailed throughout the SU and the East European countries. On his own return 
from the East, even the Archbishop of York felt forced to remark on this 
prevalent emotion, informing the press that there was a very real fear of a 
revanchist Germany. The Archbishop also conceded to the press that the new 
regimes fully supported the Russian Alliance. 
The Archbishop of, York received more welcoming receptions and inspired 
more favourable reports from the British missions than had the Dean. His visit 
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was declared a success by all, including himself in his diary, which 
further revealed that the embassies showed him every courtesy and 
provided him with every facility. Nichols declared the visit, "most 
useful as it drew attention to British interest in the religious affairs 
of Central Europe and to some extent served to counteract the 
unfortunate effect of the recent visit by the Dean of Canterbury. "<84> 
In fact the Archbishop's visit was of much more critical political 
significance than simply countering the effects of the Dean; it was a 
demonstration of the important role religion was assuming in the 
alignment of West against East. 
There seems little doubt that Garbett's visit to Yugoslavia had much 
to do with what had been achieved during the Bishop of Hereford's visit 
the previous year. Since then the Acting Patriarch, the Metropolitan 
Joseph, who had proven so "enlightened" and cooperative, had conceded 
his position at the Head of the Serb Orthodox Church when Tito had 
invited the original Patriarch, Gavrilo, who had fled the country during 
the war, to return. Although Gavrilo had proven himself a friend to 
Britain during the war, and had been at least partly responsible for 
Yugoslavia entering the war on the Allied side, the fact that he was 
returning at Tito's invitation clearly aroused Foreign Office doubts and 
they recognised the need to reaffirm the agreements of the previous 
year. Foreign Office fears for the health of their alliance with the 
Serb Orthodox Church were possibly exacerbated by the fact that during a 
recent sojourn in England Gavrilo had not received the treatment which a 
distinguished friend of the country who had rendered so invaluable a 
service deserved. 
In July 1945 Fisher asked Sir A Cadogan that the Patriarch of 
Yugoslavia be allowed to visit the U. K. for the baptism of the 
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Crown Prince, as King Peter of Yugoslavia had requested. (85) Fisher pointed 
out that apart from ecclesiastical reasons, Gavrilo was a firm friend of Britain 
and the Church of England and had been instrumental in bringing Yugoslavia into 
the war on the Allied side, a fact confirmed by F. O. records. (86) The Foreign 
Office were prepared to allow the Patriarch to visit but not to stay, whatever 
services he had rendered Britain during the war. Although Gavrilo had suffered 
in German captivity and resisted efforts to use him for anti-Bolshevist 
propaganda, the Foreign Office knew that he held strong anti-Communist views 
and believed him to be out of sympathy with the government then in power. The 
Foreign Office thus decided there was no need to exert themselves on his behalf 
by facilitating his transfer from Austria to Switzerland, necessitated by his 
poor health; as a minuted comment stated: "We do not particularly want any 
Yugoslavs here who are not in favour with the Yugoslav Government. (87) As 
relations with the Yugoslav authorites changed with the onset of the Cold War, 
the British authorities in Yugoslavia sought to cultivate relations with the 
Serb Orthodox Church, and after his return to Yugoslavia, the British 
Ambassador developed a close relationship with Gavrilo, the nature of which was 
concealed from the Communist authorities. Peake, moreover, facilitated 
correspondence between the Patriarch and the Archbishop of Canterbury using his 
"safe hand" in the Patriarchate and the diplomatic bag. (68) A visit by the 
Archbishop of York was clearly calculated by Peake to be a mark of respect and 
show Anglican support for the Serb Orthodox Church; and it was at the 
Ambassador's invitation that Garbett's visit was originally instigated. 
In the course of the critical year of 1947, other-reasons for sending the 
Archbishop developed. Since the end of the war neither of the Archbishops had 
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concealed their contempt for Vatican behaviour during the war, and both 
had attacked the Roman Catholic anti-Communist crusade, despite the 
secret negotiations conducted with the Roman Catholic authorities in 
Yugoslavia by Herbert Waddams and the Bishop of Hereford. In a trip to 
Rome shortly after the war Garbett had refused to visit the Pope. 
despite his being patronised at that time by leading British statesmen, 
because of a speech he intended to make which attacked Vatican 
pronouncements during the war. More recently Garbett had been the 
subject of criticism in the Catholic press for an attack he made on the 
Vatican attitude to the Russian Church and a warning to Roman 
Catholicism about its identification with reaction. Significantly, 
however, the counter- attacks on Garbett were not made until the 
beginning of October, the same month in which he was scheduled to visit 
the Balkans, despite the fact that his attack on Catholicism had been 
made as long ago as July. 
Speaking at Malton in Yorkshire, Garbett had apportioned some of the 
blame for the division of Europe into two blocs to Vatican policy; he 
had declared that the Catholic parties on the continent were the refuge 
of the reactionaries, so that, were the Left finally to triumph, the 
Church, and probably Christianity, would be treated as a political 
enemy; that, whereas Marxism and Christianity were logically opposed, it 
was wrong to think that there was no room for Christianity in a 
Communist State; and that, whereas it was undeniable that difficulties 
of understanding with Russia existed it would be wrong to regard these 
difficulties as permanent: 
This separation of Europe into two strongly contrasted camps 
is encouraged by the Vatican policy, which treats Russia as the 
chief enemy of Christian civilisation and, wherever it has 
influence, supports the opposition both to communism and social 
democracy... The Catholic parties on the continent are at 
present progressive in their programmes but they are also 
the only rallying ground for the reactionaries, and in course of 
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time there is danger that, once again, on the continent Catholicism will be 
identified with reaction. (89) 
Garbett not only criticised the Vatican attitude to Russia, but also to the 
Russian Church which the Archbishop defended: 
Persistent Roman Catholic propaganda is directed against the Russian 
Church as a submissive instrument of the State: the Russian Church is 
indeed loyal to the new regime, and believes it is more in accordance with 
Christianity than the other social and economic systems, but its faith and 
worship are independent of the State. The revival of the ancient Church of 
Russia and its freedom recognised by the State, are the most encouraging 
events in these critical days. (90) 
Garbett retained a great deal of respect and affection for the Russian Church. 
During his 1943 visit he had been much impressed by the vitality of its 
religious life, and the calibre of its leaders. While the Anglican hierarchy 
was traditionally anti-Roman Catholic, there was also the further consideration 
that official British policy was still opposition to a divided Europe. 
Subsequent to Garbett's expressing these views, Britain's foremost ally, 
the USA, made a widely publicised approach to the Vatican, which, although 
rendered rhetorically in the elevated language of peace, was commonly 
interpreted as inviting the Vatican to join the US in an anti-Communist crusade. 
Since the end of the war relations between the Vatican and the US had lacked 
the closeness and importance they assumed during Roosevelt's time. The decision 
to return Taylor to the Vatican was widely interpreted as the beginning of 
intense collanboration between the two. Taylor left Washington on August 15, 
1947 with Truman announcing his mission as seeking the views of "leaders 
everywhere" as part of the search for peace, and that his discussions with Pius 
XII would be on the means of establishing peace "under a moral world 
order. "(91) On his way to Rome, Taylor spent time in London where he had 
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discussions with the Archbishop of Canterbury. On August 26, Taylor had the 
longest audience ever granted by the Pope to a diplomatic representative in 
recent years. (92) On August 28 the Vatican and the White House made public an 
exchange of letters between the President and the Pope wherein they pledged to 
each other to work for lasting peace in the world. 
The Pope and the President had of course been corresponding since April 
1946, although this was not revealed at the time. The decision to publicly 
declare their alliance and their common objectives at what was a very critical 
political juncture, with relations between East and West rapidly deteriorating 
and anti-Communism spreading as Russia moved to consolidate her position in 
Eastern Europe, was widely interpreted as heralding an anti-Communist crusade. 
Catholic circles welcomed this combination of the world's greatest 
spiritual force with the world's strongest lay power as a logical sequel to the 
US policy of firmness, as embodied in the Truman doctrine, against what they 
termed Russian imperialism. Whereas before Catholic clergy could do little more 
than denounce Communism and unmask its tactics, now they could use as a 
compelling argument the material advantages that might be enjoyed by those 
countries that would fight communism within their borders and join the ranks of 
democratic nations. Those opposed to the combination of Vatican and US accused 
the Pope of taking a direct part in world politics and of abetting US 
imperialism to establish what Unita, official paper of the Italian Communist 
Party, began to call "Truman's new order, " a caustic reference to Hitler's "new 
order. " (93 ) 
This inclusion of the Pope as a central figure in the western alliance 
meant that the criticism of Garbett by the Vatican press was taken very 
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seriously by Victor Perowne, the British representative at the Holy See, who 
sent the F. O. full translations of the comments of the Osservatore Romano of 
October 3 and of the Quotidiano of October 2, which were to be passed on to the 
secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, "Since I 
imagine that our friend the Reverend Waddams would be interested in knowing 
exactly what the Vatican press did find to say on this occasion. "(94) 
The Quotidiano responded to Garbett's not letting pass "the opportunity to 
attack the Catholic Church, " by attacking him and the Anglican Church: "The 
affirmations of Dr Garbett are those which are current among those people who 
make the mistake of approaching facts from a basis of prejudice. And in this 
case the prejudice is the traditional anti-Roman spirit proper to the Anglo- 
Saxon world, and more particularly to Anglicanism. " A reference to class 
warfare, "the negation of the Christian spirit, " being transferred to the 
international plane was followed by an accusation that the Church of England 
used anti-communism as a tool with which to defend Britain's class-ridden 
status quo: "We know too well there are people among us who, while they pay lip 
service to the defence of Christian civilisation, are aiming at the preservation 
of privilege. But such people have nothing in common with the spirit of the 
Church. " Garbett's assertions about the Russian Church were refuted and he was 
accused: "By his seemingly objective speeches, he ranges himself with the 
persecutors who in many European countries are combating the Catholics, even to 
the spilling of blood. And this is not a contribution towards the moral 
unification and the peace of the world. "(95) 
The Osservatore Romano, a semi-official Vatican organ, took a significantly 
different approach, chiding Garbett in a gently patronising rather than a 
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hostile tone: "The anxiety of the Anglican dignitary for the fate of the 
Catholic Church deserves a reassurance; " at one and the same time refuting his 
criticism and using it to explain Catholic policies and objectives. Osservatore 
Romano did not fail to mention the correspondence between the President and the 
Pope. Nor was there a counter-attack on the Anglican Church. (96) Of note is 
the fact that these Roman Catholic responses were made three months after 
Garbett's offending criticism, and immediately prior to his departure for 
Eastern Europe. 
Garbett's visits to Czechoslovakia and to Yugoslavia occurred after those 
two countries were subject to serious allegations of religious persecution by 
the Catholic press in Britain. In Prague Garbett was escorted by the British 
Ambassador Sir Philip Nichols, to meet individually Ptime Minister Gottwald, 
President Benes and the Minister of Education. Garbett assured each one that 
the Roman Catholic allegations of religious persecution in Czechoslovakia were 
not believed in Britain and that the Roman Catholic press from which they 
derived, particularly the Tablet, carried no influence. (97) These assurances were 
not, however, repeated in Yugoslavia. Instead, Garbett informed Tito that, 
"everyone in the United Kingdom sets the greatest value on religious freedom, 
and that we were not satisfied that this exists in Yugoslavia. "(98) 
Prior to his meeting with Tito, Garbett first saw the Patriarch Gavrilo 
who, assured of Garbett's confidentiality, unleashed a torrent of invective 
against the "atheist" Yugoslav government which, he declared, "cared nothing for 
religion. " Gavrilo told Garbett that there was religious persecution, although he 
had to concede that the Government did not close churches or forbid worship 
and that the churches had never been as crowded. (99) These facts were 
- 154 - 
subsequently endorsed by Peake who told the Archbishop that the government 
"discouraged" religion rather than its being "openly persecuted. " 
Peake and Garbett discussed the Roman Catholic Archbishop Stepinac, whose 
trial had been used by the Vatican to focus a great deal of adverse attention 
on the religious situation in Yugoslavia. In a significant remark to Garbett, 
Peake implied recognition of Stepinac's guilt of the crimes as charged by the 
Yugoslav authorities, including collaboration against the new regime and 
criminal behaviour during the war. He stated: "Stepinac had certainly been very 
unwise; he was a young man and had committed himself unwisely. "(100) As the 
trial had drawn to an end, Peake had been instructed by the British government 
to see Tito and point out what indignation would be caused if Stepinac were 
sentenced to be shot; Tito had smiled when so informed and said: "We are not 
such fools as to kill an Archbishop. " (10 1) 
In both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia Garbett had meetings with the 
leading representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. In Prague the Roman 
Catholic Bishop had "talked about cooperation over peace, especially about 
general action against what he described as 'the common enemy'. "(102) At his 
initial meeting with the Apostolic Nuncio in Belgrade, Bishop Hurley, who had 
the previous year had discussions with Waddams and Hereford, detailed 
allegations concerning the treatment of the Roman Catholic Church by the 
Yugoslav Government were made. (103) During his interview with Tito, Garbett 
made representations on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church, warning of 
potentially adverse reactions from Britain should they not be heeded. When Tito 
had responded with complaints about the damaging allegations of the Roman 
Catholic press, far from giving him the same assurances as he had the 
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authorities in Prague, Garbett, as he noted in his diary afterwards, "... then 
took the chance of saying, and deliberately repeated it later on, that though we 
were not a Roman Catholic country all of us, and not only members of the 
Church, would be united in protest against any persecution of the Roman 
Catholics; we should feel such persecution as strongly as if it had been 
directed against members of our own Church. "(104) 
Tito sought to obtain Garbett's understanding for the complexities of the 
religious situation in Yugoslavia and the difficulties of his position. He made 
a distinction between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church, as the latter 
had become involved in politics. Tito admitted that there had been excesses. 
These he attributed to the intense anger of the people, against the wishes of 
the Government. Tito blamed the Occupation when many Roman Catholic priests 
had not only sided with the Italians and Germans, but had committed terrible 
atrocities, especialy in Croatia. Tito felt that the situaltion was improving and 
hoped in the future to establish friendly relations with the Roman Church, but 
stressed that while he was working and hoping for such, it was not yet a 
possibility, stating, as Garbett recorded in his diary: "it would be 'not yet'; he 
repeated 'not yet'. "(105) 
Tito told Garbett that cooperation with all the Churches was a government 
goal and it was for this reason that he had facilitated the return of Patriarch 
Gavrilo. Tito had told a visiting delegation of American churchmen that it was 
hoped Gavrilo's "arrival in Yugoslavia would greatly contribute to preventing 
the activity of certain elements in the Orthodox Church who, during the 
occupation behaved very negatively, so that at least this Church might not work 
against the State. " Somewhat ironically considering Gavrilo's privately declared 
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opposition to the Tito regime and the nature of his association with Peake, the 
Communist leader had expressed his personal faith in the Patriarch as a 
nationalist: "It would be premature to say whether Patriarch Gavrila will be 
completely able to justify our desires, but I personally see - from talks which 
I held with him several times - that he is endeavouring to improve this state 
of affairs. The positive thing is that he feels, as a Yugoslav, to be nationally 
responsible for improving this, that he realises that the Church should be 
Yugoslav. This means that he will not, as some other people, serve anti-national 
interests. "(106) Gavrilo told Garbett that he had avoided meeting this American 
delegation, just as he had the Dean of Canterbury, as he objected to their 
having stated, before consulting him, that from their own observations religion 
in Yugoslavia was free. (107) 
The Yugoslav Church leaders themselves had doubts as to the wisdom of 
reinstating Gavrilo. Archbishop Joseph, who had been Acting Patriarch when 
Waddams and Hereford had visited Yugoslavia, although himself not above 
political intrigue, had told his visitors that "perhaps in some ways it was a 
good thing that the Patriarch was not here since he is a very impulsive man 
and might take some precipitate step which would involve them all in a serious 
situation. " (108) 
Following his interview with Tito, Garbett had returned to the British 
Embassy and given a full account of the proceedings to Peake. That evening the 
Apostolic Nuncio, Bishop Hurley, dined at the Embassy, and was subsequently 
provided by the Ambassador with a summary of what had trespassed between the 
Archbishop and Tito. This was in turn relayed to Rome, which responded with 
9 
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expressions of interest, as well as appreciation and gratitude for the 
Archbishop's efforts. Peake subsequently informed Garbett: 
I thought it right to give in confidence to the Regent of the Apostolic 
Nuncature the substance of what passed between you and Marshall Tito 
regarding the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. Bishop Hurley passed 
this on to the Vatican, and he tells me that he has now heard from Mgr 
Tardini, the Papal Under Secretary of State, who asks him to convey to 
you, through me, a message to the effect that the Holy See were greatly 
interested in this conversation and wished you to know of their deep 
appreciation and gratitude for all you had said. (109) 
As Britain's leading ally in the Cold War looked to develop a spiritual 
offensive against the Communists, seeking the support of the Vatican for this 
new crusade, the Church of England and the Foreign Office recognised the 
necessity of a significant gesture to the Vatican to cement the new alliance on 
their part. Within a very short time the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
following the lead of the American President, was to demand a spiritual 
dimension to British Cold War policies and seek an alliance in Britain of 
Anglican and Roman and all the other various denominations in support of 
British foreign policy. 
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While the Foreign Office hoped that the influence of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury might prevent Johnson from going to Eastern Europe, Fisher knew that 
official disapproval was more likely to inspire than deter his dissident Dean. 
He considered a proposed trip to Eastern Europe by the Archbishop of York a 
more effective and sure means of negating that of the Dean. Garbett had been 
asked to make a visit to Prague by a Professor Hnick, at the instigation of the 
Patriarch and with the approval of President Benes. Keen to accept the 
invitation, Garbett first consulted the Foreign Office. (Garbett to Fisher, May 
23,1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 183). Informed of the proceedings, Fisher saw 
the invitation as a further opportunity for the Anglican Church to demonstrate 
its support for dissident Christians oppposed to Communist influence in 
Czechoslovakia, as had the Bishop of Hereford's visit, as well as a possible 
counter to the Dean. He told Garbett: 
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About Czechoslovakia, I think it would be a very good thing if you 
could go there. That country is putting up a brave fight to balance its 
unwanted Eastern connections by strengthening its connections with the 
West. The Bishop of Hereford was there a year ago, but that is no reason 
why you shouldn't go now and if the Foreign Office approves, I hope you 
will. I must add that the Dean of Canterbury tells me that he is going to 
be in Czechoslovakia about October 20th to receive a Degree. He is 
visiting Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania on the way to Czechoslovakia. 
Perhaps it is more valuable that you should go there afterwards as a 
counterblast to the Red Dean! 
Fisher corresponded with the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Charles 
Peake. The letters were often sent via the diplomatic bag. On June 10,1947, 
Peake informed Fisher of a recent dispatch he had sent to the Foreign Office, 
the substance of which was to be sent to Waddams, secretary of the Church of 
England Council on Foreign Relations, concerning Gavrilo, Patriarch of the Serb 
Orthodox Church. Gavrilo was apparently hoping for a visit from another 
English Bishop, although he professed to be fearful of the consequences for his 
staff, arrests had followed the Bishop of Hereford's visit which had occasioned 
demonstrations. Peake considered a wise procedure would be for a Bishop to 
make a private visit to himself; he would then naturally take him to visit the 
Patriarch, and also Tito. He urged that this was a valuable opportunity for 
conversation with the Patriarch, and suggested York or Chichester, the two most 
politically active ecclesiastics in the hierarchy, with known anti-Communist 
credentials, as two who would be well received. (Peake to Fisher, June 10,1947; 
Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 185). 
There was no doubt about Garbett's enthusiasm for the scheme, informed of 
the proposal he replied: "Belgrade sounds even more interesting than Prague! " 
(Garbett to Fisher, July 3,1947; Vol 38: 188). The Foreign Office clearly 
approved, sending dispatches about the Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia to 
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Lambeth, with instructions for them to be shown to Waddams and Garbett before 
being returned to the Foreign Office. (Foreign Office to Fisher, July 5,1947; 
Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 189). These had the effect of strengthening Garbett's 
determination to go to Eastern Europe, as he told Fisher: 
The enclosure you sent me makes me more anxious to go. I had some talk 
over it with my friend in the Foreign Office. He strongly advises me to 
go, though not very hopeful of any practical results. 
(Garbett to Fisher, July 15,1947; Fisher Papers, 38: 194). Garbett was further 
urged to make the visit by Orme Sargent, who also wanted him to include 
Hungary in his itinerary. Garbett told Fisher, "He pressed this rather 
strongly. " (Garbett to Fisher, July 26,1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 196). 
On July 11,1947, Fisher had written to Peake that: "Ye should dearly love 
to send another Bishop to Yugoslavia. " (Fisher to Peake, July 11,1947; Fisher 
Papers, Vol 38: 190). When Garbett expressed reservations about visiting 
Hungary, as Sargent had urged, because he doubted there was any non-Roman 
Church there he could visit, Fisher acknowledged the difficulty, but made it 
quite plain that Garbett was required to counter-effect whatever visits were 
made by the Dean of Canterbury: 
The other day, I wrote to my Dean urging him not to visit Eastern Europe 
and using as my argument that you had thought it best not to go to 
anywhere except Czechoslovakia. Very likely he will disregard my advice. 
In that case, perhaps you will have to go to all the countries he has 
visited to undo his handiwork! 
(Fisher to Garbett, July 31,1947; Fisher Papers, Vol 38: 198). 
68. Johnson to Fisher, July 30 1947; HJ 6739. Fisher wrote asking the Dean to 
refrain from his intended visits, noting Foreign Office objections. Fisher to 
Johnson, July 26,1947; HJ 6740. 
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Conventional British history states that it was the failure of the 
projected postwar settlement, based on four Power cooperation, in 1947 which 
caused Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office to construct an alternative 
settlement in 1948. Soviet intransigence and expansionism were blamed for what 
was claimed to be a new policy; but violent hostility to the Soviet Union and to 
Communism had long been a guiding priniciple of the diplomacy of the Great 
Powers. For British diplomacy in particular, the containment of Communism and 
its spread through the British Empire remained a major preoccupation. The 
collapse of Nazi and Japanese power, as had been forseen, unleashed powerful 
forces of social revolt and nationalistic fervour. These forces caused 
consternation in the British Administration, with fears for the health of the 
Empire and Britain's status as a World Power, more so than any physical threat 
posed by the Red Army. At the end of World War Two the concern of the Western 
Allies was less that the Soviet Union might start another war, than how to 
restore and stabilise an old order convulsed by war and threatened by the 
radicalism it had fostered. This endeavour took many forms; and it involved 
confrontation with the Soviet Union at many different points. Thus was set in 
motion a dialectic of escalation and counter escalation which defined the 
history of the Cold War. 
What was at issue was radical change in which Communists were certain to 
play an important, but not necessarily a monopolistic, role. At a time of great 
social and political upheaval in Western Europe in the aftermath of the war, 
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Conmunist parties played a crucial stabilizing role and rejected any 
adventurist policies that might have endangered their continued 
participation in the bourgeoisie governments they had entered. This 
strategy was of immense help in maintaining social discipline in the 
working class and was pursued in full accord with Soviet leaders. The 
Soviet Union did not insist on the Stalinization of Eastern Europe at 
the end of the war; not until 1947 amid a rising tempo of international 
aggravation were fully fledged Communist regimes installed in those 
countries which Stalin wanted in the Communist sphere of influence, with 
the inclusion of Czechoslovakia by way of a Communist takeover in 1948. 
It is also noteworthy that Stalin was prepared to abandon the Greek 
resistance to the Greek reactionaries supported by Britain, and to see 
Greece pass into the British and then the American sphere of 
influence. (1) 
These factors were disregarded by the Foreign Office where suspicion 
of Communism was always paramount and for whom the emergence of the 
Soviet Union as a World Power threatened British power, prestige and 
commercial success. The emergence of America as the major world power 
did not arouse the same instincts, although America clearly perceived 
Britain as a commercial rival whose former position of power it had no 
qualms about usurping. Rather, the Foreign Office, perceiving America 
as a naive colossus susceptible to the influence of their own refined 
and superior diplomacy, saw it as Britain's main chance of retaining its 
Empire and regaining its lost power. (2) These perceptions led Attlee 
and Bevin to become the forerunners of the Cold War, adopting a much 
more hostile attitude to the Soviet Union than did their American 
counterparts initially. (3) They also led to the formation of a close 
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alliance with the United States and Western Europe which transgressed 
traditional precepts of British foreign policy. 
Vital to the development of post-war foreign policy was the fact that 
Bevin and the Foreign Office shared the same anti-Communist views. When Attlee 
and Bevin took over from Churchill and Eden halfway through Potsdam, not only 
was there no change, there was not even an indication of a Socialist foreign 
policy, nor of an intent to cooperate with the Soviet Union. (4) Nevertheless, 
Labour had been elected on a promise of Left speaking to Left, and while many 
within the Party regarded Communism with antipathy, capitalism was also an 
anathema. The Foreign Office recognised that in order to secure the foreign 
policy they deemed to be in the best interests of Britain, it would be necessary 
to exert what influence they could over the Foreign Secretary, whom they deemed 
the heavyweight in the Cabinet, to direct the Labour Administration. Waiting 
for Attlee and Bevin to arrive for the resumed Potsdam Conference, the 
permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alec Cadogan, assessed the 
task before the diplomatic corps: 
I think we may do better with Bevin than with any other of the Labourites. 
I think he is broadminded and sensible, honest and courageous. But whether 
he's an inspired Foreign Minister or not I don't know. He's the heavyweight 
of the Cabinet and will get his own way with them, so if he can be put on 
the right line, that may be alright. (5) 
Foreign Office endeavours to put Bevin on the right lines operated on a 
variety of levels, including an appeal to man's natural vanity and the desire of 
all public figures to record, a place in history. Aided by senior Civil Service 
figures, and Tory politicians such as Anthony Eden, the Foreign Office sought to 
persuade Bevin that he was personally vested with the responsibility, and the 
opportunity, of returning Britain to World Power status, by resolutely opposing 
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the encroaches of the Soviet Union and equally resolutely pursuing a permanent 
relationship with North America and to a lesser extent with Western Europe, as 
Britain's reduced means no longer enabled her to act as an independent power. 
The Foreign Office task was facilitated by Bevin's own imperialism. (6) 
On August 21,1945, following a speech made by Bevin on August 20,1945 
about the future direction of British foreign policy, Vansittart wrote to 
congratulate Bevin on "taking up your great new office", stating: "I should like, 
however, to tell you how glad I was to see the appointment and how sure I am 
that you will make a great name for yourself as Foreign Secretary. "(7) 
Vansittart then asked to see Bevin in order to discuss a "particular matter" of 
which he was sure Bevin ought to be fully apprised, "... and I think what I have 
to say may be of service not only to you personally but to the nation. " 
According to handwritten notes on the letter, a reply was made by telephone 
that Bevin would be at the studio near Vansittart's home the next Sunday and 
could see him there. While there is no record of what transpired between the 
two, Vansittart had not only headed the Foreign Office and directed its virulent 
anti-Communist policies, but he was one of the most visible and vocal anti- 
Communist figures in British public life. It was Vansittart who coined the 
term 'Communazis' as a means of associating the two ideologies, a tactic Bevin 
was to seek to implement as part of his future Cold War propaganda policy. The 
conversation would naturally have covered what Sir Robert regarded as the major 
threat facing Britain at home and abroad, the spread of Communism. (8) 
Although the Foreign Office emphasised the danger of Soviet expansionism, 
the major concern of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the war was 
to secure its borders with a cordon sanitaire of the nations which Stalin had 
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agreed with Churchill during the war should be in the Soviet sphere of 
influence. Direct evidence of this policy was indicated in a telegram, dated 
August 6,1945, from H. M. Legation in Copenhagen to that in Oslo which stated 
that there was no evidence that the Soviet Government was trying to intervene 
in Danish politics, while there was evidence that the actions of the Norwegian 
Communist Party were dictated by Norwegian politics alone. (9) This struck 
Bevin who had clearly been giving independent consideration to Soviet 
intentions as based on a realistic assessment of their behaviour: 
I have wondered recently whether Stalin is anxious to drop Communist 
Parties but before doing so discharge his obligations by getting them into 
Socialist Parties and thereby limiting his actions to states on his 
frontiers. (10) 
Sevin instructed the Foreign Office to, "Look into this aspect. " 
The Foreign Office was already aware and had already sought to explain 
Soviet activity in terms of their own overall perception of Soviet intentions. 
Writing from Moscow on August 4,1945, Mr Roberts had suggested to Warner that 
there was a decentralised form of control intended to render an appearance of 
independence; hence the American Communist Party would be controlled from 
Mexico; Spain, Portugal and the Antilles from Cuba, and so forth. (11) Roberts 
suggested that His Majesty's Missions abroad ought to pool all known 
information. Bevin's instruction and Roberts' suggestion led to a circular 
despatch requesting information about the relations between the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of other countries. However, prior 
to any response to the despatch, Thomas Brimelow submitted an argument against 
any potential assumption in Bevin's observations that the Soviet Union was not 
committed to confrontation with the West, clearly anticipating that the 
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requested information would not support this particular Foreign Office 
conviction: 
The circular despatch which has been prepared requesting information on 
this subject may improve our knowledge, but I am not hopeful of our 
receiving much convincing evidence, as the lack of it appears to flow 
naturally from the present policy of the All-Union Communist Party. In 
countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence, crude use of the 
Communist Parties to further the ends of the Soviet Union would incur 
criticism and the years 1939-1941 showed that such criticism might do 
serious harm to the prestige of the Communists involved. It is to the 
advantage of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to respect 
nationalist feeling and to encourage the Communists of the Western 
countries to retain the reputation of patriotism which they earned for 
themselves after the German attack on the U. S. S. R. It is also in the 
interest of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that the Communists 
of these countries should increase their influence by the means most 
appropriate to the circumstamnces of the various countries, and that, if 
they are to further the ends of the U. S. S. R. they should do so discreetly, 
and should endeavour to create the impression that any pressure they bring 
to bear is a spontaneous manifestation of the popular will. This demands 
an intimate knowledge of local conditions, and it is, I think, probable 
that since the dissolution of the Comintern, Moscow has left much to the 
discretion of the local Communist Parties in the countries outside the 
Soviet sphere of influence, and has been content if they acted in a way 
generally consistent with the interests of the Soviet Union. If this 
assumption is correct, it is not surprising that for some time there has 
been little concrete evidence available of Soviet control of the Communist 
Parties in these countries. (12) 
Brimelow noted that this did not mean that Moscow would not intervene in 
case of an emergency or continue to use prominent Communists of various 
nationalities. Refuting Bevin's considerations regarding Stalin dropping 
Western Communist Parties, Brimelow concluded that: "He will abandon them 
without hesitation, as he abandoned them in Germany, if their sacrifice is 
required by the overriding interests of the Soviet Union, but they are too 
useful to be thrown overboard unnecessarily, and I am sure that he will use 
them to the full. " When the reports arrived from the various diplomatic 
missions they revealed similar thinking to Brimelow in the face of lack of any 
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hard evidence. (13) This then was the overwhelming conviction within the 
Foreign Office, and although disputed within the Labour Party, it was accepted 
by Bevin. 
Bevin's anti-Communist and imperialist views facilitated a common outlook 
with the Foreign Office in the development of policy toward the Soviet Union. 
It was Britain's dire economic position and Bevin's desparate need for dollars 
that contributed to his supporting the Foreign Office policy of pursuing a 
'partnership' with the United States. In the immediate postwar period there was 
tremendous friction between Britain and the United States and Bevin was 
outraged by the cavalier attitude of the Americans. The abrupt termination of 
Lend-Lease a few days after the capitulation of Japan in August 1945 came as a 
great shock to the British people. Public anger was compounded in the autumn of 
1945 by Maynard Keynes' spectacular failure in the negotiations over the 
American loan, to which the absence in the Foreign Office of an appreciation of 
the new situation in Washington following Roosevelt's death greatly contributed. 
The Americans were determined to end the British system of Imperial preference 
and the discriminatory aspects of the sterling bloc. (14) However, the necessity 
of cooperation with the United States for the peace of the World had been a 
theme stressed by the Coalition Government through the war, and it was 
continued by Bevin and Attlee after the war. Both these figures sought to ease 
the tensions existing between the two nations. Prime Minister Attlee was 
determined that neither American economic pressures on Britain nor commercial 
rivalry should hinder the close collaboration of the British and American 
Administrations, for he was convinced that British survival required American 
aid. On August 16,1945, Attlee urged President Truman that in order to insure 
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"the general collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom 
upon which the peace of the world ultimately depends", including collaboration 
in the research and defence field, the two leaders should authorise such 
collaboration and instruct their representatives "to get together and to work 
out methods for the solution of the commercial difficulties. "(15) 
The termination of Lend-Lease had been used to pressure the British into 
the explicit acceptance of Bretton Woods and Bevin believed that America's 
conduct over the loan was an "attempt to put tremendous pressure upon us to 
alter our way of life and economy to meet the desires of the worst elements of 
American capitalism". He nonetheless directed his efforts toward curbing 
British media attacks on the United States and tried to have influence exerted 
on the American press to respond accordingly. (16) Bevin was convinced that, 
"if ever there was a time in which these two Powers should work in an 
atmosphere of mutual cooperation for the sake of the peace of the world, it is 
now. "(17) Bevin blamed the termination of Lend-Lease after "the terrific price 
we have paid in this country", for creating most of the troubles, but did his 
best to get the British press to tone down their criticism of that act. He also 
consulted Byrnes who in turn communicated with the President to achieve some 
improvement in the situation in the American media. (18) The subject remained 
one of concern and in September 1945 Bevin privately asked Sir Stafford Cripps: 
"Perhaps you could have a talk with your friend and if he can cooperate with me 
in keeping both our presses steady, you may be assured that I will do my best 
as I have already done. "(19) 
Despite these efforts, Bevin himself bitterly resented American attitudes, 
as he revealed in his letter to Cripps: ".... there are thousands of things that 
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we have done in this war for which we have had no credit in the American press 
at all, and the Americans seldom acknowledge our ability or any of the effort 
we put in. " He particularly objected to what he perceived as an assumption that 
Britain was "down and out because of what she has done in this war. " Moreover, 
although he knew that discretion was a prerequisite of good relations, his gut 
reaction was that, "Britain should stand up for herself.... I do think the time 
has come when the world must realise that though we have paid such a terrible 
price in this war we are not down and out. We shall survive. " At the same time 
he felt it absolutely necessary that British resentment be overcome, faced as 
they were by the magnitude of world events, and this demanded controlling 
public opinion in both Britain and the United States: "If this is done I think 
the policy of the two countries can be harmonised and brought on the right 
lines. " (20) 
Key influences ecouraging both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime 
Minister toward closer association with the United States were Winston 
Churchill and Anthony Eden. Attlee had actually invited Churchill to return to 
Potsdam, "to come as a friend and counsellor and help on all the subjects on 
which we have been so long agreed. "(21) Churchill refused as he regarded the 
country's rejection of the Tories as a personal humiliation. However, 
Churchill's correspondence with Attlee and Bevin in the immediate postwar 
period illustrates that Churchill did not allow his momentary pique to prevent 
his playing an active role in postwar policy. Bevin kept Churchill fully 
informed of proceedings and Churchill advised the new Minister on strategy. The 
Anglo-American relationship was one of the subjects on which the former Tory 
- 181 - 
Prime Minister advised the new Labour Foreign Secretary, in a letter marked 
'Most Secret': 
The long term advantage to Britain and the Commonwealth is to have 
our affairs so interwoven with those of the United States in external and 
strategic matters, that any idea of war between the two countries is 
utterly impossible, and that in fact, however the matter may be worded, we 
stand or fall together. It does not seem likely that we should have to 
fall. In a world of measureless perils and anxieties, here is the rock of 
safety. (22) 
Churchill wanted Britain to press for Joint Occupation at all points as he 
believed it would greatly strengthen the power of the United States and the 
safety of Britain. He wanted Britain to insist upon going in on equal terms, 
feeling that although the United States was much more powerful, Britain had "so 
much to give". He was resolutely opposed to "the characteristic Halifax slant 
that we should melt it all down into a vague United Nations Trusteeship. " He 
argued that a special and privileged relationship between Britain and the States 
meant both safety and influence. 
Churchill's letter was full of religious overtones, clearly intended to add 
moral authority to his words. Discussing the necessity of close relations with 
the United States, Churchill intoned, "Whom God has joined together, let no man 
put asunder". Churchill told Bevin that if the British Commonwealth and the 
United States were for strategic purposes one organism, they would be better 
able to fulfill their duties to mankind and all states and nations: 
The future of the world depends upon the fraternal association of Great 
Britain and the Commonwealth with the United States. With that, there can 
be no war. Without it, there can be no peace. The fact that strategically 
the English-speaking world is bound together, will enable us to be all the 
better friends with Soviet Russia, and will win us the repect of that 
realistic State. Strategically united, we need have no fear of letting 
them come out into the great waters and have the fullest efflorescence as 
their numbers and their bravery deserve. 
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Stripped of rhetoric, Churchill was essentially saying that together the Western 
Allies could better contain the Soviet Union. Churchill's conclusion illustrated 
the type of rhetoric from which Bevin and the Foreign Office were to construct 
their Cold War theology: 
What we may be able to achieve is, in fact, Salvation for ourselves, 
and the means of procuring Salvation for the world. 
You are indeed fortunate that this sublime opportunity has fallen to 
you, and I trust the seizing of it will ever be associated with your name. 
In all necessary action you should count on me, if I can be of any use. 
Churchill was put to use, in a politically significant strategy which 
involved the collusion of the American Administration. The occasion was 
Churchill's notorious Fulton speech, delivered on March 5,1946, at Fulton, 
Missouri in the presence of the President and high ranking American officials. 
It created a storm. Both the American and British Administrations, still 
formally allied to the Soviet Union, went through a ritual of separating 
themselves from Churchill's ideas, although the historical record subsequently 
confirmed that both parties were privy to the contents of the speech, their 
agreement and approval expressed beforehand to Churchill who expressed his 
willingness to accept sole responsibility. (23) 
In many ways the speech was used as a barometer of public opinion and to 
test the response to a policy of anti-Communism and Soviet containment. What 
it revealed was the necessity of 'educating' the public, making it conscious of 
the Communist threat as perceived by the Foreign Office and outlined by Bevin 
in a paper dated April 23,1946. This argued that Britain had no choice but 
immediately to defend itself in every possible way and everywhere, including 
countering Soviet policy and propaganda. Bevin suggested a British campaign 
which was to be directed "against Communism as such (which we should frankly 
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expose as totalitarianism) rather than against the policy of the Soviet 
Government. " The Prime Minister approved the paper and I Kirkpatrick was asked 
by Mr Harvey's Committee to convene a working party to consider ways and means 
of implementing the propaganda recommendation. The working party endorsed the 
need to inform the general public as to the nature of the Soviet Communist 
threat and concluded that the campaign would be a long term affair, "since it 
will be in essence an education campaign. " The aim was "a steady drip rather 
than a sudden gush. "(24) 
The working party clearly felt that the acts of the Soviet Government 
would have provided more scope for propaganda than the essence of Communism, 
and complained that the programme would not be easy to execute, particularly as 
its efficacy would depend largely on British policy as propaganda could not 
operate in isolation. Here it drew an analogy with the success of wartime 
propaganda: "We were not inhibited by the fear that the Germans would find out 
what we were doing, or that they might react or that we might be criticised. " 
A necessary part of the endeavour included influencing the Home press and 
foreign correspondents in the right direction. The working party posited that 
this would have to be very carefully and gradually done, pointing out that 
unlike the Russians they did not control domestic organs of publicity. However, 
the Foreign Office actually wielded considerable influence with the press. As 
safeguarding the Anglo-American relationship in 1945 had required media 
cooperation, so did the 'exposure' of the Soviet menace in 1946. Shortly after 
Churchill had delivered his Fulton speech, the Foreign Office made a secret 
recommendation that the Secretary of State should send for Mr Barrington Ward 
and give him a straight talk regarding the editorials in the Times which often 
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opposed Government policy; as the Foreign Office put it, "some urgent measure is 
necessary to prevent The Times - as so often happens when there is an issue 
with Russia - from again outflanking the British position. " The Foreign Office 
noted that the editor, Mr Carr, probably knew that he might not be remaining 
for very much longer in Printing House Square and might use his remaining time 
opportunistically. This made countermeasures a necessity. Mr Ridsdale, the 
Foreign Office press officer, encouraged Mr Ewer of the Daily Herald to produce 
a counter-blast, and suggested correspondence to the Times by unofficial people 
of standing, "e. g. a few ex-Ambassadors who clearly cannot agree with the Carr 
line, " criticising and protesting against some of his leaders. (25) 
Subsequently Mr Barrington Ward was sent for and J. A. Henderson minuted 
his meeting with Bevin on March 11: 
The Secretary of State took the opportunity of complaining to Mr 
Barrington Ward about the "jellyfish attitude of the Times on all important 
matters of foreign affairs". As soon as a clear issue of right and wrong 
such as had arisen in Greece comes before the world the Times drums home 
to all its readers the need for a useless compromise. So spineless was the 
bearing of the Times on all foreign matters that it had forfeited all 
rights to call itself a national newspaper. (26) 
Although the proposed propaganda was meant to deal with Communism rather 
than the acts of the Soviet Government, the press was encouraged to print 
adverse material about Soviet activity by the Foreign Office, which itself 
provided the material. When in mid-1946 the Daily Herald refused to publish 
certain information given to their representative in Berlin, on the alleged 
ground that they were anxious not to appear anti-Soviet, RMA Hankey decided 
that it was time for the Foreign Office to define their requirements more 
specifically. (27) The fact that Britain was still officially allied to the 
Soviet Union and that the Government spoke in the rhetoric of cooperation 
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clearly confused press representatives. In August 1946, Hankey 
explained to the Prime Minister that the British press was reluctant to 
publish anti-Soviet material, "... partly because of a shortage of paper 
and partly because of a general feeling that it is not the wish of the 
Government and is not in the public interest to say material unpalatable 
to the Russians. " Hankey argued that the time had come when it would be 
very useful if direct encouragement could be given to the press to 
publish such facts: "Even if paper is short this should not preclude 
periodical messages being printed in all newspapers. This would bring us 
more neatly into line with the Americans whose press does not suffer 
from the same inhibitions. ": 
If you agree, I should like the press office at No. 10 and also 
the News Department at the Foreign Office to cooperate in giving 
confidential guidance to editors to the effect that in the 
Government's view it is definitely in the public interest that a 
steady stream of information should be published showing what is 
happening in countries behind the Iron Curtain, and also that 
reliable British journalists (and not local string-men subject to 
local pressure) should be sent to those countries, periodically at 
least, in order to get reliable information. (28) 
By August 1946 the Foreign Office were beginning to realise the 
important role that propaganda was to assume in their anti-Soviet 
policies. The creation of an anti-Communist consensus became a major 
Foreign Office preoccupation, extended to include even administrative 
colleagues. Sir Orme Sargent, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, considered other Government offices insufficiently aware of the 
Communist threat; in early 1946 he informed the Permanent Under 
Secretaries at the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office 
that the Foreign Office wanted information for their periodical surveys 
which required all the various Missions to follow the general pattern of 
Soviet policy & be alert for such things as developments in Malaya. This 
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was intended to alert officialdom to the gravity of the Communist threat: 
"Another point we had in mind in initiating this correspondence was that we 
want to make the Colonial Office themselves more communist conscious than they 
are at present. " (29) This made the Colonial Office response that they were not 
anticipating any sensational Communist moves and proposed only to send 
quarterly appreciations to the Foreign Office unsatisfactory and disappointing. 
It was in April 1946 that, at the request of Christopher Warner, head of 
the Northern Department, the Russia Committee was created, an interdepartmental 
body, composed of deputy and assistant under-secretaries and counsellors of the 
Foreign Office. (30) The object of this committee was to co-ordinate policy 
towards Russia. (31) The Russia Committee was centrally involved in the British 
interpretation of, and reactions to, the Cold War. The Committee discussed all 
important telegrams and reports concerning Soviet activities and, in time, 
itself commissioned studies of Soviet policy in various areas of the world. The 
Russia Committee was intended to form an overview of Soviet foreign policy and 
consider what action, political, economic, or in the publicity field, should be 
taken. (32) 
In this same period, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
Sir Orme Sargent, wanted to initiate more than consciousness raising about, and 
passive surveillance of, Communism. On June 21,1946, he circulated all H. M. 
Representatives in Eastern Europe asking for their responses to the 
implementation of an active anti-Communist policy. (33) Sargent was forced to 
endure yet more disappointment as the bulk of the replies opposed the 
instigation of specific anti-Communist measures on the grounds that they would 
be counter-productive, if not detrimental to British interests. (34) By the end 
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of November 1946, the Foreign Office conceded that the only practicable 
strategy for their anti-Communist campaign in Eastern Europe was propaganda: 
As regards the formulation of a general policy for Eastern Europe in face 
of the Soviet threat, I think it is clear from the letters under 
consideration that such a policy can only cover publicity. That is to say, 
we can make up our minds what line we are going to take about Communism 
in our propaganda to Eastern Europe, and apply it in each country with the 
necessary variants - which cannot, however, be very great - but the 
political situation in the area is too complex for us to be able to lay 
down a general line in regard to political action - i. e. the extent to 
which we can support Social Democratic parties. (35) 
British propaganda to Eastern Europe aimed at spreading dissent and 
discord among the people: "We clearly cannot afford to allow this important 
mass of European manpower to be turned into an active and cohesive bloc 
against us. " The Foreign Office regarded it as essential from the point of view 
of British military and strategic security, particularly the security of Greece 
and Turkey, to expose the Communists and their methods and to encourage other 
progressive elements to stand up to them. (36) Propaganda was also proving to 
be the main weapon against Communism and the Soviet Union in the Vest. 
From the beginning Britain had adopted a tough stance toward the Soviet 
Union in negotiations for peace, while never failing to blame Soviet 
intransigence for the resulting wrangling. Moreover, Britain had encouraged her 
Western Allies to adopt the same uncompromising position as being the only 
method of negotiation possible with the Russians. After his Fulton speech and 
his discussions with American leaders, Churchill had reported with evident 
satisfaction to Attlee and Bevin: "I am convinced that some show of strength 
and resisting power is necessary to a good settlement with Russia. I predict 
that this wil be the prevailing opinion in the United States in the near 
future. " (37) 
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In September 1946, in light of the difficulties of the discussions at the 
Paris Peace Conference, Mr Roberts of the Moscow Embassy recommended to the 
Foreign Office that Britain should not be quite as brusque in their diplomatic 
handling of the Russians as the Americans and Australians had been at Paris. 
Roberts further suggested that although the hope of achieving a general 
settlement seemed illusory, we could none the less live side by side and 
continue to work for practical agreements with definite and limited objectives. 
CFA Warner thought that what Roberts meant was an uneasy balance of power with 
ad hoc arrangements, which he also considered attainable. (38) However, Roberts' 
view appeared far too optimistic to Thomas Brimelow in the Foreign Office, who 
responded with a lengthy analysis of Russian intentions and the necessary 
British responses. These are worth examining because they were endorsed by RNA 
Hankey who noted that the Foreign Office was already doing most of what Mr 
Brimelow proposed. Thus Brimelow's paper is important because it reveals not 
only how the Foreign Office mind was working just over a year after the end of 
hostilities, but also because it reveals how active it already was on the anti- 
Communist, anti-Soviet front. (39) 
Hitler's Invasion of Russia had wreaked terrible devastation on the 
country and people, much worse than in any of the other countries which 
suffered Nazi occupation. At the end of the war Russia was faced with enormous 
tasks of reconstruction. Although Brimelow acknowledged the present weakness 
of the Soviet Union, he saw this as merely temporary and drew a powerful 
picture of Russia's future strength as a vast land empire containing nearly all 
the raw materials necessary for a war economy and an industry capable of 
supporting in the field armies substantially larger than those of any other 
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country in Europe or Asia. He argued that as Russian strength increased, so 
would the rapidity of their process of seizing, consolidating and undermining as 
a preliminary to further seizures. This precluded the possibility of coexistence 
without active emnity. Moreover, the Russians were convinced that there would be 
a showdown with the West sooner or later and nothing the West could do would 
alter this conviction. Unable to prevent the inevitable clash, Brimelow argued: 
"It behoves us to strengthen our position and the position of the countries in 
which we are interested against Communist undermining, and to begin doing so 
now. " Significantly, he added that although unable to improve matters, "it does 
lie within our power to make them worse more quickly. This we should try at all 
costs to avoid": 
In Great Britain a general realisation of the pattern of Soviet policy will 
only come about slowly, and while it is forming every allowance will be 
made to the Russians and none to the Foreign Office. The result of this 
will be a split in public opinion between those who blame the Russians and 
those who blame the Foreign Secretary. If we are to keep this split to the 
smallest possible proportions - and this we must do if we are to reduce 
the effectiveness of Communist propaganda inside this country - we shall 
have to show patience, forbearance and a strict correctness in all our 
dealings with the Russians. We cannot afford to be in the wrong. 
Among Brimelow's suggestions for tackling the Communist threat, which 
included undermining Communist parties and establishing Britain's own parallel 
to the Lenin school at Moscow, was the suggestion of a British doctrine to 
counter that of Communism: "We must have a basic, logical, coherent and sober 
doctrine that will be acceptable to men of common sense everywhere, and that we 
can oppose to the Communist ideology of struggle, hate and revolution. "(40) 
Within the Foreign Office, and elsewhere, there was a growing conviction that 
the West needed an ideology with which to challenge that of Communism. 
Moreover, this need became an imperative as the realisation grew that the 
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struggle with Russia was increasingly concentrated within the realm of 
propaganda. Not only had this factor been illustrated by the response of the 
diplomats in Eastern Europe, but Sir Charles Nichols, the Ambassador in Prague, 
had specifically stated: "... if we wish to combat Communism we must produce an 
alternative system or way of life which will, if possible, command an equal 
devotion. " He had further warned that, "A merely negative attitude to Communism 
will not suffice. " That a constructive alternative to Communism was better than 
a destructive offensive-defensive was a principle already agreed in the Foreign 
Office. It was the construction of an alternative that remained problematic. 
Nichols posited that Communism was a form of religion whose devotees were 
fanatics capable of greater efforts and sacrifices than members of other 
political parties; he suggested Christianity or Democratic Socialism as possible 
alternative systems with which to counter the Communist appeal: 
There is perhaps only one system or way of life in the world today which 
could fill this role and that is Christianity, and in particular Roman 
Catholicism. But neither Christianity in general nor Roman Catholicism in 
particular are political creeds and it is doubtful how far they could be 
mobilised in this guise. Nevertheless, if we were to contemplate a holy 
war against Communism I hardly see how we could avoid finding ourselves 
allied, willy-nilly, with the Catholic Church. However, leaving 
Christianity on one side, there is one alternative to Communism which we 
could project and propagate and that is democratic Socialism, or as it may 
be termed, "Socialism without dictatorship" - in short, social democracy as 
we understand it and are now implementing it. (41) 
The Foreign Office was already authorised to do propaganda in favour of 
Social Democracy, with a view to demonstrating its superiority over Communism 
as a political creed. (42) Although the Christian Churches had not been 
officially approached at this stage to add their spiritual authority to the 
anti-Communist campaign, Christianity traditionally opposed Communism and the 
Churches traditionally supported Government policy. The major problem for the 
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Foreign Office was that while it had to maintain a semblance of trying to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union, it could not attack it as forcefully as it 
desired; and, at the same time, it lacked an inspirational ideology which could 
be used to counter that of Communism. The Foreign Office did use British 
Church leaders, but they were always cautious, concerned, as during the war, not 
to risk compromising the Church, thereby creating unwelcome political 
repercussions. The Foreign Office took care to maintain friendly relations with 
the Vatican, but regarded anti-Communist propaganda from that source as 
severely compromised by its reactionary associations. Moreover, too close an 
association with Roman Catholicism risked charges of reaction, particularly 
during this period when many of the more reactionary elements in Europe were 
girding themselves as Christian Democrats. 
The problems of using Christianity as a political rationale were still 
less, however, than those which the use of Democratic Socialism would create for 
Anglo-American amity. While the Foreign Office might confuse the terms 
Democratic Socialism and Social Democracy, preferring the latter, the fact was 
that neither creed would be acceptable to the capitalist administration of the 
United States as the basis of a Western doctrine intended as an alternative to 
Communism. The Foreign Office already had sufficient problems convincing 
certain sectors of America that neither Attlee nor Bevin, or indeed any of the 
Labour Government, were not themselves Communists. 
Nonetheless, the formation of a Western doctrine remained an important 
element of Britain's Cold War strategy. However, it was not until the public 
breakdown of relations between the powers that the Foreign Office was able to 
pursue and implement effective propaganda incorporating an anti-Communist 
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doctrine, supported both by Government policy and the British public. The 
breakdown over the German question supposedly speared the search for some 
alternative system of security. Although the Foreign Office did not openly 
pursue its offensive-defensive strategies until the category of events, 
involving the Stalinization of Europe, for which the Marshall Plan undoubtedly 
acted as a catalyst in late 1947 and 1948, it is clear that the Foreign Office 
never assumed that the general structure of peace would be based on cooperation 
between the Great Powers. Although this concept was allegedly not abandoned 
until the failure to resolve the crisis over Germany, it is noteable how quickly 
the Marshall Plan evolved from an economic concept in mid-1947 to the political 
and military sphere in 1948. The Brussels Treaty, described as the hardcore of 
the European system, was signed on March 17,1948. This was soon followed by 
the Atlantic Pact, which, for the first time, committed the United States and 
Canada to the defence of Western Europe, an achievement of what was indubitably 
the major objective of British foreign policy from the end of the war. 
The pursuit of American involvement in Europe is particularly well 
illustrated by Bevin's corollary roles in implementing first the Truman 
Doctrine, following Britain's semi-withdrawal from Greece, and the Marshall Plan 
which evolved from the Truman Doctrine. These events are already well and 
revealingly documented to show the political motives behind the idealistic 
rhetoric. (43) While the public formulations of the Marshall Plan took every 
precaution to avoid the stigma of anti-Sovietism, the real nature of the 
proceedings and what Bevin hoped would emerge from them for Britain, was 
illustrated during three days of talks between the British and Americans in 
London just before the meeting in Paris with Molotov and Bidault. Bevin tried 
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to convince the Americans to recognise Britain as a special partner in 
whatever emerged from the Marshall discussions. Britain, Bevin argued, 
was on a different basis from other European countries and should not be 
"lumped in" as just one more country. The anti-Soviet theme was 
stressed: "If the UK was considered just another European country, this 
would fit in with Russian strategy, namely, that the US would encounter 
a slump and withdraw from Europe; Europe would be helpless and out of 
dollars, and as merely another European country, the Russians, in 
command of the Continent, could deal with Britain in due course. "(44) 
The Marshall Plan was portrayed to the British public as an act of 
overwhelming and disinterested generosity on the part of the Americans, 
with no political strings, an image Russia's inclusion was meant to 
confirm. The psychological impact of Marshall Aid was one of the most 
significant factors shaping the political development of postwar 
Britain, not just the population at large, but much more importantly, 
those on the Labour Left who had been bitterly apposed to Bevin's 
foreign policy. For two years following the Labour Government's 
assumption of power in the summer of 1945, there was severe and 
continuous criticism of many parts of Benin's general policy. Bevin's 
continuation of the Coalition Government's policies in Greece aroused 
a great deal of opposition within the Labour Party. The debate on 
foreign-policy in November 1946 revealed the widely supported demand 
for a "Socialist alternative". Then the Government's "drift into 
the American camp" was vigorously attacked by RHS Crossman, one of 
Bevin's most vociferous critics. In the voting on the crucial 
amendment about 120 M. P. s were not accounted for. Within two 
months the "Keep Left" was officially formed, mostly of members of 
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what would later be called the "Bevanite" group. Their aim in foreign 
policy was to work for a "third force" between the two superpowers and 
independent of both blocs. (45) 
It was Marshall Aid and the political initiatives of the Labour 
Administration, against a background of a rising level of diplomatic 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the West, that began to alter 
quite dramatically the politics of the Left within the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, and outside in the wider movement. By 1948 Grossman was 
announcing in the Commons his conversion from total opposition to 
Bevin's policies and his support for the American initiatives; and in 
the American liberal weekly The Nation he condemned Russian hostility in 
Iran and again called for a third force with the socialist parties of 
Western Europe. It was in 1948 that the attitudes toward President 
Truman changed and he began to be regarded as America's version of 
Clement Attlee. His re-election was greeted with enthuthiasm by many of 
the Parliamentary Left. There was a small group of genuinely 
independent socialists who remained opposed to Bevin and his policies; 
but in 1948 and 1949 most of the serious critics of Labour's approach to 
foreign affairs were expelled from the Labour Party. (46) 
Significantly, in the formulation of British propaganda to support 
the Western Union on which America insisted before Marshall Aid 
began, Mr Mayhew in the Foreign Office suggested that the term "third 
force" could "be used generally for the anti-Communist forces to 
which we are anxious to give a lead. "(47) This was opposed by 
Warner and others in the Foreign Office who considered it quite 
impossible and inappropriate to use the term for those forces in 
British publicity to the Middle and Far East; and even in Western 
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Europe, the term already had a specific connotation in French politics and could 
not, it was felt, readily be taken over by the Foreign Office and given a 
different connotation. A further consideration making Warner anxious that the 
term not be used in such a way as to become part of the basic directive in the 
Foreign Office's new publicity line was that it might be viewed badly in Canada, 
"and once we have started using it, it would be very awkward to slither out of 
it, supposing that the close association in policy with the U. S. A. which our 
security and our material needs force upon us was found to make it 
inappropriate, " (48) 
Regardless of Warner's anxiety, Bevin proceeded to use the term in his 
January 1948 paper to the Cabinet on "Future Foreign Publicity Policy"; in such 
a way, moreover, as to suggest that Bevin wanted Britain to lead in that sphere: 
In my paper on "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy" (C. P. (48)6) 
I have shown that the Russian and Communist Allies are threatening the 
whole fabric of Western civilisation, and I have drawn attention to the 
need to mobilise spiritual forces, as well as material and political, for 
its defence. It is for us, as Europeans and as a Social Democratic 
Government, and not the Americans, to give the lead in (the) spiritual, 
moral and political sphere to all the democratic elements in Western 
Europe which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely 
progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social 
justice - what one might call the "Third Force. "(49) 
In this same paper, Bevin insisted that past British publicity, despite 
vicious attack from Soviet propaganda, had been confined to explaining and 
promoting the British way of life. Now something far more positive was clearly 
required and Britain must be prepared to pass over to the offensive. Bevin 
called for a rival ideology based on Christianity and Social Democracy: 
We cannot hope successfully to repel Communism only by disparaging 
it on material grounds, and must add a positive appeal to Democratic and 
Christian principles, remembering the strength of Christian sentiment in 
Europe. We must put forward a positive rival ideology. We must stand on 
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the broad principles of Social Democracy which, in fact, has its basis in 
the value of civil liberty and human rights. 
This policy was, of course, not new, and had in fact been being developed 
and implemented over a considerable period. The effort to construct an 
appealing ideology extended back to the struggle against Hitler's New Order, 
were Christianity and ideas of social justice had both been called into play. 
Hitler's possible conquest of Europe had unrelentingly been portrayed as a 
threat to Christian civilisation. Churchill's Fulton speech had referred to 
Soviet expansionism as a threat to Christian civilisation. Thus Bevin was 
treading a well established and well prepared path when on March 3,1948, he 
presented to the Cabinet a paper on "The Threat to Western Civilisation". This 
followed the events in Czechoslovakia and Finland which provided the 
justification for Bevin to take his proposals for Western Union that step 
further toward a military treaty, something which before he had hinted at only 
very inferentially in his public disclosures. (50) 
"The Threat to Western Civilisation" was actually written by Gladwyn Jebb 
in early February, prior to the Prague coup. (51) Bevin cited Communist 
aggression in Czechoslovakia and Finland to convince his cabinet colleagues 
that Britain would now have to go wider than the initial friendly intent of the 
original limited approach to Western Union as, "It really has become a matter of 
the defense of western civilisation, or everyone will be swamped by this Soviet 
method of infiltration. " To gain Cabinet support for proceeding, instead of with 
bilateral treaties, with a multilateral economic, cultural and defence pact with 
France and Benelux which could be left open for accession by other Western 
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European democracies, Bevin drew a harrowing picture of Soviet activities and 
intentions: 
There is only one conclusion to draw. After all the efforts that have 
been made and the appeasement that we followed to try and get a real 
friendly settlement on a four-Power basis, not only is the Soviet 
Government not prepared at the present stage to cooperate in any real 
sense with any non-Communist or non-Communist controlled Government, but 
it is actively preparing to extend its hold over the remaining part of 
continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East and no doubt 
the bulk of the Far East as well. In other words, physical control of the 
Eurasian land mass and eventual control of the whole World Island is what 
the Politburo is aiming at - no less a thing than that. The immensity of 
the aim should not betray us into believing in its impracticability. 
Indeed, unless positive and vigorous steps are shortly taken by those 
other states who are in a position to take them, it may well be that 
within the next few months or even weeks the Soviet Union will gain 
political and strategical advantages which will set the great Communist 
machine in action, leading either to the establishment of a World 
Dictatorship or (more probably) to the collapse of organised society over 
great stretches of the globe. 
All our evidence indeed points to the probable staging by the Soviet 
Government of further efforts in this direction during the next few weeks 
or months. We cannot be sure where exactly this showdown will take place 
nor even that it will not occur in several places at once. All we know 
for certain (since the Cominform has proclaimed it openly) is that its 
object will be the frustration by one means or another of the European 
Recovery Programme and the consequent development of a situation in which 
the Communist cause will triumph in many countries largely as a result of 
a process of economic decay. But this does not mean that the Soviet 
Government are determined to have their way whatever the outside world 
may say or do. There is no reason even now to suppose that it could 
possibly welcome the World War which would undoubtedly result from its 
overstepping the mark. It is commonly accepted Communist doctrine that no 
issue should be forced until the moment is ripe and victory almost 
certain. If, therefore, the upholders of true democracy and opponents of 
dictatorship can present a really united front, and if the necessary 
economic means are made available by those who have them, the danger of 
war is, in my opinion, not imminent. Indeed it is my considered view that 
the only danger of war arises from the non-fulfilment of those two 
conditions. Provided they are fulfilled I believe that Communism will be 
forced onto the defensive and that for many years at any rate we may look 
forward to a period of relative calm. (52) 
The fact that Bevin represented these views, which were actually those of 
Gladwyn Jebb, as his own considered opinion, is in itself a testimony to the 
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symbiotic relationship between himself and the Foreign Office. It was equally a 
demonstration of how quickly the Foreign Office were able to expand and develop 
Bevin's views, when compared to his January proposals when the emphasis was 
merely that Britain should adopt a more positive anti-Communist stance. Then, 
in his consideration of Britain's anti-Communist publicity, Bevin had stated: "In 
general we should emphasise the weakness of Communism rather than its 
strength. Contemporary American propaganda, which stresses the strength and 
aggressiveness of Communism, tends to scare and unbalance the anti-Communists, 
while heartening the fellow-travellers and encouraging the Communists to bluff 
more extravagantly. Our propaganda, by dwelling on Russia's poverty and 
backwardness, could be expected to relax rather than raise the international 
tension. "(53) The Foreign Office realised however that if they were to secure 
their overall aims with regard to Western Union and American aid, then they 
needed to emphasise international tension. The "Threat to Western Civilisation" 
was considered by the Cabinet at their 19th meeting on March 5, and Bevin's 
recommendations were endorsed. On March 7, diplomatic representatives of the 
United Kingdom, France, the Metherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg net in Brussels 
to negotiate what became the Brussels Treaty, agreeing to economic, social and 
cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. Gladwyn Jebb was the 
British representative. Following the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 
1?, Jebb was dispatched to Washington with instructions, in his own words, "to 
find out how the land lay and, generally speaking, to put the case, in very 
informal and non-committal talks, for the early formation of something like an 
Atlantic alliance. "(54) Bevin's paper had recommended the necessity of Britain 
bringing the real facts of the situation home to the Americans. 
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A further, and very important, recommendation endorsed by the Cabinet had 
been that steps should be taken to associate the Christian Churches in Britain 
with H. M. G. 's policy regarding Western Union. The Cabinet agreed that the 
Foreign Secretary should himself take whatever action he thought appropriate to 
this end. Following this, Bevin personally net with the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and Cardinal Griffin. Subsequently, Bevin agreed with the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, a committed and active Christian, that 
the latter should henceforward assume the primary responsibility for pursuing 
the matter, and should in particular see the Moderators of the Church of 
Scotland and of the Free Churches. (55) Letters had been despatched to these 
latter two gentlemen on March 12, asking them to call on the Foreign Secretary 
at a convenient opportunity, "in order to discuss certain questions connected 
with our present foreign policy. "(56) 
Neither the recommendation, nor the decision, to associate the British 
Churches with Britain's Cold War foreign policy, was mentioned by Lord Gladwyn 
in his memoirs. Nor is there any record in the Foreign Office documents of 
Bevin's meetings with either Archbishop Fisher or Cardinal Griffin. The only 
indication that they happened was correspondence from the Foreign Office to the 
Treasury on March 15,1948, informing the latter of the letters sent to the 
Moderators and enclosing copies, and noting that the Foreign Secretary had 
already met with the Archbishops following the March 5 Cabinet meeting. (57) 
The decision to involve the Churches officially seems to have been 
implemented before it was discussed at Cabinet level. Bevin had announced his 
intention to mobilise spiritual forces in the series of papers he presented to 
the Cabinet in early January. In "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy", he 
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had categorically stated: "It is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers 
which still guard our Western civilisation. We must also organise and 
consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces inherent in this Western 
civilisation of which we are the chief protagonists. "(58) Moreover, Gladwyn's 
"Threat to Western Civilisation" note was written in early February 1948, 
immediately after which plans were made for a meeting of officials in Brussels 
and a trip to the United States. Thus, it is hardly surprising that before 
official endorsement was given to associating the Churches with foreign policy, 
both Archbishops spoke out forcefully in terms which projected a conflict 
between Christianity and Communism. 
On the last day of February 1948, the Archbishop of Canterbury, at a 
meeting in Lambeth, declared his opposition to Communism: "Creeping across 
Europe is a political power that denies all things that in the English family 
we value above life itself. It is a creed in which there is not discussion but 
force. "(59) Fisher's statement received immediate support from Cardinal Griffin 
who one week later was even more explicit in projecting the politcal conflict as 
one between Christianity and Communism: 
Europe, and in fact the world, is faced with a great challenge. That 
challenge is whether we are going to be for God or against God. Whether 
we are going to defend the rights of God and the personal rights of man 
or submit to a system which makes men slaves while masquerading under the 
name of democracy. Where the rights of God are ignored, the rights of man 
are denied; he becomes a slave and not a citizen, a tool in the hands of 
unscrupulous dictators. (60) 
Christianity was traditionally associated with emnity to atheistic 
Communism. However, the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, the subsequent 
formation of the United Nations and official Government policy of four-Power 
cooperation, suppressed any major public venting of clerical anti-Communist 
-201- 
sentiment. This was unleashed by the Archbishop of Canterbury's own attack at 
the end of February. One such example appeared in the Sunday Graphic on March 
7,1948. Written by the Sub-Dean of the Chapels Royal, the Reverend W. H. Elliot, 
the article, "Challenge of the Hour", was clearly inspired by Fisher's address 
and reflected Bevin's new publicity line, particularly the equating of Nazism 
and Communism. (61) Calling for the "forces of the spirit" to combat Communism, 
it echoed Fisher's "Creeping across Europe... " statement: "Look at the shadow 
creeping across Europe. Austria comes next, then Italy, then France. The old 
game! Remember what we said about Munich! "(62) On March 11, the Christian 
World devoted its front page to an attack on "Communism", etched in headline in 
large bold letters. Pleading the necessity for "as yet free" people to realise, 
"the evil, the anti-Christian nature of the Communist conspiracy", the Christian 
Vorld urged its readers to hate Communism: 
Our first Christian duty with regard to Communism is to hate it with 
a mortal hatred, to teach our children to hate it, and if it ever comes to 
the point of actual conflict, to fight it with as fierce a resolution as 
that with which we fought Nazism. (63) 
The surge of ecclesiastical anti-Communism following Fisher's statement 
Zed Stanley Evans, constantly alert to the political nuances of Anglican 
behaviour, particularly the leadership, to observe in the left-wing monthly 
newsletter, Religion and the People: "A new 'Christian' attack on Communism has 
begun. In Great Britain it is headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury. "(64) 
while Religion and the People was right in claiming the attack to be new, as it 
das in the respect that it was more widespread than previously, this did not 
Kean that ecclesiastical anti-Communism had not existed before 1948. Indeed, 
by 
mid-1947 a significant anti-Communist movement was already, evident within 
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the Church: significant because it involved the higher echeleons and men of 
standing. Widely respected in the Church of England was the Community of the 
Resurection. In the latter half of 1947 its quarterly newspaper published an 
article by Mark Tweedy, one of its members, attacking the Russian Orthodox 
Church, which the Foreign Office regarded as a medium capable of reconciling 
Christians to an acceptance of the Soviet regime. Tweedy argued that the 
Russian Orthodox Church was but a tolerated tool of the State which "would be 
liquidated overnight", should it indulge in politics. In the article Tweedy 
clearly addressed Russia as an enemy state and claimed the Soviet regime would 
not survive: 
Next Sunday, when you return from the altar to give thanks after your 
communion, will you join your prayers with some Ivan or Maria who has 
been doing the vey same thing away in the fastness of Russia which - 
though temporarily occupied by the enemy - is being daily prepared by the 
Lord on whom her faithful (near and far) continually call to manifest 
again the true riches of Russian Orthodox piety. (65) 
The Dean of Chichester's 1947 Battle of Britain Sunday sermon urged the 
maintenance of powerful armed forces in Britain because the country was now 
faced with an adversary worse than Nazism: 
Once more our beloved country is confronted by a foe still more 
ruthless than the Germans, though not so powerful. This foe is 
endeavouring to destroy us by plot and by propaganda, by open attacks, by 
secret machinations and by slander and abuse. In nearly every country of 
the world this foe employs its agents to weaken the influence of 
Britain. (66) 
The Dean subsequently explained to the press that the foe in question was 
Russia. 
The most overtly, political action taken by a high ranking Churchman in 
this period was that of the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell the Chairman of 
the Church of England Committee on Foreign Relations, who tried to secure a 
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resolution in the Convocation of Canterbury supporting a United States of 
Europe, prior to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in November 1947. While he 
spoke in terms of securing peace, the project clearly involved the formal 
division of Europe rather than unity, as was acknowledged by Bell in his 
speech: "If we cannot get a United States of Europe as a whole on the basis of 
freedom and respect for justice, then a beginning must be made with those 
states that are at present willing and can unite on this basis. " The resolution 
was opposed by Bishop Barnes of Birmingham, a pacifist and a socialist, and 
thus a figure of controversy in the conservative ranks of the Bishops. He 
recognised such a policy as divisive, not unifying, and admonished: "We should 
not seem to imply anything which can suggest an alienation of Western Europe 
from the Slav peoples, and, in particular, from the great Soviet Republics. "(67) 
In May 1945, Religion and the People observed the Church of England's 
manifestations of support for the Polish Government in London and the 
reactionary regime of Archbishop Damaskinos in Greece, and questioned the 
sincerity of its official support for Russia. The newsletter speculated whether 
the Church's wartime pro-Soviet, anti-fascist policy had come from conviction 
or was simply the belated following of Downing Street. After all, "It would be 
difficult to deny that between the wars the foreign policy of Canterbury was 
not wholly unlike that of Downing Street. It was anti-Russian and anti- 
Communist. Even though it found some difficulty in following Mr Chamberlain 
wholeheartedly - Hitler's policy with regard to the churches being a great 
embarrassment - there was no open breach and relatively few sermons were 
preached attacking the concentration camps. " The war brought change, and "as 
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the State has found a rapprochement with the Kremlin so Dr Garbett has visited 
the Patriarch. "(68) 
Just over a year later, in June 1946, Religion and the People returned to 
this same theme: "it would be difficult to deny that there is a certain relation 
between the official utterances of the churches, or the utterances of their 
highly placed spokesmen, and the dominating views'of the state in which they 
are expressed. "(69) The newsletter then gave examples of the Church of 
England's opposition to Moscow and Communism prior to 1941 compared to the 
support it gave after the Anglo-Soviet alliance. Following these, it proceeded 
to compare Christian support for the activities of the Soviet regime in 1943 
with Christian attacks on the very same activities in 1946, noting that while 
the activities had not changed, the political situation had. Particular emphasis 
was given to the transformation in attitude to relations with the Soviet Union 
of the British Council of Churches. In a 1943 report, "The Christian and World 
Problems", the BCC had not only stated, "the greatness of the Soviet 
achievements should be willingly acknowledged", it had posited, in line with 
official British foreign policy, that, "One of the supreme needs for the future 
peace and welfare of Europe is the removal of mutual suspicion and the 
development of cordial cooperation between the U. S. S. R. on the one hand and 
Britain and the U. S. A. upon the other. " In 1946, in, significantly, the Council's 
report on Atomic Power, the BCC cited the Soviet Union as the "greatest 
immediate obstacle to the realisation of world community". Noting that the 
Soviet Union repudiated the democratic tradition and was unrestrained by public 
opinion, the British Council of Churches warned: 
We must therefore be prepared for a period during which Russia will appear 
as the crucial obstacle to the emergence of world community and even as a 
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menace to world peace, and there might even be circumstances in which the 
Western democracies might find themselves confronted with a direct 
challenge, in which the use of force, or at any rate, the readiness to use 
force, might be the sole means remaining to them of defending their 
national existence and, what is equally important, of maintaining the 
conditions necessary for the emergence of world community. (70) 
At this juncture in mid-1946, this was the sort of publicity which the 
Foreign Office both desired and encouraged, aimed at converting the views of 
the British public from their wartime support of Russia into a suspicion and 
hostility which would support Britain's Cold War plans. An examination of the 
activities and statements of the Anglican leadership in the immediate postwar 
period reveals the extent to which the Church of England did follow Downing 
Street. This included participating in the Foreign Office's "education 
campaign", of which the Church leaders' consciousness was illustrated by the 
Archbishop of York's warning to Patrick Dean about the retention of affection 
and admiration for Russia in the North of England. (71) 
Initially the Foreign Office's anti-Communist propaganda was confined to 
overseas, while the pretence of friendship and seeking cooperation with the 
Soviet Union was maintained at home. Thus in his visit to Canada in September 
1946, a country recently swept by hysteria following atomic espionage trials, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury took the opportunity to attack Russia, something 
which he had not publicly done previously in Britain, and something which, 
significantly, the British press reports of the Archbishop's speeches in Canada 
omitted. (72) This attack came only six months after the furore created by 
Churchill's Fulton speech and at a time when Fisher was repudiating British 
appeals for him to lead an anti-Communist crusade. To one such request, 
shortly after the Canadian visit, Fisher had responded, "So far as this country 
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is concerned there is no need to attack Communism at present since it has so 
little influence and is losing a good deal of what it had. On occasion Church 
leaders have said what needed saying. "(73) 
The Foreign Office decision to take a more definitive anti-Communist line 
at home and to blame the Soviet Union for the deterioration in international 
relations, was reflected in the Archbishop of Canterbury's Diocesan Notes, in 
which in May 1947 he expressed similar sentiments to those he had first voiced 
in Canada in the autumn of 1946: 
While no nation can ignore its own national interests progress depends on 
their suborndination to frank and friendly cooperation on the basis of 
justice and good neighbourliness. Such subordination never easy, is made 
far more difficult by the fact that the Soviet Union has distorted 
conceptions of justice and good neighbourliness which antagonise good 
feeling and impede cooperation, and which lead them to blame others for 
actions which are the consequences of their own acts. (74) 
That Fisher was lining up politically was suggested when he took the chair 
for Winston Churchill at a United Europe meeting in the Albert Hall. "Mr 
Churchill, " said the Archbishop, "led Europe out of the jaws of death. He now 
leads it in a crusade for its continuing life and hope. " The question, he said, 
was whether a Europe near to death should now "sink into final chaos" or 
recover its life "by recovering its unity and that by recovering the spirit 
which created it. "(75) Despite the fact that the United Europe movement was 
claimed not to be anti-Soviet by many circles, Churchill's own speech most 
certainly was. Very shortly after this, in a complete turnabout and in decided 
contrast, Fisher made a statement to the British United Press in which he 
pleaded for patience and understanding between the Western democracies and 
Russia: 
This required readiness on one side to understand Russia's historical 
growth, and to appreciate her immense war losses and her genuine concern 
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to establish for the first time in Russia a coherent social code with a 
good standard of living for all its citizens. On the other side Russia 
must lay aside her suspicions of the Western Powers and cease her 
unfortunate habit of attacking the statesmen of other nations and 
attributing to them dishonest motives. She must come to believe that 
there was real goodwill ready to meet Russia, and she must be ready to 
encourage the free interchange of thought and experience with other 
peoples, and to abolish the barriers of secrecy. (76) 
This abrupt reversal of attitude toward Russia followed Bevin's 
welcoming the inclusion of that nation Russia in Marshall Aid. The 
Marshall Plan, with the institutional developments that came into being 
in order to implement its proposals, confirmed the division of Europe 
into East and West blocs. It was essential, however, that it not appear 
as a divisive element as this could only generate opposition in Britain 
and on the Continent. Thus in the period following its announcement 
there was a pronounced emphasis on the West's desire for friendship with 
the Soviet Union, as the changed attitude of the Archbishop of 
Canterbury illustated when he said: "the only method of safeguarding 
world peace was the long and patient one of approaching an international 
understanding instead of opposition between Russia and other States 
whose ideas of the meaning of democracy were not the same as Russia's. " 
Reiterating the Government line, Fisher declared this was of course a 
long term policy, Soviet suspicion and hostility leaving the West no 
alternative but to combine in its own defence, an action which the 
Russians must understand concealed no aggressive intent nor the wish to 
engender aggression: "the Western democracies would have to reaffirm and 
protect the fundamental principles of the freedom for which they stood. 
Russia must not take this as being aggressive, and on her side must show 
evidence that she did not wish to be aggressive either. "(77) 
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That the Archbishop was responding to political expediency in speaking of 
a raprochement with Russia at some future time, is illustrated not only by the 
contrast with his previous sentiments, but also by the fact that within two 
months of these statements Fisher became party to the anti-Communist 
collaboration between the President of the Unites States and the Pope being 
effected through Truman's personal emmissary to the Vatican, Myron Taylor. In 
mid-August 1947, President Truman announced Taylor's return to the Vatican and 
his mission to seek the views of His Holiness and other leaders in Europe on 
problems relative to the establishment of peace under a moral world order and 
the alleviation of suffering, plus: "to obtain the energetic cooperation of all 
men and women of goodwill, whether in religion, in government, or in other 
activities of life, in the interest of progress toward the resolution of these 
problems. "(78) Before proceeding to Rome via Paris, Taylor spent a few days in 
London where he had discussions with Fisher. 
After his arrival in Rome, on August 26 Taylor had the longest audience 
ever granted by the Pope to a diplomatic representative in recent years. (79) 
The New York Times reported that although relations between the United States 
and the Vatican had not had the closeness since the end of the war as during 
Roosevelt's time, it was believed that the Taylor visit would mark the beginning 
of intense collaboration. On August 28 the White House and the Vatican made 
public an exchange of letters between the President and the Pope which pledged 
to each other to work together for lasting peace in the world. The President's 
letter, dated August 6, denounced "the chains of collectivist organisation" as 
destructive of the God-given rights of man. Truman called for a renewal of 
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faith" the world over "to the end that the individual's sacred rights, inherent 
in his relation to God, will be respected in every land. 
Pope Pius was no less emphatic in placing the rights of the individual 
ahead of those of civic society. In his reply, the Pontiff observed that "once 
the state, to the exclusion of God, makes itself the source of the rights of the 
human person, man is forthwith reduced to the condition of a slave or a mere 
civic commodity to be exploited for the selfish aims of a group that happens to 
have power. 
The President made it clear in his letter that he sought to cooperate with 
the Vatican for world peace and had instructed Myron Taylor to pledge the same 
cooperation to every leader of the world's moral forces. Truman said that he 
had requested Taylor to return to Rome to resume the audiences with the Pontiff 
that "have already contributed profoundly toward a sound and lasting peace and 
to the strengthening of the impelling convictions pursued by peoples of the 
world in their quest for a moral world order firmly established in the life of 
nations. " These moral principles were to be found the world over, the President 
said, wherever the principles of free cooperation and voluntary association in 
self-government were honoured. He said the war had demonstrated that all 
persons, regardless of divergent religious allegiances, could unite to preserve 
freedom, morality and justice. The same unity of effort, he continued, must be 
brought about for an enduring peace if the individual forces for a moral world 
order were not to be weakened and rendered impotent. He added that all men of 
goodwill shared the responsibility of vindicating the great hopes for which men 
died in World War II. Truman stated that, "An enduring peace can only be built 
an Christian principles", and said that as a nation declared to be Christian by 
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the highest court of the land, all Americans desired to banish war from the 
world whose creator ordained that men everywhere should live together in peace, 
goodwill and mutual trust. 
Claiming that the greatest need of the world was a renewal of faith, 
"faith that mankind shall live in freedom, not in the chains of untruth nor in 
the chains of a collectivist organisation of their lives", Truman yet warned 
that that faith must be strong enough to struggle if necessary for the right, 
able to endure troubles and hardships, attack and even contempt from forces of 
evil - and able to arise reborn and revitalised from the daily struggle. (80) 
The Pope's response fully endorsed the substance of Truman's message, and 
declared, "No one more than we will hope for its success and for the happy 
achievement of the goal. We pledge our resources and earnestly beg God's 
assistance. The Pope assured the President of the wholehearted cooperation of 
the Church in his fight for the dignity and freedom of the human person. 
Telling Truman that in striving to bring men and nations to a clear realisation 
of their duty to God, the Church would go on, as it always had done, "to offer 
the most effective contribution to the world's peace and man's eternal 
salvation", the Pope declared: 
From her foundation almost two thousand years ago she has championed the 
individual against despotic rule, the labouring man against oppression, 
religion against persecution. Her divinely given mission often brings her 
into conflict with the powers of evil whose sole strength is in their 
physical force and brutalised spirit and her leaders are sent into exile 
or cast into prison or die under torture. This is history of today but 
the Church is unafraid. She cannot compromise with an avowed enemy of 
God. (81) 
Neither Truman nor the Pope, as was usual in Papal pronouncements, made 
any direct reference to the Soviet Union nor Communism, yet their inferences 
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were clear. As the Pope had made clear that he regarded effective means to 
combat Communist doctrines and check their spread as a necessary part of any 
effort to establish and consolidate peace, Vatican circles interpreted the 
exchange of letters as a virtual pledge to resist Communism by all means at 
their command. From Rome, Arnaldo Cortesi reported to the New York Times 
that an "anti-Red crusade" was anticipated: 
Indeed, the Pope's references to Communism were so insistent, and his 
belief that it barred man's progress toward peace so obvious, that it was 
being whispered in the Vatican today that the true purpose of Mr Taylor's 
present mission in Rome is to enlist the Vatican's support for an anti- 
Communist "crusade" that Mr Truman is thought to be about to launch. 
If this is so, there is no doubt that the Pope intends to lend it all 
the assistance in his power. 
It is pointed out in Vatican circles that Mr Taylor, after delivering 
Mr Truman's letter on Tuesday, remained for an hour and a half 
conversation with the Pontiff. It is certain that Mr Taylor informed the 
Pope minutely of Mr Truman's intentions and of the circumstances under 
which the letter was written and therefore that the Pope was fully aware 
of the President's thoughts and plans when he penned his reply. 
The Pope's anti-Communist utterances assume new significance if this 
fact is borne in mind. (82) 
The New York Times, in its editorial columns, cited "this unusual 
correspondence", and particularly the fact that it was published, as not only a 
sign of crisis, but intended to emphasise how "fragile" was the structure of 
peace. (83) Truman and the Pope had actually been in correspondence since April 
1946, but their previous letters were neither published nor acknowledged; so the 
release of these two letters was clearly intended to have a calculated impact at 
that specific point in time. (84) Catholic organisations regarded the 
correspondence as a major propaganda coup and planned to print tens of 
thousands of copies to be distributed among the faithful, including in Eastern 
Europe. 
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Camille M Cianfarra reported from Rome on August 29 to the New York Times 
that satisfaction was felt in Catholic circles over what, in the final analysis 
was frankly stated to be an anti-Communist crusade. In their view the official 
joining of the Catholic Church as the greatest spiritual force and the United 
States as the strongest lay power in the Christian world was a logical sequel 
to the then current United States policy of firmness, as embodied in the Truman 
Doctrine, against what they termed Russian imperialism. Moreover the implicit 
pledge of material support for the Vatican's spiritual campaign was seen as a 
convincing and useful factor enabling Catholic clergy to point to the material 
advantages available to those countries that oppose Communism within their 
borders and joined the ranks of the democratic nations. The Vatican 
anticipated considerable results from such an approach in Europe, particularly 
when compared to Soviet unwillingness to cooperate in application of the 
Marshall Plan. This was in fact an extension of the strategy being used by the 
United States and the Vatican to stop Communism in Italy. 
The Vatican knew that it would be accused of direct involvement in world 
politics and of aiding American imperialism, particularly as during the war the 
Pope had, in his public declarations, claimed the necessity of the Vatican 
stance being one of determined neutrality. In practice, the Pope had been far 
from neutral, but he had never declared, as he was now doing, his opposition to 
one side and his support for the other. Nonetheless, during the war the Pope's 
distaste for Communism was suspected by the Allies of making him unduly 
sympathatic toward the Germans. Thus, after the Pope's pact with Truman, Unita, 
official newspaper of the Italian Communist Party, began referring to "Truman's 
new order", a caustic reference to Hitler's "new order". In defence, Catholic 
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circles argued that during the war the Vatican had been physically surrounded 
by a Fascist power that, if it had wanted, could have virtually isolated the 
Holy See and seriously crippled its work by means of reprisals. The situation 
today was quite different. The issue now was to secure an enduring peace based 
on Christian principles. While the fight might appear as political to laymen, 
as far as the Vatican was concerned it was nothing more than its mission to 
defend the Catholic faith wherever and whenever it was threatened. (85) 
On August 28,1947, Myron Taylor sent a telegram from Rome to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury: 
Declarations by President Truman and His Holiness the Pope in harmony 
with our discussion will be released to the press today. We hope Your 
Grace will make public statement along generally parallel lines to indicate 
growing solidarity of religious denominations toward a common objective. 
You are of course free to state that at President Truman's request I had 
called upon Your Grace to discuss these matters. (86) 
On August 29, Taylor sent Fisher actual transcripts of the correspondence; 
and on September 4 he wrote requesting further discussions with the 
Archbishop. (87) Fisher replied that he wished much to see Taylor and invited 
him to stay at Canterbury. (88) There is no record of what transpired between 
Taylor and Fisher during the former's stay with the Archbishop. Fisher kept no 
records of any of his meetings with the President's personal emissary to the 
Pope. Nor is there any indication of the Foreign Office being kept informed, 
although it seems unlikely that they would not have been. However, from a 
letter sent to Fisher after his return to the United States, it is clear that 
the Archbishop had agreed to support Truman's scheme for Christian unity in 
opposition to Soviet Communism: 
On arrival home and after preparing my report to President Truman 
concerning my visit to Europe, I found that he was much pleased with my 
conversations with Your Grace, and particularly with the prospect of the 
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address by you before the Assembly of the Knights of the Round Table, 
which I believe is to take place the middle of this month. Your remarks I 
understand will expand the pattern of the effort through common faith in 
God to give encouragement to struggling mankind and to create in the 
world a beneficent influence to offset the growing propaganda and 
accomplishments of the Soviet which are contrary to our faith and imperil 
human liberties. 
Both the President and I await delivery of your address with interest 
and confidence. (89) 
Fisher replied to Taylor on October 20, following his address. He told 
Taylor the gathering was very successful, and although it did not receive very 
much publicity, there had been a large and distinguished audience. Five leaders 
of the different Churches had been asked to say something about their common 
mind as to the Christian contribution to world peace. Fisher ventured to 
Taylor that he thought himself the only speaker who really dealt with the 
subject. He noted that Cardinal Griffin had given a little address on Christian 
marriage, while the others did not say much. Fisher's speech had claimed there 
was a common mind, partly owing to the realization of the Churches that even if 
they could not yet be one, they must yet do their utmost to think and act 
together as Christians in relation to the world; and partly owing to the 
increasing external challenge to the fundamental truths and values of the 
Christian faith. Fisher included among his illustrations of this movement the 
Pope's numerous calls for the collaboration of all Christendom and the recent 
exchange of letters between the Pontiff and the President. The rest of his 
speech concerned the contribution that the Churches could make in achieving 
peace. He concluded his speech on the fundamental principles of the moral law, 
the worth of human personality, the essential rights of man and of the family 
against the State, the over-riding principles of freedom, justice and 
neighbourliness, and the fact that in defence of the moral law the Church stood 
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with and would work with all men of goodwill. (90) This latter declaration was 
exactly what Truman was asking for. 
The substance of this speech proved that Fisher had pledged himself 
willing to cooperate with the President's and Taylor's plans. The speech itself 
was evidence of his compliance. However, the fact that the Archbishop did not 
seek to give it more publicty, as he could have done through his press office, 
and the fact that it was not made at the time of the actual exchange of 
correspondence, as Taylor had initially requested, suggests that the Archbihop's 
compliance was, at least, cautious. Several factors could account for this, 
including the domestic situation in Britain where the Vatican was regarded as 
a seat of reaction by many, and there still remained suspicion of American 
intent. Moreover, Fisher himself was fiercely anti-Catholic and had no wish to 
line up behind the Pope, particularly in what was indisputably a political anti- 
Communist crusade such as the Anglican Church had repeatedly repudiated. In 
November 1946, Fisher had stated in a private letter, "As I know, the Vatican 
would very much like our Church and others to rank ourselves in this matter 
behind the Church of Rome as the great defender of liberty, but so far as 
liberty goes Rome itself has a by no means unsullied record. "(91) 
Despite his aversion to the Roman Catholic Church, Fisher was prepared to 
cooperate with it politically, if not spiritually. Following Truman's pledge to 
the Pope the Anglican Church identified with the struggle of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Eastern Europe. This was illustrated by the Archbishop of York in 
his visit to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1947. 
Truman and Taylor, clearly seeing the atheism of Communism as Russia's 
ideolgical achilles heel, sought to promote a united Christian front which could 
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exploit that weakness and, with its combined moral and spiritual authority, 
command a world wide audience. This, at the very least, would have tremendous 
propaganda value. Fisher's participation as a key figure in this scheme was 
illustrated in March of 1948 when, with the Cold Var rapidly escalating, Bevin 
called for Church support. Fisher's response included a proposed statement 
calling for Christian unity in face of the Communist threat. The intent was to 
articulate a condemnation of Communism which could be signed by all Christian 
leaders, bar those in Eastern Europe. Yates by the Reverend Vaddams, General 
Secretary of CFR, on this statement, show it to have been written in March 
1948, the same month that Bevin met with Fisher. The notes were dated March 
15, which was after Bevin's meeting with the Archbishop, which suggests that he 
must have been at least privy to, if not responsible for, its preparation. (92) 
A memorandum by Vaddams about the aims and substance of the proposed 
statement illustrated that the objective was to try to secure its agreement over 
the signatures of leaders of the majority Churches of all countries in the world 
which would normally be termed "Christian" countries. These included Roman 
Catholic Churches; so a prime necessity was to have the support, or at least the 
sympathy, of the Vatican. The statement was to be submitted for comment to a 
small but select number of individuals before general submission. Most 
important, the proposal was to be made as a personal demarche by the Archbihop 
of Canterbury, personal letters being written and delivered through British 
Missions throughout the areas concerned. These fell into four main groups: 
Western Europe; North and South America; the Dominions, and the Near East. 
Eastern Europe was omitted, a significant fact in itself. Although the 
authorship of the Archbishop of Canterbury was clearly meant to conceal the 
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political inspiration behind its conception, the substance of the statement, 
despite its Scriptural quotation, Deuteromony xxx, 19, was plainly political and 
anti-Communist, as the extract below illustrates: 
The advance of Communism both in its control of whole countries and 
in its penetration of countries which still maintain non-Communist or 
anti-Communist Governments is a serious threat to the whole basis of 
civilisation as it has been hitherto understood. We must, however, 
emphasise the fact that Communists do not form more than a small minority 
in any country in the world, even in those countries which they control. 
We are not here attempting to deal with political problems as such. We do 
not desire to maintain any political status quo which has proved 
inadequate to deal with the problems of modern society, nor as Christians 
do we recommend any one political system as a solution of national and 
international difficulties. 
The threat which in Communism is focussed and expressed in an 
extreme degreee is to be found in some measure in every land, but 
Communism demonstrates its nature in an unmistakeable form. It is the 
threat of the breakdown of those accepted moral principles on which all 
civilised life has been built. (93) 
The statement went on to revile the nature of Communism, unequivocably 
blaming it for all the world's problems: "We feel it is our duty to publicly 
direct the minds of men to the root cause of the present disorder and misery 
which trouble our world. " Stating the choice before mankind to be basically 
spiritual and moral, the statement referred to the "many pronouncements dealing 
with these moral bases made by Christian leaders, especially to those issued 
from time to time by His Holiness the Pope". The statement appealed to all 
Christians, including non-practicing, to join in the work of restoring moral 
values to the world, inserting the hope that members of other religious Faiths 
would add their influence. 
Waddams considered that in view of the many difficulties, "perhaps 
insuperable", the statement could not be strong in its wording and could not 
touch upon many desirable points: "But whatever its merits or demerits as a 
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statement, the success of such a plan would provide a sensational example of 
Christian solidarity hitherto unmatched. " Even the attainment of a partial 
success was thought to be worthwhile. The plan was not, however, pursued at 
this point. With the Lambeth Conference and the first meeting of the World 
Council of Churches on the horizon, it was considered unwise for the Church to 
be seen to be associating itself too much with political causes, as Visser 't 
Hooft pointed out to Kenneth Grubb in connection with another Christian scheme 
in which Bevin was implicated. 
While Fisher's Christian appeal to oppose Communism was still under 
consideration at Lambeth, the Archbishop received from Kenneth Grubb copies of 
correspondence between Grubb and Visser 't Hooft, General Secretary to the World 
Council of Churches, concerning a possible meeting of Christian politicians on 
the present world crisis. The conference was the suggestion of Grubb, 
Controller of Overseas Information at the Ministry of Information during the 
war and afterwards widely involved with a number of Church organisations, 
including the WCC, in which he was chairman of the Churches Commission on 
International Activities, the BCC and the CFR. He explained to Fisher that he 
had had reason to believe that the conference which he then had in mind would 
be agreeable to the Foreign Office: 
I based this upon discussion with certain officials, who reported that Mr 
Bevin had heard of the possibility of this idea and thought well of it. I 
have since heard through a Foreign Office official that Mr Bevin has 
expressed a much more active interest, in the sense of saying that he 
would like to stir up the appropriate church body authorities to take a 
lead in the matter. It has struck me, therefore, that he might in the 
first instant communicate with Your Grace, and hence my present action. 
It does not of course follow that Mr Bevin's objectives and those of this 
Commission in seeking to promote such a conference would agree. They 
certainly would not agree all the way. There might be a considerable 
common ground between them. (94) 
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Because of his correspondence with It Hooft, Grubb felt he could not press 
the matter, unless he in turn was advised or pressed from other quarters. The 
Secretary of the WCC did not think the time appropriate, particularly with the 
Amsterdam and Lambeth conferences coming up. Moreover, he was concerned that 
the nature of the proposed conference "would increase the already too 
widespread impression that the World Council is linked up with the Western 
Powers. Now that impression would do more harm than good... "(95) It Hooft 
further advised Grubb that the dates June 2 to 5,1948, had already been set 
aside for a small conference of Christian political leaders. The meeting 
concerned the forthcoming assembly of the WCC, but it could be used for a frank 
facing of the responsibility of Christian leaders in the present situation. 
Grubb aquiesced to this alternative, although he advised he was himself unable 
to attend the meeting. (96) 
Fisher recognised the difficulties alluded to by It Hooft. Moreover, he 
had little faith that such a conference would actually achieve anything: "nor is 
it altogether easy to see what they could do. "(97) He informed Grubb of an 
already arranged Christian Action meeting, organised by the Anglican Canon 
Collins, "it is hoped to get Christian laymen from Western Europe to be among 
the speakers. It is an attempt to put a constructive Christian lay impetus 
behind the movements in the West. " Fisher clearly perceived Christian Action 
as presenting a preferable alternative to Bevin's meeting of Christian 
politicians scheme. 
The inaugural meeting of Christian Action was held at the Albert Hall on 
April 25,1948 and was chaired by the Earl of Halifax. Described as "A call to 
action by Christians in the present crisis", it was a "Campaign to build up the 
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Western Union of European Nations on Christian lines, and to give spiritual 
energy and courage to the peoples of the world to face their present 
difficulties. " Initially it generated a great deal of support and enthuthiasm 
from Church leaders, including the Bishop of Chichester as well as Fisher. 
However, Canon Collins later proved too independent in the atmosphere of 
conformity engendered by the Cold War. CFR came to regard him as a maverick 
and advised that Church support be withdrawn. (98) 
Fisher's following of the Foreign Office line was fully endorsed and 
supported by his fellow Primate, the Archbishop of York. Garbett had already 
proven himself a skilled ecclesiastic statesman through his wartime services 
for the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. If Truman and Taylor 
had proven able to persuade the very anti-Roman Catholic Fisher to cooperate 
with the Vatican, then it was hardly surprising that the patriotic, 
nationalistic Garbett, susceptible as he was to the influence of men of affairs, 
was persuaded to give his support to the postwar Anglo-American alliance, 
despite its compromise of British sovereignty. 
Toward the end of 1945, the Foreign Office feared that the ill will created 
in Britain owing to the abrupt termination of lend-lease and the wrangling over 
the British Loan might sour Anglo-American relations and provide support for 
opponents of their American policy. Bevin had done his best to influence the 
press in both countries to counter adverse effects, and the situation clearly 
demanded positive publicity. (99) In December 1945, the Archbishop of York 
received a letter from the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord 
Halifax. Garbett was a great admirer of Halifax, and during his 1944 tour of 
America, in which Halifax had been instrumental, had written of the Ambassador 
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in his travel diary: "He is a truly great man, so simple and devout, with wisdom 
and strength... I was so glad to find that the Americans now appreciated 
Halifax. "(100) Halifax's letter to the Archbishop concerned the loan. Garbett's 
reaction to financial transactions between Britain and the United States 
matched those of most other Englishmen, Bevin included. The general feeling 
was that Britain had given her all during the war and was deserving of greater 
consideration now the war had been won. Halifax sought to give the Archbishop 
an American perspective in order that he might adopt a more sympathetic 
attitude to the action of that country: 
I was very disappointed about the way the Houses of Parliament 
handled all our loan business... the debates revealed how great the gulf is 
between opinion here and in England, and once the Americans made up their 
minds that they could not give us a grant in aid or an interest free loan 
I do not think that their terms and actions were ungenerous. English 
opinion has given much less weight than the Americans themselves are 
prepared to attach to it to the clause permitting reconsideration and 
there seems to have been little or no recognition of the fact that the 
United States Administration was really conducting a negotiation on two 
fronts; with their own public opinion at the same time as with us. Now, 
of course, they are tempted to say "If people in England dislike all this 
so much, why should we do it at all? Certainly most of us do not want to 
do it merely for the blue eyes of Professor Laski. "(101) 
By the time the loan was worked out, Garbett had still not fully overcome 
his resentment, "Any grace or friendliness that might once have been attached 
to it has been destroyed by the slow and grudging way it has been granted. At 
times, indeed. it looked as if such humiliating conditions might have been 
attached to it that Great Britain would eventually have been compelled to refuse 
it. " Nonetheless, despite these harsh words, his treatment of the loan was in 
effect an act of reconciliation: "But while we resent and regret many of the 
speeches made during the passage of the loan, we must not forget that the 
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United States Government did its utmost to secure its acceptance and that there 
are many Americans who showed true friendship to this country. "(102) 
Garbett accepted that Britain needed American financial aid, but while he 
spoke in conciliatory terms, he remained suspicious of American intentions. 
During his wartime visit to the United States, Garbett had been most impressed 
with the country, but he had detected dangerous undercurrents which made him 
fear for the future of Britain. These he confided to his travel diary: 
I have come away greatly impressed with the United States. Its 
people will see the war through to the end, but afterwards they may easily 
lapse into imperial and economic isolationism. We must not easily assume 
their continued cooperation. They may use their military and economic 
power for their own interests. There are pacifist, isolationist and anti- 
British influences which will make thenselves felt later on. But 
cooperation with the States will be essential for the future of the human 
race. Power and influence are passing, if they have not already passed, 
from Great Britain to the United States. The energy and enterprise of its 
people are amazing. But they are highly strung, emotional and impulsive; 
very sensitive to criticism, but very ready to criticise other nations. 
They have little experience of public affairs, and know nothing about 
Europe. But the future of the world probably lies with them and Russia 
even more than with ourselves. Canada is loyal to the Crown, very proud 
of its national independence; suspicious of any suggestion for federal 
organisation which might interfere with its own self-government. But 
Canada will cooperate with us. (103) 
Apart from revealing his suspicions as to how America would use its power 
and his doubts about postwar cooperation in the postwar period, Garbett was 
also critical of certain aspects of American society: 
In the United States there will undoubtedly be difficulties after the 
war. Compared to ourselves it is backward in social reform. The 
relationship between Labour and Capital is most uneasy, and probably there 
will be a series of strikes. Strikes in America are much more serious 
than in this country, for violence is used by the contending parties. And 
of course America has the great colour problem. This has become much 
more acute during the war. The negroes have been used for labour in all 
parts of the States. They are conscious of their poor and humiliating 
position. The North begins to understand the anti-negro sentiment of the 
South. It is strange that the Americans should be so ready to criticise 
our treatment of Indians, and yet leave their own problem in their own 
country of dealing with the darker race quite unsolved. Canada will 
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gravitate towards the United States, and its policy will always be 
influenced by that of its more powerful neighbour. But the Canadian is 
critical of his Yankee brother, and would not wish to be absorbed. There 
is however in Canada among the younger Roman Catholic priests an anti- 
British element which might prove dangerous in the future. (104) 
Anxiety over American intentions and resentment over American attitudes 
remained constant concerns of the Archbishop, even during the last months of 
the war: "We are immensely grateful to our American friends.... we admire greatly 
their contribution to the American war effort... But they do not always 
sufficiently realise that people who have for nearly six years given their all, 
without reserve, in the fight for freedom, are exceptionally sensitive to 
criticism... Nor do our American friends always realise how anxious we are about 
our industrial and economic future. Is their 'big business' going to cooperate 
with us or hinder us in our steps toward recovery? Is the United States 
prepared to take an active part, as we hope and pray, in the restoration of 
Europe, or will she only advise us in the days of peace about our duties to the 
world? "(105) During the negotiations for the loan, Garbett was well aware that 
the failure of the two nations to cooperate would mean bitter Anglo-American 
rivalry throughout the world: "If the Loan had been rejected on either side of 
the Atlantic there would have followed years of bitter and unfriendly rivalry in 
every part of the world "(106) 
British need for the financial aid which came to be known as the Marshall 
Plan was partly occasioned by the financial crisis created when sterling 
convertibility, insisted on by the Americans as part of the Loan, was 
implemented during the summer of 1947. However, largely owing to a positive 
press and propaganda exercise which emphasised American magnanimity while 
concealing less palatable aspects, such as Britain's economic subordination, it 
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engendered a wholly favourable attitude in Britain toward the United States. 
Garbett, however, remained unconvinced, unable to eradicate the ambivalence of 
his feelings: 
There are some who believe that the miracle which may save us will 
be action by the United States. Here again we must not deceive ourselves 
by wishful thinking. In that great country there are large numbers of 
people who are friendly to Great Britain and anxious to help us: but there 
are many who dislike us and wish to see us weakened: Zionist and 
Isolationist propaganda are always traducing us. Moreover, the political 
and economic policy of the States is largely determined by hard headed 
men of business who are not prepared out of mere sentiment to throw good 
money after bad. America is only likely to come to our help if she is 
convinced that we shall survive as a Great Power. At present she is very 
doubtful about this. (107) 
Garbett's uncertainty and foreboding about the United States were 
exacerbated when he visited Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the autumn of 
1947. There he was confronted with Eastern Europe's dread and fear of another 
war and the terrible apprehension of America. He returned declaring the need 
for Britain to remain aloof from American pressure to combine against the 
Soviet Union: 
I came away more convinced than ever that we in this country ought to 
take no part or give any support to those appeals which are sometimes 
made to us from the other side of the Atlantic by the lining up against 
Russia and against Communism. (108) 
This was entirely contrary to the sort of publicity desired by the Foreign 
Office, particularly from such an important public figure as the Archbishop of 
York. Following the Cabinet decision to enroll the British Churches in 
Britain's Western Union plans, Garbett's pronouncements fell neatly into line. 
In his Diocesan Leaflet for April 1948, Garbett referred to the existence of 
"two camps" in such terms as to completely repudiate the feelings he had 
expressed after his experiences in Eastern Europe: 
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The Eastern camp is well organised and confident; the Western camp is 
hastily making ready to protect its heritage of ordered freedom. Our 
country, and notably our Foreign Secretary, did its utmost to avoid a 
cleavage which is bound to be dangerous to the peace of the world. But 
through no fault of our own the two camps are now established and are 
watching one another in armed fear and suspicion. (109) 
Moreover, he provided exactly the sort of Christian publicity desired by 
the Foreign Office for their Western Union propaganda: 
First, we must make our western camp both materially and spiritually 
as strong as possible. It must have the physical strength of armaments 
to protect it against any attack; a defenceless camp invites aggression. 
No single European nation is strong enough to stand alone; security will 
only be found in a close military alliance between the nations which share 
the same ideals. But there must be spiritual as well as physical 
ramparts. Those who are within the western camp must understand clearly 
the heritage they possess and the reasons why they treasure it; both the 
youth and the adults of the allied countries must be taught the nature and 
meaning of the values which they may have to defend with their lives. 
Here the Communists give us an example through the care they take in 
instructing their members. We must make it plain that we value justice, 
mercy and freedom more than life or peace. We who are Christians, 
whatever our Church, have a special responsibility in building the 
spiritual ramparts. It was through Christianity that the West received 
its moral and cultural heritage. A divided Christendom has weakened its 
defence against secularism. Now in the hour of crisis all Christians 
should bear united witness to the religious and moral values which they 
possess. Behind all material strength there must be moral 
conviction. (110) 
Significantly, however, revealing that the Archbishop had not entirely 
banished his former doubts about the United States, in the same article Garbett 
warned: "There are necessary precautions the State must take for its own 
security, but there must be no "spy mania" nor "witch hunting". We must not 
confuse the Christian Communist with the marxian. It is the latter and not the 
former who is the menace to peace. " 
There was a parallel transformation in Garbett's attitude toward American 
aid. Writing in his Diocesan Leaflet for May 1948, Garbett declared that 
Marshall Aid would be "honoured by future historians as an unique act of 
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Political interest has long clad itself with high idealism for which it 
has sought Christian endorsement. The association of politics with Christianity 
is ancient. Cold War warriors invoked Christian inspiration for what were 
effectively Western interests. The theme of saving Christian civilisation had 
been fought over in the Second World War. The Allies claimed to be saving it 
from the pagan Nazis; the Axis from the Godless Bolshevists. In the Cold War, 
with atheist Communism as its opponent, the West considered itself to have an 
advantageous monopoly of Christianity which it determined to exploit to the 
full. Cold War oratory was suffused with religious imagery. The Foreign Office 
discussed the use of Christiah themes in its propaganda and surreptitiously 
used sympathetic Church leaders to support its policies. It was the United 
States, however, which effectively endorsed the concept of the Cold War as a 
crusade against Communism by its formal alliance in common cause with the 
Vatican. Despite the separation of Church and State insisted upon in the 
American Constitution, a display of religious faith was essential to politicians 
seeking electoral success in America. While references to God and Christian 
$Spirations were common place in American political speeches, after Truman's 
`correspondence with Pius XII was published, the President's use of Christian 
'Ppeal inevitably gained a new significance. 
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In the days of Empire, British leaders told the public that their mission 
was to spread Christian civilisation. In the twentieth century, looking to 
create an economic Empire, the American public were told that their mission was 
to save Christian civilisation. Truman propounded the theme that American 
defence of the free world was a God-given duty. In his annual message to the 
Congress on the State of the Union, delivered in person before a Joint session 
on January 7,1948, Truman began his address with the claim that the basic 
source of American strength was its spirituality: "For we are a people with a 
faith. " Truman declared, "The faith of our people has particular meaning at 
this time in history... " In the speech, which was carried on a nationwide radio 
broadcast, the President referred to American faith in God supplying strength 
and vitality. In his conclusion, he stated that the whole world was looking to 
America for leadership and that this was the hour to rededicate their faith. (1) 
On the day the Brussels Treaty was signed by five European nations, 
'Truman again addressed Congress in person to deliver a special message on the 
'threat to the freedom of Europe. To counter this threat, Truman recommended 
first that action on the European Recovery Programme, Marshall Aid, be speedily 
Completed and, second, that universal training legislation be promptly enacted. 
tie urged that assistance to other nations and American strength were 
brerequisites in carrying out America's great purpose. "(2) 
That same evening, discussing these recommendations before the Society of 
the Friendly Sons of St Patrick, Truman spoke of "the righteousness of our 
1ourse", and emphasised the Christian foundation of the American alliance with 
kurope: "The faith in God which sustains us, also sustains men in other lands. 
t%vgether 
we can erect an enduring peace. " In this speech Truman also made 
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an attack on Communism which particularly stressed its atheism: "And even 
worse, Communism denies the very existence of God. Religion is persecuted 
because it stands for freedom under God. This threat to our liberty and to our 
faith must be faced by each one of us. "(3) The protection of Western 
civilisation with its Christian foundation was a theme used by Bevin to 
persuade the nations of Western Europe to unite and accept American aid in 
their defence; it was used by Truman to persuade Congress and the American 
people to send the aid. 
While Bevin emulated Truman in the use of idealism and Christianity to 
elaborate the Russian threat, he wanted Britain to take the spiritual lead with 
regard to Europe. Although Bevin was well aware that American finance was 
essential for Western Union to succeed, he believed that its acceptance by the 
rest of Europe necessitated British leadership: "Material aid will have to come 
principally from the United States, but the countries of Western Europe which 
despise the spiritual values of America will look to us for political and moral 
guidance in building up a counter attraction to the baleful tenets of Communism 
within their borders and in recreating a healthy society wherever it has been 
shaken or shattered by the war. "(4) 
In his initial suggestion of what he called "a spiritual union of the West" 
to Marshall, Bidault and the British Cabinet, Bevin proposed "close consultation" 
rather than the formal alliance which subsequent events revealed to be his real 
aim. To the Cabinet, Bevin portrayed this "close consultation" as a means 
whereby British prestige, leadership and world power could be restored: 
Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have 
outlined above, backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and 
of the Americas, it should be possible to develop our own power and 
influence to equal that of the United States of America and the U. S. S. R. 
-250- 
We have the material resources in the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, 
and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task 
in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to the United 
States of America or to the Soviet Union. (5) 
Bevin possibly perceived that with American domination of the scheme, 
Social Democracy would not have the same opportunities for expression. Bevin 
clearly felt that it was for Britain as a European and a Social Democratic 
Government and as, in Bevin's view, the chief protagonist of the ethical and 
spiritual forces inherent in his concept of Western civilisation, to provide 
leadership, not the Americans. Bevin recognised that British leadership could 
not be based solely on Social Democracy. The addition of a religious dimension, 
or as Bevin termed it a spiritual and moral lead, would greatly widen its 
appeal. In his consideration of British publicity, Bevin stated: "... in the 
Middle East and possibly in certain Far Eastern countries such as India, Burma, 
Ceylon, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China, Communism will make headway unless a 
strong spiritual and moral lead ... is given against it, and we are in a good 
position to give such a lead. In many countries of Western Europe the forces 
of Social Democracy will be the mainstay, but even in Western Europe and 
obviously in the Middle East and Far East our appeal could not be only to 
Social Democratic Parties. "(6) 
Bevin's desire to assert British leadership, as well as his anti-Soviet, 
anti-Communist policies, received the full support of the Prime Minister. In 
his New Year's broadcast of January 3,1948, Attlee gave what he stated to be a 
reasoned case for British Socialism - and implicitly for Bevin's Third Force. 
Attlee spoke of the "British Approach" and emphasised that a Socialist Britain 
would not be a half-way house between American Capitalism and Russian 
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Communism, but an organic development of western European civilisation. He 
presented the issue as how to preserve their way of life in a world dominated 
by two non-European Powers, both of which were opposed to colonialism. The 
broadcast emphasised, by comparison with Russia and America, the positive role 
of British Socialism in the postwar world, with Attlee specifically stating that 
Britain was not aiming at a watered down version of the American way of life. 
However, it was the anti-Communist content which was emphasised in the press 
reports of the speech, particularly in the United States. 
According to the weekly political summaries sent to the Foreign Office by 
the Embassy in Washington, Attlee's January 3rd broadcast was favourably and 
prominently headlined in a number of western as well as eastern newspapers. 
Vhilst it evoked no great volume of comment amidst a welter of other matters, 
it was evident a very favourable impression had been created in the 
Administration, trade unions and other quarters by the Prime Minister's 
denunciation of the totalitarian and imperialist' practices of the Soviet Union 
and its Communist adherents in other countries. The summary noted that reports 
from American correspondents in London had led to a belief that His Majesty's 
Government would shortly redefine British foreign policy in terms which would 
make clear that Britain recognised itself as a "defender of western values" 
rather than a mediator between east and west. (7) 
British foreign policy had never been to mediate between Russia and 
America; and a Foreign Office minute on the above summary noted that this 
mistaken theory of British intent to mediate, "dies hard". On a more positive 
note, the minute observed that, "American opinion evidently sets store by our 
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support for practicable steps being taken to curb Soviet expansion, and values 
it more highly in the light of our economic improvement. * (8) 
Bevin's reasons for wanting British leadership in Europe rather than 
American was a complex mix of patriotism and national pride, British interest 
and the desire to make Britain the leading Social Democracy with London the 
Mecca for Social Democrats: 
We should develop visits by important Trade Unionists from abroad 
and other influential, non-Communist foreigners, and set up a "Wilton Park" 
in which we could offer them courses on British life and institutions, and 
make available to them material and ideas useful for the struggle in their 
own countries against Communism. In short, we should seek to make London 
the Mecca for Social Democrats in Europe. (9) 
Bevin's determination to secure the leadership of Western Union in the 
spiritual sphere was illustrated by Foreign Office considerations of the new 
policy for publicity in relation to Communism. This was an area in which 
collaboration with the Americans obviously had to be considered, as Warner 
informed Sir John Balfour in a secret communication to the Washington Embassy 
in February 1948. After deliberation, the Foreign Office had decided that it 
would be inadvisable to have any general agreement or understanding with the 
United States "which would in any way tie our hands. " This was clearly 
intended to allow the Foreign Office more scope in developing their propaganda 
themes to promote British interests and the British way rather than the 
American. There were other considerations too: "On the whole the Americans 
seem to be-very ham-handed in their anti-Communist and anti-Soviet publicity. 
Our line is likely therefore very often to differ from theirs. We should hope 
however by consultation In suitable cases to prevent our getting in each other's 
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way. We also - perhaps rashly - rather hope to be able to influence them 
imperceptibly in the direction of greater subtlety. "(10) 
A considerable amount of time and effort was given to developing Bevin's 
concept. A Foreign Office working party was set up under the Chairmanship of 
CFA Warner to consider the spiritual aspects of Western Union and provide terms 
of reference. The first was "to examine the factors common to the Western 
Union countries other than political, strategic and economic which can 
contribute to building up the Western Union conception". (11) This problem was 
tackled at the first meeting of the working party, which took place on February 
19,1948, and at the second meeting, it was agreed'to approach various outside 
people with a view to getting ideas. (12) 
From the responses it is possible to guage that religious themes were 
already important. There was, however, a warning note, which illustrated the 
way in which the Foreign Office intended to use religion and Social Democratic 
economic theories. Arthur Goodhart argued that the Foreign Office was 
confusing the problem with which they were faced by making a distinction 
between Western democracy and a totalitarian state based on economic theory and 
a special attitude to religion. He argued that there was not necessarily 
conflict between religion and totalitarianism, because a country which 
recognised religion could be totalitarian, as in the case of Spain. He observed 
that there was always a tendency at times of revolt to attack established 
religion on the ground that it supports the status quo, but when the 
revolutionary government has become established its conflict with the Church 
might cease. Goodhart noted that this was what seemed to have happened in the 
Soviet Union, where it would now hardly be surprising to find it playing the 
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defender of the Greek Catholic Church in the Middle East. Goodhart thus 
objected to describing the basic division between Western democracies and the 
totalitarian states as a conflict between Christianity and Communism, (13) 
In the middle of April the working party produced a preliminary 
memorandum outlining the aims of British foreign policy and how these would be 
facilitated by establishing an anti-Communist educational institution such as 
had been recommended by Bevin, offering courses on British life and 
institutions to "influential non-Communists" and making available to them 
material and ideas useful for the struggle against Communism in their own 
countries. Bevin's, proposal evolved from an already established institution,, 
Wilton Park at Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire which was originally a re- 
education centre for, German prisoners. Apart from illustrating the lengths to 
which the Foreign Office were preparing to go in their propaganda campaign 
against the Soviet Union, , 
the institution was a testimony to the British desire 
to use the concept of Western Union and the anti-Communist struggle as vehicles 
to promote British leadership, British interests and the, British way of life: 
, 
Britain has taken the lead in drawing Western Europe together in 
order to promote its recovery from the effects of two disastrous wars and 
to organise its spiritual defence of the western tradition against the 
Communist assault. To achieve these ends it is essential that the 
ideological ties between Britain and the Continent should be reinforced. 
As a step in this direction it is essential that the other Western 
countries should realise more vividly than in the past how much the 
Western way of life owes to Britain and how closely it knits them together 
with her, not merely in their common fight against the totalitarian 
doctrine of the East but in their common effort to restore the dynamic 
power and the prestige of European civilisation in the world. 
The main purpose of the institution will therefore be to afford a 
certain number of fellow Europeans from the Continent the opportunity for 
studying the British contribution to Western civilisation first hand. An 
understanding of the British conception of representative government, the 
freedom of the citizen, social security and social justice should create a 
bond of sympathy between them and this country and a sense of sharing a 
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great common heritage. It is on such psychological foundations that the 
new Europe must be built. 
It is suggested that emphasis should be laid on this positive and 
constructive aim of the enterprise rather than on the negative aim of 
strengthening the common front against Communism: The former necessarily 
includes the latter. The exposition of the principles of a free society 
necessarily involves pointing the contrast to unfree societies organised 
on party dictatorial lines, whether Fascist or Communist. The credit of 
the institution will stand much higher if it is looked upon as a 
contribution to the spiritual unity of Western Europe rather than an 
instrument of anti-Communist propaganda. (14) 
Finance and administration were to be provided by the universities, the 
TUC and other such bodies, as well as the Government. Bevin was enthut4, iastic 
about the scheme, but Ralph Murray foresaw pitfalls. He argued that, largely 
owing to international jealousies, there was no clear path for Britain to run 
indoctrination courses or courses of instruction and inspiration in the anti- 
Communist struggle; there was no particular reason why Britain should be 
accepted as entitled to brief all and sundry against Communism. Murray 
considered a more realistic policy would be to pursue an international centre, 
giving full play to each nationality, which could instruct, inspire and inform 
individuals engaged in the battle for the defence of Western principles and 
ideals and, in particular, in the active struggle against Communism; these 
individuals could be drawn not only from the signatories to the Brussels. 
Treaty, but also from other territories where possible. Britain would thereby 
be able to establish" an indoctrination centre or international "Wilton Park" 
which could draw on the whole of Europe for instructors, lecturers and 
resources. "(15) 
After the signature of the Brussels Treaty, Mr Murray proposed an 
"Information Executive" be attached to the Consultative Council. Murray's 
proposal was agreed in the Foreign Office and subsequently presented to the 
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representatives of the Five Powers at the Commission's meeting of May 5,1948, 
where it was accepted as a basis for approach. Bevin did not, however, abandon 
the plan for a British project, even attempting to secure it a Royal Charter. 
The Lord President resisted the move which he regarded as inappropriate for 
"What is, after all, an experiment! " (16) The project subsequently encountered 
difficulties both in securing the requisite finance and a suitable chairman. It 
had initially been agreed that £1 million should be found for a West European 
Educational course, half from the Treasury and half from public appeal. (17) 
Despite the difficulties, the project was not abandoned until the end of June 
1949. (18) Although Bevin's original concept did not survive, some of. the ideas 
behind the project did, and were implemented at Wilton Park as part of its job 
of promoting Anglo-German relations. (19) 
The emphasis on propaganda, and its nature, at this stage, are noteworthy, 
particularly because in his address to Parliament when he oulined his concept 
of a spiritual union, Bevin spoke against propaganda. Bevin's speech to the 
House on January 22,1948, during a two day debate on foreign affairs signalled 
to the United States that Britain was ready to fulfil the American conditions 
for Marshall Aid. At the same time, Bevin's words were clearly designed to 
convince the domestic audience that American aid was not politically motivated, 
and nor was Britain's response. Bevin assumed a high moral position in 
discussing British policies and aspirations. He claimed that the concept of a 
unified Europe as the heart of western civilisation was accepted by most people, 
and that the Government had striven for closer association and economic 
development, and eventually for the spiritual union of Europe as a whole. 
Russia's fait accompli in Eastern Europe prevented the fruition of this hope. 
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The European Recovery proposal had been put forward in the same spirit, it was 
offered to the whole of Europe, including Russia. While Britain always wanted 
the widest concept of Europe, Russia repudiated a great cooperative movement 
and deliberately chose to risk the creation of such a movement within the 
confines of Western Europe. (20) 
Bevin told the House: "Propaganda is not a contribution to the settlement 
of international problems. They are all so important that the only way to 
solve them is coolly and calmly to deal with them on their own merits. "(21) 
This was stated at the very same time as the Foreign Office, following Bevin's 
recommendation to specifically collect and disseminate information on Communist 
policy, tactics and propaganda, was forming an anti-Communist publicity section. 
The work of this department involved providing anti-Communist material for use 
at home and abroad, including for the use of other countries. Its Head, CFA 
Warner, also had charge, significantly, of the Foreign Office working party 
examining the spiritual aspects of Western Union. The existence of the section 
was not widely known, as Warner, informed the British Ambassador to Washington, 
Sir John Balfour in February: "Thus far we are only at the beginning of the 
organisation of our new anti-Communist information department, (which is to be 
called the Information Research Department and is to be under my supervision 
and the functions of which must so far as possible be kept strictly 
conf idential). " (22) 
The Foreign Office argued the need to enlighten public opinion and alert' 
other countries to the threat posed by Russia. However, the nature of the 
publicity they disseminated was constructed to support their policy actions, 
rather than provide an objective analysis. This was well illustrated by a 
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Foreign Office Research Department paper on "Anglo-Soviet relations since 1939", 
which the Foreign Office issued to twenty selected Members of Parliament for 
information. The paper issued was actually a re-make of a previous F. O. R. D. 
paper on Anglo-Soviet relations which the Foreign Office had criticised because 
it argued that Soviet policy could be understood as a search for security. The 
replacement paper began: "The Soviet Union is not merely a State among other 
States. It is the vehicle of an aggressive ideology. It was dedicated by Lenin 
and has been repeatedly rededicated by his successors to its task of reshaping 
the world to a Marxist pattern. "(23) The second paper specifically repudiated 
the argument contained in the first: "Apologists for the Soviet Union attempt to 
explain her expansionist tendencies as a "search for security", a natural desire 
to convert a former sphere of Western influence into a Russian cordon sanitaire 
against the Vest. The superficiality of this view is obvious to all who have 
read the basis works of Marxist-Lenin ideology.. " The paper, which was 
lengthy, proceeded in the vein of Foreign Office orthodoxy: that the Soviet 
Union cooperated with other nations only in so far as that cooperation 
furthered the triumph of Communism on a world scale; that the wartime alliance 
with Britain was but a necessary evil to Soviet leaders; that Cominform had 
been the ceremonial reinstatement of Comintern, and that the dominant feature 
of Soviet domestic and foreign policy since the end of the war had been the 
vehement reassertion of uncompromising Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. 
The paper necessarily treated British foreign policy during this period, 
arguing that their objective had been the establishment of a modus vivendi 
under which all nations could work together in the interests of general peace 
and prosperity. The Foreign Office attitude to a modus vivendi was well 
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illustrated in the notes prepared for Bevin's speech in Parliament's January 
foreign affairs debate. These advised Bevin to include a passage stating: "We 
believe that countries with different ideologies can cooperate", only because it 
was believed that Stalin had said something to this effect which might be 
quoted in a question. Bevin was further advised to say that Britain was 
endeavouring to cooperate with the peoples of Eastern Europe but the acts of 
Cominform, like its predecessor Comintern, afforded the greatest hindrance to 
mutual confidence and understanding. (24) Bevin, of course, spoke accordingly. 
Within the Foreign Office Ralph Murray was responsible for the 
distribution required by Mr Mayhew of the second F. O. R. D. paper on Anglo-Soviet 
relations to the selected people. He could not resist a cynical comment on the 
affair in the minutes: 
I take it that scholarship goes ahead and issues, and propaganda does a 
rehash: but that scholarship's version does n, get sent to M. P. s etc., and 
propaganda's does. I have taken the liberty of detaching Mr Mayhew's 
requirements so that we may work to them. (25) 
While it is clear from the Foreign Office papers of 1948 that propaganda 
was assuming an ever increasing importance in foreign policy considerations, 
there were still those who preferred more direct action against the Soviet 
Union, both in and out of the Foreign Office. These included Winston Churchill, 
whom the Foreign Office believed to favour a "show down": 
We have reason to believe... that Mr Churchill is in fact in favour of a 
"show down". He is known very confidentially to have explained his ideas 
in conversation with Mr Marshall at the beginning of December. On that 
occasion he emphasised the immense importance of the atomic bomb, and 
argued that the U. S. A. should use their monopoly of it to arrest the 
forward movement of the Soviet Union, as a policeman stops oncoming 
traffic. The Americans should, Mr Churchill said, tell the Russians 
plainly that they must withdraw within their own borders and cease from 
troubling the Western world. If this were said at once, he thought, the 
Russians would be bound to give way. If, on the other hand, the Americans 
waited until the Russians also had the atomic bomb, they would merely make 
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it certain that both sides would eventually destroy each other. These 
remarks are said to have evoked no response whatever from Mr Marshall at 
the time. (26) 
The question of a "show down" was discussed by the Russia Committee on 
January 29,1948, when the consequences of such a drastic action were 
deliberated. It was considered that the Russians, far from complying with 
demands made to them, might overrun Western Europe in preparation for a 
conflict. They might even appeal to the Security Council, and the effect of 
such an appeal on public opinion in Great Britain and the Dominions would 
require careful assessment(27) 
American support was a prerequisite of any such action, which meant 
exploring how the State Department's mind was moving on the subject. Moreover, 
as RMA Hankey observed, "We should have to be very careful not to convey the 
impression that we favoured an idea of which the Americans would have to bear 
most of the cost, and it would have to be done in such a way that there was no 
risk of subsequent leakage of any sort. "(28) 
Information supplied from Washington revealing American hesitance about 
supporting Western Union did not encourage the belief that the United States 
would be likely to "show their hand over this far more delicate and difficult 
question". (29) Mr RH Bateman posited that Churchill's idea was that the Western 
Powers should address the Soviet Government in unison, and in the absence of a 
Western Union the Americans would not budge. He declared, and Gladwyn Jebb 
penned his agreement in the margin, that Churchill's proposal lacked reality at 
that moment and should be put in cold storage. (30) 
Not quite so drastic, but looking to achieve in Western Europe what Stalin 
had achieved in Eastern, but in reverse, was Sargent's scheme, discussed at the 
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time of the meeting of the Brussels signatories, to eradicate all Communist 
influence from Western governments. A top secret minute sent from the Foreign 
Office to Mr Broad of the North American Department stated: 
Sir 0 Sargent has asked me to produce for him a list of countries 
with Coalition Governments (containing a Communist element) which may be 
liable to pressure from the Soviet Government working through local 
Communists. 
Sir 0 Sargent would also like to have an expression of opinion 
whether the time is ripe to ask any such Governments to cast out these 
snakes from their respective bosoms. (31) 
The response from the North American Department concluded that they lacked 
adequate grounds at that moment to approach any of the Governments with which 
they were concerned. (32) 
The lack of option with regard to initiating any form of direct political 
action against the Soviet Union naturally meant even more importance attached 
to propaganda. The development in this period of Bevin's concept of a spiritual 
union led to attention being focussed on religion. This included Islam which 
the Foreign Office Research Department generally thought to be opposed to 
Communism, but warned that Muslims were becoming more susceptible owing to the 
encroaches of Western materialism. F. O. R. D. also pointed out that there was no 
foundation for the belief that Islam and Communism were incompatible. It was 
thought that the revivalist movements hitherto vaguely directed against Europe 
and Christianity should come out with even greater force against Communism as 
a destructive influence. This did not mean that any genuine rapprochement 
would take place with other opponents of Communism however. F. O. R. D. concluded 
that Islam "occupies an intermediate position between Western civilisation and 
Communism and the direction in which it moves will not only decide the fate of 
Islam but will have a profound effect upon western civilisation itself. "(33) 
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The Foreign Office was also concerned with the role of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, about which there existed many conflicting and contradictory 
opinions. Because it was recognised as a means of reconciling Christians to 
the regime, as well as a potential cultivator of Russian nationalism and Pan- 
Slavism, the official attitude was to regard the Russian Church as a tool of the 
Russian Government. The Foreign Office were concerned about the tendency of 
visitors to Russia and Eastern Europe to return to the Vest testifying to the 
vigour of Church life in the countries under Communist domination. They took 
particular exception to left wing clerics such as the Dean of Canterbury, 
Hewlett Johnson, who not only testified to the strength of the Christian 
churches in the East, but preached the compatability of Christianity and 
Communism. Vhen at the end of 1947, prompted by the Archbishop of York and 
the Bishop of Chichester, the Archbishop of Canterbury issued a public 
disclaimer of his "Red Dean", it was perceived by those an the clerical left as 
yet another example of the consonance of ecclesiastical events with general 
political events. (34) 
Following the failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference, the public 
attack on the Dean parallelled the splitting of the Trade Union movement in 
France and the public attacks on the Communists in the British trade 
unions. (35) The precedent for Fisher's censure was that of Cosmo Lang, who had 
reacted similarly prior to the war when the mood of country and Church had 
been vehemently anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. Further, as Fisher's action 
involved no question of disciplinarian or other measures against the Dean, it 
was effectively a symbolic gesture against the leftwing of the Church. However 
sincerely held were the beliefs of leftwing clerics, the Foreign Office opposed 
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them as being useful to Soviet propaganda. The Foreign Office was opposed to 
the Russian Orthodox Church for the same reason. 
This attitude led to consideration in the Foreign Office of means of 
sabotaging the Moscow Conference for Orthodox Churches, organised by the 
Patriarch of the Russian Church, by advising the leaders of the Churches with 
which they had influence not to go. However, no decision was reached about 
dissuading Orthodox Patriarchs from attending before the Foreign Office learned 
that a considerable number had accepted their invitations. The Foreign Office 
response was relief that they had not proceeded with the proposal, as B Miller 
observed: "In the circumstances I think it a good thing that we did not 
intervene with definite advice not to go; we should have put our foot in 
it. " (36) 
The Foreign Office regarded such conferences as dangerous because of the 
false propaganda picture which could be constructed from them. No objections 
or fears were expressed about the Lambeth Conference, nor the Assembly of the 
World Council of Churches, two major Christian conferences held in the Vest, 
although prior to both these conferences there was a great deal of unease in 
Church circles, on the right, the left, and the centre, that political 
considerations might distort spiritual aspirations during what was a very 
critical period for the Church and the world. 
Expression was given to unease on the left in an open letter from the 
Society of Socialist Clergy and Ministers which contained an appeal to the 
assembled bishops not to endorse the clamour for a Christian crusade against 
Communism and the Soviet Union. The letter referred to changing Christian 
attitudes in the critical international tension: "There is a tendency, of which 
- 264 - 
your Lordships cannot be unaware, for official ecclesiastical pronouncements of 
the Church of England to follow much the same line in foreign policy as that of 
the Government. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that a change is 
coming over episcopal pronouncements as the estrangement grows between the 
Soviet and the British Governments. " (37) 
occupying the centre ground, JA Douglas, former General Secretary of CFR, 
expressed his grave concern to Herbert Waddams about which Orthodox 
personalities were to attend: "When I surveyed the possibilities I was very 
depressed... " His depression was engendered by the fact that the Orthodox to 
attend were to be of the Greek religio-nationality whose presence would carry a 
political implication. Douglas considered that the very emphasis of their 
special relation with the Lambeth Conference would give the impression that 
the 
Anglican Communion was ranged on their side in the very difficult and dangerous 
jurisdictional conflict which threatened schism between Constantinople and 
Moscow and the rest of the autocephalous churches; that was between ten million 
or so of the former and the scores of millions of Slavs and other non-Greek 
Orthodox. Douglas foresaw potentially dire consequences: the disruption of the 
Orthodox Communion; "the weakening of religion behind the Iron Curtain; the 
engendering or confirming of the notion, greatly increased in the past twelve 
months, that the Church of England was a political puppet, and that to have 
dealings with the Anglican Communion was perilous. Douglas told Waddams that 
he was therefore aghast at the idea of throwing "a maximal Mikaean function" at 
which Damaskinos and the Greeks would be the outstanding figures. (38) 
Douglas told Waddams that his target of the past twenty years had been 
the establishing of "maximal practical relations possible" with every Christian 
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Communion: "My principle has been nihil Christiani a me alienum... " Nonetheless, 
Douglas recognised the necessity of studying the political situation, if only 
because churches are not only ecclesiastical institutions but have religio- 
national characters: "Thus in the old days I was bold always to declare in 
Athens that where the politician expected the Anglican Communion to reflect the 
British Government's sympathy for Greece as against Bulgaria that I was a 
Bulgaro-phil and so on. " From the information at his disposal, Douglas judged 
the guest list, which included Churches which the Russian Church denounced as 
schismatic and the Soviet Government as rebels, and the presence of a major 
hierarch such as Damaskinos himself, as enhancing the suspicion and resentment 
which the feteing and limelight of the guests of the Conference was certain to 
arouse the other side of the Iron Curtain. 
Douglas concluded his forebodings to Vaddams with an observation which 
John Birbeck used to impress upon him, that the great obstacle to advance with 
the Orthodox was the repercussion of the open rivalry between Russia and Great 
Britain in world politics. (39) 
Unease over the impact of the political on the ecclesiastical was 
expressed on the right by the Archbishop of York. His concern was the perennial 
Church fear of being compromised by being implicated in political activity. The 
Church of England was quite willing to have its Ministers condemn Communism 
and Russia from the pulpit, but it did not want to be seen to be participating 
in a politically orchestrated campaign against them which would, on the one 
hand, identify the Church with social reaction and possibly alienate the working 
classes; and on the other, identify it with a political position which would 
deny its supranational, suprapolitical status, adversely effecting its relations 
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with Christian Churches in Communist States. The desire of the Church to 
maintain a distinction between its anti-Communist activities and the political 
anti-Communist campaign then gaining momentum, was elucidated by the 
Archbishop of York in his Presidential address to the Convocation of York at 
the end of May 1948. Garbett began his address with an attack on "Marxian 
Communism", which he called "a religion without a God" and "a corrosive acid 
eating away and destroying the foundations of truth, honour, mercy and fair 
dealing, on which alone a stable civilisation can be built "(40) He next sought 
to distinguish between "Marxian Communism, and "Christian Communism", before 
inveighing against the Church becoming involved in a "Holy War" against 
Communism. Nonetheless, resorting to a distinction employed by the Ministry of 
Information during the war when it wanted to use Church leaders for its 
propaganda, the Archbishop endorsed the involvement of individual Christians in 
the aforesaid political campaign: "The individual Christian will as a good 
citizen naturally support the Government when it takes steps to defend the 
nation against danger. " 
Garbett tried to differentiate the roles of Church and State by contrast: 
The weapons of the Church should be different from those of the 
world. While the statesman and the politician must use the appropriate 
weapons at their disposal to defend their nation and its allies, the 
Church must rely on the spiritual weapons of sound teaching, of 
persuasiveness, of love as against violence, and of brotherhood as against 
class warfare. 
More to the point, and on a matter which at this juncture was of real 
concern to the Church, Garbett warned of the consequences for Christian 
relations should the issue between Marxian Communism and the Churches become 
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confused with the political conflict in which Russia and the Communist regimes 
were ranged on one side and the Western democracies on the other: 
If, therefore, we joined in a Holy War, using political and spiritual 
weapons indiscriminately against all who called themselves Communists, we 
should be making a breach with millions of Orthodox and other Christians; 
we might easily also prejudice their position with their Communist rulers; 
and we should certainly be giving the militant atheist an excuse for 
demanding the resumption of persecution on the ground that Christianity is 
a danger to the State. 
There was no question but that the Cold War confronted the Church with 
immense problems and dilemmas. The Church's attempts to meet the Cold War 
challenge, and the pressures to make it succumb, were expounded at the 1948 
Lambeth Conference, a meeting of Anglican representatives from all parts of the 
world, which took place in London in July and August of that year. Presided 
over by the Archbishop of Canterbury, 329 Bishops, 198 of which were from 
abroad, met for five weeks of grave deliberations. (41) 
The procedure of the Conference was that it met in private with no 
reporting of its deliberations allowed, but with a Conference Report published 
following its conclusion. The Conference was divided into Committees, each of 
which adopted a report on a particular subject. On the basis of these reports a 
series of resolutions were drawn up and adopted. The Encyclical Letter of the 
Conference enshrined the policy of the resolutions. 
The published Committee Reports from the Conference are illuminating in 
that they reveal that despite the Cold War tension created by the Berlin crisis 
and press hysteria, not to-mention the prevalent mood of anti-Communism, still 
many Churchmen sought to acknowledge and welcome the progressive changes 
wrought by the postwar revolution. The Committee Reports, however, carried only 
the authority of the Committees by whom they were respectively prepared and 
9 
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presented, the Conference as a whole being responsible only for the formal 
resolutions and the Encyclical Letter. Unfortunately, the final resolutions 
produced an innocuous report, seemingly calculated not to offend either the 
British or the American Administration. This effectively nullified the inherent 
challenge of certain vital Committee Reports. Moreover, the essential reticence 
of the Conference to confront issues which challenged Anglo-American interests 
was illustrated by the fact that while there was a resolution on Palestine, 
there was none about Malaya, China, Indonesia or other troubled areas of 
controversy involving the Western Powers. 
The disorders of the contemporary scene were considered by the vital 
Committee on "The Church and the Modern World", which was presided over by the 
Bishop of Albany and included the Archbishop of York. In 1848 Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels wrote: "A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of 
Communism. " One hundred years later the same spectre was clearly haunting 
episcopal minds, and as well as having its own section, the subject of 
Communism touched most of the others. The Report was divided into six 
sections: 1. Human Rights; 2. The Church and War; 3. The Church 'and the Modern 
State; 4. Communism; 5. Christian Education; 6. The Church Militant. The 
influence of the Archbishop of York was clearly discernible throughout, not 
least in the Report's preoccupation with Communism. The Report not only 
reflected the didacticism of Garbett's own writing, but contained characteristic 
topics dealt with in his own publications: past failures of the Church, now 
comprehended and redressed, all noteably confined to "the formative decades of 
the industrial era", the era that produced Marx; and a contrasting of 
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Christianity and Marxism, with the early Christians held up as an ideal against 
which the prophets of the new age compared badly. 
The Committee began with a discussion of human rights which condemned the 
emergence of the modern totalitarian state, and quite clearly meant Russia and-- 
the new Communist regimes. Totalitarian police states were the subject of 
discussion in the section on "The Modern State", and the reference to their 
being "accepted by some as a necessary means to the communal life, based on 
social justice... " made it plain that the Communist regimes were again being 
indicted: "Such, however, is the evil in human nature and the corrupting 
influence of power that the dictators and their subordinates fall in love with 
power and the exercise of coercion over others. No agreement is possible 
between the dictatorships of police states and the Christian way of life, " This 
statement was extraordinary in that it effectively condemned all the Churches 
'then functioning in Eastern Europe with-the consent and cooperation of the 
authorities, and at a time when the Anglican Communion was voicing dismay at 
'the prospect of deteriorating relations with just those Churches. 
In "The Church and War", -section, 
the Committee was unequivocal in 
declaring its opposition to war: "We are faced with a choice between the 
avoidance of war and race suicide. Peace is no longer desirable: it is an 
absolute necessity. " The Bishops acknowledged the seriousness of the existing 
'tensions, but declared these should and could be resolved other than by war: 
''Nations have, in fact, lived a long time in uneasy relations with their 
'xeighbours without going to war. It can be done again. " Although such words 
%ffectively endorsed a state of cold war and suggested political expediency 
Tather than reconciliation, of uneasy rather than good relations, and with no 
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word of friendship, they were an accurate reflection of the political crisis, 
and considering the degree of tension then existing, were actually quite bold as 
well as wise. In repudiating force, the Bishops again gauged the situation 
accurately and wisely: "Force is never a final solution, since all conflicts are 
ultimatley in the realm of ideas and one cannot kill ideas with bombs. " 
The section on "Communism" began with wise words: "As Christians we ought 
to strive to prevent the world dividing into two mutually hostile camps. " The 
Bishops stated that this involved, "A clear understanding of the truth as well 
as the errors in positions with which we are compelled... to disagree. " The 
Report disclosed that its compilers were not always successful in adhering to 
their own recommended criteria. A study of the positive aspects of Communism 
which made it appealing was recommended: "Both its critical insights into 
history and its desire to help the oppressed. " It was posited, however, that 
Marxian Communism was born of despair, based on "Proletarians have nothing to 
lose but their chains. " This was quoted as the penultimate sentence of the 1848 
Communist Manifesto. It is actually the last but two. 
The Report did contain a token recognition of the hope and strength of 
Communism which it described at one point as having "the resilient strength of 
a confident hope". However, the main emphasis was on Communism as a negative 
force. It was asserted that Communists did not hesitate to use despotic power 
to achieve their ends; and, where they gained control of a state they were 
ruthless in social action, indifferent to freedom of thought, careless of the 
sanctity of human life, in fact all "that contradicts the Christian faith in 
eternal life and justice and Christian love as a criterion of human behaviour". 
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Significantly, these adverse aspects of Communism were attributed simplistically 
and unequivocally to its atheism: 
This lack of scruple springs from the atheism of Marx's creed. He 
accepted no moral imperative in the relations of man with man except a 
compulsion to set forward the Communist revolution by every achievable 
means. He believed that this revolution was the only way to achieve 
social justice and a classless society, and therefore the ultimate goal 
justifies any means. By its despotic use of power, Communism not only 
becomes a cloak for men of ambition and for imperialism, it is also bound 
to defeat its own ends. In God's world, good cannot be achieved by evil 
means, nor a true community by hating one's neighbour. (42) 
This concentration on the atheism of Communism was criticised by Religion 
And the PeQplfa, which noted in its critique of the Report the historical error 
contained in the suggestion that early Christian history knew nothing of 
despotic power or cruelty; it also questioned the wisdom of blaming "this lack 
of scruple" on the atheism of Marx's creed as such an argument "lends itself too 
easily to the tu quoque+". Citing the Inquisition, the execution of Hus by the 
Council of Constance and the fact that countless other examples could be given, 
Sgt ion and the Peon asked was it to be assumed that these sprang from 
theism and accused the Bishops of using atheism as a simple means of evading a 
discussion of the real issues raised by Communism. Religion and the People 
further criticised the Report for contributing to the widespread propaganda 
"That Communists use wicked means, and of course everybody else, especially 
Christians, believe only in the use of perfect means"; admonishing that such an 
argument should not be repeated by those who were supposed to have had some 
'training in moral theology and casuistry. The Report was further taken to task 
for descending to the level of malicious slander in using statements such as, 
")Iarxian Communism regards mercy and pity as weakness. "(43) 
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The Report claimed Christianity as the force to challenge and overcome 
Communism. The Bishops declared that Marxism was a powerful proselytising 
force possessing a religious appeal which could only be overcome by a true 
religion and a greater force - that of Christianity. It was argued that the 
birth of Marxism had been made possible by the failure of Christianity at a 
critical point in historical development; a powerful proselytising force, it 
could only be defeated by a superior such force, a successful Christianity: it 
could not be overcome by secular forces, neither armed strength nor propaganda: 
"Communism cannot be overcome by argument alone. It has to be outlived, not 
merely outfought. Under the province of God its truths will pass into the 
experience of humanity; its untruths and half-truths will be self-destructive. " 
The gauntlet thrown down, the Report declared the Church ready to battle; 
significantly, it noted that the battle was from loyalty to God's cause, not the 
State's: "It is for the Church to be faithful to the Word of God and for 
Christians to live, and, if need be, die for the truth of God as He allows them 
to see it. But let us be sure that its martyrs die for the Kingdom of Christ 
and not for some lesser loyalty. " The Report explicitly rejected the Church 
becoming involved in the political crusade against Communism: "By making 
common cause with anti-Communist forces, the Church might have some success 
but such a short term policy would prove in the end disastrous to the Church, 
both in the East and the Vest. "(44) 
Ecclesiastical concern was expressed that the Church not be identified 
with social reaction which would alienate it from the workers from whom 
Communism derived its power; more was to be gained by competing with 
Communism in the field of social reform: "In the long term policy to win 
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workers for the Kingdom of Christ and to win them from a policy based on 
materialism, Churchmen must begin by entering into the despair as well as the 
hope that has inspired modern Communism. They must proclaim human rights 
without equivocation"; they must be seen to be sincere; "They must practice 
corporately what they preach and so cleanse the household of faith that the 
Spirit of God is able to work through it with power. " 
The Report reflected ecclesiastical concern, common also to the Roman 
Catholic Church, to cultivate the working classes and not alienate those who 
subscribed to the economic theories of Marxism. Churchmen, it stated, "must 
realise that those who accept an economic theory of Communism as distinct from 
Marxian atheism do not thereby put themselves outside the fellowship of 
Christ's Church. "(45) It was pointed out that in the spiritual fight against 
Communism there would be potential allies among the enemy who would be ready 
to join forces with a Christianity that appeared really redemptive in that 
essential sphere. This expansion of the appeal of Christianity by the addition 
of an economic element resembled Bevin's efforts to produce an appealing 
Western ideology based on Social Democracy and Christianity. 
In many respects the Report succumbedto the prevalent mood of anti- 
Communism, reflecting both class prejudices and those born of the era's 
ubiquitous propaganda. Nonetheless, the Report spoke clearly against a third 
world war and a divided world; plus it effectively identified anti-Communist 
forces as reactionary and pointed to the dangers of. an anti-Communist crusade 
and where it might lead. However it was these bold and positive declarations 
which largely disappeared in the resolutions adopted by the Conference as a 
whole. Thus, the resolution on war reaffirmed the 1930 Lambeth Conference 
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resolution: "War as a method of settling international disputes is incompatible 
with the teaching and example of our Lord Jesus Christ. " Not included, however, 
was the Committee's-assertion that modern war, was incompatible with the welfare 
and possibly the continued existence of man and the absolute necessity of 
peace. There was no word of reconciliation between East and West. Instead, 
after laying down the duty of Governments to work for disarmament, the 
resolution stated that "until such a time as this is achieved" war might be 
necessary and justified. 
This brought a suspicious and cynical rejoinder from Religion and the 
People which implied that the chairman, the Archbishop of Canterbury, had 
removed any material which might offend the political powers: 
The challenge of the Committee's report is dropped. In its place 
there comes a statement that war might be right. In other words, between 
the Committee and the Conference, somebody has asserted himself to see 
that not a word should be said of which the American or British 
Governments might disapprove. (46) 
Although in many respects the Report had been exceedingly condemnatory of 
Marxian Communism, in others it had seemed to strive for objectivity and 
understanding. It had conceded that Communism was a potent force with a 
"dynamic power", comparable to Christianity, which appealed to the hearts and 
minds of the best young men and women, including Christians, declaring: "It has 
the intellectual power of a revealing general principle and the quality of an 
overmastering faith. " In contrast to this, the Conference resolution conceded 
that there were practicing Christians who were Communists, but totally rejected 
that such a position had any validity: 
The Conference, while recognising that in many lands there are 
Communists who are practicing Christians, nevertheless declares that 
Marxian Communism is contrary to Christian faith and practice, for it 
denies the existence of God, Revelation, and a future life; it treats the 
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individual man as a means and not an end; it encourages class warfare; it 
regards the moral law not as an absolute but as a relative to the needs of 
the State. (47) 
The challenge of Communism, as it was recognised and met in the Report, was 
simply disregaded or dismissed in the Conference resolutions. 
The distinction which the Committee had clearly sought to impose on the 
Church's opposition to Communism to differentiate it from the dangers of the 
political anti-Communist crusade received no consideration in the resolutions 
which, moreover, effectively proposed that the Church perform a corollary role: 
The Conference holds that while a State must take the precautions it 
regards as necessary to protect good order and peace from all subversive 
movements, it is the special duty of the Church to oppose the challenge of 
the Marxian theory of Communism by sound teaching and the example of a 
better way, and that the Church, at all times and in all places, should be 
a fearless witness against political, social and economic injustice. (48) 
Relizion and the Peon interpreted the above as the Church's abdication from 
any moral responsibility with respect to State action instituted in the drive 
against Communism, whatever it entailed: 
This sentence enshrines the crux of the Lambeth Conference. In plain 
English it means that whatever measures the State takes against 
Communism, the Church will not interfere. Hitler asked no more from the 
Church as, by eradicating the left, he set the stage for war. At this 
point no safeguards are inserted about human rights, nice means, or 
anything else. The State must do what it wills. (49) 
The Committee recommendation that Communism should be studied in order to 
know which elements to resist and which were a "true judgement on the existing 
social and economic order, " was endorsed in the Conference resolutions. In the 
shadow of the preceeding resolution it seemed both futile and contradictory. 
Religion and the People deemed it "laughable", a sop for the Bishops' 
consciences for which it showed its contempt by comparing them to the Spanish 
Inquisitors, recalling that they were never guilty of murder, they simply 
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condemned for heresy and then watched while the State performed the burnings. 
Emphasising its disgust with the proceedings at Lambeth, Religion and the 
People quoted Kipling as its own judgement on the modern Lords at Lambeth who 
shared with the Inquisitors what Kipling called "corruscating innocence": 
"The charge is old? " - as old as Cain - as fresh as yesterday; 
Old as the Ten Commandments - have ye talked those laws away? 
If words are words, or death is death, or powder sends the ball, 
You spoke the words that sped the shot - the curse be on you all. 
They only said "intimidate, " and talked and went away - 
By God, the boys that did the work were braver men than they! 
While the Conference Resolutions were a counteraction of the Committee on 
the Modern World's Report, the Encyclical Letter was subversion of it. The 
Report had bravely tried to make distinct, and underline the dangers inherent, 
in a confusion of the Church's opposition to the atheism of Marxism with the 
political conflict between the Western democracies and Russia. The Encyclical 
Letter equated the two causes, conveying a sense of identity and common cause, 
in which the only distinction was the divine nature of the Church's mission: 
This is an hour of testing and peril for the Church, no less than the 
world. But it is the hour of God's call to the Church. (50) 
The importance and significance of the Encyclical Letter was not simply 
that it obscured the redemptive features of the Committee Report, but that it 
was presented to the public as the essence of the Conference when it became the 
collective voice of the Anglican Bishops, read out in Churches throughout the 
world on October 10,1948. (51) At a time when some gesture of conciliation was 
needed, the Bishops' proclamation simply added to the mounting tension and 
became yet further grist for Government propaganda: 
Mankind has only recently escaped conquest by totalitarian states 
which deified their own power. It now finds itself threatened by the new 
menace of Marxian Communism which exalts atheism, puts supreme confidence 
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in material progress, and proclaims its gospel with a militant enthusiasm 
which expects to conquer the world. Christians must repudiate this form 
of Communism and must condemn the cruelties, injustice and lying 
propaganda which are inherent in it. (52) 
The campaign against Communism was portrayed as a modern crusade: 
In the world of our time two ways of living, two beliefs concerning 
the meanining of human life, contend with one another for man's soul. ' The 
battle is between that faith in God and man through Christ, by which man 
is set free, and (against it) the creeds of materialism and the will to 
power by which he is enslaved. (53) 
After the Second World War many within and without the Church had hoped 
it might be an international instrument of peace and reconciliation. Its 
conversion to a Cold War institution was itself an illustration of the 
irresistible pressure of the Cold War mentality in that period, while the Church 
became an indicator of the extremes of Cold War polarisation. The World 
Council of Churches had yet to speak; there many appealed for a third way, but 
Lambeth had already repudiated it: 
Finally, we invite all men and women to join with us under Christ's 
banner in the war against the evils which wreck man's life and against the 
false creeds which debase it. In that war there can be no neutrality. To 
those who stand aloof Christ says, "He that is not with me is against 
me. " (54) 
1*fl**14*1 
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The Lambeth Conference, an exclusively Anglican affair, was followed by the 
Assembly of the World Council of Churches held at Amsterdam in August and 
September, 1948. Here were represented the overwhelming majority of the 
Christian Churches of the world, save for two significant blocs, those of the 
Russian-led Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church. Cold War 
pressures were exerted quite blatantly at the Amsterdam meeting to achieve a 
further Christian condemnation of Communism and the policies of the Soviet 
Union. However, deep misgivings in the Christian community regarding the 
West's attempt to monopolise Christianity as a rationale for political purposes, 
were expressed at Amsterdam. Similar misgivings had been silenced under the 
authoritarian procedure of Lambeth, but at Amsterdam they resulted in a 
Christian rejection of both Communism and laissez faire capitalism, and a 
resolution to seek an alternative means, a third way. 
This result was of exceptional significance because political pressure from 
the United States aimed at influencing the direction taken by the WCC was 
tremendous. Throughout its development, the organisation of the WCC had been 
subject to pressure from the United States, and Britain, aimed at creating an 
organization which identified and was sympathetic to the West. In the origins 
of the WCC there was no intent that the body should be subject to political 
influences or used for political reasons. The VCC grew out of the various 
streams of the Ecumenical Movement. A reunion of the Churches was regarded by 
many as essential for the revival of the Christian faith as a meaningful world 
movement. The question of Church reunion had long been in existence, yet before 
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the Great War it had made little headway. The War of 1914-1918, however, 
brought the whole question forward and gave it urgency, in the words of JG 
Lockhart: "in part from a consciousness that religious division was one of the 
circumstances which had made such a catastrophe possible, in part perhaps from 
a sense of shame that in every beligerent country the Church had given almost 
unreserved fealty to the secular power, and in part through an attraction 
towards secular unity which was bringing to birth a League of Nations. "(55) 
Progress toward reunion proceeded during the inter-war years culminating 
in the meetings at Oxford and Edinburgh in 1937 under a design inspired and 
promoted by William Temple which brought the various streams of the Ecumenical 
Movement into the broad river of the World Council of Churces, intended to 
facilitate more effective Christian action in the modern world. Following a 
conference in Utrecht in 1938, the Ecumenical Movement was organised into the 
World Council of Churches in the Process of Formation. It was established in 
Geneva and was run by a Provisional Committee and an Administrative Committee 
with Dr Visser It Hooft as secretary-general. World War Two interrupted the 
process of formation and led to some significant changes owing to the inability 
of the Provisional Council to function and the death of the movement's leading 
spirit, William Temple, as well as other founding figures such as William Paton. 
The Occupation of Europe inhibited the growth and development of the Ecumenical 
Movement there, whereas in America it grew and flourished. The North American 
Ecumenical Conference held in Toronto in 1941 was supported by thirty-five 
Churches with delegates from North. Central and South America. 
When the founding of the WCC was proposed at Oxford and Edinburgh, the 
American section of "Life and Work", which in practice was the personnel of the 
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Federal Council of Churches' Department of Relations with Churches Abroad, 
formed a Joint Executive Committee to cooperate with Geneva and Oxford. The 
American members of the Provisional Committee were all members of the Joint 
Executive Committee and Dr Henry Leiper served both groups as executive 
secretary. This later became the American Committee for the World Council of 
Churches. An office was set up in New York and, amongst a host of other 
activities, it created the American Advisory Committee for the Study Department, 
set up to re-examine the whole WCC programme which it was claimed the outbreak 
of war necessitated. 
From 1937 on, the New York office carried the heavy financial burdens of 
the WCC, particularly as the number of countries which could support the 
Council became smaller and smaller. The magnanimity of the member Churches in 
the United States received a special tribute from the Central Committee of the 
VCC in 1954; this monetary provision made possible the favourable financial 
situation the organisation enjoyed in the first years of its life. In the post- 
war period financial contributions from the United States were vital to the 
health of the WCC. (56) At Amsterdam in 1948 a goal of $240,000 was set; this 
was reached by contributions from the United States in 1951; that level was 
exceeded in 1952 and 1953, necessitating the creation of a special reserve fund 
for allocation at a later date. Thus, during a period of dire economic stress 
throughout Europe, the VCC had more money than it could spend. (57) Moreover, 
this meant that the WCC was in an analogous position to the Vatican which was 
also believed to, receive the most substantial part of its income from the 
United States. (58) 
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The VCC also received substantial contributions in the post-war period 
from John D Rockefeller, the American multimillionaire commonly associated with 
Standard Oil, one of the biggest, and toughest, organisations supporting the 
structure of American capitalism. (59) In may 1945, Visser 't Hooft explained 
the task of the Churches in the post-war world to Rockefeller. He argued that 
in the struggle with totalitarian ideolgies the Churches realised their own 
responsibility for the dechristianisation of their countries and the need to 
evangelise in all realms of life and to reoccupy the many fields of thought 
and life from which they had retreated. They were, however, gravely handicapped 
by lack of leadership, particularly in Europe. and required trained leaders with 
a strong foundation in Christian doctrine and a vision of the existing reality 
of the worldwide ecclesia militans. Rockefeller was so interested in these 
views that he offered half a million dollars for the opening and launching of 
an Ecumenical Training Centre, meant firstly for the European theatre and then, 
as soon as possible, for the whole world. (60) Further financial contributions 
came from this same source in 1950. 
During the war years the attention of the Council came to be focussed on 
postwar reconstruction, including not only mutual help between Churches, but 
general discussions concerning the international post-war order. This was of 
particular concern to the "Just and Durable Peace Commission" of the Federal 
Council of Churches in the United States, headed by John Foster Dulles, and the 
"Peace Aims Group" in Britain, which included Sir Alfred Zimmern of the Foreign 
Office Research Department, Geoffrey Wilson from the Foreign Office and Herbert 
Waddams from the Ministry of Information. 
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The origins of the Just and Durable Peace Commission under the leadership 
of John Foster Dulles, in the light of subsequent events, was really quite 
ironic. Dulles was among the Church leaders and influential Christian 
spokesmen who shared strong misgivings about reacting to the war in Europe in 
the spirit of a religious crusade, as it was being presented in America by the 
"Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies". Leaders of the Department 
of International Justice and Goodwill, in particular, turned their energies to 
I keep the Federal Council of Churches from moving in this direction. Faced with 
a serious division of opinion, the leadership of the Federal Council of Churches 
sought some common ground. During Executive Committee and special study group 
meetings in the spring and summer of 1940, it became clear that however deep 
their disagreements might be on the causes of the war and the nature of the 
belligerents, they shared common long range goals. It was decided that each 
should take an individual stance on the nature of the war and the desirable 
response of the United States. The collective effort would be directed to a 
policy for implementation after the war. 
With Protestant thinking channelled on the post-war world, a consensus 
emerged on the desirability of organising a major study commission. In 
December at the biennial meeting of the Federal Council in Atlantic City, 
approval and support were given for the creation of a "Commission to Study the 
Bases of a Just and Durable Peace", designed to "Clarify the minds of our 
Churches regarding the moral, political and economic foundations of an enduring 
peace. " John Foster Dulles was named as Chairman. (61) The Commission evolved 
into a body committed to interesting the American people in international 
affairs and convincing them of their God-given duty to the rest of-the world. 
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In this respect the Commission was an important element opposing American 
isolationism, and as such was naturally of interest to the United States 
Government which was vitally interested in the post-war world and the 
opportunities it would bring America. 
Between 1941 and 1945 the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace 
elaborated a number of basic tasks for producing a new and better world order 
which reflected similar preoccupations of other internationalist groups in the 
United States. The Commission aimed for stimulation of a vast segment of 
American public opinion, publicity efforts and publicity campaigns becoming 
dominant ingredients. (62) Dulles proposed a major campaign to "force" a 
positive decision on the question, "Will the American people now commit 
themselves to a future of organised collaboration within the areas of 
demonstrated world interdependence? " The result was a set of propositions 
christened the "Six Pilars of Peace" which received massive media promotion in 
America with wide European coverage. (63) 
In July 1942 Dulles travelled to England at the invitation of British 
Church leaders in the hope of beginning some transatlantic cooperation. The 
substance of the visit proved to be, as Dulles remarked, "more on the secular 
than the religious side. (64) He had lengthy meetings with almost every member 
of the War Cabinet, including Anthony Eden and Ernest Bevin, but found little 
direction and enthuthiasm in Church circles. The following year however, in 
July 1943, fourteen British Church leaders, including the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, issued a statement entitled "A Christian Basis for Reconstruction" 
which was modelled closely on the Six Pillars of Peace and was endorsed and 
publicised in the United States by the Dulles Commission. In that same month 
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the general secretary of the recently formed British Council of Churches 
travelled to an International Round Table held at Princeton to enable Protestant 
leaders to consult with Dulles as a group. The meeting included political 
leaders who were invited as sources of information and ideas. The work of the 
Commission was privately endorsed by President Roosevelt and Sumner Welles of 
the State Department. However, Velles' plan for State Department discussions 
with the Commission were quickly terminated by Leo Pasvolsky, Secretary Hull's 
special assistant for work on an international organisation. (65) 
Prior to Dulles' involvement with the Commission, he had deprecated any 
identification of national self-interest with righteousness. (66) Yet during 
1942 and 1943, intent "that the American people be filled with a righteous faith 
and a sense of mission in the world", he unfailingly characterised the 
Commission's purpose as a great crusade that would bring a bright, peaceful 
future. In his "Christian Message" address Dulles emphasised that "Almost 
everywhere a new society must be built. This is not only a calamity, it is an 
opportunity, the like of which man never saw before. "(67) Noteably, however, 
after the Moscow Declaration's promise of a new international organisation, 
Dulles shifted his emphasis from that of opportunity to that of calamity. This 
step went only part of the way, he insisted, and could turn out to be little 
more than an empty gesture: "To move from words into functioning institutions 
infused with the spirit of Christian fellowship remains a spiritual task of 
immense proportions. " (68) 
Dulles was concerned about the potential nature of the settlement of 
immediate post-war issues which would inevitably reflect the interests of 
others than those of the United States: "Many of the major decisions are within 
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the power of others than ourselves and the necessities of continuing war 
collaboration compel compromises as to post-war arrangements... " Moreover, any 
world organisation created by the victorious Allies might "adopt and sanction 
such post-war settlements and seek to perpetuate them. "(69) In 1947, when the 
WCC's Churches Commission on International Affairs defined the desired 
relationship between churches and governments in its summary of the study 
paper "The Church and the International Disorder", it reflected a similar 
concern: "One of the functions of the Churches is to keep before the leaders of 
states the demands of the moral law, lest the necessary compromise in political 
action go farther than necessary in the direction of mere expediency and so 
bring disaster. "(70) That agreements with the Soviet Union were the object of 
concern in both statements was clear. Significantly, the CCIA had based their 
study an the "Statement on Soviet-American Relations" of the Federal Council of 
Churches and the Dulles Commission, despite the fact that it naturally and 
inevitably reflected American interests first and foremost. 
Dulles rhetoric was full of Christian and moral concern, fired with a 
striking missionary zeal, but this did not blind him to more substantive 
political and economic goals. In October 1941, in a private letter, Dulles 
criticised the self-righteous cast of the Atlantic Charter not to seek special 
advantages for the United States and Great Britain: 
.. I .. believe that our national policy will 
in fact very greatly 'aggrandise' 
our nation to some extent 'territorially', and to a great extent 'otherwise'. 
The statement may be correct if emphasis is put on the word 'seek'. It 
may be that our aggrandisement will not be of our 'seeking', but 
nevertheless it will be a fact. We have acquired for ninety-nine years 
far-flung naval bases in the Atlantic. We have taken over Greenland and 
Iceland, and through the guise of developing commercial aviation we have 
driven the German and Italian airlines pretty much out of South America 
and are developing there what in reality are United States military air 
bases. We are greatly developing naval and air bases in the far distant 
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Pacific islands and in the northwestern extremes of Alaska. These, 
coupled with our two ocean navy, will put us in a position to dominate the 
Far East. I do not think there can be any question but what the United 
States will come out of this period with a combination of naval power, air 
power and strategic bases controlling both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 
and South America to an extent that we will have aquired a dominant 
position in the world comparable to that of England during the last 
century. It seems to me that this is 'aggrandisement, territorial or 
otherwise. ' (71) 
Dulles had no objection to the likelihood of these developments, as was 
illustrated in his visit to England in 1942, Worried about "turmoil and 
confusion" in Europe after the war, Dulles told Anthony Eden and Stafford 
Cripps that London and Washington, not some world organisation, should come to 
"rather definite views as to what should be done in Europe" and then do it 
"firmly, backing the element in each country who shared those views"; he told 
Clement Attlee they "should make up their mind as to what should be done and 
then go in and do it. " In discussions of underdeveloped areas, Dulles told Eden 
and Colonial Secretary Lord Cranborne, "What you have got to do is have some of 
your important people say that from now on we are going to have a new deal and 
open up the door to these colonies and start off on a new basis. " He further 
advised that the British would have "to pocket their pride" in order to secure 
post-war American collaboration in the development of the great colonial areas 
of the world. (72) The fundamental exploitative relationship of great powers and 
underdeveloped regions was to remain untouched, Dulles sought only to eliminate 
conflicts between the great powers in a manner ultimately beneficial to 
American interests. 
Although during World War II Dulles made global reform a religious as well 
8s an ethical imperative, adopting a lofty tone in his Commission work, he was 
effectively using Christ's words and the Christian tradition, with its emphasis 
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on caring and unselfishness, to put forward what were essentially political 
solutions with American interests at heart. In a 1944 meeting at the White 
House, Franklin Roosevelt told Dulles that he could see the logic of his 
proposals, but that he should "put some steeples on them" in order to rally 
public support. (73) This is exactly what Dulles had been doing with 
measureable success. From Versailles through the interwar years, Dulles had not 
only consistently cast his appeals in terms of national or self-interest, 
supporting his claims with political, economic, social and security arguments, 
he had equally consistently deprecated appeals to man's emotional being, despite 
acknowledging their potency. Prior to the Second World War, religious 
references, ideological overtones, moral appeals, and any crusading aspects were 
noticeably absent from his writings and speeches. During the war these very 
elements were responsible for taking him to centre stage in international 
affairs. Dulles involvement with the Federal Council of Churches and the 
emerging World Council of Churches proved effective platforms from which Dulles 
was able to espouse political arguments in the guise of ethical religious ones 
with added moral authority. In the post-war period Dulles moved more 
exclusively into the realm of political statesmanship, but-he retained both his 
Christian rhetoric and, more specifically, his connections with Christian 
organisations, particularly the WCC. 
During the weeks just before and just after the end of hostilities in 
Europe, groups of WCC Provisional Committee members held important meetings in 
London and New York during which the foundation was laid for the post-war 
period, the organisation of a Reconstruction Department, soon to become larger 
than all the older departments put together, was completed and a decision taken 
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to open a World Council Office in London. The New York meetings were attended 
by a European delegation composed of the Bishop of Chichester, Dr Visser It 
Hooft and Pastor Boegner. 
While the United States carried the main financial burden of the VCC and 
played an active part in directing its development, Britain played a 
corresponding role. Britain contributed financially to the support of the WCC 
both during and after the war, and had participated in the interchange of 
thought on the issues of the international order continued through the 
Commission on a Just and Durable Peace and the corresponding commission on the 
British Council of Churches. At Utrecht in May 1938, Dr William Paton, 
Secretary of the International Missionary Council, had been appointed one of the 
General Secretaties of the Provisional Committee of the VCC with headquarters 
in London. The International Missionary Council at its Madras meeting in 1939 
approved the setting up of a Joint Committee under the chairmanship of Dr John 
Mott, with Dr Paton serving both bodies as General Secretary. Their unity and 
interdependence was declared an acknowledged principle in 1946. 
In August of that year, an international Christian conference was held at 
Cambridge, on the joint invitation of the WCC and the International Missionary 
Council. These two Councils there decided to set up a "Commission of the 
Churches on International Affairs"(CCIA) to "explore, educate and express the 
mind of the Churches on international problems. " The foundation of such an 
organisation had already been thoroughly discussed by the Provisional Committee 
in Geneva in February 1946. (74) Starting with an initial concentration on the 
question of international safeguards for religious liberty and related human 
rights, the Commission constructed a procedure for action on a wider front. (75) 
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Following the Cambridge Conference, offices of the Executive Chairman, KG Grubb, 
and of the Director, OF Nolde, were promptly opened in London and New York 
respectively. The location of the offices was decided with a view to the 
"closest possible contact with the international centres of political 
activity. "(76) The early work of the Commission was guided by British and 
American "continuation committees" which had been appointed at Cambridge. " 
Provision was also made for a President and three Vice-Presidents. John Foster 
Dulles was appointed as one of the latter. (77) 
The CCIA was made responsible for special studies on international issues 
in preparation for the Amsterdam meeting and, in that connection, served as 
Commission IV of the Study programme. The papers submitted for study show a 
preoccupation with Communism and the Soviet Union. Interestingly, concern over 
the Soviet Union as a world power predominated over concern with Marxism. The 
subject of relations with the Soviet Union dominated CCIA studies. Its 
importance was acknowledged by the discussion at the Cambridge Conference and 
subsequently in a memorandum on the Commission's projected studies: 
... the subject of the relation of the USSR to the world will be one. It 
may, indeed, prove as important as to be the only major one, for, 
adequately treated, it involves both the principle international "crisis" as 
well as the "critical" confrontations of outlook between the Christian view 
of man in his own nature and society, of government and politics, and of 
the purposes and content of the peaceful and good life, and the Communist 
view of those things. Most of the anxieties and hopes which move men's 
minds today are involved in this confrontation. (78) 
The CCIA's major concern became, "the problem raised for the Christian 
conscience by the state and tendency of relations between the USSR and the rest 
of the world. * Grubb, who enjoyed close connections with the Foreign Office, 
felt that this necessitated other than simply Christian views: "Although this 
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will have to be studied as a piece of work prepared for an official assembly of 
the Churches, it is important that on many points full account be taken of the 
views of qualified judges who may have no explicit confessional connection with 
the Churches. "(79) This provided for outside consultation with a whole range of 
interested parties, including political and economic, and was an attitude 
previously endorsed and justified as making their statements better informed 
and more effective by the Provisional Committee in Geneva at its February 1946 
meeting: "A primary condition of effective utterance on contemporary issues will 
be adequate provision for continuous and intensive study and consultation. " (80) 
The anti-Soviet bias clearly discernible in the study preparation of the 
CCIA was in opposition to the a-political aspirations of the World Council of 
Churches. At the Amsterdam Assembly in August 1948, It Hooft presented a 
report on behalf of the Provisional Committee which denied political bias: 
A second misunderstanding in some quarters is that the Council 
pursues political ends. We live in a world possessed by politics and 
large masses of men cannot believe that any great undertaking of an 
international character should be free from political bias. Our task is to 
prove in word and deed that we serve a Lord Whose realm certainly 
includes politics but Whose saving purpose cuts across all political 
alignments and embraces men, of, all parties, and all lands. (81) 
Nonetheless, full recognition was given the fact that the value of VCC 
statements was that they were authoritative announcements from a Christian 
body. CCIA statements were considered as probably finding their chief value in 
the stimulus and guidance afforded to the Churches rather than in their direct 
influence upon the secular world. They were to be in effect an ecclesiastical 
corollary to the Foreign Office's more general "education campaign": "In so far 
as the Commission succeeds in focusing the attention of Christians in all the 
Churches on issues which are of crucial moment, it will be fulfilling an 
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important function. " Even the largest and strongest denominations were 
regarded by the Provisional Committee as having much more limited outlooks than 
the ecumenical fellowship and needing the "perspective and sense of direction" 
which it could provide. (82) 
In its approach to the study of international questions, it was clear that 
the CCIA identified itself with Western interests against the Soviet Union. As 
a Western organised body, this was natural, but the pretensions of the WCC were 
that as a religious organisation representing the World's churches it was 
supposedly independent and above the East-West conflict. Its Western bias was 
illustrated by a consideration raised by one response to a long draft outline 
study on the USSR prepared by Grubb but eventually withdrawn on the advice of 
his colleagues as too ambitious. The consideration, described as "very 
questionable" by Grubb, was, "That it is a mistake to concentrate attention on 
the issues between the USSR and 'the rest'. What is wanted is a general study 
of the relations between the Great Powers. " This advice went unheeded. The 
"Statement on Soviet-American Relations", a summary of the "unavoidable and 
avoidable tensions" in Soviet-American relations, prepared by the Federal 
Council of Churches and the Dulles Commission, was selected as the starting 
point for the British study of postwar relations. It was a step of which Grubb 
approved: "There is much to be said for this, for whereas the document would 
need close scrutiny and lifting out of its immediate American context, the 
advantage of closely engaging American interest would be great. "(83) 
Grubb thought there might be a divergence of opinion between American and 
European Christians as to whether the CCIA were trying to write a study on 
political relations, what they should be and how they should be pursued, or a 
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statement by Christians on their attitude to existing political situations and 
the assumptions which these appeared to reveal: Grubb favoured concentration 
on the latter. (84) In its study preparations the CCTA viewed the forthcoming 
Amsterdam Assembly as a "demonstration of the merits and weaknesses of the 
tactics of democracy in relation to a situation of totalitarian rigidity", and 
sought to define "an attitude of temper and outlook which should govern the 
Christian mind in approaching the dilemma created by the policy of the USSR 
and of Communist tactics in the world. "(85) 
The identification with the West of both the WCC and the CCIA was 
particularly well illustrated in the study contributions and other preparatory 
material for Amsterdam composed throughout 1947 and the first half of 1948. 
Vestern propaganda and the Lambeth line were clearly discernible in Assembly 
Commission IV's "The Church and the International Disorder", which stated that 
the Communists resorted to violence to achieve their ends: 
The present conflict of ideologies which find their expression in differing 
political structures and which are supported by different national groups 
is the cause of the gravest apprehension, for while there is no 
irreconciliable conflict between many of the social ends which are 
professedly sought by Soviet Communists, and those ends which Christian 
citizens seek, there is a great difference as to the means which should be 
used... The existence of severely conflicting systems in a closely 
interknit world presents the danger of a "series of frightful collisions", 
especially since the proponents of one system profess that change involves 
the use of violence. (86) 
An anti-Soviet, pro-Western perspective was naturally imposed on all the 
various international issues considered by the CCIA. This was illustrated in a 
CCIA paper on the "Characteristics of present international tension", dated 
December 15,1947, which discussed nationalism. In reference to the revival of 
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nationalist feeling in Russia it was noted that it had made no difference to the 
use of Communist parties abroad: 
The organisations which were originally formed in order to spread world 
revolution are now used to further the national aims of the Soviet Union, 
and the difference in effect is not easy to perceive. In fact the power of 
the Soviet Union may be and often is best extended by the spread of chaos 
and revolutionary conditions. The emphasis has changed since the old days 
but the methods remain much the same. (87) 
In discussing the growth of nationalism, colonial governments were 
credited with providing the essential prerequisites; territories were "unified 
and given good government by Western Imperial Powers. This was the task 
discharged by the United States in the Philippines. "(88) Where nationalism was 
regarded as being disadvantageous, it was thought "not unreasonable to maintain 
that the independence would be better withheld. "(89) Correspondingly, the 
civilizing imperialism and territorial expansion of Western empire builders was 
defended: 
Similarly Christians should not permit themselves to become carried 
away by unthinking condemnation of "imperialism" and "imperialists". The 
great empires of the world have brought untold benefits to mankind. It 
was the existence of the Roman Empire which was a chief reason for the 
spread of Christianity through the then civilised world. Europe received 
some of its most valuable civil traditions and customs from the Roman 
Empire. The French, Dutch, Spanish, Portugese and British Empires have 
also been tremendous civilising and beneficial influences in the world. 
Moreover the conquering and incorporation of adjacent lands by force, 
although not always referred to as imperialism, do not in fact differ in 
any way in principle from it. Few would deny that the territorial 
expansion of the United States has been beneficial to the areas 
concerned. (90) 
In its relations with Churches outside the ecumenical fellowship, the WCC 
adopted much the same attitude as did the politcal opponents of the Soviet 
Union; thus its efforts were more directed toward cultivating relations with the 
Roman Catholic than with the Russian Orthodox Church. Where the war acted in 
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many ways as a stimulant in bringing the Churches closer together and revealing 
to them the value of combined action, it also presented the possibility of 
bringing the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches into the new spirit 
of cooperation. Following Mussolini's occupation of Albania on Good Friday, 
1939, Pope Pius XII stated in his Easter sermon that any lasting peace must of 
necessity be founded on Christian principles. The views expressed by the Pope 
were in line with those which had been issued by the Oxford Conference of 1937, 
and Bishop Bell of Chichester, who was deeply committed to ecumenicalism, 
conceived the idea of an approach to Rome by representatives of the Ecumenical 
Movement with a view to producing a joint statement on the basic principles of 
a true international order. Securing the approval of the WCC representatives, 
including the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Lang and Temple, on June 10, 
1939, Bell proposed to Archbishop Godfrey, the Apostolic Delegate, that there 
should be preliminary conversations to discuss the project confidentially. The 
proposal was rejected by Rome. 
Bell remained undeterred. He responded sympathetically to the Pope's 
Christmas Eve message of 1939 where he outlined what came to be known as the 
Five Peace Points. His was one of the signatures, together with those of the 
Archbishops Lang and Temple and the Reverend VH Armstrong, the Moderator of 
the Free Church Federal Council, which endorsed the points and added to them 
the Five Economic Standards of the Oxford Conference. Bell went on to draw up 
a plan for joint cooperation within wartime Britain, the Chichester Memorandum, 
which became the basis of discussion at informal talks between Catholics and 
Protestants. A plan was agreed an January 24,1942, whereby there were to be 
parallel movements, the Sword of the Spirit for Roman Catholics, and Religion 
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and Life for the Protestant Commission of the Churches. These were to 
undertake joint action at the local level. A joint official statement was issued 
on May 28,1942, which emphasised the compelling obligation resting upon all 
Christian people to maintain the Christian tradition and to act together to the 
utmost possible extent "to secure the effective influence of Christian teaching 
and witness in the handling of social, economic and civic problems, now and in 
the critical postwar period. "(91) 
Although there was considerable disagreement between the YCC and the 
Vatican with regard to the post-war formation of an anti-Communist Christian 
front, intercourse between Protestant and Catholic leaders was encouraged by the 
Vest's political leaders who sought a spiritual dimension to their political 
opposition to the Soviet Union. While from the Ecumenical point of view the 
Vatican drew no closer to the other Churches, in that no doctrinal differences 
were resolved - in fact, owing to the Pope's pronouncement on the Virgin Birth 
in this period doctrinal conflict was exacerbated - there was much more 
cooperation and working together on the administrative and political levels. 
Yet in the immediate post-war period the Vatican was closely identified with 
reactionary elements and in 1948 Amsterdam declared against an anti-Communist 
crusade such as the Vatican supported. 
Despite the Protestant Churches in the West being closer doctrinally and 
more in sympathy theologically with the Russian Orthodox Church than with the 
Roman Catholic, while the Pope and the Vatican were regarded with suspicion, 
and worse, by many Protestant leaders, it was with them rather than the Russian 
Patriarch that ecclesiastical cooperation was attempted. There was a war-time 
attempt to establish relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. Initiated by 
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the Rusians, an exchange of delegations took place between the Church of 
England, represented by the Archbishop of York in September 1943, and the 
Russian Orthodox Church, whose delegation came to England in June 1945. 
While Churchmen on both sides recognised the political inspiration of 
their renewed ecclesiastical relations, still, the desire to promote friendship 
between their Churches was genuine. Nonetheless, while the WCC presented itself 
as a world-wide Christian body transcending national and racial frontiers, 
there were doubts within it as to the advisability of including the Russian 
Church in the Ecumenical fellowship. In December 1943 Visser It Hooft, the WCC 
General Secretary, wrote to William Temple: "What must we make of the new 
Church situation in Russia? Are we wrong in thinking that the Patriarch and 
the Synod are not really echoing the word of their Lord, but the word of the 
Kremlin? Is there not reason to fear that the entrance of the Russian Church 
upon the ecumenical scene would mean the introduction of a definitely political 
element in our, thank God, supra-political movement? "(92) In fact, It Hooft's 
objection to the Russian Church was applicable to any national Church within 
its membership; certainly the Church of England. That it was considered only 
in relation to the Russian Church was a critical indicator of t'Hooft's anti- 
Soviet sentiments. These were significant because as Darril Hudson in his 
study of The World Council of Churches in International Affairs remarked of It 
Hooft: 
The effect of the chief administrative officer of the World Council, its 
General Secretary, on the whole organisation, but especially on its primary 
political voice to the outside world, is important. He, after all, sets the 
tone of the international work of the organisation. (93) 
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Contacts between the Russian Orthodox Church and the WCC were 
characterised by a large measure of caution. On April 23,1946, the Presidents 
of the Provisional Committee of the WCC sent an official invitation to the 
Patriarch of Moscow, informing him that at the meeting which took place in 
Geneva in February it had been decided to seek increased contact with the 
Orthodox Churches and a meeting of delegations was proposed. The WCC was 
uncertain as to what response to expect, knowing that the Russian Church 
followed the Byzantine tradition of emphasis on eternal rather than earthly 
questions. Moreover, a fact which had been considered before extending the 
invitation, the Russian Church would be extremely wary of joining in any 
statement which criticised the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, the Russian 
Church expressed an interest in participation and requested further information 
and publications relating to the Ecumenical Movement, of which they had a very 
limited knowledge. 
In Russian Church circles there was undoubtedly interest in the Ecumenical 
cause and in contacts in general with those Churches from which it had been 
separated for so many years. The political complications to be encountered 
were probably not immediately envisaged by the Russian Church, but as they 
learnt more of the movement they gradually became apparent. Following the 
Church Conference of heads and representatives of the Autocephalic Orthodox 
Churches held in Moscow from July 8 to 17,1948, the Russian Orthodox leaders 
decided to refrain from taking part in the Ecumenical Movement "with its 
present tendencies". (94) The Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria 
and the Orthodox in the satellite countries supported the Moscow decision. The 
Kremlin probably exerted an influence mitigating against participation, 
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suspecting the WCC to be a political tool of the Americans, in the same way as 
the West suspected the Orthodox Church to be a tool of the Russians. 
There were also confessional difficulties preventing the Orthodox Churches 
Joining the WCC; a number of Orthodox representatives raised ecclesiastical 
objections to their participation at the Moscow Conference. The decision was 
not wholly unwelcome in the WCC; certainly the participation of the Russian 
Church had appeared as potentially problematic. A CCIA study outline of the 
Soviet Union had noted that the possibility of Russian Orthodox delegates from 
the Patriarchate, "must be remembered, as well as the fact that significant 
documents are carefully studied in Moscow. "(95) 
Comments on the study contributions to Assembly Commission IV on "The 
Church and International Affairs" reveal a mixed response to the Dulles line. 
Reinhold Niebuhr had no criticism to make of John Foster Dulles' "excellent 
paper" on "Continuing Christian Responsibility in a Changing World". 06) But 
the same paper made "a most horrible impression" on the Reverend Frits Kuiper. 
Complaining that he had but shortly received the paper and had no time to make 
a detailed criticism, Kuiper called it "not a contribution to help the Church to 
find its way in the international affairs of the day but an example to show us 
how we should nt make our approach to this theme: 
If we want to know the arguments many American Christians are using 
to support their government in its present policy towards the Soviet 
Union, the study of Mr Foster Dulles' paper is certainly of very great 
value. But it seems to me to lack comprehension of the Biblical teachings 
of judgement and grace, as we can find them in both Old and New 
Testament. It is not looking on both friend and enemy both in the light 
of God's revelation. 
In the diagnosis of the situation the paper fails to deal with the 
guilt of the democracies toward the world. In the formulation of the 
Christian attitude there is a lack of modesty that is rather apt to close 
doors between the Christian and non-Christian parts of the world instead 
of opening them. 
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Although Stalin's "Problems of Leninism" are cited often and not 
incorrect, the paper proofs a very serious lack of understanding for the 
background of the Soviet attitude. (97) 
This disparity of views and the opposition to the American way prior to the 
1948 Assembly anticipated the coming conflict which was to prevent the WCC 
giving the sort of endorsement and support as had Lambeth's Encyclical Letter 
to the West's Cold War policies. 
Inevitably at Amsterdam, amidst growing Cold War tension, Commission IV's 
"The Church and the International Disorder" proved to be the main arena of 
conflict within the Council. The leading protagonists were the United States 
Foreign policy expert, John Foster Dulles, and the Czech professor of the Hus 
Faculty at Prague, JL Hromadka, a respected non-Communist who was also the 
leader of the Evangelical Church of the Czech Brethren, that country's largest 
and most influential Protestant Church. Dulles' speech declared war on 
Communism: Communist parties, he said, dominated the governments of seven 
countries, which accounted for nearly a quarter of the population of the world, 
and they alone rendered impossible the immediate creation of a universal 
organisation for world peace. When he proceeded to discuss the necessity of a 
better organisation of the Churches against Communism, he was effectively 
calling for an organisation of the Churches against Communism. He stated that 
Communism rejected the world law; the Communist regime was not a regime of 
peace, and was opposed, in principle, to peaceful change. Communism had world 
wide ambitions. The solution - supposing there was still time - was not the 
use of force but the further integration of the moral idea into social 
institutions. (98) 
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Dulles' oversimplified Christian anti-Communism was resisted by Hromadka 
whose own analysis of the post-war situation attempted to transcend the East- 
West conflict: 
What we are witnessing is - speaking in secular and political terms 
- the end of Western supremacy within the realm of the international 
order. The repercussions of this appalling upheaval are noticeable 
everywhere, in politics as well as in trade and business, in literature as 
well as in spiritual and moral life. I am not speaking about the fall or 
decline of the West. What I have in mind is simply the fact that the 
Western nations have ceased to be the exclusive masters and architects of 
the world. The era of the Western man is approaching its end under a 
terrific storm which is sweeping through all humanity. For several 
decades many a deep and responsible observer has been pointing to the 
portentous omens of the forthcoming crisis... Somewhere deep under the 
ground we can hear a resounding echo of the millions of the 
underprivileged, the underdogs of society, marching and claiming a full 
share in the material and cultural gooods of modern society... (99) 
Hromadka's speech was not uncritical of Communism, but it also pointed to 
the features which Christians could appreciate and recognise: 
Nevertheless Communism represents, although under an atheistic form, much 
of the social impetus of the living Church, from the Apostolic age down 
through the days of the monastic orders to the Reformation and liberal 
humanism. Many barbarians are, through the Communist movement, coming of 
age and aspiring to a place in the sun. 
Hromadka did not minimise the inherent dangers of Communism, but he 
regarded the anti-Communist solution as futile: "The perils of Communism cannot 
be overcome by equating it exclusively with totalitarianism and by marshalling 
all the possible and impossible groups against it. " He posited that the way 
forward was not through opposition but understanding, with an appreciation of 
Christian failure combined with a new willingness for future dialogue and 
cooperation: "It is our great task to understand our own failures, omissions and 
intangible selfish motives, to acknowledge the right of the new barbarians 'to 
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become co-builders and heirs' of the treasures that were accumulated through 
the centuries and enjoyed only by some few nations of Europe and America. " 
Thanks to the striking part played by Hromadka in the discussions, this 
section of the final report repudiated Christianity taking sides in the Cold 
Var: 
The greatest threat to peace today comes from the division of the 
world into mutually suspicious and antagonistic blocs. This threat is all 
the greater because national tensions are confused by the clash of 
economic and political systems. Christianity cannot be equated with any 
of these... 
The Assembly was divided over whether or not the use of war could be 
justified, although it did state that "war is contrary to the will of God". 
Moreover, it further declared: "A positive attempt must be made to ensure that 
competing economic systems such as Communism, Socialism or free enterprise may 
co-exist without leading to war", and called on all Christians to examine 
critically all actions of governments which increased tension or aroused 
misunderstanding. 
The section on "The Church and the Disorder of Society" discussed 
Communism and Capitalism. The appeal of Communism was recognised, but the 
report was excessively critical and contained statements regarding the nature 
and beliefs of Communism which were essentially misleading. (100) Objections 
were also raised about Capitalism, but nothing was said about ruthless methods 
as it was of Communism. Nonetheless, the conclusion was important because, 
like the section on "The Church and the International Disorder", it warned 
against the Church associating itself with one side or the other in the 
ideological conflict of the Cold War: "The Christian Church should reject the 
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ideologies of both Communism and laissez faire capitalism. " Instead they must 
seek new creative solutions. 
In 1948, with the Cold War rapidly gaining momentum, the stance of the 
World Council of Churches at Amsterdam was courageous and, however momentary, 
raised it above the political conflict and set a standard against which all 
subsequent proposals had to be measured. 
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In the post war period the Church of England became one of the means of 
spreading and reinforcing British Cold War propaganda. This was achieved 
mainly through the contacts of the hierarchy with Government sources, and 
particularly through the relationship of the Foreign Office with the Church of 
England's Council on Foreign Relations. Herbert Waddams, the Secretary of the 
Council, became well known to Information Research Department (IRD), the Foreign 
Office anti-Communist department. (1) Although this department was not formed 
till 1947, its practice of supplying information to selected sources for 
unattributed distribution was already a common Foreign Office practice. During 
the war, the Archbishop of York, who had made a number of propaganda visits on 
behalf of the Ministry of Information wih the collusion of the Foreign Office, 
had been the recipient of a number of official despatches, containing 
information which he was advised he might use, but without divulging its 
source. (2) 
IRD was the creation of a Junior Foreign Minister, Christopher Mayhew, who 
in 1947 presented Bevin with a confidential paper which proposed a covert 
"propaganda counter offensive" against the Russians by means of a Foreign 
Office Department to be formed specifically for that purpose. (3) It is 
noteworthy that IRD's ideological roots were in Social Democracy. Even before 
the creation of IRD both Archbishops were propagandists for the Welfare State, 
although neither was a socialist nor firmly committed to the socialist 
experiment. (4) When anti-Communist propaganda came to the fore, expressions of 
r 
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support for the Welfare-State were superceded by admonitions against the 
dangers of the totalitarian centralised state, with both Archbishops revealing 
doubts about the wisdom of the socialist experiment, and expressing fears 
regarding its potential for corruption. (5) 
Mayhew's early papers talked of creating a socialist "third force" in 
Europe half way between Washington and Moscow, but as the Cold War intensified 
this quickly succumbed to an extreme Atlanticist view in which those who did 
not support the American alliance, whether they intended it or not, were 
actually aiding its enemies. Both Archbishops gave full support to the alliance 
with the United States, lauding Britain's great and generous ally and preaching 
the necessity of never allowing any rift to divide them. Moreover, both 
Archbishops preached the doctrine of Anglo-American friendship on both sides of 
the Atlantic, visiting the United States twice each within seven years of the 
war ending. (6) 
In the aftermath of the war, both Archbishops spoke in support of 
friendship with Russia, that being the official British foreign policy. When 
this position was officially abandoned, both Archbishops joined the chorus of 
attacks on Communism, applauded Bevin for trying his best to achieve an 
agreement in the face of Russian intransigence, and blamed the Soviet Union for 
the division of Europe and for forcing the Vest to adopt "defensive" measures. 
From the end of the war until the Cold War was officially proclaimed at the 
beginning of 1948, there was an interim period in which the Government knew 
that hostility towards Russia would be the mainstay of British foreign policy 
and for which they assiduously prepared public opinion by means of an 
"education campaign. "(7) Both Archbishops were part of this campaign which 
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emphasised uncooperative Russian behaviour and the less palatable aspects of 
the Soviet system. 
Churchill's Fulton speech had deliberately invoked the image of a 
beleaguered Chrisitanity: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, 
an Iron Curain has descended across the continent. " Everywhere else, except in 
the United States and the British Commonwealth, communists and fifth columnists 
"constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. " Just six 
months later, reinforcing this image by his ecclesiastical persona, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury attacked the Soviet Union during a tour of Canada in 
terms far stronger than he had used in public speeches at home. By mid-1947, 
his antagonism toward the Soviet Union was indicated in Britain by his taking 
the chair for Winston Churchill at a United Europe Meeting in the Albert Hall, 
and stated in his Canterbury Diocesan Notes for May 1947 where he said: "the 
Soviet Union has distorted conceptions of justice and good neighbourliness 
which antagonise good feelings and impede cooperation, and which lead them to 
blame others for actions which are the consequence of their own acts "(8) 
Both Archbishops were active propagandists for British policies, and in 
contact with the Foreign Office, well before the establishment of IRD. 
Moreover, the Church was a declared spiritual opponent of Communism. It was 
thus natural they should become recipients of the "grey" propaganda 
disseminated by IRD. (9) The Church and Churchmen were particularly suitable 
for IRD's approach, summed up in a note marked 'Secret' to Bevin from Mayhew 
who said: "One of the problems which constantly faces us in anti-Communist 
publicty work is to discover publicity media which are definitely non-official 
(so as to avoid undesirable diplomatic and political repercussions when certain 
-318- 
issues are handled). "(10) The Church position was putatively neutral, above 
politics and independent of the Government. At its command were not only 
pulpits throughout Britain and a national, regional and local Church press, but 
an international network of contacts with a vast publicity potential. 
The need for anti-Communist publicity not to be simply negative, but to 
have a positive side was agreed on throughout the Foreign Office. The Church 
was very important in this respect. In a meeting of November 18,1947, called 
to discuss Mayhew's October 17 proposals to Bevin for a covert "propaganda 
counter-offensive" against the Russians, the need for something to believe in 
was raised. (11) Orme Sargent agreed on the need for offensive rather than 
defensive propaganda. This, he felt, could consist of attacks on Communism and 
also of an attractive presentation of a "better way of life. " He strongly 
advocated offering the world "something in which it could believe. " Kirkpatrick 
agreed, pointing to the lack of progress made in converting Communists in 
Euröpe, and urged that something more than mere exhortation to observe the 
British way of life and copy it was called for. (12) 
The message of the Church in this period was that Christianity was the 
answer to Communism and the solution to man's disorder. (13) This was the 
message of Lambeth and of Amsterdam and, of course, of the Vatican. In answer 
to the material benefits and new world order promised by Communism, the Church 
promised immortality in a heavenly afterlife. It also added its voice to the 
demands for a better life for the masses and portrayed itself as on the side of 
suffering humanity. Having obtained the approval of the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary for his scheme, amongst the ideas Mayhew put forward at the 
November 18 meeting was that "we shouldn't appear as defenders of the status 
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quo but should attack Capitalism and Imperialism along with Russian 
Communism. "(14) This was the course advocated and endorsed by Lambeth and 
Amsterdam in 1948, the two major Protestant Conferences of the post-war period, 
both of which were chaired by the Archbishop of Canterbury. It was equally 
endorsed by the Vatican. 
At the November 18 IRD meeting it was also agreed that the Russians 
should be attacked at certain sensitive points, for example, the 
Ribbentrop/Molotov dealings, and the close similarity of Nazism and Communism 
in their terror and propaganda. The latter was a propaganda point exploited 
fully by Church of England ecclesiastics in their attacks on Communism at the 
beginning of 1948, including the Archbishop of Canterbury. (15) It was the 
latter's example which set in motion the Anglican tirade against Communism and 
it was his own speech which suggested the Nazi/Communist analogy. (16) 
The type of information that IRD dealt with was not the "black" propaganda 
of lies and fiction. Rather, it concentrated on the "grey" area: carefully 
selected factual material dealing with deficiencies in the Soviet system and the 
advantages of the Western. (17) The existence of the Department was 
confidential and its work was under cover. IRD drew on secret service 
information as well as information gathered openly by diplomats in overseas 
missions. All of this was energetically reproduced and distributed to a great 
variety of recipients. These included: British Ministers, MPs and trade 
unionists, the International Department of the Labour Party and UR Delegates, 
British media and opinion formers including the BBC World Service, selected 
journalists and writers. It was directed at the media all over the non- 
Communist world, information officers in British Embassies of the Third World 
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and Communist countries, and the foreign offices of Western European 
countries. (18) Amongst its recipients in the ecclesiastic world were the 
Vatican and the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations. 
The type of information supplied to the Vatican and the Council on Foreign 
Relations mainly concerned the religious situation in East European countries. 
Apart from IRD, certain missions, such as the Legation to the Holy See, sent 
information directly to Vaddams(19); certain ambassadors, such as Peake in 
Yugoslavia, corresponded directly with the Archbishop of Canterbury (20); the 
Archbishop of York received information direct from the Foreign Office through 
his friend Patrick Dean. (21) Information supplied by IRD was doubtless 
accepted in the same way as these other Foreign Office sources. More than 
likely the recipients appreciated that they were being fed a British viewpoint, 
and were able to discern its anti-Communist/pro-British nature, and gave their 
support from a mixture of patriotic motives and a conviction that what they 
were receiving was fundamentally true. The most effective propaganda is almost 
invariably based on the truth, but the facts are selected to fit the 
propagandist's case. IRD's activities were backed by a virtual monopoly of 
information on what Mayhew called "Communist themes". The flow of reports from 
overseas missions and intelligence officers backed by hundreds of researchers 
and analysts - both British and American - relating to the Soviet orbit which 
was virtually closed to independent observers, was doubtless perceived as an 
invaluable source of information. (22) 
The credidbility of apparently objective reporting is completely destroyed 
once it is revealed as government special pleading. IRD, providing as it did 
non-attributable information, or "grey" propaganda, acted as a major hidden 
3? 1- 
influence on public opinion at home and abroad towards Communism; that the 
public, and in some cases the recipients, were deliberately deceived in that the 
material's origins were obscured, in as much as it derived from a secret 
department designed to distribute specifically anti-Communist information, gave 
the information acquired the stamp of objectivity. In the process of selection, 
negative features only were reported resulting in a distorted picture of Eastern 
Europe. This not only effected the nature of the material distributed by the 
Church, most particularly with regard to religious persecution in the Communist 
regimes, but gave it a false perception of the Churches in Eastern Europe and 
Q 
thus effected relations with them. 
The influence of Foreign Office anti-Communist propaganda on the Church 
can be demonstrated by the transformation effected on the attitude of Herbert 
Vaddams who, as Secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations, played a vital 
part in directing Church affairs in the post-war period. His attitude in 1946, 
prior to the organization of IRD, was significantly different to what it became 
by 1950 under the impact of selected "grey" propaganda relating to the religious 
situation in Eastern Europe and the aims of Communist Governments. Waddams' 
pre-IRD views are illustrated in a paper he submitted to Kenneth Grubb in 
January 1947 as his contribution to the CCIA study documents preparing for the 
Amsterdam Assembly of 1948. (23) Waddams' study concentrated on the tension 
and indeed struggle between Soviet Russia and the Vest. " 
Waddams had spent the war working in the Ministry of Information; so he 
had a very clear understanding of propaganda and also of the workings of the 
Foreign Office, aspects which clearly influenced his study. He began by noting 
that principal issues were oversimplified or misinterpreted for the sake of 
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propaganda and stressed the necessity of detachment in order to be able to be 
free of the "differing interpretations and distortions of national political and 
ideological propaganda. " Waddams believed that "Christians have a specific 
contribution to make in this realm of international affairs", for which "the 
nature of Communism must be clearly grasped and also the degree to which it is 
a Russian phenomenon and the degree in which it finds parallels in the life of 
the rest of the world. " Waddams appreciated that there were "a series of 
opinions whose gradations extended from those Christians who see in Soviet 
Russia the nearest approach to the realization of Christian principles on earth 
yet achieved by man, to those who regard Soviet Russia as the most intimate 
handmaid of the powers of darkness. " He also recognised that the perspective 
on Communism had more to do with salary and status than the "inescapably 
Christian. " (24) 
Waddams argued that "From a Christian point of view, one idolatry, one 
anti-Christian religion is much the same as another in the fact of its 
opposition, and its substitution of something else as an idol in the place which 
should be given only to God": 
In fact the essentially and most vitally anti-Christian characteristic of 
Communism, as seen in the Soviet Union, is first the belief that man is 
master of his own destiny and of the destiny of the world, and secondly 
the preaching of a gospel of material progress and satisfaction as 
sufficient. 
If this is admitted to be true, it is at once seen that Communism is 
not an isolated phenomenon so far as its essential nature is concerned... 
Atheistic humanism, secularism and materialism are widespread throughout 
the world and manifest themselves in many countries in one form or 
another. Quite apart from Communism they do in fact supply a religion to 
those who have lost their Christian faith. 
Communism is... so to speak, one of the highly developed forms of the 
Godless humanism of our time. But there are equally serious developments 
in other countries, not less serious because they are largely unrecognised, 
nor because their supporters number many friends of Christians among 
them. In the West and North of Continental Europe, in Britain and in 
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America secularism and materialism are an the march and are not at all 
confined to the bodies which are political communists. (25) 
Waddams developed this theme stating that "the danger of Communism in 
Soviet Russia resides chiefly in its ideological appeal... but it may be doubted 
whether this situation is in fact as dangerous as the position in the West. " 
Waddams perceived that it was increasing Western materialism, "a largely 
undiagnosed disease, which at this time is more dangerous to Christianity, for 
it saps the supports on which Christendom rests... the deadly creeping paralysis 
which almost unnoticed is rapidly spreading among the populations of the so- 
called Western Christian democracies. " (26) 
Waddams posited that "Communism therefore, may be regarded from a 
Christian point of view as the expression in one country of a diseased state of 
mind which exists all over the world, and which springs largely from the 
Western technical civilisation, in which such pride is manifested by men 
everywhere, including Christians... It would therefore seem misleading to say the 
least, for Churches to draw attention to Communism as tha dangerous enemy, when 
its danger is created by the failure of the churches (a) to recognise the 
disease in their own surroundings and (b) to take adequate steps to counteract 
it and to create conditions of intensified Christian life where Communism would 
cease to exercise any ideological attraction. " (27) To Waddams' mind the 
solution was that while Christians should struggle against Communism as against 
the powers of darkness in the world, "the most effective struggle is likely to 
be conducted by Christians in various countries who can come to grips with the 
spirit of materialism which through the weakness of Christian witness has 
already gained disquieting victories. " 
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In his comments on the actual international situation, Waddams tried to 
put the behaviour of the Soviet Union into the context of normal international 
behaviour. He looked first at the Christian interpretation of events: 
In Central Europe, many Christians believe that the future of 
European civilisation is at stake in the struggle between Communism and 
the Christian tradition, and this is often identified with or translated 
into a struggle between Soviet Russia and the West. It is pointed out 
that there is a great common tradition of European civilisation which is 
permeated by the influence of Christianity and retains many of the values 
which have been derived from the Christian Faith. On the other hand, in 
the East stands a wholly different tradition which denies many of these 
traditions and substitutes for them a materialist pseudo scientific 
civilisation which threatens to swallow up all the elements of the Western 
tradition which most clearly enshrine Christian Principles. Such as the 
conception of justice, the value of men as persons, the tradition of 
political freedom, and freedom of thought and culture. Soviet Russia 
denies all these in their Western sense. (28) 
Waddams next posited that, regardless of motives or justification, the Soviet 
Union could be seen as an expansionist power, despite denying an expansionist 
outlook, because "since the beginning of the war the Soviet Union has vastly 
expanded. " Noting that the "inference to be drawn from these facts is that if 
Soviet Russia is given the opportunity it will extend its influence still 
further", Waddams equally noted: 
But it must also be remembered that other nations also seek to extend 
their influence, noteably the United States of America, which does it in 
various ways, chiefly (a) by the influence of trade and the spread of 
cultural and economic propaganda, (b) by the acquisition of additional 
bases in the Far East, (c) by intervention in the affairs of China and (d) 
by virtual monopoly in the control of Japan. In fact every country tries 
to extend its influence in any way which is open to it, and it should 
cause no particular surprise when Soviet Russia does the same thing... The 
Foreign Offices of the World have never done anything else except spend 
their time trying to extend the influence of their own country and to 
prevent the extension of that of others... 
The Foreign Offices of the world, one may be sure, and of Britain and 
America in particular, are continually occupied with the question of how to 
stop Russia extending further, and even how to press her back, without 
prejudicing the chance, of establishing stability. The Russian Foreign 
Office is occupied with precisely the same problem vis a vis Britain and 
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America, just as Britain and America are vis a vis each other - to think 
otherwise is self-delusion. (29) 
Waddams emphasised that "the best way to fight Communism may be for the 
Churches to convert the people in their own countries, and that political 
k'esistance to the Soviet Union is not necessarily the obvious way to advance 
'the Kingdom of God. " Waddams was also concerned that should Christians outside 
Russia "band together and urge upon the rest of the world political resistance 
to Soviet Russia, it is more than likely that the Christians who are under 
Soviet influence or control will suffer as a result. " Waddams then asked: 
Have other Christians the right in such a case to act in this fashion . 
Christians? As citizens of other states, Christians are entitled to urge 
any political views they favour, but to try to acquire a Christian 
imprimatur for them is a most serious step. Our Lord's attitude and the 
attitude of St Paul to the heathen Roman Empire is a relevant factor which 
must be considered. (30) 
Vaddams view was that "Christianity must avoid identifying itself with any 
political group and that its task is to bring the Christian Gospel by 
conversion into the lives of the men and women by whom all political systems 
are controlled. " 
Waddams complained that, "One of the most misleading tendencies in the 
Western democracies is the inclination to picture their policies as moral 
virtues. " He recognised in this an "unconscious tribute to the tradition of 
Christianity in the past and the importance of Christians in the present, " The 
need to commend themselves to the people meant that Governments presented 
their foreign policy "largely in terms of moral principles and not as naked 
self-interest" which had the effect of "hoodwinking the people, for the truth is 
so wrapped up in high-sounding phrases that it is difficult or impossible for 
the ordinary person to discover it. "(31) 
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Despite this exceedingly frank and realistic appraisal, as the Cold War 
intensified, Waddams himself succumbed to Foreign Office propaganda. In his 
position as Secretary of CFR, and an adviser to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Vaddams was involved in formulating Church of England policy, and that Church, 
in the post-war decade, described Communism as the most dangerous foe 
confronting Christianity; submitted to the belief that the aim of Russia was 
world domination and the eradication of Christianity; endorsed the need for the 
Vest to defend Christianity and Western Civilisation, and supported Western 
accusations of Communist persecution of religion. (32) 
The charge of religious persecution was one to which the Communist 
regimes were peculiarly sensitive, because they recognised it as an emotional 
issue which not only lost them support or toleration in the West, but which 
created a great deal of active emnity toward their existence. Waddams had 
considered the Communist attitude toward Christianity and the question of 
religious pesecution in his 1947 study, stating: 
Communism does clearly provide men with a religion, and it is a 
religion which is implacably hostile to Christianity. This hostility is 
inevitable, is inherent in its own nature. But this is not to say that 
Communism necessarily persecutes Christianity, to assume this would be 
sequitur: it may or it may not. For persecution is a matter of tactics or 
strategy from a Communist point of view, and not a matter of principle. 
This is demonstrated by the history of Communist Russia, and it is also 
confirmed by numerous statements by Communist leaders that persecution of 
the Church only strengthens it, and religion must be fought by education 
and not by force. (33) 
ý? 7 
A wartime survey revealed that the public regarded one of the major 
obstacles to an understanding between Britain and the Soviet Union to be 
the Soviet treatment of religion. (34) Although the war had forced the 
Ministry of Information to emphasise in their propaganda that the 
Russian Orthodox Church supported the Russian war effort, and that the 
State allowed freedom of religion, there was often an element of 
qualification which increased as victory became more assured. After the 
war the Foreign Office deprecated those who returned from Russia and the 
new regimes enthusing about the deep religiosity of the people and the 
new life in the Churches. The Dean of Canterbury, because he was a high 
cleric in the established Church was regarded as particularly 
objectionable. As the crisis between East and West deepened, Foreign 
Office views of him underwent a radical transformation. At the end of 
the war he was seen as a naive dupe; as the Cold War gripped he became a 
danger to be discouraged; during the Korean War he was a traitor to be 
suppressed. 
In 1947, the concern of the Foreign Office was to prevent the 
unofficial delegations that went to the Soviet Union to see for 
themselves what life was like under Communism, from returning to England 
and spreading around the idea that religion was free and the Church 
flourishing in the Soviet Union, giving rise to the unwelcome concept 
that Marxism and Christianity were compatible and able to exist and work 
together. (35) 
The theme that Christianity and Communism were incompatible was 
clearly important to the Foreign Office. In November 1948 it was the 
subject of some controversy in the correspondence columns of the Times. 
Giving rise to the controversy was an address by the Archbishop of York, 
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at the annual service of the Industrial Christian Fellowship. His 
address was devoted to the response of Christianity to Communism, during 
the course of which he made a distinction between Christian Communism 
and Marxian Communism. This was not unusual for the Archbishop, who had 
made a very similar speech some six months earlier, in May, to which the 
Times had not reacted at all. This time, however, an editorial took 
Garbett to task for sanctioning such distinctions: 
Many Christians will not go so far as the Archbishop in 
distinguishing between Marxist and non-Marxist Communism; in 
practice the Communist force of today is wholly Marxist, but all 
will agree with him that Marxist philosophy is incompatible with 
Christian belief. The predicament of those Christians who sincerely 
believe it is possible to combine loyalty to their Church with 
membership of a political party which attacks that Church is painful 
indeed, but the Churches cannot flag in their campaign against 
Communism out of concern for a minority which at the best must be 
regarded as a victim of grave if innocent error. (36) 
That the subject was indeed one of public concern was illustrated by 
the correspondence which it initiated. The Daily Worker joined the 
dispute, arguing that many Christians reconciled their beliefs with 
membership of the Communist Party and many others associated themselves 
with the general aims of Communism and were staunch friends of the 
Soviet Union whose Consitution allowed free practice of religious 
beliefs and where tens of millions of practicing Christians were devoted 
and loyal citizens of the Soviet State: 
These facts, life itself, give the answer to those who rant about 
the deadly incompatability of Christianity and Communism, to those 
who, in letters to the Times denounce the horrors of Communism in an 
effort to conceal their own immorality in attempting to reconcile 
the teachings of the early Christians with the upholding of a class 
system of society which is based on privilege, property, class 
oppression, and which results in mass economic crises and the 
degradation of millions, (37) 
Although the controversy had been centred on the incompatability of 
Christianity and Communism, the theme of religious persecution had been 
- ý^ý 
included as an accepted and a proven assumption by the Times leader 
which had stated that in Eastern Europe "priest and laymen of the 
Christian faith are already suffering active and increasing 
persecution, " whereas in the West a part of the opposition to Communist 
penetration came from political parties which based their programmes "on 
the social teachings of the Gospels and Canon Law. "(38) The fact that 
none of the published letters addressed this subject was regarded with 
suspicion by Religion and the People which commented: "The whole 
campaign to induce Christians to attack Communists falls to the ground 
if it becomes known that, they are working harmoniously together in 
Eastern Europe. Therefore,.. all evidence on this point must be 
suppressed. "(39) 
At this point in time, the accusation of religious persecution to 
attack the Communist regimes was used mainly by the Vatican. According 
to the Archbishop of Canterbury, there was a strong Roman Catholic 
influence in the Times, amongst other significant influences. At the 
end of 1946, in an address on religious freedom at Pusey House, Oxford, 
Mr Christopher Dawson, a well known Roman Catholic thinker, sounded a 
warning that unless Western Christians united in order to defend 
essential democratic liberties, continually encroached upon by the 
growing might of the secular state, they would find themselves in an 
atmosphere in which religion could not breathe. This was of course a 
very thinly disguised attack on the new Communist regimes. It was, 
however, countered by another speaker, Mr Parker, who pointed out that { 
pure religious persecution was hardly ever known. The French Huguenots, 
Roman Catholics in England, and Jews on the Continent were persecuted 
largely for political and economic reasons. Once these motives 
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disappeared persecution ceased. Mr Parker also pointed out that no 
State, however powerful, and no planning authority, however efficient, 
could deprive man of his essential spiritual freedom. 
Commenting on these two addresses, Serge Bolshakoff, an astute and 
practiced observer of the Russian religious situation, noted that events 
in Russia largely justified Mr Parker's views. Not only had the Godless 
Movement failed to destroy religion, the Soviet leadership, hardboiled 
realists, now understood well that it did not pay to persecute 
religion. (40) The existing tensions between Church and State in the 
Communist regimes were in their essence political. As much was conceded 
by the Tim when it concluded the correspondence on the conpatability 
of Communism and Christianity: 
Today the theory and practice of Communism presents Christians 
with an inescapable challenge. The great persecution in Eastern 
Europe has arisen not from a deliberate assault by the State on the 
prerogatives of the Church, but from the Church's refusal to buy the 
large measure of freedom offered to it at the cost of giving its 
blessing to Marxist dogma and Communist practice. The Christian 
case for property in a sinful society stands. The real question for 
Christians to answer is whether men and women can continue to enjoy 
freedom in a society in which all economic power is vested in a 
Government composed as it always must be of fallible men. (41) 
This argument brought forth an angry response from Religion and the 
People: 
"The great persecution" is a myth. The Times has now made 
itself clear. Only those church people in Eastern Europe (a 
minority) who accept the Vatican line and fight their Governments on 
the question of property may be called Christian. The whole 
argument is not about Biblical interpretation or doctrine or 
philosphy. It is about property. If property is socialised, there 
is by definition (of the mss) no freedom. Economic power must not 
be vested in Governments because men are fallible. The fact that 
company directors are also men and therefore fallible (but not 
answerable to the people as is a Government) had not apparently 
dawned on the leader-writer. If it had, he apparently thought it 
wiser not to mention it. (42) 
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The religious situation in Eastern Europe was infinitely more 
complex than the simplistic crudities of either Eastern or Western 
propaganda were able to encompass. Complicated by the religio- 
nationalist antagonisms which permeated Eastern Europe, the situation 
varied from region to region, and was far from static. Indeed, at the 
time the West was most vigorously charging religious persecution, as 
part of their anti-Communist propaganda during the Korean War, the worst 
of the State pressure on the Churches was over. While Communists and 
Christians were not liaising quite as harmoniously as the wishful 
presentation in Religion and the People often suggested, nor was the 
black and white picture conveyed by Western propaganda of Communism 
versus Christianity anything like suggestive of the true story. 
Relations between individual Communist Governments and the Churches in 
their domain depended much on the attitudes of their respective leaders 
to one another and on the local situation and circumstances. 
In the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church and the Communist 
Government had developed a modus vivendi which was far from ideal but 
which did allow Christian practice and Church organisation. Moreover, 
the situation was not complicated by the existence of a beligerent anti- 
Communist Roman Catholicism as it was in other of the regimes. As anti- 
Communist propaganda mainly evolved in the West as a weapon with which 
to attack the Soviet Union, Communist persecution of religion did not 
initially receive the same emphasis in secular, or in Protestant, 
political propaganda as it did in that of the Vatican. Furthermore, 
Western Governments appreciated the political nature of the restraints 
applied to the Churches, and certainly in the case of the Catholic 
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Church were able to understand, if not sympathise, with the attitudes of 
the new regimes to troublesome Churches. 
Before the war had ended, the British representative to the Holy See 
had actually warned the. Pope that he should not expect the Soviet Union 
to allow the Roman Catholic Church free reign, and he must not regard 
the restrictions imposed on it as religious persecution. (43) Osborne 
told the Pope that Russia's preference for the Orthodox Church to the 
Catholic Church was not an indication of hostility to religion. At that 
time the fact that countries should prefer their own national brand of 
Christianity appeared understandable and acceptable to the West; 
subsequently, in a different political atmosphere, it was to charge 
domestication and persecution when the Communist regimes sought to 
establish the sort of cooperative relationships, in which the Churches 
were politically subservient to the State, which the West had already 
established with its own main stream Churches. 
The demands of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to what it 
considered its religious perogatives could prove problematic even to 
Western regimes. The American Government had its own problems with 
the demands of the Roman Catholic Church. These were addressed by 
Norman Mackenzie in the New Statesman, in September 1949, in an article 
entitled "American Democracy and Catholicism". Mackenzie observed the 
dilemma created by the fact that in the modern state its jurisdiction 
and that of the Church increasingly overlapped, with competing claims 
often difficult to reconcile. There were further complications with the 
Roman Catholic Church because first, it was not a democratic 
institution, and second, ultimate authority resided in the Pope outside 
of American society: "Politically, therefore, the American Catholics are 
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a powerful pressure group whose basic policies are defined for them by a 
leadership over which they have no control, which can use most 
persuasive religious arguments to ensure their active support, and which 
is ultimately not American. "(44) 
Mackenzie noted that the Catholic Church was a "State within a 
State" which reached into every corner of American life: "For every 
social activity it creates its own organisations with its own policies. 
Through this vast network, the Catholic is not only bound more closely 
to his Church, but he may also be mobilised more readily for whatever 
campaigns the hierarchy may choose to launch. " Mackenzie illustrated 
how the problems raised for American democracy by the problems of its 
Catholic minority were not, for the majority, religious problems at all, 
although the Catholic social programme was advanced in the name of 
religion. Criticism, he stated, was not discrimination, it was the 
prevention of domination by an assiduous confusion of the real issues. 
Catholic education was as much a source of controversy in the United 
States as it was in the Communist regimes. In America, Cardinal 
Spellman accused the very liberal Eleanor Roosevelt, a recognised 
champion of minorities, of being a bigot and exercising consistent 
prejudice against his Church because she opposed its seeking of 
Government funding for its private schools. In Hungary, the 
Government's intent to nationalise the schools resulted in a threat from 
Cardinal Mindszenty to excommunicate all Catholics who gave it their 
support. 
America had established free schools from which sectarian religion 
was excluded, the rights of Catholics to support their own special 
schools was, however, conceded, although the consequent segregation of a 
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minority's children was regarded as unhealthy in a democracy which was 
seeking to "Americanise" a hundred minorities and there were strenuous 
objections to any attempt either to encroach upon the public school 
system or to make Catholic schools a charge upon public funds. 
Mackenzie observed that: 
Every society creates an educational system in its own image. In 
its public schools, American democracy trains its future citizens to 
fit into a definite social pattern, to acquire common habits and 
assumptions. The Catholic Church rejects many of these assumptions 
and, as a society within the greater society, it has established an 
educational system of its own. 
Mackenzie saw the education controversy as a crucial aspect of the 
conflict between the social policies of American Catholicism and the 
principles of American democracy which illustrated excellently "the 
difficulties that arise from the Church's extension of its doctrine of 
superior allegiance from spiritual to temporal matters. " 'Mackenzie 
argued that the distinction had to be made to allow an honest discussion 
of the reactionary policies of the hierarchy in American life without 
interfering in any way with the religious liberties of American 
Catholics, adding, "Such a discussion is what the hierarchy seeks to 
prevent by raising the bogy of bigotry. "(45) 
The Roman Catholic Church's deliberate use of religious persecution 
accusations to obfuscate many political issues on which it opposed the 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, meant that Western Governments and 
Churches were initially reluctant to support or endorse the Vatican 
campaign against these Governments, or make indiscriminate use of such 
charges themselves. A great deal of pressure had been exerted to secure 
a protest from the British Government when Yugoslavia had tried and 
imprisoned the Roman Catholic Archbishop Stepinac. Nonetheless, 
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throughout the Government maintained that the question was one of 
Yugoslav internal politics. So much so that Marshall Tito conveyed his 
appreciation to Bevin through the British Ambassador in Belgrade: 
"Marshall Tito asked me to thank you and say that he had followed with 
close attention the proceedings in Parliament about Archbishop Stepinac, 
and he would like me to tell you how much he personally appreciated the 
firm attitude you had maintained. "(46) 
For the Church of England the issue was of particular sensitivity as 
their fellow churchmen in Eastern Europe had let it be known that such 
charges did not help their-situation. When Canon JA Douglas, concerned 
by the pressures to which Churches in the Communist States were 
subjected, proposed to put down a motion for discussion in the Church 
Assembly, 
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found himself opposed by members of the hierarchy. In a 
letter to the Bishop of Chichester, Douglas noted that the Archbishop of 
Canterbury had previously asked him not to press the matter as it would 
embarrass him. (47) Bell likewise advised that he not put down a motion 
or a question in the Assembly on religious persecution in Eastern 
Europe: 
... my view is that 
the heads of these particular churches are in an 
extremely perilous condition. If they were considered to be in 
friendly correspondence with the Church of England the Government 
might take that as good enough reason for locking them up or putting 
them on trial. We should therefore do a great disservice to these 
Churches. On the other hand the Government might press them very 
hard to give a reply, which would have the drawback of having been 
given under compulsion. So my advice is not to put either motion or 
question down. (48) 
Douglas heeded neither the Bishop nor the Archbishop, and went ahead 
with his motion, which in turn drew an angry response from the Secretary 
of CFR, Vaddams, who complained to Fisher and Bell: "The question at 
issue is a political one and it is therefore not one which falls within 
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the competence of the Council whose business it is only to deal with 
relations with foreign Churches. "(49) As the Cold War intensified, CFR 
not only relinquished, its opposition to being implicated with such 
charges, despite the fact that they were potentially damaging to its 
relations with the Churches in Eastern Europe, but itself became a 
producer and disseminator of "religious persecution" propaganda. Barely 
two months after rebuking Douglas, the Bishop of Chichester, speaking in 
the Lords on March 3,1948, deliberately projected the East-West 
conflict as being religious by drawing a direct analogy between the 
existing situation and the Thirty Years War of 1618 to 1648. Drawing 
attention to the religious nature of the latter struggle, Bell used the 
comparison to reinforce Cold War propaganda that fundamentally the 
East/West struggle was one of history's great religious wars: "It was a 
struggle for the supremacy of Europe. It was also a struggle between 
two religions, ranging far and, wide... "(50) 
Subsequently, some months later, the Archbishop of Canterbury 
sanctioned the charges of Communist persecution of religion when the 
arrest and trial of Hungary's Roman Catholic Cardinal Mindszenty became 
the focus for Western anti-Communist propaganda and set the Vest off in 
full cry against Communist persecution of the Churches. The fact that 
it was the Mindszenty case which the Vest elevated to a cause celebre 
illustrated the political motivation which underlay the charges of 
religious persecution. The selection of this particular case very 
possibly had more to do with the time it occurred than its actual merits 
as an example of religious persecution. Just prior to Mindszenty's 
arrest, the Vest had suffered what it considered a major propaganda 
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defeat, and was consequently looking to redress the balance by 
blackening the Communists. 
Vyshinsky's 1948 proposal for disarmament was seen as a propaganda 
coup for the Soviet Union by the Foreign Office Russia Committee. At 
its October 28,1948 meeting, General Jacob of the BBC stated that the 
Soviet delegation with their simple proposal for disarmament had got the 
initiative leaving the West on the defensive. Although it was 
considered that the speeches of the United Kingdom delegates had wrested 
it back to some extent, a future need was perceived for a simple 
proposition which would capture public opinion. Mr Jebb explained that 
the Foreign Office had tried over many months to agree such a line with 
the Americans but without success. (51) 
In America the Mindszenty case caused an uproar, and its use against 
the Communists was clearly something which America and Britain were able 
to agree on. The week preceding the Cardinal's arrest, the Vatican had 
been informed by the Hungarian authorities that unless Mindszenty were 
removed, it would be necessary to take legal action against him. (52) It 
later emerged that the Americans, who were implicated in the trial as 
having been involved in the alleged plan to return the Hapsburgs to 
power, had tried to persuade the Cardinal to flee the country, but acted 
too late to prevent his arrest. (53) 
Prior to the Archbishop's arrest, the British Administration were 
well aware of the political nature of his activites. In 1946, the 
despatches from the British Political Mission in Hungary were full of 
complaints about the "fanatical primate", Cardinal Mindszenty, whose 
excessive behaviour was seen as "inviting martyrdom"; and praise for 
the Government which was seen to be exercising commendable restraint in 
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the face of extreme provocation. So grave was the concern about 
Mindszenty's activites, that Sir D Osborne tried to use his influence at 
the Holy See to have the Cardinal's behaviour curbed; he appealed to the 
Under Secretary at the Vatican: 
Do you think it might be wise to urge the Cardinal Mindszenty to 
be a little less violent and provocative in his utterances and 
attitude? It seems to me that he is going too far in exposing 
himself to the charge of bringing the Church into politics. (54) 
If the Vatican did urge the moderation which Osborne advised, there 
was no obvious change in the Cardinal's behaviour. In July 1946, AK 
Helm, reporting from the British Mission in Hungary, and clearly 
concerned not to overburden Southern Department with "literature" about 
and from the Prince Primate, sent copies of correspondence between 
Mindszenty and Ferenc Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister. Helm thought 
there was more of interest in Nagy's reasoned reply than Mindszeny's 
dire threats and observed: 
It is highly regrettable that the Leader of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Hungary at this time should have so little sense of 
tactics and of statesmanship. By his actions he is doing grievous 
harm to his flock and to the Hungarian people. Events of the last 
few days suggest that the Russians are going slow, at any rate for 
the time being, but nothing seems more likely to make them turn the 
heat on again than the constant goading which they are receiving 
from the Prince Primate. (55) 
Earlier in July 1946 Helm had informed Southern Department that he 
was trying to keep contacts with Mindszenty to a minimum, but that was 
not easy, as he subsequently observed: "The Cardinal Archbishop bombards 
the Commissioner and myself almost daily with vitriolic effusions which 
I do not even acknowledge. "(56) Mindszenty also bombarded the Hungarian 
Government, examples of which correspondence Helm sent to the Foreign 
Office, which in turn sent them to Osborne who showed it to the Under- 
Secretary at the Vatican: 
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Monsignor Tardini appears to be only too well aware of the 
intemperance and provocation of the Cardinal's conduct and speech, 
but professes helplessness to control him. He says that a Nuncio, 
were there one at Budapest, could exercise a lot of control, but 
there is no present hope of that. And, in the absence of a local 
and overriding representative of the Holy See, the Primate seems to 
be beyond control. It is anyway difficult enough to communicate 
with him, but opportunities do present themselves. I impressed upon 
Monsignor Tardini as strongly as I could the harm the Cardinal was 
doing both to his Church and his country, and I hope that maybe a 
further warning and injuction may be sent to him, but I doubt 
whether it will have any effect. 
He is a fanatic, both as a patriot and Churchman, and I believe 
that there is in the Hungarian constitution an article which says 
that, in the absence of the Regent, the Prince Primate is the 
highest authority in the country; it is probably by this article 
that the Cardinal justifies his political activity. (57) 
When the Hungarian Government eventually arrested Mindszenty two 
years later and charged, tried, and found him guilty of treason, the 
Vest reacted to the case as being part of a universal Communist drive 
against Christianity. During the proceedings against him, Bevin 
declared that it was not the Cardinal that was on trial but the 
Hungarian Government. This clearly won favour with the Catholic 
hierarchy who were violently denouncing the Hungarian authorities. The 
Anglican hierarchy added their support. The Archbishop of Canterbury 
opened the Convocation of Canterbury with a speech which projected the 
trial as part of the struggle between Christianity and Communism, 
stating: "We are witnessing a deadly struggle between the Christian 
faith, on the one side, and, on the other, a Communism which will not 
tolerate any form of the Christian Church unless it is subservient to 
itself. "(58) 
While the more responsible sectors of the press tried to present 
reasonably objective accounts of the proceedings of the trial, it was 
otherwise widely sensationalised. (59) The Catholic press was flagrantly 
sensational, as were others. The Catholic Times followed the lead given 
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by Cardinal Spellman in a sermon delivered at St Patrick's Cathedral in 
New York on February 6 1949 where he preached: "If this be treason - to 
deny allegiance to an atheistic Communist Government - then, thank God, 
Cardinal Mindszenty confessed to treason"(60) As the editor of the JaH 
Statesman, Kingsley Martin, pointed out, Spellman's argument amounted to 
saying that in an atheistic state the Church has a duty to plot and 
intrigue against the civil authority. (61) The Catholic Times defended 
Xindszenty's action, rationalising it in a domestic context: "Suppose 
that every one of the political charges had been fully proved. They 
amounted to no more than what any patriot would expect of the Archbishop 
of Canterbury if - which God forbid - this country fell under Communist 
tyranny. Would he not seek to interest civilised powers? Would he not 
protect the Regalia, and have plans for the restoration of his country, 
convinced that the tyranny couldn't last long? "(62) 
While the various accounts of the case were equally sensational, 
they were not equally consistent. On February 1, the Intelligence 
Digest reported: "Since his arrest, Zakar, Cardinal Mindszenty's 
secretary, has been tortured. He has been forced for hours to sit 
cross-legged on a small iron apple which causes the most intense pain, 
and has suffered other tortures which it is not possible to describe... 
It is believed that it has been decided to hang him. "(63) This account 
contrasted markedly with that of the Catholic Herald which reported: 
"Father Zakar, the' Primate's faithful secretary, noted for his piety, 
spending his Sunday in jail, avidly reading the Marxist-Communist 
classics... it is a revelation of what may be achieved by drugs, or 
hypnotism, or a combination of both. "(64) In yet a further contrast, 
and apparently quoting a press service, the Tablet reported: "The 
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Cardinal's secretary, Dr Zakar, seems to have been in a pitiful 
condition, slouched silently on a bench, said the correspondent of the 
British United Press, in contrast to the Cardinal, and seems to have 
given occasional signs of the characteristic anxiety to incriminate the 
Cardinal. "(65) 
The Catholic Herald and the Tablet provided the Catholic faithful in 
Britain with substantially different accounts. The Herald presented the 
version which claimed that the Cardinal was appearing under the 
influence of drugs. It referred to those arrested as being so changed 
after several weeks in jail that their words and behaviour were 
meaningless. The Herald declared, "For his magnificent profession of 
faith, Cardinal Mindszenty has suffered the supreme penalty which only 
modern scientific ingenuity has made possible - the penalty of standing 
before the world as a gross distortion of his very self. " 
In virtual opposition to the Herald account, the Tablet stated: 
Yet at the trial itself, he (Mindszenty) was master of himself and 
was, indeed, handling the situation as he then found it with no 
small amount of skill. He was handling it himself in effect because 
the lawyer nominated for his defence, Dr Kickzo, an elderly and 
hitherto obscure man, did him small service. The Cardinal might 
have risen angrily in Court, with all the fire he has shown on 
countless occasions during the past three years, to denounce his 
accusers. But to have done so would have meant, perhaps, the 
instantaneous arrest of other members of the Hierarchy... it is 
fully in line with the Cardinal's character for us to believe that 
he humbled himself almost intolerably - although never compromising 
his conscience - to spare others, and the Church herself. (66) 
The Tablet had initially given the same currency as the Herald to 
the "lurid account of the drug torture" allegedly given the Cardinal, 
but had changed its presentation following criticism in the ICA 
Statesman to which the Tablet's editor, Douglas Woodruff had replied in 
defence, "The account which we printed had reached us direct from the 
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Cardinal's entourage in Budapest. It was not printed as evidence that 
the Cardinal had, in fact, been drugged, for he had then only just been 
arrested, but as evidence of what was anticipated. " 
The course of the trial, in the presence of the world's press who 
emphatically stated that they were fully able to report the trial and 
transmit their reports without censorship, and the conduct of the 
Cardinal, falsified the stories of drugs and torture originally put 
forward, initially as prophecies but so oft repeated that they were 
reported as fact. This forced the Vatican to issue a statement on the 
trial which, in the words of Kingsley Martin, "made a nonsense of its 
own former attitude and of thousands of words which had been written and 
spoken in innumerable papers and pulpits": 
Repudiating its former view that the Cardinal had by foul means been 
reduced to composing a false and shameful confession, it said that 
it was now possible "to take an objective and truthful view" of the 
trial and that the Cardinal had chosen "the way of justice and 
honour. He admitted what was true and denied what was false. " In 
brief, the Cardinal, speaking without coercion, was right in telling 
the court that he was guilty "in principle" of the charges against 
him, while he repudiates the theory fathered upon him by Cardinal 
Spellman, that in a Communist country loyalty to the Church demands 
treason to the State. If this Vatican statement had been issued a 
few hours earlier it would have been impossible for the leaders of 
the Catholic Church in England to utter the violent words that were 
heard in the Albert Hall on the same night, or, for Mr Bevin, as 
Foreign Secretary, to take the surely unprecedented course of 
sending a message from the platform in which he said that it was not 
Cardinal Mindszenty but the Hungarian Government which was on trial. 
The Vatican statement has caused great confusion in the ranks of 
Catholic propagandists. (67) 
Depite the Vatican statement, the case continued to be a source of 
anti-Communist propaganda, for Protestants as well as Catholics. On 
February 18, the Anglican Church Times declared: "Almost without 
exception, -Christians in England recognise that the arrest of Cardinal 
Mindszenty was not due to secular authorities' exasperation with a 
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'turbulent priest', or hatred of the Vatican's political power. It is part of a 
deliberate plan to stamp out religion in the Balkans. " (68) 
Although not yet prepared to accuse the Communists of a systematic plot 
to eradicate Christianity, Waddams was also taking a less favourable view of 
the religious situation in Eastern Europe. While at the beginning of 1948, 
Waddams had objected to a motion Douglas put before Convocation regarding 
religious persecution in Eastern Europe, complaining that the "persecution" of 
the Churches behind the Iron Curtain was political and as such not within the 
compass of CFR, later that same year he himself gave an address, "Communism 
and the Churches Today, " which emphasised the disabilities of the Churches in 
Communist regimes. Waddams did concede that Communist measures against the 
Churches were mainly in the sphere of administration, curtailing Church 
independence and ensuring that the Churches did not interfere with the 
Communist programme in any form. He talked of what he called "post-persecution 
Communism as far as the Churches are concerned.. ": 
By a post-persecution phase I mean that the Communists in these countries 
have learnt wisdom from the Russian experiences of wholesale attacks 
upon Christians and religion in general on religious or political pretexts. 
They are likely to avoid some if not all of the mistakes made then. (69) 
The mistakes were that such methods did not destroy Christianity, but 
reinforced it. Although Waddams pointed out that this did not mean that Church 
people were not being attacked or were not suffering, he ended his address on a 
positive note, which included a warning not to judge the Communist regimes "by 
standards which may be wholly inappropriate. " Waddams stated that despite the 
restrictions "It must also be remembered that there are many essential 
activities of the Christian Churches which remain unaffected": 
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The sacred mysteries can still be celebrated, and the model of the Gospel 
held up through them before the eyes of men.. The message of Redemption 
can still be brought to the individual soul, and the Christian life can 
still be lived. These are not things to be lightly jeopardised. (70) 
In the years that followed it was this positive aspect which was 
eliminated from the Church's treatment of the question of religious persecution 
in Communist regimes. This was particularly the case with Waddams and CFR. 
Moreover, were before it was a subject the Church preferred not to treat because 
it was seen as political and because it was feared that it would make worse the 
lot of Christians and Churches subjected to Communist authority, from 1949 it 
became a frequently addressed topic for adverse ecclesiastic public comment, 
with CFR deliberately contriving to keep the subject in the public eye. By the 
fifties, the Churches in Communist countries had usually reached an 
accomodation with the State, yet it was in this period that religious 
persecution was most forcefully charged by the Vest. Nor was there was a 
corresponding attack on known religious persecution elsewhere in the world. 
Religious persecution virtually always meant, and soon became synominous with, 
Communist treatment of the Churches. 
In his 1947 paper on the "Christian in International Affairs", Waddams 
remarked, "it must be remembered that governments have much information of 
which they release only that part which suits them, and a partial view is often 
quite as misleading as a deliberate falsehood. " Nonetheless, within three years 
of making this comment, Waddams was party to the compilation of a book on 
Communist persecution of-the Churches which derived its material mainly from 
Foreign Office sources. On September 13,1949, GL Prestige wrote to Sir A 
Rumbold at the Foreign Office requesting permission for Colonel JB Barron to 
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have access to their files. Prestige explained that Barron was currently 
producing for CFR a factual statement on the relations of Communism with 
organized Christianity behind the Iron Curtain and they wanted him to look 
through the relevant files on Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and if possible 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. (71) Rumbold replied with a prompt yes on 
September 15,1949. (72) Information was also obtained direct from Charles 
Peake, the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia. (73) The book, Communism and the 
Churches, 'produced and written by Waddams and Barron, described as a 
documented study, was an example of the "grey" propaganda selective techniques 
of IRD. It was welcomed and favourably reviewed by the Church press. On the 
Left, Stanley Evans subjected the study to a thorough and exceedingly critical 
analysis. Although the critical reception given Communism and the Churches by 
R lliigion and the People was not itself without bias, and while it would not have 
had a sufficiently wide impact to bring the book's contents into question, its 
detailed analysis serves today as a comment both on the lack of objectivity 
which characterised publications which placed too much reliance on Foreign 
Office sources and the polarisation of views caused by the Cold War in the 
ecclesiastical world. 
Communism and the Churches stated that it was based on "basic and 
indisputable" facts; a statement disputed by Religion and the People which 
reviewed the book in three consecutive issues from May to July 1951, 
challenging its various assertions country by country. (74) The partiality of 
the composition was illustrated by comparing it with Roman Catholic 
publications, which Communism and the Churches cited as sources. Summarising 
events at the beginning of the section on Hungary, Communism and the Churches 
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recorded the murder of Mgr Alpen and attacks upon the clergy by Communist 
sympathisers. Contradicting the latter claim, Four Years Struggle of the Church 
Hungary, published under the imprimatur of the Vicar-General of Westminster, 
writing explictly of 1945, stated that the Communists "started launching attacks 
against the Church" only two years later. Illustrating the selectivity 
practiced by Communism and the Churches, the Catholic publication recorded and 
it did not, the attack of the Hungarian Bishops on the Government in May 1945, 
because "the rights of property" were assailed; their attack on the agrarian 
reform and, at the same time, their admission that, "The rumours that the Red 
Army would destroy all the churches did not come true. We even met with some 
consideration in ecclesiastical matters. "(75) 
Communism and the Churches did not report positive developments in the 
Church field in Hungary, such as the reconstruction of church buildings, the 
church social services, the church press and church publications which received 
coverage in the West in the reports of the Vatican newspaper Osservatore 
RgM=, The Vatican newspaper made frequent allegations of religious 
persecution against the Hungarian Government, but still it noted the success of 
the Hungarian Church in the rebuilding of churches and the increasing 
religosity of the people: "Even before the spiritual revivial took place in the 
soul, the faithful had rebuilt, one after the other, the churches and chapels 
destroyed during the war. "(78) 
An example of how selective reporting verged on misrepresentation was 
illustrated by the assertion in Communism and the Churches that in July 1948 
the Roman Catholic Church advised teachers to leave Hungary; omitted was the 
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fact that any teacher who accepted a contract from the Government was 
threatened with excommunication. (77) 
Communism and the Churches presented allegations of religious persecution 
as isolated phenomena without placing them in their political and social 
context. In the treatment of Czechoslovakia, Religion and the People objected to 
the manner in which the summary noted "attacks" against the churches without 
indicating what had motivated them and without any reference to the vindication 
offered, justified or otherwise, by the Communist authorities with the support 
of Church leaders sympathetic to them. Relative freedom and democracy had 
existed in Czechoslovakia prior to 1948, yet only three occurences were recorded 
in the Summary of Events" for that period, the formation of the Provisional 
Government in April 1945; the First Assembly in June 1946, and a protest from 
Archbishop Beran in December 1946 at the closure of Church schools in Slovakia. 
This further illustrated the objective of presenting only negative aspects of 
the religious situation. 
Complaining of inaccuracies, mis-statements and omissions in Communism 
and the Churches' presentation, Religion and the People considered that events 
needed to be placed in a relevant context to give a fuller appreciation of the 
situation. To a quotation which Communism and the Churches took from the Irish 
press concerning Father Plojhar who was disciplined by the Roman Catholic 
Church "not as a punishment for political activity or for endorsement of the 
People's Democracy, but as a punishment for disobedience", Religion and the 
People added supplementary information which it considered essential to any 
comprehensive presentation of the case: 
The reader is not told that whereas Plojhar had refused to resign the 
Ministry of Health at the request of his ecclesiastical superiors, no such 
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request was ever made to the quisling Fr. Tiso to resign the leadership of 
the Slovak Government during the war, yet it is precisely the juxtaposition 
of these two facts that throws a flood of light on the entire situation 
under discussion. (78) 
The papers of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations at 
Lambeth Palace amply testify to the volume of material sent to CFR detailing 
anti-religious activity in Eastern Europe, including official despatches and 
published articles taken from the Communist press; news of restrictive measures 
against the Churches, and any sort of information relating to the less 
favourable aspects of the religious situation in the Communist countries. 
Invariably the material supplied by the Foreign Office contained a request that 
the source remain conf idential. (79) In 1955 the Foreign Office began a bi- 
monthly publication, Quotations, which consisted of a selection of quotations 
from the Soviet press and radio, the Large Soviet Encyclopedia and the Marxist 
classics, "reflecting trends, shortcomings and anomalies in Soviet internal and 
external propaganda. " JO Rennie sent a copy to Vaddams on March 1,1955, with 
an index showing the subjects to be covered in future issues, advising: 
If you would like to receive it regularly, under the usual conditions 
(i. e. that you make any use you wish of the contents provided there is no 
attribution to the source), would you kindly let me know? (80) 
An independent contribution to CFR anti-religious material was a 1951 
report from HP Johanns, of Denmark, who had studied the Soviet press and radio 
to ascertain the extent and intensity of the Russian anti-religious campaign 
which was a subject of great concern in the West at the beginning of the 
fifties. 
To what conclusion have I come? In fact there is an increasing anti- 
religious propaganda, but not at all of such dimensions as the Western 
religious papers tell us. Most Russian periodicals do not know anything 
of such an atheistic campaign, and the journal which specialised in these 
matters did not offer it more than one tenth of its columns. 
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All the actual information of such a campaign, which was given in the 
papers of the Western Churches, is more than questionable. (81) 
Johanns found that many of the charges against the "Society for the 
Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge" were clearly untrue; such 
as the accusation that it had 500,000 "anti-religious propagandists" when "the 
society in question has only reached 265,000 members in April 1951. "(82) Most 
important, in his concluding paragraph Johanns observed that he found little 
difference in attitudes toward religion between the Russian people and those of 
Northern Europe: 
Northern Europe and Russia are quite different regarding politics, 
ideology and economy. But regarding religion the matters do not seem so 
divergent. The majority of the Russian population does not seem to be 
interested in religion or struggle against religion, just as in Northern 
Europe. A minority of the Russian population is highly interested in 
religion and church, just as in Northern Europe. A minority of the Russian 
population are "specialists in godlessness" as they call themselves, they 
are organised as a department of the Society for the Dissemination of 
Political and Scientific Knowledge. In Northern Europe for the time being 
the godless are usually not organised. Is that the whole difference? (83) 
If Johanns findings had any impact within CFR it was not discernible; CFR 
remained susceptible to Foreign Office publicity and suggestions. In May 1952, 
JH Peck wrote from the Foreign Office to Vaddams about a Pavyolkin book, 
"Religious Superstitions and their Harmfulness" published during the winter by 
the State Publishing House for Political Literature in Moscow. (84) Peck had 
been told that this book was probably the most complete guide for anti- 
religious propagandists published not only since the end of the war but since 
the disbandment of the All-Union Society of Militant Godless in 1941. Offering 
to help with the translations, Peck suggested: 
I am sure you will agree that selected extracts published in pamphlet 
form would be of use and I wonder if you would consider the matter and 
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let me know whether this could be undertaken by the Church of England 
Council on Foreign Relations. (85) 
Later that year CFR considered establishing a small committee for the 
dissemination of information about Communist persecution of religion. (86) Prior 
to both these events, Vaddams had suggested to Bishop Bell in October 1951 that 
Part II of Communism and the Churches be updated and circulated to the Church 
Assembly, "because it seems to me desirable that this information should be 
brought up to date, and it would do something to educate the Assembly in the 
situation "(87) Waddams further suggested the publication of The Churches in 
Communist Countries, a general survey of the whole situation written for the Old 
Catholic Conference at Brighton, which he said had received a very favourable 
reception. (88) 
The appointment of a "Special Sub-Commitee on Information about the 
Treatment of the Churches in Communist Countries" was considered by CFR on 
December 1,1952. The Minutes of the Council relating to the appointment were: 
That a small committee should be set up to consider and report to the 
Council at its next meeting the best ways by which information about the 
treatment of the Churches in Communist countries could be brought to the 
attention of the general public and in particular the Church public. The 
following were appointed members of the Committee: Dr Kenneth G Grubb, 
CMG (Chairman); Major Tufton Beamish, MP; the Hon Mrs B Miller; Dr Tracy 
Philipps; Dr George Bolsover; the Dean of Chichester; Colonel JB Barron; Mr 
DA Routh, and the Rev HM Vaddams (Secretary ex officio). (89) 
Five methods of operation were defined: 1. By the circulation of existing 
literature; 2, By the production and circulation of new literature; 3. By 
communication of materials to the press; 4. By means of the BBC; 5. By lectures 
and talks. The meeting recognised that the promotion of these activities 
would take time and involve some expense: "The first expense would be the 
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provision of an officer, part or whole-time, and an office to promote a 
campaign, or rather general activity on the lines above. "(90) 
The composition of the appointed Committee was noteably right-wing and 
its perception of the task before it was indicated by the desire of Dr Philipps 
that Sir Reginald Leeper be included: 
I should like to express strongly an opinion that the late head of the F. O. 
psychological warfare, and an ambassador in a country nearly overwhelmed 
by the internal techniques dictated from outside by the agency which our 
committee has to consider, should not be forgotten for us, as he is 
already a member of the CFR. I mean Sir Reginald LEEPER. It may be that 
you have already arranged that we should not be deprived of the advantage 
of his experience. If so, no action needed. If not, would you represent 
it? (91) 
Giving some indication of the nature of the material which the Committee 
was considering for dissemination, Philipps asked Vaddams had he seen Bob 
Darke's Penguin Special which had Just appeared. Darke was an ex-Communist who 
had written a sensational expose of Communism confirming the propaganda 
picture of a cloak and dagger fifth column aiming at the overthrow of the 
British Empire. Philipps told Waddams, "Parsons and C. of E. school teachers 
and all Anglican organisations in industrial areas ought, I should think, to be 
made aware of the existence of this documentation. " (92) 
This was exactly the sort of literature which Waddams did not want the 
Committee to be circulating, and it confirmed the doubts about the Committee 
which Waddams had expressed to Grubb following Council discussions about the 
role of the Committee: 
In the discussion at the Council there seemed to be some confusion between 
the question of spreading information about what was happening in 
Communist countries on the one hand, and propaganda against Communism in 
general on the other. Of course, the former would no doubt have a 
propaganda effect, but the general question of combatting Communism in 
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this country is not one for this Council at all. I think the committee 
will have to get this clear. (93) 
One of the means of dissemination selected by the special sub-committee 
was lectures and talks, and a suggestion was made that these should be given to 
theological colleges. This was proposed to the Rev Oliver Tomkins, Assistant 
General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, by the Rev WH Macartney, 
Assistant General Secretary of CFR. (94) In a reply which implied that the 
views represented by the Council were selective, Tomkins would promise nothing 
and stated: 
The great difficulty of course is to get people informed about au 
the facts. Whilst the news of persecution and so forth is important it is 
equally important for people to know that what church life there is is 
very often of an intensity and fire which were never known before. I have 
never met anybody who has stuck to his post beyond the iron curtain who 
has not included this note of thanksgiving in his testimony, and the 
greater the Christian the greater the thanksgiving (I think of talks only 
last month with that remarkable man Kreissig from East Germany). (95) 
When the special sub-committee to disseminate information about Communist 
treatment of the Churches was formed, Grubb was informed of the necessity of 
additional finance and staff as the pressure on the staff of CFR was such that 
the task could not be undertaken by it without additional provision. (96) The 
lack of funds was a subject discussed by Grubb with Fisher in March 1953, who 
subsequently reported their conversation to Waddams, informing him, "It did not 
appear to me, nor he confessed in confidence to him, that there was any money 
to spend on this purpose, or that, if there were, it could justifiably be spent 
on this purpose. (97) The problem was assessed as the need to improve 
literature and articles, "a great many of which do already appear, " to provide a 
panel of speakers on the subject and a means of getting information into the 
press or the BBC, correcting errors that appeared and encouraging common action 
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between the Churches and interested groups. Fisher said that as far as he 
could see there was no possibility of propaganda, "properly so-called", because 
there simply was not the money to pay for a man and an organisation: "but there 
might be something to be said for keeping more constantly before people's minds 
the state of affairs in Iron Curtain countries. " The Archbishop conceded the 
desirability of getting across the information they received and suggested the 
possibility of a Watching Committee and the use of BCC resources as well as 
CFR. (98) 
While inadequate finance inhibited CFR from entering the propaganda field 
in the ambitious way clearly desired by certain members, nonetheless, it still 
continued to produce literature and provide speakers on the subject. In early 
1954 CFR published a brochure, "The Churches of Europe under Communist 
Governments", and in February 1954, Waddams made a broadcast on the BBC's 
European Service on "The Church of England and the Persecution of the Churches", 
in which, despite the general nature of the title, the persecution was confined 
to that allegedly committed by Communists. (99) 
Waddams desire to disseminate information on this subject as widely as 
possible was illustrated in his instructions to the Bishop of Derby who had 
agreed to introduce CFR's Report, which included a survey on Communist 
persecution of religion, to the Church Assembly in February 1954: 
I suggest that your speech should concentrate on taking one or two 
of the salient features of the Survey which is attached to the Report and 
discoursing upon them, and above all else in trying to impress the 
Assembly, both clergy and laity, with the importance of understanding what 
is really going on in Communist countries and what are the aims of 
Communist Governments with regard to the Christian religion. I should 
like the Assembly to be strongly urged to buy and to circulate and to sell 
copies of the Report in their districts and parishes and to get as many of 
their local shops to put it on sale as possible. (100) 
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One of IRD's activities was the secret sponsoring of anti-Communist books 
by supposedly reputable publishers - as the CIA had done with the American 
firm of Frederick A Praeger. (101) They were published through a small firm, 
Ampersand Ltd. started by Leslie Sheridan, Deputy Head of IRD, and Victor Canon 
Brookes. (102) By the late fifties there were a vast number of titles dealing 
with Communism from an anti-Communist perspective. In June 1958, GFN Reddaway 
informed Waddams that the Foreign Office had been consulted confidentially 
about a bibliography an Communism from 1946 to 1957 inclusive, which was to be 
published commercially. The section on the Communist persecution of Religion 
was to be one of the most important, and Vaddams was requested to give the 
benefit of his advice and look through the thirty-five books selected for 
inclusion. (103) Included in the selection were all the CFR books, as well as 
some Catholic publications and one by the Church of Scotland, "The Church Under 
Communism", published in 1952. There were also eight Crisis Booklets, all 
written by Christian ministers and published by Ampersand. (104) 
The good relationship enjoyed by the Foreign Office with Waddams put them 
in a very good position to influence the hierarchy of the Church of England and 
the various national and international Christian organisations with which it 
was in contact. The effectiveness of Waddams as a conduit was illustrated at 
the Church Assembly at the beginning of 1954. The Church of England as a body 
was somewhat incoherent, having no easy way of expressing corporate opinion on 
general matters of interest, and debate in the Assembly was the nearest way of 
doing so. The survey which Waddams attached to the CFR Report to the Assembly 
was a means of allowing the Church to state its position on Communist 
persecution of the Churches. The Bishop of Derby introduced the topic in the 
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Assembly, as he had been asked to do by Vaddams, pointing out that "conditions 
in Communist countries vary but the Communist objectives remain constant, 
namely to undermine and destroy Christian faith and the Christian Church in the 
most effective way possible. Their limited success up to date is a striking 
tribute to the power of the religion of Christ to live under persecution, 
whatever form it may take. "(145) 
The Dean of Chichester, a member of CFR, addressed the same topic in his 
speech, pointing to the, intense Communist hostility directed toward the Roman 
Catholic Church. The policy of the Communists in dealing with the Churches was 
summed up for the Assembly by the Archbishop of York who concluded his speech 
warning that there must be no doubt as to "the implacable hostility of 
Communism to Christianity and its determination to extirpate the Christian 
religion if possible"(106) 
This was not the first time that the Archbishop of York had been a 
spokesman for the Foreign Office an the subject of religious persecution. In 
1950 there was some consternation in the Foreign Office when it was heard that 
the Archbishop of York had put down a motion, "to ask H. M. Government to bring 
before the United Nations Organisation the question of persecution of religion 
in Communist controlled states; and to move for papers. " The dilemma in the 
Foreign Office was that while they regarded religious persecution as an emotive 
issue with which to discredit the Communist regimes, because it was related to 
the whole question of human rights and because that was an issue which 
threatened British interests in the Colonies, the Foreign Office did not want it 
raised at the United Hations. (107) Thus, while neither Northern, Southern nor 
the Information Research Department saw any special advantage in attempting to 
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precipitate such a debate, both the United Nations Political Department and the 
United Nations Economic Department had reasons for not wishing to raise this 
problem at Lake Success. Such a debate was regarded as doing no good for the 
people behind the Iron Curtain, while the United Nations, particularly the small 
countries, were "tired of the cold war debates precipitated by the major 
powers. "(108) More importantly, however, "We feel that the matter would raise 
questions about the interpretation of the 'Domestic Jurisdiction Article' of the 
Charter which might have far reaching implications in the Colonial Empire and 
which would therefore have to be subjected to detailed legal scrutiny. "(109) 
A Mackenzie preferred "to avoid discussing the matter", and considered it 
would be beter "if the Archbishop could be persuaded privately not to press his 
question at the present time; or if he cannot agree to that, to rephrase it. " 
Mackenzie's views were supported in a minute by JB who opined: "the Russian 
attitude is unlikely to be thereby changed, the propaganda advantage is 
probably not so great as in such questions as forced labour, and the precedent 
might lead to unwelcome counter-attacks on practices employed in our 
Colonies. "(110) The misgivings about the desirability of raising the question 
formally at the United Nations were shared by Pierson Dixon, later Sir Pierson 
Dixon, who had been Private Secretary to Eden and Bevin between November 1943 
and December 1947. Nonetheless, he considered that, with the Archbishop's 
cooperation, the debate could be advantageous: "Indeed from many points of view, 
it is desirable, in my view, that the issue of religious persecution should be 
kept before the Parliaments of the free world. "(111) Dixon was confident that 
if the difficulties about the proposal that H. M. Government bring the question 
before the United Nations were explained to the Archbishop he would be willing 
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to confine his motion to the general question of religious persecution; Dixon 
added that there was no objection to his phrasing the motion in such a way as 
to point out that this persecution of religion was in contradiction to the 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
Because the terms of his question were already an the paper and it would 
be difficult to do so, the Foreign Office decided not to ask the Archbishop to 
amend it. It was decided to let him know privately and in advance the 
difficulties with regard to the United Nations proposal in order that he might 
adjust the development of his theme. Subsequently Lord Henderson, Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the Archbishop informing 
him of the discussions which had taken place in the Foreign Office, frankly 
disclosing all the difficulties, including the "intricate problem" of domestic 
jurisdiction: "The interpretation of this article is a matter of considerable 
legal controversy. It is of special concern to us as it obviously has far 
reaching implications as regards the intervention of the United Nations, 
including the Soviet Union, in our Colonial Empire. "(112) 
Garbett's motion was brought before the Lords on November 29,1950. When 
the debate was drawn to a conclusion by Lord Henderson, he informed the Lords 
that "there is no legal basis upon which to bring these matters before the 
United Nations. " Garbett promptly withdrew the motion. This effectively 
rendered the debate nothing more than a propaganda vehicle for attacking the 
Communist regimes, which had been Garbett's intention all along, as he remarked 
upon withdrawing his motion: "I feel it has already secured the purpose for 
which I moved it - namely to give this House an opportunity of expressing its 
abhorrence of the persecutions which are now taking place. "(113) 
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Nor did the Lords waste the opportunity, indeed certain of them expressed 
gratitude for it, namely the Earl of Perth and the Viscount Cecil of Chelwood 
who declared himself "profoundly grateful" and claimed the House owed the 
Archbishop a deep debt "because this is the most important question that we 
have yet discussed, or are likely to discuss... "(114) A number of the Lords 
expressed the hope that the debate might be a means of publicising the issue. 
The more publicity the better was the view of Lord Lloyd, while the Earl of 
Perth hoped the debate would "stimulate attention" and "concentrate public 
interest on the tragedy. " 
One Lord who took full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the debate 
was Vansittart. He began with the complaint that Britain seemed impervious to 
the denunciations of atrocities and persecutions: "Nothing on God's earth would 
set this country afire, and that is precisely one of our great dangers. One of 
our most urgent security measures is that we should stop preening ourselves on 
our dispassion. We may die from the atomic bomb; we may also die from moral 
leucaemia; and the bloodstream of our body politic shows a continuous increase 
in white corpuscles. Here in this motion is a chance for an antidote. " 
Declaring that Communism was "bent on liquidating religion, just as it is bent 
on launching a Third World War", that religious persecution was the chief agent 
destroying the whole fabric of Christian civilisation, Vansittart claimed it was 
their task to frustrate Communism and devoted the rest of his speech to 
outlining his antidote, "the disruption of the Communist cold war machine. "(115) 
The defence of Western civilisation was inevitably a major theme of the 
debate. Lord Lloyd stated, "... this country has always been a Christian country. 
The whole of our institutions, and the whole way of our life, are based upon 
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Christianity... Christianity is fundamental to the whole of European 
civilisation... it is not our Church which is being attacked, but that is purely 
geographical good luck... other countries... might well have taken some action 
before we did... I cannot see that the fact that they have not done so is any 
reason why we should hold back... It is Christendom that is being attacked, and 
I think we should give a lead in this matter. " 
Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, also saw a threat to British civilisation; 
referring to the "widespread attempt to stamp out Christianity", he urged: "It is 
important that we should recognise the enormous importance which this problem 
holds for us: that if Christianity is destroyed or removed from practical 
effect, it would mean the end of our whole civilisation, and there would be 
nothing left of it in this country. " 
In his opening speech, Garbett had stated that "there is no persecution of 
the Russian Orthodox Church at the present time. "(116) This did not prevent 
the Russian Church, nor the Soviet Union, from being indicted in the debate. 
Viscount Swinton, who followed Garbett, blamed Russia for Eastern Europe's 
religious crisis claiming that the suppression of religious freedom was 
instigated and enforced by Russia. Vansittart said there was no persecution 
because the Russian Church was subservient to the Kremlin. The Earl of Perth 
quoted Lenin to illustrate that the ultimate aim of religious persecution was 
the destruction of Christianity and he denigrated the leaders of the Russian 
Orthodox Church as "protagonists of Russian foreign policy. " Lord Henderson, a 
spokesman for the Foreign Office, said that religious persecution was "an 
instrument of state policy in Soviet Russia, and countries within its orbit... 
The model for the oppression of the Churches and the restrictions on religious 
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activites was set by the Soviet Union, and today all the satellites are working 
to that model and with the same ruthless efficiency and implacable consistency. " 
The inevitable comparison of Communism with Nazism was introduced by the 
Earl of Perth, whose efforts to brand the former as worse than the latter led 
him to make a dubious distinction: "I am sure that in a sense the present 
persecution is worse than the wicked persecution by Hitler. His were mainly 
racial; this is mainly religious. " 
The Lords concentrated on emotional issues such as alleged atrocities, 
freely citing Roman Catholic allegations of vast numbers of priests imprisoned, 
executed, ill-treated, and of the widespread closure of religious institutions. 
Viscount Stansgate was alone in attempting to put the religious situation into 
its political context observing that "the problems which have been raised 
possibly deserve a little more examination and exploration. " He tried to gain a 
hearing for the religio-political complexities of the East European situation: "I 
should like to make clear at this point that some of the fiercest controversies 
that exist in Central Europe today, and which have resulted in imprisonment and 
punishment, really have nothing to do with what we call religion. " He also 
asked the Lords not to declare the Cold War in Christian relations: "if that is 
done, then in my judgement, the last ray of hope for peace fades. " 
Stansgate recognised that the debate was a means of attacking Communism 
rather than religious persecution per se, and he challenged the Motion: "This 
Motion is partial... The purpose of the Motion is to focus our attention upon 
the treatment of the Churches in certain countries. "(117) Stansgate's 
observation was valid; and it applied not just to the Lords, but to the 
361 - 
treatment accorded religious persecution by the Church of England in this 
period. 
Religious persecution was a legitimate concern of the Church, but the 
selective way in which it was expressed suggested that its treatment was 
dictatedn by political considerations. Garbett was fiercely anti-Zionist and 
had publicly condemned the activities of what he called "Jewish terrorists" in 
the Lords and in his York Diocesan Leaflet. (118) In January 1948 Garbett's 
Presidential Address to the Convocation of York concentrated on religious 
persecution of Christians in Palestine. The Archbishop appealed to all 
Christians to ensure that there should be complete religious freedom in the 
future Jewish and Arab States: 
... freedom to worship, freedom to teach, freedom to evangelise; and that 
those who profess Christianity should not be subjected to any kind of 
legal disability on account of their faith... 
It is not generally known that Christian Jews have always been 
refused help or recognition by the Jewish Agency in Palestine. They 
regard a Jew as a person of Jewish blood in whole or in part, of any or 
no religion, provided he is not a Christian. 
The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem and the Presbyterian Moderator of 
Jerusalem submitted to the United Nations Committee a memorandum in 
which, referring both to Jew and Moslem, they said: "We speak from long 
experience of many individual cases, when we say that in spite of 
theoretical religious liberty converts to Christianity in Palestine are 
liable to be, and frequently are, deprived of their inheritance, boycotted 
in, or even dismissed from their employment, turned out of their homes, 
pilloried in the Press, 'framed' in the Law Courts, and threatened with, and 
often subject to, personal violence. We ask the Commission to see that 
complete religious freedom is secured for Christians as well as for Jews 
and Moslems in these new States. "(119) 
Later that year when Garbett moved a Motion on Human Rights in the Lords, 
although there was discussion of religious discrimination, Garbett did not raise 
the plight of Christians in Palestine. Moreover at the Lambeth Conference in 
July 1948, the resolution dealing with Palestine excluded any reference to the 
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religious issue and was confined to a general expression of concern for all 
suffering in Israel. Nor was the subject of Palestine discussed in Committee, 
despite being included with the Resolutions adopted from the discussions of 
"The Church and the Modern World. " 
Throughout the following Cold War years, the Church maintained a 
comparative silence on the subject of religious persecution in Israel, although 
there were important similarites between it and that of the Communist regimes. 
While there was not the excess of violence which characterised the religio- 
political issues in the Communist regimes, political factors were similarly at 
the root of the intolerance, derived from the insecurity and internal fears of 
these newly formed states established in the face of international opposition 
and hostility. While the Christian Churches in the Communist regimes were able 
to reach an accomodation with the authorities, the situation for Christians in 
Israel remained unchanged, as reports from Christian organisations in the 
region illustrated. (120) Yet the Communist regimes were continually attacked 
and condemned while nothing was said about the situation in Israel. This 
distinction was more than likely owing to political factors. Israel was an ally 
of the West in its opposition to Communism and the Soviet Union. Israel also 
enjoyed favoured nation status with the United States owing to the importance 
of the Jewish bloc in domestic affairs, particularly elections and the strength 
of the Jewish lobby on Congress. 
A further consideration was the way in which the West used religious 
persecution of the Churches in the Communist regimes to support the claim that 
the Soviet Union aimed at the eradication of Christianity and ultimately world 
conquest. This sequence of deductions could patently not be applied to Israel 
- 363 - 
where the same sort of persecution took place. To have drawn attention to the 
persecution there could have undermined the basis of Western opposition to the 
Soviet Union and the Communist regimes, and to an important justification for 
the Cold War. 
The influence that political considerations exerted on the Churches public 
attitude toward religious persecution was clearly illustrated by the events 
surrounding the visit to England of the Communist leader of Yugoslavia, 
Marshall Tito, in 1953. In 1946, Tito had incurred the wrath of the Vatican 
when Yugoslavia had judged the Roman Catholic Archbishop, later elevated to 
Cardinal, Stepinac, guilty of treason and subsequently imprisoned him. Tito 
also had troubled relations with the Serb Orthodox Church, about which CFR was 
kept fully informed by the British Ambassador in Belgrade, Charles Peake. Peake 
had contacts in the Patriachate and cultivated good relations with the very 
pro-British Patriach Gavrilo, who was fiercely opposed to Tito's Communist 
regime and complained bitterly about the new legislation imposed on religious 
orders. Peake tried to develop a similarly close relationship with his 
successor in 1951, Vinkentije. (121) Peake was naturally involved with the two 
Church of England delegations which visited Yugoslavia in 1946 and 1947 which 
both encouraged a cooperative relationship in opposition to the Communist 
regime between the Serb Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church in 
Yugoslavia. (122) 
Because of what was regarded in the Vest as his adverse record on 
religious issues, when it was learnt that Tito was to visit England, it was 
suggested to the Archbishop of Canterbury that a delegation be sent to protest 
against his record and to put forward certain demands. Fisher himself was 
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critical of the increased hostility which the Yugoslav authorities were 
allegedly then expressing toward the State, but insisted that Bevin would 
himself raise the matter with Tito and opposed the formation of a Church 
protest. (123) 
The Archbishop's reluctance to make an official Church protest was 
doubtless owing to the political fact that Tito had not only broken with Stalin 
but appeared responsive to Western overtures. (124) This was certainly the case 
wih the Archbishop of York. Garbett had previously visited Yugoslavia in 1947 
and made personal representations regarding the treatment of the Churches, 
including the Roman Catholic, by Tito's regime. (125) Moreover, one of Garbett's 
books, The Church and State in England, published as recently as 1950, had 
specifically attacked Yugoslavia's religious situation and commended the stand 
of the Roman Catholic Church, praising its resistance to State domestication 
and subservience: "The Roman Catholic Church is bravely resisting this policy, 
and by doing so is defending human freedom against tyrannical 
totalitarianism. " (126) 
Following the break away of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, its position 
had received a more sympathetic approach in Garbett's book, In An Age of 
Revolution, published in 1952, in which he attributed Communist persecution of 
religion as primarily owing to the opposition of Christianity to Marxian 
Communism, with political factors subsidiary: 
There is also the vindictiveness of triumphant Communism against 
Roman Catholicism as the ally of their political opponents and as the 
supporter of reaction; sometimes, indeed, justification has been given for 
oppressive measures, for in Yugo-Slavia some Roman Catholic priests openly 
sided with the Italian armies and took part in the harrying of both the 
Orthodox and the Communists. Elsewhere Roman Catholic priests and monks 
showed active hostility to the newly established Communist governments. 
But even if these subsidiary causes had not sharpened the hatred of the 
- 365 - 
Roman Catholic Church, there would still have been persecution, for the 
totalitarian State, whether Nazi or Communist, cannot tolerate a powerful 
rival which rejects its claims. (127) 
This slight concession was still a long way from expressing a real 
appreciation of the complicated religious situation inherited by Tito at the end 
of the war and the widespread hostility of the Yugoslav people to the Roman 
Catholic Church. (128) Garbett came considerably closer under the impetus of 
further political developments which brought Tito substantially nearer to the 
Vest, and he actually made an appeal to the British people to give the Marshall 
a welcome when he arrived in England: 
Towards the end of this month the nation expects as its guest 
Marshall Tito, the head of a Communist State. I hope very much that he 
may receive a cordial welcome. He represents the one Communist nation 
which has broken away from Russian aggressiveness and is prepared to live 
on terms of peace with the Western democracies... It has been said that 
Britain ought not to receive him on account of his attitude toward the 
Roman Catholic Church. Those who take this line forget that during the 
Italian and German occupation of his country there was severe persecution 
of the Greek Orthodox Christians by the Roman Catholics, and in Croatia a 
policy of forcible conversion was adopted which involved the murdering and 
suffering of many of the Orthodox clergy and laity. Religious persecution 
anywhere is hateful, and on several occasions I have expressed publicly my 
detestation of the persecution of Roman Catholics by Communist States. 
But both popular anger and reasons of national security made it necessary 
for the Marshall's Government to take steps against those Roman Catholics 
who in the war had collaborated with the invaders, and who in some cases 
had been guilty of grave crimes against the non-Roman Catholic population. 
Our welcome to Marshall Tito will not imply approval of his religious, 
social or economic views and policies, but it will be a tribute of goodwill 
and honour both to a brave man and to the sturdy, hard-working peasant 
community of which he is the head. It will show our sympathy with him in 
his defiance of the aggressive totalitarianism of Russia. (129) 
At the Lambeth Conference in 1948, the Anglican bishops had ruled that the 
Church should not implicate itself in the political opposition to Communism but 
adhere to that dictated by Christian considerations alone. (130) Tito's 
resistance to the Soviet Union was not such a consideration. Yugoslavia 
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actually prided itself as being the country most authentically true to the 
revolutionary inspirations of the Marxist classics and most creative in its 
application of Marxian principles, a factor impressed upon Garbett during his 
1947 visit. (131) In theory the-Church of England should have been more opposed 
to Yugoslavia than to the Soviet Union which had shown itself ready to 
accomodate religion, did not persecute the faithful and had the support of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. (132) 
The condemnation of Communist persecution of the Churches was notably 
and increasingly used by the Church of England to express its solidarity with 
the Vatican in the struggle against Communism as the Vatican came to be 
regarded as a vital ally by the British Government in its anti-Communist 
policies. This meant that Roman Catholic persecution of other faiths was most 
usually disregarded in Anglican indictments of religious persecution, which were 
also noteable for their conspicuous lack of protest about the privitations 
endured by Protestants under Franco's totalitarian regime in Spain. At a CFR 
meeting in 1949, which discussed dissemination of information regarding 
Communist persecution of religion, the Dean of Westminster had suggested that 
the Archbishop of Canterbury be asked to set aside a Sunday for prayer for 
persecuted Christians. Waddams pointed out that Christians were being 
persecuted in Spain and Latin America by Roman Catholics and asked were those 
too to be taken into account when prayer was offered for persecuted Christians. 
They were not: "Mr Tracy Phillips said a distinction should be drawn between 
the persecution of Christians by atheists and persecution by Roman Catholics of 
other Christians. " (133) 
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The concern of the Anglican authorities for fellow Christians suffering 
persecution for their faith was natural and justifiable. However, the 
selectivity of its expression, concentrating almost exclusively on Communist 
persecution of religion, indicated that Church policy depended on that of the 
Government, and the main impetus of Government in this period was anti- 
Communism. The clearest expression of Church policy in this period was usually 
through the two Archbishops, and it is clear from their statements and speeches 
that Church policy was subordinate to that of the Government throughout the 
first Cold War decade. 
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-392- 
It is not too much to say that a Jew professing Christianity is 
commonly regarded at best as an anomaly, a freak, or near 
impossibility; and at worst as an apostate and a traitor whose 
general respectability and loyalty to the state must be seriously 
open to doubt. And though no doubt some Jews of all religious and 
political parties deeply deplore the fact, the fact nevertheless 
remains that for an average wage earning Jew to travel openly along 
the Christian road in Israel is for him to attempt social and 
economic suicide, in which he is almost bound to succeed... The 
inevitable consequence of all this is that an unknown number of 
people are placed in a cruel dilemma and suffer. distress of mind and 
conscience in varying degrees... 
One reflects that religious intolerance is fcund in other 
countries besides Israel, wherever a particular religion is bound up 
with a particular nationalism. Time and experience may teach the 
unwisdom of religious discrimination and that it is ultimately a 
weakness to true nationalism and true democracy. 
121. Peake to Waddams, February 16,1951: "I an anxious to cultivate my 
present good relations with him (new Patriarch Vikentije), since I think 
that good may result. Once he feels himself firmly on his feet, I shall 
expect him to take a much more independent line, and I do not want to 
put him off by doing. something which might offend him. " (FO 371 95573/ 
R/1782/3) Following the visit of the Bishop of Armagh to Belgrade, 
Peake reported to the Foreign Office that his reception by the Patriarch 
in his own home, -with the obvious approval of the political authorities, 
was not only a sign of the improvement of Church/State relatior.: s, but 
also of the importance. attached by the regime to putting "religious 
tolerance" in the front-of their Western shop window. (July 6,1951; 
R/1982/15) Peake remained unable to derive the desired response from 
the Patriarch,. however, complaining to the Foreign Office on July 7, 
1951, that Vinkentije's "many expressions of goodwill towards us during 
the recent visit of the Bishop of Armagh had led us to believe that we 
could expect a greater measure of sincerity from him in private 
conversation. " (R/1782/14) Nonetheless, Peake gave permission for 
- 393 - 
Tomkins of the WCC to use the diplomatic bag for writing to persons to 
the Serb Orthodox Patriarchate "with printed material that might 
otherwise be*delayed in the post. " (Tomkins to Southern European 
Section, July 17,1951; FO 371 95573 R/1782/17. ) 
122. See "Pan Slavism" chapter. 
123. Marshall Tito's visit to Britain as a guest of ti. M. Governoent was 
announced by the Foreign Office on November 25,1952. The Romar. 
Catholic Archbishop of Westminster requested representations be ride to 
Tito over persecution of the Church in Yugoslavia on December 6,1952; 
he was followed by the Archbishop of Canterbury on December 10. At the 
time of Tito's visit, the pressure to which the Serb Orthodox Church was 
subjected in- Yugoslavia had, according to Fisher's address to the Annual 
General Meeting of the Council of Christians and Jews, "become 
increasingly hostile. " Fisher told the meeting that while this remained 
true, it would obstruct the development of any real friendship between 
the two countries. Observing the necessity that Tito should be made 
aware of the strength of feeling in Britain about this, he told the 
meeting: 
I do not doubt that the Foreign Secretary will make him fully aware 
of it, and he will know best how to do it. And I am at prese:: t 
satisfied that the best thing is to leave him to do it rather than 
proceed by deputation. " December 10,1952; CFR rapers. 
On December 16, the Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church replied to 
Fisher, maintaining that relations between State and Church were 
improving and stating that they did not need a mediator. Tito released 
-a statement on the same 
day. On January 27,1953, a delegation led by 
- 394 
Mim Stokes M. P, called on Eden asking him to bring to Tito's 
attention the strong feeling of many people in Britain about the 
Yugoslav Government's attitude toward religious liberty. KeesinZs 
Archives, January 24-31,1953, no. 12713. 
124. At the end of the summer in 1953 there was a press campaign in 
Yugoslavia attacking Orthodox Church leaders; this was accompanied by 
local outbreaks of violence against Orthodox Bishops and others. 
Vaddams considered that the Archbishop of Canterbury ought to make some 
public comment about this state of affairs, but first consulted the 
Foreign Office. which replied that if Yugoslavia were to be singled öut 
for criticism, "it would do more harm than good. " The Foreign Office 
also counselled that criticism from abroad was more likely "to have the 
opposite effect to that desired. " The Foreign Office then pointed to 
Government deprecation of the attacks: "information which we have 
received subsequent to the documents already forwarded to you suggest 
that the authorities themselves recognise that they have gone too far In 
their provocations. "(September 29,1953; CFR Papers. ) Fisher's address 
to the Convocation of Canterbury on October 14,1953, mentioned 
Yugoslavia, and the pressures on religious freedom in the rest of the 
Communist world, noting Tito's condemnation of events and there being 
"grounds for cautious optimism that things there might improve. " 
125. See "Pan Slavism" chapter. 
126. Garbett, church and State in England, 1950, p 24. 
k 
- 395 - 
127. Garbett, In an e of Revolution, 1952, p 214. 
128. During Garbett's visit to Yugoslavia in 1947, Tito had informed him 
that the State hoped to develop relations with all of its Churches, but 
was constrained by the will of the people with regard to the Roman 
Catholic Church. The culpability of the Roman Church for war-time 
atrocities, for which it never publicly admitted regret, created deep 
feelings of anger-and bitterness in the people. During World War II the 
policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was in a leadership 
position during the war of liberation, was not to alienate the large 
masses of peasants who were overwhelmingly religious. Therefore no 
atheist propaganda was permitted, and the Partisan units were encouraged 
to accept priests and allow them to perform religious services. Some 
priests who were sympathisers of the Communist Party before the war, 
reached high political positions. 
129. York Diocesan Leaflet, March 1953. 
130. Lanbeth Conference-1948, 
. 
131. Garb. tt's Travel Diary, pp 19-20. 
132, In 1957 the Bishop of Gibraltar, reporting the religious situation 
in Yugoslavia to Waddams, blamed the Roman Catholic Church there for the 
restrictions on religious freedom: "There is much evidence that the 
attitude of the Roman Catholic Church continues adversely to effect the 
, attitude of the 
Yugoslav authorities to religious bodies in general and 
I 
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constitutes a serious obstacle to further progress in the direction of 
complete religious freedom. " (January 2,1957; CFR Papers) According to 
Paul Mojzes in Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Eastern Europe, when the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia eventually initiated a Christian-Marxist 
dialogue, it was the Roman Catholic Church which responded, whilst the 
Orthodox, which traditionally rejected political "involvement, showed no 
interest. The Christian-Marxist dialogue thus became, for all practical 
purposes, a Roman Catholic-Marxist dialogue. (p 129) 
133. CFR meeting, undated but can be placed prior to July 1949, when 
Leeper and Halifax approached Fisher regarding a service of intercis: sion 
for persecuted Christians in Eastern Europe, as it was at this same 
meeting that the decision to make this suggestion was agreed. CFR 
Papers. 
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The trials of Church leaders and other measures taken by Communist 
Governments, the secularising of Christian schools, the forbidding of 
Christian youth movements and periodicals, interference with the choice 
of Church leaders or their forced resignation, hindering direct 
relationships with Churches in other lands or ecumenical bodies, plus 
the imprisonment of prominent Church leaders, made a very deep 
impression on the Western Churches and on public opinion generally. 
Communist policy was the domestication of the Church, not its 
extermination. While the methods used could be crude, and thus often 
counter-productive, their purpose was not to abolish the Christian 
Churches. This was admitted by Visser It Hoof t, General Secretary of 
the World Council of Churches in a March 1949 confidential memorandum 
circulated to Church leaders, with the stipulation that it not be 
quoted, on religious liberty. In it he dealt with the Western claim 
that Communism sought to abolish the Churches and destroy the Christian 
religion: 
At this point a great deal of Western propaganda overshoots the 
mark. For the available evidence does not prove that that is at the 
present moment an objective of Communist policy. On the contrary in 
several countries Communist Governments are subsidising Churches and 
theological faculties. They go out of their way to declare that 
they. are not antagonistic to the Churches. And there is no evidence 
that the Governments organise anti-religious campaigns such as took 
place in Russia during the early stages of the Revolution. (1) 
It Hooft regretted the publicity given the Mindszenty case, and also 
that of the Bulgarian pastors, as both allowed Communist propaganda to 
present Church leaders as reactionaries. He stated, "The fact that 
onn 
Cardinal Mindszenty had obviously been closely connected with monarchist 
and feudal groups outside and inside his country and the fact that the 
Bulgarian pastors maintained such very close relations (and that not 
only in the ecclesiastical realm) with America, the country of 
'reaction', made the holding of these trials extremely attractive from 
the point of view of propaganda. " It Hooft considered that the Western 
press had unconsciously played into Communist hands in publicising the 
trials, the dilemma being that to defend them proved the Communist case, 
not to defend them showed bad conscience: "unfortunately very few in 
the Vest have seen this. The political obsession has already gone so 
far that it becomes almost impossible to speak about these matters in a 
dialectical form. " 
It Hooft advised against an unreserved defense of either case as 
such was taken to mean a defense of their political attitudes: "We 
ought therefore not to make them appear as martyrs of the Christian 
faith. What we can and should say is that in spite of the political 
stand which they have taken and with which the Church cannot identify 
itself we must protest against the sinful treatment to which they have 
been submitted by the Courts. " The Churches were to protest the 
punishment as out of all proportion to the "the actions performed", and 
that "the trials have shown most clearly that Communism in Eastern 
Europe is building up a totalitarian society in which no one is allowed 
to hold a political opinion which differs from the official one. "(2) 
S. Hooft suggested no criticism of the West's implication. When 
America condemned the Rosenbergs to death two years later for conspiracy 
to commit treason, It Hooft did not circulate a memorandum to WCC 
leaders recommending the Churches protest that the sentence was out of 
PAGE 
MISSING 
IN 
ORIGINAL 
- 400 - 
proportion, or make any observation as to what the trial revealed about 
American society. This was the essence of the WCC dilemma, that while 
it sincerely wanted to follow the Amsterdam resolution of seeking new, 
creative solutions, of forging a third way, it was too closely 
identified and associated with the Vest psychologically for that to be 
possible. 't Hooft recognised this problem, and advised that the VCC 
must not appear committed to the status quo: must not defend the pre- 
revolutionary situation of Communist bloc countries, and must concede 
the benefits Communism bestowed; must not defend in toto the systems 
dominating Western nations and must, in order to make a convincing 
judgement on Communism, attack the evils of capitalism. But this in 
itself illustrated the strength of identification with the West, because 
the advised judgements against it were very much token criticism meant 
to give an appearance of objectivity to the VCC. 
Equally, 't Hooft opposed identification with a general anti- 
Communist crusade: "It must become clear that our stand against 
Communism is exclusively motivated by Christian convictions. " For this 
reason it was important the the WCC not follow the Vatican and that it 
avoid the impression of in any way emulating its lead or example: "For 
the Vatican has identified itself strongly with the defense of the 
established order in the West and does not bring into its message that 
note of repentance and self-criticism which alone can save the struggle 
against Communism from becoming a pure struggle for power. " In theory 
this was fine, but in practice it proved more difficult as was 
demonstrated within the Church of England. Both its Archbishops 
supported the WCC position and repudiated an ecclesiastical anti- 
Communist crusade, while at the same time both publicly endorsed and 
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were actively involved in the implementation of the British Government's 
anti-Communist policies. 
It Hooft realised that the international situation was making it 
increasingly difficult to maintain the position formulated at Amsterdam, 
that the deteriorating political situation and the sharpening conflict 
meant even less "vital space" for a third way. Nonetheless, It Hooft 
considered that Amsterdam's commitment to new, creative solutions was a 
responsibility which could not be taken too seriously: "If the World 
Council can really become a centre for those who seek a better way it 
will fulfill a great historic mission. " The WCC third way was not a 
middle way between two extremes, that was too static a concept. It was 
a new way, a search for the solution of the real problems which lay 
behind the deadlock between the East and West: "it is the realistic 
tackling of the problems of social disintegration and economic 
disruption which neither capitalism nor Communism can solve in a way 
which is compatible with the dignity of man and with his reponsibility 
to his fellows. " 
It Hooft predicted that the attempt to indicate a general direction 
which Christians could and should follow in order to lead the world out 
of its present impasse would often be misunderstood: 
It will be accused by the left and by the right of half-heartedness 
and of refusing to choose in a world where only two choices seem to 
be available. But it will draw to itself that great number of men 
and women in all Churches and nations who look beyond the present 
situation, who are increasingly troubled about the sterility of the 
war of the propagandas and who look to the Church for a word of hope 
which will transcend the present conflict. "C3> 
It Hooft's prediction was borne out by the experience of the German 
Evangelical Church which tried to implement the Amsterdam resolution. 
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The fact, however, that that Church was alone and that it did not receive the 
support of other member Churches of the WCC was a testimony to the strength of 
Cold War forces and the inability of the Churches at that time to transcend the 
East/West conflict. 
The experience of the German Evangelical Church illustrated the 
difficulties for Churches which tried to steer an independent course unaligned 
with either East or West. The endeavours of its leaders to implement new, 
creative solutions was seriously misrepresented by both the Church press and 
the secualr media. In 1949, Mary Bailey submitted a memorandum to CFR which 
elucidated the actions of this Church. Bailey was concerned about the sensation 
created by recent statements made by Dr Martin Niemoeller and Propst Heinrich 
Grueber, leaders of the German Evangelical Church, and the amount of adverse 
criticism directed toward them. Bailey's memorandum was an attempt to give 
Christians abroad the facts and explain their motivation, particularly as they 
had been almost universally misunderstood. The remarks of Niemoeller and 
Grueber were used by the Eastern press to show agreement with Russian and East 
German policy. This led to a violent reaction on the part of the Western press 
which responded with accusations that there was a movement in the Evangelical 
Church to cooperate with the Russian and the East German Governments in order 
to increase the influence of the Evangelical Church in the Eastern Zone, and to 
secure at all costs the political unity of Germany. 
Bailey explained how Niemoeller and Grueber's statements should be 
understood within the context of the attitude of the Evangelical Church to the 
political situation as a whole and in accordance with the WCC's resolutions: 
In line with the decisions taken at Amsterdam the Evangelical Church in 
East and West Germany is trying to avoid allying herself either with a 
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Communist (Eastern) or a Capitalist (Western) political set-up and feels 
it is her duty to remain free to criticise injustice in both East and West 
and to acknowledge good on both sides where she sees it. (4) 
Bailey went an to point out how the German Evangelical Church was faced 
with the problem of having to exist under, and therefore deal with, the de facto 
Government. Its recognition of the Government went so far as to appoint a 
liaison officer, Grueber, but did not exceed that of the Roman Catholic Church: 
"In practice the Catholic Church, which in public has declared war on 
Communism, has also to negotiate with the 'de facto' Government; and does not 
hesitate when necessary to do so. " 
Bailey argued that Niemoeller had focused the attention of Christians 
everywhere on the concrete case of Germany where the division of the world into 
two hostile blocs was most obvious, and put before their conscience the 
question, "are we to accept this situation as inevitable (as most of us seem to 
be doing) or if not, what concrete steps can we take to alter it? " She 
concluded: 
The Evangelical Church in Germany existing as it does as a unity on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain is trying to find the "third way" which 
Amsterdam believed to be the way the Church should take in the present 
situation; she is experimenting on behalf of us all to see whether this 
third way can find concrete expressions in the complicated political 
situation in Germany. (5) 
If CFR were committed to the Amsterdam way, then this document was 
clearly one for serious consideration. Instead, it was suppressed. Bailey's 
declared intent in writing it was to inform Christians everywhere. CFR gave it 
no circulation. On it, in bold, black capitals was the printed instruction "NOT 
TO BE QUOTED". 
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The trend in this period of both statesmen and Churchmen was increasingly 
to identify the West with Christianity; Western opposition to the Soviet Union 
was portrayed as the defence of Western civilisation, anti-Communism was the 
protection of Christianity and Christian ideals. There were those who saw 
where this was leading and objected, amongst them the world famous theologian 
Dr Karl Barth, who, in a lecture on April 17,1949, stated 
We must have no part in this East-West antagonism! It in no way concerns 
us as Christians. We can only warn against this even greater crime of 
wishing to convert this conflict into a third world war. We can only 
advocate any possible easing of this tension. Influence from America is 
strong and we must take care that we do not regard our Western judgement 
as being unquestionably the right, the Christian judgement. The Church is 
not identical with the Vest. The Western conscience is not necessarily 
also the Christian conscience... 
... I must demand of the Church something else than godless political 
calls. What right have we then to speak of a Christian West and seek to 
come to its aid in a spiritual, political and eventually in a military 
crusade? (6) 
As the Cold War intensified, however, so did the trend, bringing further 
conflict into the Church between those who wanted to follow Amsterdam and 
those who wanted to follow the British Government. The Dean of Chichester was 
one of the latter, and when the British Council of Churches rejected a statement 
by the Joint Religious Bodies Consultative Committee, of which the Dean was 
Chairman, the Dean responded by giving notice of his intention to move a 
reduction in the Assembly vote to the BCC during the budget debate in order 
that he might draw attention to certain trends of thought on the Council 
regarding international matters. (7) Those trends of which the Dean complained 
were effectively the BCC's efforts to follow the decisions of the WCC. Writing 
to Waddams about the matter, the BCC's Rev RD Say explained to him that the 
statement, for which the Dean had been responsible, had been adversely 
A Ac 
criticised in the Council and turned down altogether by the Executive, and noted 
that most of those who had opposed him were Anglicans. In order that Vaddams 
might have a clearer understanding of the issues, Say included a summary of the 
main reasons for the statement's rejection. 
The statement had described the ideals of "European culture" as if they 
were universally accepted and as if they were the principles upon which 
governments and nations normally acted, without making clear that the practical 
life and administration of "European civilisation" has always fallen very far 
short of these ideas, and that the ideals themselves have often been denied: 
"This whole body of belief and practice painfully built up through the ages" was 
claimed to be faced by a new world order of a wholly evil kind. The Executive 
considered such a picture to be too much black and white and unqualified. 
Moreover, the document was representative of the school of thought which sought 
to build up a "Christian-Western" bloc versus a "materialistic-Soviet" bloc, on 
the lines of Vatican policy. This was the very stance rejected by the 
Amsterdam Assembly. Advisers in touch with Continental conditions urged 
strongly that it would be unwise, or very unhelpful, for the BCC to be 
associated with such a document. 
The Dean of Chichester as Chairman of the Religious Bodies Consultative 
Committee, argued that the statement was inadequate if it were to be a 
statement of the Council. But the point was that it was an agreed statement 
drawn up by a Committee of Anglicans, Free Churches, Roman Catholics and Jews. 
The Council was being asked, as were the Roman Catholics and Jewish 
authorities, to say that this was important as an agreed statement. However, 
neither the Council nor the Executive could find any formula by which it could 
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respond to the Dean's request without committing the Council to a responsibility 
it did not wish to take. While desiring cooperation where possible with Romans 
and Jews, members did not wish to associate themselves with the Vatican against 
Russia. 
Despite desiring to cooperate in any way possible with Roman Catholics 
and with the Jewish community, it was not clear to the Council and Executive 
that there was any positive case for the publication of any such agreed 
statement in international affairs at that juncture. It was pointed out that 
the Joint Committee had not been created for any such purpose. All in all, the 
statement was held to be gravely inadequate, and if it were urged that it was 
the most that could secure agreement on the Joint Committee, as the Dean did 
urge, then it was felt that it was better to make no public pronouncement at 
all. (8) 
The efforts to secure symbolic Christian statements or rituals which would 
identify the Churches with political anti-Communism was a never ending quest 
for those who were determined to endow political Communism and Western 
policies with spiritual sanctity. The concept of suffering Christians oppressed 
by Communism behind the Iron Curtain provided a powerful emotional stimulus 
with which to politically mobilise Christian sentiment. In mid-1949, Halifax 
and Leeper, late Ambassador in Greece, approached Fisher with an idea they 
wished to put into his mind. They proposed that sometime in the autumn there 
should be a Service in Westminster Abbey of intercession for all the persecuted 
Christians in Eastern Europe under the heel of Communism. They suggested that 
this Service should be attended by the King and Queen, the Government "and 
everybody else", and that on the same Sunday clergy throughout the Church of 
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England should do the same in their parish churches. They posited that it 
would be a national mark of British sympathy with persecuted Christians, and a 
national disclaimer of Communism, and it would bring encouragement to their 
persecuted brethren. A further consideration put to Fisher was that such 
would be greatly appreciated by Rome while at the same time it would avoid any 
appearance of joint action with Rome such as might offend Protestant feeling. (9) 
Informing Garbett of the proposal, Fisher considered it necessary to 
separate the idea from the particular clothing given it by Halifax, which in the 
Archbishop's opinion was somewhat grandiose. Further, a Service to be attended 
by the King and the Government on a Sunday would really have to be a day of 
prayer appointed by the King. Fisher thought such a scheme, observed 
throughout the country, would be overdoing it. Although Fisher eventually 
rejected the scheme, it clearly had appeal: 
I do wonder, however, whether there is something in the idea. If the 
Service was in the Abbey an a week day as an act of the Church, and if a 
representative of the King and members of the Government came, it might 
be suitable - less obviously political and more obviously an evidence of 
Christian solidarity. (10) 
What gave the very obvious politcal motivation behind this scheme yet 
more significance was that it was intended as an act of solidarity with the 
Roman Catholics. It was thus an endorsement of the Pope's very recent anti- 
Communist decree and an indicator of how the political situation was pushing 
the Anglican Church closer to the Vatican position. As the British Government 
pursued a closer and more cooperative relationship with the Vatican, in the 
wake of American endeavours; so too the Church of England followed suit, despite 
the fact that Roman Catholicism was regarded as most unpalatable by many 
within the Church, not least the Archbishops themselves. 
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Then they had claimed the time was not ripe, in January 1949 they stated that 
now Communism must be kept on the run and the time was ripe for Italy to 
commit herself. The Vatican, of course, along with the United States, had 
played a key role in the defeat of the Communists in Italy's 1948 elections. (17) 
Subsequently, on February 11,1949, the Pope identified the Christian cause 
against atheism with that of the Vest's opposition to the Soviet Union. As part 
of the response, on February 20,1949, a long feature article appeared on the 
Pope in the New York Times Magazine which documented his transformation from a 
"diplomatic" Pope to a "fighting" Pope: 
Today the peacemaker has become the warrior. He is using as weapons 
the moral authority as well as the physical resources of the Church to 
fight, side by side, with Christian lay powers, the Communist juggernaut. 
The premise of Pius' present attitude is that no compromise is 
possible between the Catholic Church and Moscow. He is no longer 
"neutral". Suavity has been replaced by frmness; mediation by a political 
realism that has led him to advocate the creation of "blocs" of nations, 
which he sees as anti-Communist dams. His appeals to reason, good-will 
and understanding have been replaced by the sombre counsel that the duty 
of the Christian world is to resist aggression even "by force if 
necessary" . (18) 
Foreign Office documents illustrate that there was conflict between Rome 
and Moscow before the war had ended, and that this conflict steadily worsened. 
The Pope had never adopted a neutral attitude, nor shown goodwill. However, the 
claim that he had done so reinforced the similar claims of the British and 
American Governments, making it appear that everyone had tried to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union and that it was the Russians alone who were 
responsible for the political crisis. The Pope's "new" realism, brought him into 
line officially with the Western policy of resistance and preparation against 
aggressive Communism, a fact which did not pass unobserved by the Communists. 
In their response to the Pope's Exhortation on "Atheism", made to the Catholic 
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Episcopate on February 11, the Italian Communist leader Signor Togliatti wrote 
an article entitiled, "God and the Atlantic Pact". 
In the article, Togliatti asked what had provoked the "violent" 
Exhortation. It could not have been dictated exclusively by the irritation 
caused to the Holy See by the embarrassing situation in which it had been 
placed by the trial of Cardinal Mindszenty, that "hero and martyr manque, that 
political intriguer and conspirator manque". (19) Leaving aside the Pope's 
request to the Bishops that a special mass of expiation should be celebrated on 
a particular day, a question which did not concern him, Togliatti saw in the 
Exhortation an argumentation, followed by a political conclusion, and that was 
the serious part of the document. The argumentation was that atheism was 
whipping up a conspiracy "against the Lord and against His Christ". Togliatti 
went on to say that this was a false premise. The Illuminists, indeed, in the 
18th century, and the principal thinkers of the new and triumphant bourgeoisie 
in the 19th and 20th centuries, had carried out propaganda against religion and 
the Catholic Church in particular. Since the moment, however, when the working 
classes and the people had taken the lead in the struggle against Fascism, the 
working class movement had in no way undertaken anti-religious propaganda. 
The real purpose, therefore, of the Pope's Exhortation lay in his political 
conclusion, in which, to counter this alleged atheist offensive, he welcomed 
"those iniatives which tend to unite nations in ever closer bonds". The Pope's 
intention was clear, said Togliatti; he wanted a Holy alliance of God and the 
Atlantic Pact against the peoples who had committed the sacrilege of freeing 
themselves from capitalism and imperialism, that American imperialism which 
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refused to reduce armaments or abolish the atom bomb and was preparing a new 
war. (20) 
The Vatican was always exceptionally sensitive to charges that it was in 
political collusion with the West, and a semi-official pronouncement protesting 
that Togliatti had falsified the Pope's meaning was made in Osservatore 
Romano, (21) As the British representative to the Holy See frequently had 
occasion to report, "the Vatican is peculiarly sensitive to the charges which 
Communist spokesmen are fond of making, that the Church is 'warmongering', or 
the tool of the Western 'imperialists', or the ally of Capitalism. "(22) In order 
to refute such charges the Vatican used, amongst others, a tactic also empoyed 
by the VCC, it spoke out against capitalism. On May 8,1949, Count dalla Torre 
published in the Osservatore Romano an article entitiled "The Catholic Church 
and Capitalism", designed to refute the accusation that there existed an 
alliance between the two. The Encyclicals of Leo XIII, Pius XI and the reigning 
Pontiff were quoted to show that the Church had pronounced herself against the 
accumulation of enormous wealth and hence power in the hands of a few. 
Although in a note published subsequently, dalla Torre stated that he was 
writing for himself alone, and that his words could not commit the Vatican, the 
article concorded generally with a number of recent utterances by the Pope 
himself and with the Pastoral Letters of certain Italian Bishops, which Perowne 
summarised in his despatches to the Foreign Office. (23) 
The Pope further exposed himself to Communist attacks when the Sacred 
Congregation of the Holy Office issued a decree dated 1st July, 1949, the terms 
of which excluded from the Holy Sacraments Roman Catholics who wittingly and 
freely enrolled or lent active support to the Communist Party. The public 
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pronouncement on July 13 of this decree caused a sensation throughout Italy. 
The theological meaning of the decree was clear enough, as its application in 
practice and its effect were not. Pravda charged that it was dictated by 
international reacton and that it constituted a decree of anathema against "one 
third of mankind". (24) Pravda pointed out that President Truman in Washington 
and Prime minister Attlee in London had almost simultaneously launched attacks 
against Communism. Truman had blamed the Communists for America's 
catastrophic drop in production and Attlee for Britain's financial collapse. (25) 
In Italy, the middle of the road papers jjma-nita(PSLI) and Voice Republican 
showed concern over possible repercussions of the decree in the Italian 
political field. Given the persecution of Catholicism, the decree was seen as 
legitimate, but there was fear that a new psychological situation could arise as 
a result of it which could alter the principles and methods of the Western 
democracies. Opposed was any change that would make the Communists appear as 
victims of persecution, nor should the principles of foreign policy be altered 
to make the U. S. S. R. feel that the Western democracies wanted to exercise 
political influence within the satellite countries. Umanita asked why it had 
been decided only now to strike a blow at the atheistic political and 
materialistic doctrines while the Kaiser, the Czar, Haille and Mussolini went 
scott free. If Communism was a political fact, so was excommunication and it 
would have far reaching effects. (26) 
The Italian press in general were chary of commenting upon the Holy 
Office's decision to excommunicate Catholics who defended and spread the anti- 
Christian and materialist doctrines of Communism. Christian papers stressed 
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that the Church was defending herself against her enemy and the decree was not 
inspired by political but by religious considerations. (27) 
The Pope received Perowne in audience on July 17 to explain the necessity 
for the decree. The Pope declared that the persecution in the Iron Curtain 
countries was worse than anything in previous history; and that Christianity 
and Communism were completely incompatible. The Pope told Perowne that he was 
a man of peace, but that, little as he might like it, he had no alternative but 
to fight, there was nothing else to do. The Pope believed the decree would be 
effective, especially in America. He was pleased with the use of the decree by 
the BBC in its foreign service transmissions, and also by the Bishop of 
Chichester's pronouncements concerning the mutual incompatability of Communism 
and Christianity. (28) 
The Foreign Office were well pleased by the decree, as the minutes 
illustrated: 
We should welcome this most important development on the anti- 
Communist front. The Pope was quite right in foreswearing appeasement, 
recognising his enemy and attacking him with every available weapon. John 
Russell, Western Department. (29) 
The Catholic Church has always been strongest where it was most 
dogmatic, and it was probably a sound instinct which made them throw down 
this gauntlet to Communism. Indifference is Communism's greatest ally in 
the religious as well as the political field. CAE Shuckbrough. (30) 
The only qualification came from Christopher Mayhew: 
My personal experience suggests that Catholics are active and 
effective on the anti-Communist front in this country. But the fact that 
a man is a Catholic lessens his value as a propagandist greatly among 
non-Catholics - (3 1) 
The immediate impact of the decree was difficult to quantify. When the 
Italian Communist Party Deputy Giancarlo Pajetta said that the decree had been 
to a large extent ineffective, the non-Communists responded that that was one 
A1J 
way of saying there had been immediate repercussions which were important 
enough to be recorded in an official party report. (32) The New York Times 
stated that reports described the reaction of Catholics as one of bewilderment 
and uneasiness, noting that the decree was being taken seriously by Communists 
and Catholics alike. (33) In a report on the effect in Italy of the decree from 
Sir V Mallet to Attlee, Mallet said the public announcement on July 13 had 
caused a sensation throughout the country and it had been generally recognised 
as one of the most important in the modern history of the Roman Church. Mallet 
noted that the Communists were minimising the whole affair and taking the line 
that the decree was a political move of a purely tactical nature, nevertheless, 
the Rome edition of ynita was reported to have dropped by about 20,000. (34) 
The New York Times did a survey of the effects of the decree in various 
European countries, asking their foreign correspondents to report the local 
response. In Czechoslovakia and Poland the decree was thought to have given 
an impetus to the fight against the Church; while generally, Catholic priests 
didn't understand how to apply the decree and were tending to wait for further 
directions. (35) 
The New Statesman observed that it was the threat that Catholics might 
delude themselves into believing that they could remain sons of the Church and 
yet voluntarily accept Communism that had so greatly alarmed the Vatican and 
caused the decree. It further noted that the Pope had not made a blanket 
condemnation, but had distinguished between those forced to acquiesce in 
Communism, those who did so for personal gain, and those who were avowed 
believers. The first were pitied rather than condemned. the second were denied 
the sacramnents but not excommunicated, the third, like Albigensian and similar 
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heresies in the past, were diseased limbs which must be amputated and removed 
from the Church. (36) In his appraisal, Sir V Mallet noted that it was widely 
thought that, having taken an unequivocal theoretical stand against the 
Communists and having "finally disposed of the insidious idea that it is 
possible to be both a good Catholic and a good Communist, the Church will show 
itself in practice understanding of human frailty and will not necessarily 
insist on the strictest application of the decree. "(37) 
While Mallet's observations confirmed that the decree was in many ways 
symbolic, one of its effects was to divide still further the Churches of East 
and West. On August 26,1949, in Moscow, speaking on behalf of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, the Metropolitan Nikolai responded to the Vatican decree by 
telling the All-Union Peace Conference that the Orthodox Church stood firmly 
behind the Soviet Government and the Soviet people in the fight against the 
threat of a new war, stating that, "The Russian Church cannot stay neutral now. " 
He rejected charges that the Church in Russia was persecuted as hypocrisy or 
nearsighted calculation designed to deceive. He denounced the Pope as an agent 
of imperialism and a warmonger; opposed to which was the Soviet Government's 
humane aim, directed at the peaceful life of their land in which it had the full 
support of the Russian Church. (38) 
With the WCC vehemently opposed to the Vatican line, Fisher, as one of its 
Presidents, could not follow the Foreign Office and express support of the 
Pope's action. That same month, however, he spoke out forcefully against 
Communism in a significant manner, equating political good sense with good 
Christianity, calling Communism evil, and decrying religious persecution in 
Eastern Europe: 
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In this matter, as in others, political good sense is good 
Christianity too. As Christians know to their cost, political Communism 
is in its roots and in its fruits destructive of the Christian sanctities 
of human life and hostile to the Christian Faith. The Christian Church 
still exists in Eastern Europe and can still preach the Gospel and 
administer the Sacraments - but on sufferance only and on the condition 
that it says and does nothing obnoxious to political regimes which are 
totalitarian in their powers, ubiquitous in their system of espionage and 
offended by anything which departs one jot or tittle from their own 
opinions. Not everything that Christians there want to say or do is right 
and not everything that the political regimes want to say or do is wrong. 
But the system is evil: and its consequences are evil too. No end can 
justify these means and the end is as unjustifiable as the means. (39) 
Throughout 1949 the Vatican's energies were principally taken up with 
the struggle against Communism and in countering the theory that Communism and 
Catholicism were compatible. This was the assessment of the British Legation 
to the Holy See in its annual review. This same review also noted that the 
Vatican regarded Great Britain as one of the main pillars of world stability 
and was thus accordingly interested in developments in Britain and in the 
attitude of His Majesty's Government. (40) Earlier in the year, in March, the 
Vatican Radio had broadcast a talk on The Christian Business of Reform" in 
which tribute was paid to the British Labour Party. The commentator had stated 
that in the coming Holy Year, contact and cooperation between the Catholic 
Church and those Socialists who shared the same social principles must be 
maintained and extended. He quoted the Prime Minister's statement that British 
Labour derived its Socialism from Jesus Christ, rather than Karl Marx; he 
praised Sir Stafford Cripps' book, Towards Christian Democracy,. stating that if 
Sir Stafford Cripps was an authentic mouthpiece, it would seem that British 
Socialism was saved from the contamination of Marxism by its regard for 
property as a symbol of personal independence. (41) 
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Apart from sharing a common enemy and a mutual regard, the Vatican and 
the Foreign Office had a common interest in Eastern Europe. A 1949 Foreign 
Office Research Department document had observed that as the Orthodox Church 
collaborated, and Jewry were not in Eastern Europe in force, the Roman Catholic 
Church was the only organised religion of Eastern Europe which was opposing 
Communism. (42) This was an important consideration from the Foreign Office 
viewpoint. On November 24,1948, the terms of reference for the "Cold War" sub- 
committee of the Russia Committee were enunciated in a top secret document, 
giving the following objectives: 
(a) loosening the Soviet hold an the orbit countries and ultimately 
ennabling them to regain their independence; 
(b) pending the attainment of this relatively long-term objective, we 
should aim at promoting civil discontent, internal confusion and possibly 
strife in the satellite countries so that they will be a source not of 
strength but of weakness to Russia and a drain on her resources of 
manpower and trained personnel. We must hope to make the orbit so 
disaffected that, in the event of war, it would be a dangerous area 
requiring large armies of occupation and not a source of useful manpower 
for Russia. This in itself will make war less likely. 
(c) seizing every opportunity of discrediting the Soviet regime or 
weakening its position. (43) 
In June 1949 there appeared an article in a Czech newspaper about the 
Vatican's "espionage services", one of which was meant to be the "Pro-Deo" 
movement. The For : gn Office minuted that it was not to be taken seriously. 
Chancery dismissed the allegations that the Pro-Deo organisation was sinister, 
however: "To return to the 'Pro-Deo' movement, it seems to us that it is a small 
but useful ally in the anti-Communist fight, and steps have already been taken 
to supply it with Research Department material. "(44) 
Throughout 1949 relations between Great Britain and the Vatican became 
increasingly close, and there was undoubtedly a great deal of cooperation on the 
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anti-Communist front. Much of this was connected with the Vatican plans for 
Holy Year, as was indicated in the Vatican Radio broadcast. Holy Year, of 
course, had specific political aims. The plans and preparations for Holy Year, 
1950, including the creation of a united front against militant atheism, took 
place in 1949. The vast majority of the diplomatic documents for 1949 relating 
to the correspondence between the British Legation to the Holy See and the 
Foreign Office have been retained by the Foreign Office. The number retained 
amounts to fourteen pages of indexed documents, which indicates not only that 
the correspondence was of extreme sensitivity, but was also substantial, more 
than for than any other year in this period. (45) 
The retention of this body of documentation indicates how, as the 
ideological dimension of the Cold War expanded, Christianity assumed an 
increasingly significant role in Western propaganda. Charges of religious 
persecution were used to attack the Communist regimes, while the defence of 
Western civilisation with its Christian heritage was used to justify what was 
termed the West's 'offensive/defensive' policies. As the Cold War escalated, 
pressures on the Church intensified, as a dissenting voice in the ecclesia might 
bring into question the important spiritual base to which Western propaganda 
had laid claim. Christian themes became even more critical in early 1950 with 
the coordination of British and American propaganda. This was a transformation 
from 1948 when Bevin had wanted propaganda about Social Democracy to be an 
integral part of Britain's publicity policy. Then the preference had been to 
remain independent of American propaganda, partly because of American hysteria 
and its inept handling of anti-Communist themes, and also to allow Britain more 
scope in promoting her own interests. In 1948 Bevin had envisaged Britain as 
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giving a lead to the Social Democratic forces of Europe, but as early as 
February 1949 this policy was proving difficult to implement without offending 
the Americans and jeopardising the close relationship sought by the Foreign 
Office. (46) 
In February 1949, furore had arisen in America over a speech made by the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary, Christopher Mayhew, who was part of the British 
delegation to the United Nations in New York. By his own admission he had 
greatly underestimated the sensitiveness of the Americans when, as he explained 
in a despatch on February 27,1949, to Bevin, he had made a speech in which he 
extolled British social democracy: 
The Council is a forum where British social democracy and the 
Marshall Plan are constantly under attack. It includes delegates from a 
number of countries which look to us for a confident political lead 
against the Communist campaign. It was therefore necessary for me to 
give a warm account of our economic and social achievements and to 
forestall and rebut allegations of British subservience to United States 
imperialsim, by demonstrating that the acceptance of Marshall aid in no 
way lessened our political and economic independence. Since I am 
responsible to you for our general overseas publicity work -I felt 
entitled to try if I could to do so without indiscretion, to strike an 
unusually challenging note. The debate posed the familiar problem of 
steering a course between holding back too much on British recovery and 
British social democracy on the one hand and coming to grief in 
Washington on the other. (47) 
By April 1950 Britain was trying to avoid Europe with regard to anti- 
Communist propaganda and Mr Murray was arguing that there were good reasons 
why Britain should "fight shy" of efforts to coordinate Western European 
propaganda or the creation of intergovernmental machinery. (48) A major 
consideraton was that the other European powers lacked the machinery for 
handling and collating anti-Communist material and material about the Soviet 
Union and for getting it published. There was also the feeling that their 
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European colleagues lacked the will to implement anti-Communist publicity along 
the same lines as the British: "You cannot do publicity by means of a multi- 
lateral international committee, particularly if some of the members, like the 
French and Belgians, are so nervous of the Soviet Union and always wanting to 
keep the way open for a compromise. " (49) 
Another consideration was that the Americans did not propose to go ahead 
with including an item on the Atlantic Council agenda in 1950 on joint measures 
to combat the Communist menace; "their latest idea seems to be to discuss these 
bi-laterally with us first. "(50) The Foreign Office preference had thus changed 
from 1948 when it wished to keep its hands free from the Americans to wanting 
in 1950 to remain aloof from any European multi-lateral machine in order to 
"keep our hands and those of the Americans as free as possible. "(51) Shortly 
after these Foreign Office deliberations in early 1950, an Anglo-American 
Information Committee was created to coordinate British and American 
propaganda; and by July 1950 the Foreign Office were objecting to the Post 
Office principle that no foreign authority should be allowed to operate a 
broadcasting station in British territory when it was applied to the Americans. 
The Foreign Office argued that in the past three years great strides had been 
made in coordinating British and American policies and in combining their 
resources in the defence of Western democracy against Communist infiltration: 
"In all information work we and the Americans now operate very much as one 
team... " (52 ) 
Operating as one with the Americans in the publicity field inevitably 
meant that the promotion of British social democracy was not as an acceptable a 
theme as the defence of Christianity. Part of the British and American 
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operation was to use Christianity as a source of resistance to the Communist 
regimes and a means of creating opposition among East European Christians both 
against the Soviet Union and their own Governments. This tactic was very 
evident in "James Dobson's Political Commentary", a BBC broadcast forming part 
of their Albanian and Bulgarian programmes. Certain broadcasts were clearly 
designed to incite Christians. One told how the the Bulgarian Government's 
avowed aim of deleting the word Christian from the Bulgarian language meant not 
only attacking Christianity where it could, but also horrible methods such as 
bribery, ridicule and "the meanest kind of trickery" practiced on children, on 
whom Communist propaganda was allegedly concentrated. The broadcaster 
illustrated wih an example which was said to come from Czechoslovakia, warning 
that it might easily take place in any Bulgarian school: 
At a school in a small town near Prague it was customary to have 
daily prayers before starting work in the morning. One day the pupils 
noticed two large boxes standing on the teacher's desk and asked her what 
they were for. She told them that one box belonged to God and the other 
to Stalin. The teacher then gathered the children round the first box and 
told them to pray very hard so that God would fill the box with 
chocolates. They did so, and the teacher opened the box, which was empty. 
The same procedure was repeated with Stalin's box, which, when opened, was 
full of chocolates. (53) 
This was cited as proof that the Communists recognised in Christianity "not 
only their most bitter opponent, but an opponent whom they can never overcome". 
In comparison to Christianity, the "highest they can offer is a life where 
everything depends on the whim of the head of the Soviet Government and an 
acknowledgement of no other source, not only of power, but also of wisdom and 
knowledge. " In concluding, the broadcaster noted that the Communists 
themselves knew that they could not defeat Christianity, and urged that the 
listners not simply be comforted but, "let us show the Communsits that we know 
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also that Christianity is unconquerable; let us show them that Christians have 
an unconquerable faith to support them which Communism can never provide! "(54) 
The broadcaster very deliberately identified Britain both with Christianity and 
with the Bulgarian people. 
Also in early 1950, the BBC began purely religious programmes to Eastern 
Europe, broadcasting Orthodox Church services. The British missions, however, 
did not feel that these were as useful as actual talks with some political 
content, even where oblique. (55) The Press Department of the British Embassy 
in Moscow thought the services a good idea, but had doubts regarding the value 
of the project. (56) While there were undoubtedly large numbers in the Soviet 
Union who would appreciate the services and they were an innovation which 
might help to encourage them to look to the West: "these were not people who 
had any political influence. "(57) The value of the Slavonic Orthodox services 
were further undermined by Soviet jamming. (58) The services were thus 
discontinued, the final transmission taking place on July 2,1950. (59) 
The Moscow Embassy's preference for political substance in Russian 
language broadcasts applied equally to the projection of Western Civilisation. 
Talks on aspects of Western life such as the Welfare State, sport and culture, 
which had been the practice before Carlton Greene took over, were not favoured 
in Moscow: "we think the concentration in recent months on important political 
themes was a big improvement. Surely the BBC's main theme should be Soviet 
policies or actions in relation to Western civilisation. "(60) 
Another major undertaking for the Anglo-American Information Committee 
and BBC propaganda in this period was to "debunk" the peace campaign. (61) The 
Soviet peace movement was supported by the Russian Orthodox Church and other 
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East European Churches, churchmen and religious organisations, showing that the 
Communists too recognised the value of ecclesiatical support on the ideological 
battlefield that was the Cold War. The political value of Christianity on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain made this a critical period for ecclesiastic relations 
as Churches became strategically important and an integral part of their 
national Cold War propaganda machines. In Britain, the political role assigned 
to the Church during the war, and its continuation in the Cold War, made Church 
leadership a politcally sensitive role, particularly for the Church of England, 
as the Established Church. Throughout this period all the Churches, in East and 
Vest, were exceptionally sensitive to charges of political control. (62) But 
while spiritual allegiance was reserved for God, the Bible sanctioned allegiance 
to constitutional authority, and all the Churches, with the exception of the 
Roman Catholic which placed the Pope above heads of State, were subordinate to 
their respective national governments. In the Communist regimes, the situation 
was more complex because the governments were new and their authority recent. 
Moreover, the Communist regimes deprived them of the wealth and status enjoyed 
under former regimes which, unlike the Communists, recognised and gave 
allegiance to God, at least in theory. Communist pressure exerted on the 
Churches to secure ecclesiastical cooperation of the kind established in the 
Vest often led to crude political manipulation in the East, which generated 
charges of religious persecution. 
In Britain relations between the Church and the State had developed over 
the centuries to a point of subtlety and sophistication where each tried not to 
transgress on the authority of the other and in which they cooperated to their 
mutual advantage. The Church of England was an hierarchical, authoritarian 
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institution over which the State exercised control through its relationship with 
the leadership. The subtlety with which state control was exercised was 
demonstrated during World War II and the ensuing Cold War. It depended not 
upon orders and commands but upon mutual understanding, respect and shared 
values, as well as a common interest in the preservation of the status quo. 
The political mobilization of the Churches in the East-West conflict meant 
that the Cold War inevitably entered into ecclesiastical relations. Because 
Britain's opposition to the Soviet Union led to a close alliance with the 
Vatican, the Anglican Church necessarily had to follow suit, although Fisher 
nurtured a distinct aversion to all things Roman Catholic. (63) Similarly, 
because the Foreign Office perceived the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool of 
the Soviet Government and a vehicle of Pan Slavism, the relations which had 
been renewed during the war between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Church 
of England were allowed to fall into abeyance, although Fisher was more 
sympathetic toward the Russian Patriarch than the Pope. 
Because Fisher was himself anti-Communist and because he respected 
authority and saw it as his duty to support the State, compliance was not 
unduly onerous. Moreover, the Foreign Office appreciated the necessity of the 
Church retaining an appearance of independence, and was careful not to openly 
compromise its spiritual authority. Nonetheless, Cold War demands confronted 
Fisher and the Church with numerous dilemmas. Ironically, it was the subject of 
peace, an issue on which the Churches, of all institutions, should have been 
united, which most revealed how divisive a force the Cold War became in Church 
relations, splitting them East to West, internationally, and right to left 
domestically. 
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The peace movement was originally an instrument of mass emotional appeal 
against the use of atomic weapons. As it grew and evolved it became an 
important part of Soviet propaganda, possessing, in the aftermath of the horror 
of World War II, an even greater visceral appeal than the West's propaganda 
theme, the defence of Western civilisation. The Communists used peace to arouse 
opposition to what they perceived as aggressive Western policies threatening 
their continued existence, both amongst their own subjects and those of the free 
world. The British Government perceived the growing peace movement as an 
instrument of Soviet policy with sharply defined tasks which threatened the 
Western way of life. In October 1950, Bevin sent the Prime Minister a minute 
arguing that the World Peace Movement had two main functions which it 
performed for Cominform. First, under the guise of general peace propaganda it 
sought to enlist support for peace on Soviet terms. Second, it aimed at the 
incitement to subversion and sabotage of the rearmament efforts of the North 
Atlantic Treaty powers, and obstructing the movement and supply of arms to 
Europe from the United States. Bevin argued that from a movement of mass 
emotional appeal, "it has turned into a "cover organisation" for the agitation 
towards industrial unrest and sabotage of rearmament... "(64) 
The peace movement was of major concern to the Foreign Office which 
sought to actively discourage all support, particularly that of British 
ecclesiastics. In October 1949 the Foreign Office wrote to Archbishop Fisher 
advising him that they were warning their people in Rome about the attendance 
of Hewlett Johnson, the "Red" Dean of Canterbury, at the World Peace Conference 
in Rome. (65) Fisher responded by trying to dissuade Johnson from attending, 
claiming he was worried about relations between the Church of England and that 
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of Rome, owing to the Soviet inspiration of the Conference and the Vatican's 
attitude to the religious persecution in Eastern Europe. (66) Johnson replied 
that he was unable to refrain from attending. His mission was to prevent a 
third world war, besides such an endeavour all else seemed small, including the 
relations between the two Churches. He advised Fisher that if the peace 
campaign were Soviet inspired, then all should join and it would become 
Christian and world inspired. (67) 
The Secretary of CFR wrote to Perowne at the Holy See about the Dean, 
enclosing a copy of the Archbishop of Canterbury's latest disclaimer of . him, 
issued in March 1949. Perowne replied to Waddams that he had passed on the 
contents of the letter and the statement to the Ambassador and also to Montini 
to whom he told, "in strictest confidence, that it was against the express 
wishes of the Archbishop that the Dean was at present in Rome. " (68) Perowne 
reported to Waddams the Dean's activities in Rome and sent translations of his 
remarks at the meetings taken fron Unita. Perowne wrote twice more to Waddams 
on the subject of the Dean. First to inform him that the Archbishop's 
disclaimer had been published in the Christian Democrat newspaper 11 Popolo; 
and secondly with a copy of the Ambassador's; despatch to the Foreign Office in 
which he expressed strong feelings deploring the presence of the Dean at the 
Peace Congress - (69) 
The Roman Catholic Church was much more severe and decisive in dealing 
with what it regarded as dissident clergy who supported the peace movement. (70) 
Moreover, the Vatican had already made an attempt to answer the Communist 
conferences by organising one of its own in Rome on the subject of "Communism" 
in April 1949. (71) The British Foreign Office applauded this Vatican response, 
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requesting papers from the conference for their own use. (72) As the peace 
movement grew throughout 1949, so did Foreign Office correspondence with the 
Vatican. Although most of this correspondence has been withheld from the 
public domain, it is a logical conclusion that the Foreign Office sought some 
counter to the mass emotional appeal of the peace movement through an 
organisation expert on matters of mass emotional appeal. 1949 was also the 
year that the Vatican laid its plans for the forthcoming Holy Year whose 
central theme was to be opposition to Communism. (73) 
Following the Dean's appearance at the Rome peace conference, the Reverend 
Dr GL Prestige made an unofficial mission of friendship to Rome from November 
21 to December 7,1949. The object was to make the acquaintance of leading 
Roman Catholics who might be interested in the Church of England, and to 
explore the possibilities of improving relations between the Church of England 
and that of Rome. The Archbishop of Canterbury was aware of the proposed 
visit and of its general object, but deliberately left its conduct to the 
discretion of Prestige. Before Prestige left England Fisher furnished him with 
a formal letter stating that he was not himself directly concerned in the 
matter; and he issued no instructions for Prestige to observe. (74) 
According to a report prepared by Prestige on his return, considerable 
pains were taken in advance to arrange contacts in Rome. He took with him a 
"Personal Memorandum" designating matters which Prestige was anxious to 
discuss, of which copies were distributed to Mgr Montini, Vatican Secretary of 
State, to Cardinal Tisserant, and to Father Charles Boyer, S. J., Editor of Unitas. 
Included was the suggestion that it was important "to secure all practical 
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cooperation possible in matters of common interest to the two communions by 
means of private and unofficial consultation". (75) 
The Memorandum further stated: "It is desirable that the authorities on 
both sides should discourage all expressions of ill-will, contempt and 
suspicion. " Ironically, during Prestige's visit, a fierce controversy enraged 
the Anglican hierarchy, provoked by an article in the Times concerning 
relations between Rome and the Christian world. The article precipitated a 
large volume of mail virtually every day throughout November and the first week 
of December, engaging certain elements of the Anglican leadership. Fisher was 
instrumental in arranging for replies, but was careful to avoid any personal 
involvement. At its conclusion Fisher remarked privately that the 
correspondence would have done good if it had made Anglicans aware that Roman 
Catholicism was making a renewed effort to capture the Church of England from 
within. (76) 
Prestige reported that he had a brief discussion with Cardinal Tisserant, 
the only non-Italian Cardinal in the Curia. He had much more prolonged 
conversations with Mgr Montini and one of his assistants, the American Mgr 
Carroll; with Mgr MacMillan and Mgr Duchemin and members of their staffs at 
the two English seminaries already mentioned; with Father Boyer; with Father 
Tindal-Atkinson, O. P., Prior of Santa Sabina; and with Father Gill, S. J., of the 
Oriental Institute. All the discussions were friendly and frank and the general 
atmosphere was sympathetic to his proposals, "sometimes very markedly so. " 
Prestige did not enter into any discussion of practical or political problems in 
detail, but confined himself to "the main object of commending the principle 
that such discussions were desirable and practicable. " (77) No objection was 
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taken to the suggestion that unofficial consultations should be held between 
responsible persons on either side, on practical matters in which both sides 
have a common interest. Such consultations would be designed primarily for the 
exchange of views on public problems and policies, but would not necessarily 
lead to joint public action, unless in particular cases this were considered 
specially advisable. 
Prestige found a strong desire expressed on many occasions that contacts 
should be made between the authorities of the Church of England and of the 
Roman Church. He was told again and again that now the time had come to 
establish friendly relations both between leading personalities on either side 
and also between some of their leading assistants. Considerable interest was 
shown quite spontaneously in the life, and to a lesser degree in the 
organization, of the Church of England, and on one occasion Prestige was told 
that to Roman Catholics the Church of England appeared to resemble the Church 
of Rome far more closely than did any other non-Roman communion. (78) 
Although the visit was supposedly made by Prestige in his private 
capacity, it is noteable that he was one of the Archbishop's leading assistants 
at Lambeth and very involved with the Committee on Foreign Relations. Equally 
noteable was that a report of his visit was submitted to the Foreign Office. 
Moreover, following Prestige's visit, Ernest Bevin himself visited the Pope, at 
the end of January 1950. The British Legation to the Holy See judged the visit 
a success, noting that the Pope had provided his personal elevator for Bevin's 
use, although it was stressed that the visit was purely one of courtesy. (79) 
CFR, with the knowledge of the Archbishop and the encouragement of the 
Foreign office, were quietly working to establish a cooperative relationship an 
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a low level with the Vatican on non-theological matters. Onto this subtle 
operation descended Myron Taylor on a mission from President Truman which, 
although it indubitably had many of the same political aims as had the Prestige 
visit, was a much more blatant anti-Communist exercise: the major aim being a 
conference between President Truman and the world's moral leaders, including the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Pope. Taylor informed Fisher of Truman's 
desire to do everything in bis power "to support and to contribute to a concert 
of all the forces striving for a moral world order, " in a letter and a visit on 
November 21,1949, while Prestige was still in Rome. (80) Taylor's letter was 
couched in flambouyantly idealistic rhetoric, stating that it was the 
President's desire to contribute "his own highest personal effort" to a renewal 
of faith on the obtainability of the world's peoples of freedom of religion, of 
conscience, from want, from fear, and to strengthen and encourage the forces 
working for a world order built upon the dependable foundation of morality: 
All who have fought and died during the last decade have suffered and died 
in vain, if we who survive cannot out of their sacrifices and suffering 
find a road to a just and lasting peace which all nations can travel 
together. This is our supreme opportunity. We must not fail. There is no 
problem of any nation or between members of God's great family of nations 
that will not yield to the intelligence, the courage and the magnanimity in 
the religious faith of free men. Though the way ahead is long and hard 
and full of travail, through a union of moral forces we can bring near the 
day when the United Nations will fulfill the dream of peace under freedom, 
the Parliament of man. (81) 
Fisher was decidedly unimpressed by the extravagant claims, seeing clearly 
the political objectives they clothed, as his interpretation of the proposd 
meeting to Garbett revealed: 
I do not think he had any sort of idea what the Agenda should be beyond 
the fact that it should oppose Commumnism and all its works and declare 
large and necessary principles of a godly civilisation. Apparently he 
envisages that if the idea were approved the American State Department 
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would summon and organise the Conference and he fondly imagines that the 
world would take notice of it. ((82) 
Fisher regarded Taylor as well meaning but muddle-headed and very 
ignorant of ecclesiastical affairs and frequently deprecated the "muddled ideas" 
Taylor presented whenever he was passing through between America and Rome: 
"he urged on me before Amsterdam that official representatives of the American 
Government and of ours should be invited to it and I had to suppress it. He 
also put his finger into getting the Pope to send official observers to 
Amsterdam and caused a good deal of trouble and confusion. " Taylor had for a 
long time wanted "some joint statement signed by Christians, Jews, Hindus, 
Moslems and everybody else who, as he says, believes in God. " A prime 
consideration for Fisher was, as he explained to Garbett, "I must suppose that 
Truman is indeed behind this present proposal: indeed, Myron Taylor tells me 
that he has borrowed some of the wording of the enclosed letter from Truman's 
letter of instructions to him. "(83) 
Taylor wanted to know Fisher's view before he consulted the Pope. Fisher 
told Taylor that he could express no opinion until he had consulted Garbett, to 
whom he sent Taylor's letter of November 21: 
If you think that such an idea coming from no less a person than Truman 
ought to be followed up I would do my best to agree with you. If, on the 
other hand, you are against it I hope that in your reply you will give me 
some reasons against which I can pass on to him. One of the reasons 
against which I feel one cannot very well express to him is that the idea 
of the American President calling a conference of the religious leaders of 
the world is in itself likely to cause offence as being part of (a) 
America's opposition to the Soviet Union and (b) America's will to 
dominate. (84) 
Garbett was totally opposed to the proposed conference, as much because it 
would have placed other religions on the same level as Christianity as because 
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of its political objectives. Garbett warned: "I should not feel able to join in 
any joint statement issued by Christians, Jews, Hindus and Moslems. " He stated 
that he disliked intensely the attempts occasionally made to put all the faiths 
on exactly the same level. Garbett had no illusions about the political 
considerations inspiring the move. He observed: "This would only be another 
form of American opposition to the Soviet Union. It would be regarded widely 
as a political move. There would soon follow a counter-conference held in 
Moscow at which the Baptists, Orthodox and others in the Soviet States would 
reply to the Washington Conference. " He also thought that as every religious 
conference in America had spoken repeatedly and loudly about action on the part 
of moral forces, that such a conference would be a sheer waste of time. He 
advised Fisher to have nothing whatever to do with it, voicing additional 
concern about the Pope's role: "I should also be a little suspicious as to how 
far the Pope, or at any rate the Roman Catholics, are engineering this through 
Myron Taylor. You will remember some time ago Taylor asked you if we could 
not cooperate more actively with the Pope in his attack on Communism. "(85) 
Acting on the advice of the Bishops and his own convictions, Fisher 
composed a very lengthy diplomatic reply claiming that the proposal, coming 
from the President of the United States, had commanded his earnest 
consideration, and he was grateful for the motives leading the President to 
draw together spiritual powers to meet the grave disorders and diseases of the 
world, but he, and the Archbishop of York, considered the scheme impracticable. 
Fisher detailed the many problems he envisaged, the ecclesiastical difficulties 
and the religious conflicts which would first need to be resolved. Despite the 
objections he had raised with Garbett, Fisher was disturbed to be rejecting a 
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scheme of the President of the United States, and clearly sought to absolve 
himself from being unnecessarily obstructive: 
Unfortunately the very position of the President would be liable to 
misinterpretation and the purely spiritual effect, which would be the aim 
of the conference, would be opened to this distortion. You know how ready 
I am to give heed to everything you say and how I appreciate both your 
earnest desire and that of your President to forward the true bases of 
human well-being under God. I hate ever to appear to be critical of 
proposals which come out of such true and deep motives. "(86) 
Taylor was not deterred. He returned to the charge on December 7,1949, 
suggesting that all the questions raised by Fisher could best be settled by a 
small meeting at the office of the President in Washington at a convenient time 
by such a group as would be represented in the first instant by Fisher himself 
and selected colleagues, representatives of the Pope, few in number, and some 
group representing Churches in America. Taylor solemnly stated that Fisher had 
been selected by the President as one of the world's moral leaders who should 
give thought and express it to him by word of mouth, as the representative not 
only of the Church of England but of advanced thought in the field of 
religion. (87) 
Fisher felt the same reasons as told against the conference originally 
proposed, told equally against the latest scheme, as he explained to Boegner who 
had also received a visit from Taylor and whose opinion of the proposals 
coincided with that of Fisher. (88) Fisher intended to discourage this latest 
iniative, dubious as to how much was Myron Taylor's wishful thinking and how 
much really represented the mind of the President. (89) Fisher further doubted 
that Taylor would receive much encouragement from the Pope for any meeting 
summoned by the President. He considered nothing could be expected of the 
suggestion that the Pope himself should invite the Heads of the various 
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Churches to meet him in Rome to make a pronouncement, least of all during the 
Holy Year: "If he were to summon such a meeting it would be an admission by 
him that the Heads of the great Confessions were in some sense Churches, and he 
would think long before publicly giving such an impression. "(90) 
Despite Fisher's conviction that Taylor would not be able to secure Papal 
cooperation, events suggested that the Pope was making some effort to comply. 
In Rome on December 23,1949, Pius XII called upon all Protestant and Orthodox 
Christian Churches to "return" to that of Rome and urged all Christians as well 
as Jews to support the Roman Catholic Church in the creation of a united front 
against militant atheism. (91) These were among the main objectives of Holy 
Year which, according to the Pontiff, should be the inspiration and motivating 
force for the Christian crusade because, he said, it should bring about a 
resurgence of religious feeling and solve the spiritual crisis caused by the 
struggles betwen atheistic materialism and religion. (92) 
The Pope explained that Catholics must be at the forefront of the crusade. 
He offered reconcilation to atheists. He appealed to the Jews, those "who adore 
Christ - not excluding those who sincerely but vainly await His coming - who 
must join the common battle. "(93) This reference, at a time when the Vatican 
and Israel were at variance over the manner in which the Holy Places in 
Jerusalem should be safeguarded, was interpreted as a conciliatory gesture on 
the Pope's part and a call to Israel to modify her attitude to facilitate the 
solution of a question that deeply concerned the Vatican. (94) He invited other 
Christian Churches to rejoin that of Rome, as "Popes through the centuries have 
appealed to other Churches that no longer recognise the Pope as supreme leader 
to come back into the fold of the "Mother Church"; but the invitation gained 
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particular political significance when read against the background of Myron 
Taylor's activites. 
Another aspect which gave the invitation a political significance was the 
cooperation of Christian Churches in Eastern Europe with the Communist 
authorities. According to CM Cianfarra, the Rome correspondent of the New York 
Times, Vatican circles claimed that many of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches 
had become instruments for the furtherance and consolidation of Soviet power 
beyond Russian borders and were therefore vehicles for spreading Commumnism. 
They, above all, must cooperate with other Christian Churches to build a dam 
against Communism-(95) 
Cianfarra had no doubt but that the Holy Year had a political aim. 
Putting it in the context of the anti-religious drive of Moscow, and claiming 
that the Communist onslaught had already gained some physical success in 
Eastern Europe, he projected it as epitomising the spiritual issue at stake in 
the struggle between religion and materialism: 
The main objective of the offensive directed by the Kremlin, as the 
twentieth century headquarters of atheism, is the destruction of the Roman 
Catholic Church, largest and most powerful religious group in the world by 
virtue of its more than 400,000,000 adherents and the discipline and 
compactness of its hierarchical organisation. (96) 
A New York Times editorial subsequently portrayed Holy Year in a much 
wider context, stating that it was a challenge to Communism, and that: 
Holy Year must inevitably dramatise the conflict between Communism 
and the Catholic Church - indeed, the conflict between Communism and any 
faith which emphasises the dignity of man and the value of the individual 
human life. (97) 
On the same day that the Pope delivered his Christmas Message urging a 
fight against militant atheism, an exchange of Christmas messages between the 
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Pontiff and President Truman was released and published simultaneously in 
Washington and Rome, in which the two leaders declared their joint objective of 
securing peace. (98) Truman's letter re-dedicated the United States to the 
"creation of a peaceful and advancing world order"; while the Pope's reply paid 
tribute to that nation's people, praising their generosity, "so bounteous and 
spontaneous, we recognise with pleasure, and hold up as an example to all, that 
good will which, according to the Christmas message of the angels, gives glory 
to God and hastens the coming of peace on earth. "(99) The substance of both 
letters dealt with the necessity of a Christian foundation for civilisation as 
the only basis able to secure a just and enduring peace. 
Truman's letter was delivered personally to the Pope by Myron Taylor in 
December 1949. In September, Taylor had made a tour of Europe, visiting London, 
Paris, Berlin, Rome and other cities, going farther afield than on any of his 
other journeys. The law York Times reported "Taylor to Report on European 
Tour" to the President. Prior to his visit to Rome, Taylor net with both the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and with Prime Minister Attlee in London. (100) 
Although there is no record of what trespassed between Attlee and Taylor, the 
substance of their discussion can be gauged from those with Fisher. There are 
also records of talks the previous year when Taylor met religious and 
political leaders in Spain. 
In early April 1948, Taylor visited Madrid just after the American House 
of Representatives voted for the inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan. The 
Pope was one of those who supported the rehabilitation of Spain and its 
readmission into the European community of nations, Ernest Bevin saw it as a 
necessary and inevitable part of Western Union. (101) Taylor met with Franco, 
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Artajo, the Foreign Minister, the Nuncio and high ecclesiastics. (102) The 
American charge d'affaires, Culbertson, was present during Taylor's meeting with 
Artajo, the Foreign Minister, but had been excluded from the meeting with Franco 
who had insisted on seeing Taylor alone with only his interpreter present. (103) 
At the meeting with Artajo, Taylor had started by saying that it was quite time 
that all the anti-Communist countries got together and helped each other 
against the Communist menace. Artajo replied that he could not agree more, but 
Spain was excluded from the family circle of anti-Communist countries. Taylor 
told Artajo that it was up to the Spaniards to make the necessary changes which 
would render their admission possible. Very shortly after this meeting the 
American decision to include Spain in the Marshall Plan was reversed, and 
Taylor's mission was rendered futile. (104) 
Amongst those with whom Taylor had discussions during his 1949 tour was 
Luigi Gedda, the leader of Catholic Action. Their meeting was given a sinister 
interpretation by the Dutch Communist newspaper De Vaarheid, which stated that 
Gedda, head of the "terrorist and spy organisation", Catholic Action, was said 
to have been interviewed by the Vatican Under-Secretary of State, Montini, and 
Myron Taylor, and to have discussed with them "methods of increasing activity 
against Communism and materialism. " The newspaper further stated that it had 
been decided to found "special intelligence schools" in Rome, Leghorn, Florence 
and Ferrara. (105) Such suspicions of Taylor's activites were fostered not only 
by the anti-Communist nature of his mission, but also by adventurist activities 
in the United States involving American business and religious organisations; 
Taylor himself was a business man and former chairman of the board of United 
States Steel. (106) On December 22,1949, the New York Times reported that in 
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1947, with the approval of the Holy See through its Sacred Congregation for the 
Oriental Church, and with the financial help of Thomas J Watson of the 
International Business Machines Corporation, a small unit of selected student 
priests was established at a monastery in Connecticut; they were being prepared 
to carry the Gospel behind the Iron Curtain, "to slip unheralded into the 
underground for assignments in Russian-dominated countries. " (107) 
A further indication that the Vatican was trying to cooperate with 
Truman's desire to create a religious front, uniting all faiths, against 
Communism, was its approach to the Muslim world, reported in Time on February 
10,1950. (108) Following this, the Manchester Guardian reported that the 
Egyptian Minister to the Vatican, a descendant of the Caliph Omar, had proposed 
a "new Holy Alliance aimed at joint Islamic-Christian action to revive and 
strengthen the practice of religion, to improve world conditions, and to defeat 
atheistic Communism. "(109) The Church of England was a passive participant in 
this Muslim /Christian activity. Following the Pope's approach to the Muslim 
world, an approach was made to the Archbishop of Canterbury by His Eminence 
Muhammad Abdul Aleem Siddiqui who wrote on February 14,1950 from the Islamic 
Cultural Centre suggesting discussions as to ways and means for all religions 
to cooperate against the menace of materialism and Communism. His Eminence 
noted that Marxist Dialectical Materialism was challenging all Religion and 
Absolute Morality and called for a comprehensive counteraction by the world of 
religion. (110) 
No one at Lambeth had any idea who His Eminence Muhammad Abdul Aleem 
Siddiqui was. Professor Rushbrooke Williams, the Times specialist on Muslim 
affairs, explained that he was a Muslim divine of prominence. The Professor 
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told Lambeth that the Muslim world was "buzzing with excitement" over the 
approach from the Vatican, and thought the solution to the dilemma created by 
His Eminence's approach to the Archbishop would be to send a representative to 
meet him, pleading that the Archbishop was unable to himself. This course was 
followed by Lambeth, and a meeting was arranged between His Eminence and 
Vaddams. The discussion centred on Siddiqui's hope that religious leaders would 
get together, as they were all threatened in the same way by Communism. He 
referred to the World Congress of Faiths, a lay conference of which he thought 
little, stating that such should be done by clergy and ecclesiastical 
leaders. (111) Neither Fisher's Papers nor CFR records give any indication of 
this initial discussion being followed up, nor is there any avaiable record of 
Islamic/Anglican cooperation against Communism. 
On December 13,1949, Taylor had informed the Pope that he intended to 
retire owing to personal considerations of age and health; and on January 18, 
1950, President Truman accepted Taylor's resignation. Shortly after this, 
Franklin C Gowan, a career diplomat borrowed from the State Department to act 
as Taylor's assistant at the Vatican, was recalled to Washington by Truman "for 
consultation. "(112> Although this meant there was no American representative at 
the Vatican, the State Department had no wish for relations with the Vatican to 
lapse. The State Department regarded the resumption of normal diplomatic 
relations with the Vatican as deirable for a number of reasons, not least the 
belief that direct relations would assist in coordinating efforts to combat 
Communism, particularly in the ideological field. (113) 
Although Taylor's resignation was anticipated at the Vatican, Gowan's 
recall was totally unexpected, particularly the immediate closing down of his 
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office. (114) Moreover, Truman's statement to the press that the question of 
whether the post of Presidential representative to the Vatican should be 
maintained was under consideration, caused considerable bewilderment and 
surprise in Vatican circles, who said they had received no indication of such a 
development. The hope was expressed by these circles that the President would 
re-open the office as soon as possible and that he would resume the 
collaboration between Washington and the Vatican, which, they said, had been 
"mutually advantageous. " (115) 
This state of affairs, where there were no direct relations between the 
Vatican and the United States, was as unwelcome to the State Department as it 
was to the Vatican. Apart from the very obvious diplomatic advantages of 
relations with the Holy See, the State Department feared not simply 
misunderstanding in the Vatican, but also on the part of millions of Catholics 
in Communist countries to whom a termination of the relationship might imply a 
lessening of the interests of the United States in their eventually regaining 
freedom. (116) 
As equally perplexed as the Vatican by the closure of the. American office 
was the British Legation to the Holy See. The British Embassy in Washington 
reported that the State Department viewed the Taylor resignation as quite 
natural. Sir F Hoyer-Millar reported to Perowne that in point of fact, the 
State Department were not at all sorry that Taylor had resigned as he had been 
really much too old to do useful work during the past few years and from the 
work angle his departure was viewed with litle regret. (117) The State 
Department had felt that the Taylor Mission had not provided adequately for 
maintaining full consultation and liaison between the American Government and 
ýýý 
the Holy See in matters in which the foreign interests of the United States 
were deeply involved. Experience had shown that the Vatican exerted great 
influence an other Catholic nations of the world in support of its own 
interests, with the result that those nations in some instances pursued courses 
in opposition to that of the United States. In such instances it proved most 
difficult to bring about a change of attitude through diplomatic pressure on the 
countries concerned, and virtually impossible to take the matter up directly 
with the Vatican. (118) 
Perowne appreciated the State Departmnet's sentiments, but observed that 
Taylor's resignation did not look nearly so natural from Rome. Taylor had 
seldom been there, and then only for short periods; as seen from Rome, he could 
either have resigned sooner, if his years were weighing, of which there was no 
particular sign, or have let the appointment run on until the question of a 
successor had been decided. The removal of public United States representation 
from the Holy See at the very opening of the Holy Year, which was so important 
from the Catholic point of view and as regarded the strategy of the Church's 
battle with Communism, appeared from Rome "as a slap, and a rather unexpected 
slap", in the face for the Vatican, "and 'figural, as you well know, counts for a 
good deal here and elsewhere. "(119) 
In the practical field, the closing of the Taylor office caused a lot of 
turmoil and inconvenience with no official means whereby arrangements could be 
made "for the hordes of American tourists coming to Rome to be received in 
audience by the Pope. " Perowne's Latin American colleagues, of whom there were 
to fewer than eighteen, under the leadership of the acting doyen, the Chilean 
Ambassador, addressed an official note to Jimmy Dunne, the American Ambassador, 
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asking that the State Department be informed of their strong feelings that Pan- 
Americanism required that the United States should not be unrepresented at the 
Vatican. This information was given Perowne on March 18,1949, by Mgr Montini, 
the Under-Secretary for Ordinary Affairs, who was careful to say that the 
Vatican had in no way inspired this demarche, its attitude to which was 
completely neutral. Perowne noted that it would not be in accordance with 
Vatican practice to take the iniative in a matter of that kind, but he seriously 
doubted whether the Vatican were as indifferent to the issue as Montini 
pretended. (120) 
Perowne's perceptions about the Vatican attitude were correct. On June 30, 
1950 Franklin Gowen called on the Pope to take leave on his transference to 
Washington. The Pope referred to the events of January when immediately upon 
Taylor's resignation Gowen had been ordered to cease all activities at once. He 
said that it had been considered most unusual that the mission had ceased in 
this manner as he had never received any communication in the name of the 
President that the President had decided to discontinue relations with him. 
Neither, the Pope added, had there been any indication as to what form further 
relations might take if any were still desired. The Pope said he wished in 
this connection to deny most emphatically rumours that no American 
representative below the rank of ambassador would be acceptable to him. He 
pointed out that on the contrary he would gladly accept an ambassador, a 
minister, or even a charge d'affaires if the American Government should, he 
repeated, desire to establish official relations with the Vatican on a permanent 
basis. The Pope said that America was a country especially dear to him and 
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that he felt now more than ever all the free countries of the world should 
unite in renewed effort in the cause of truth, justice and peace. (121) 
Following this communication from the Pope, Truman asked Taylor in mid 
July 1950 to return to Europe, "as an American citizen of good will seeking to 
enlist leaders in religion of various and varying allegiances in a quest for 
peace... It is my earnest hope that you will continue to discuss with men of 
open minds - wherever you find them - whether leaders in church or state of 
civic affairs generally, the possibilities of a meeting here in our Capital City 
to lay the groundwork for peace and to promote goodwill among men. "(122) 
Taylor subsequently went to London, Paris and Rome; but without success, as was 
noted in a memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President, Elsey, 
to the Secretary to the President, Hassett, on November 11,1950. (123) 
President Truman, at a press conference in the White House on August 3, 
1950, finally broke his public silence on the matter and disclosed that he was 
considering the possibility of sending a regular diplomatic mission headed by a 
Minister to the Vatican, while no further representation on a personal basis, as 
had been the case with Myron Taylor, was being considered. (124) This statement 
came after the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, and the British 
Embassy in Washington considered that his decision to come so far into the 
open on this controversial question before the November elections indicated that 
he felt that in the light of the general international situation and the present 
state of American domestic opinion, it was possibly a propitious moment for the 
establishment of permanent United States representation at the Vatican, "and the 
move could be justified as part of the crusade against Communism. " (125) 
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An official of the State Department had informed the-British Embassy that 
as far as they were concerned the situation was unchanged and the matter was 
still in the hands of the President. If formal diplomatic relations were to be 
established with the Holy See, both the post and the nominee would be subject 
to Congressional approval. Taylor's appointment as the President's personal 
representative and without pay, had been independent of Congressional 
authorisation. (126) 
Truman personally certainly wanted a replacement for Taylor in what he 
regarded as a "politically sensitive post". (127) He even propositioned his old 
regimental chaplain, Monsignor Tiernan, who was retiring from the army, stating, 
"I need someone to get at the Pope through the backdoor and I think you are the 
one to do it. "(128) Monsignor Tiernan, however, did not share Truman's 
conviction and declined the offer. A more significant figure whose possible 
appointment as Minister to the Vatican Truman discussed with Secretary of State 
Acheson was that of Allen W Dulles, brother of Foster, and subsequently Head of 
the CIA. In May 1950 the President decided the time had come to bring the 
matter to a conclusion and to proceed expeditiously with this appointment. (129) 
However, nothing came of this, and in August 1950 the British Embassy reported 
to the Foreign Office a confidential political report from the British 
Information Services in Washington, from Major CB Ormerod to the Controller, 
which stated that Ormerod had been told confidentially by Mr Jackson Martindell 
that he was to replace Myron Taylor. Martindell was described as a right-wing 
Republican and a bitter opponent of all forms of socialism. (130) In the event, 
no nomination was forthcomimg at this stage. 
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The tale is told that at Yalta, when reference was supposedly made to the 
views of the Pope, Stalin inquired with heavy sarcasm, "And how many divisions 
does he have? "(131) The story is apocryphal. The Vatican, in terms of 
temporal domain a cartographical dot, was thought by the Americans to be 
regarded as a special and dangerous menace by the masters of the Kremlin. In 
the chaotic world of ideological confusion that was the Cold War, America 
viewed the dual institution of the Papacy as a spiritual and a lay power, as 
being of special significance. This perception was formed from watching the 
struggle in Italy, where at the end of the war in 1945 the most significant 
organisations left intact were the Communist Party and the intricate 
administrative complex of the Church. Subsequently, in one phase of Italian 
national life or another, Communism and Christian Democracy, the political 
expression of Catholic views, were constantly contesting for Italian authority. 
The Vatican, with the aid of American finance, was perceived to have played an 
important part in preventing the Communists winning power in the 1948 Italian 
elections. 
Moreover, behind the Iron Curtain, Catholicism. was the greatest coordinated 
force opposing Communism in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to a 
lesser degree in the Baltic States, Rumania and Albania. Apart from stoking the 
fires of Catholicism in Eastern Europe and urging the preservation of faith and 
therefore of anti-Communism, the Vatican was perceived in America as having a 
profound influence in the democratic world, as an article by CL Sulzberger in 
the New York Times, entitled "Vatican Has a Big Role in Fight on Communism", 
illustrated: 
Today in Western Europe there is a significant if informal spiritual 
alliance among the political leaders in Italy, France and the Bonn Federal 
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Republic. The most persuasive supporters of the European Defence 
Community, that bugbear of Moscow, have been the Catholic statesmen, 
Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault, Alcide De Gasperi and 
Mario Scelba. 
Christian Democracy, a phenomenon of the post-war world which seeks 
to unite new social concepts in the material sphere with ancient spiritual 
tenets, is still dominant in Western Germany and Italy and strong in 
France. This is the political philosophy closest to the Vatican and 
approved by it. It is the practical force of militant Catholicism. (132) 
From the point of view of foreign affairs, direct relations with the 
Vatican was to America's advantage, but domestically the issue was politically 
controversial. Although the American Adminstration had no desire to offend the 
Vatican, domestic considerations took priority over the appointment which the 
Vatican so desired, as a State Department memorandum on the question had 
conceded: 
Vhile the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the Holy 
See would be preferable from the foreign policy point of view, the foreign 
considerations are probably less important than the avoidance of religious 
controversy in the United States and the President may well wish to base 
his decision primarily on domestic considerations. "(133) 
A number of memoranda in the State Department papers testified to the strength 
of feeling opposing a Vatican representative and the various means considered 
of allaying the violence of the opposition. (134) On August 7,1950 the Under 
Secretary of State discussed the question with Truman and the President decided 
that it should continue being studied. On August 28 Secretary Acheson 
discussed the question with the President, stating that representatives of 
Protestant denominations wanted to see him about the problem. In September 
1950 the President said informally in a staff meeting he would not act on an 
emissary to the Vatican until after the November elections, and that he would 
refer the matter to Congress then. Subsequently, on board the Presidential 
yacht, Truman stated his intention to nominate a Minister to the Vatican and 
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let the Senate argue it out. (135) This was the course the President eventually 
took, but not until October 1951, after the failure of his plans for a meeting 
of Christian leaders, including the Pope, in Washington. 
At the end of October 1951, Truman announced the proposed appointment of 
General Mark Clarke as United States Ambassador to the Holy See. This was 
followed by a storm of controversy in the United States. There was also a 
great deal of criticism over the White House inclusion in the announcement a 
reference to a coordinated effort between the United States Government and the 
Vatican against Communism. (136) In Rome, Somers-Cocks asked Tardini, the 
Under-Secretary for Extraordinary Affairs, what he thought of recent 
developments in the matter: 
He dodged giving any direct Vatican views, but said that President 
Truman's moves in the matter evidently turned on considerations of 
internal politics, and that the Vatican could only lie low until these 
problems had been got out of the way somehow or other.... Tardini also 
commented that the United States was a rich, powerful and young country 
which could permit itself the luxury of disregarding the impression which 
some of its antics created abroad. His indulgent attitude, which conflicts 
very markedly with the periodic blasts of L'Osservatore Romano against the 
materialistic capitalism of the United States, confirms my diagnosis that 
the Vatican are secretly most anxious to have a United States Ambassador 
accredited to them, and are ready if necessary to swallow a General as the 
first Ambassador. (137) 
Somers-Cocks was clearly perplexed by the appointment of a military figure and 
he concluded his report with the comment : "But I can't for the life of me see 
why President Truman made things more difficult both for himself and for the 
Vatican by nominating a man of blood for the job. "(138) 
Opposition to the nomination of an American Ambassador to the Holy See 
was so strong and so emotional in the United States, that Truman's nominee, 
General Mark Clarke, withdrew his acceptance of the nomination. (139) Truman 
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made no further nomination and the affair remained unresolved until Eisenhower 
was elected. He had stated in his election platform that he would not appoint 
a representative to the Vatican. (140) 
The Americans handled the whole affair very clumsily from the Vatican 
point of view, causing a great deal of unnecessary offence. While the Vatican 
appreciated the difficulties created by domestic considerations, it still felt 
that the United States had behaved discourteously. When nothing more was heard 
about the representative Truman had announced he was considering in August 
1950, the Under Secretary at the Vatican, Montini, aired the Holy See's 
displeasure to the Secretary at the British Legation, Somers-Cocks. (141) 
Montini noted that the Vatican had been exceptionally cooperative with Myron 
Taylor, to the point of arousing sardonic comment against itself. (142) Montini 
protested that the Vatican having accredited Taylor in the critical days of the 
war, should not have been dropped when the war was over. Moreover, Taylor had 
expected, and the Vatican had granted, facilities on a scale such as no 
Diplomatic Mission to the Holy See had ever dreamt of demanding. Not only had 
the Pope received him every week when he condescended to be at his post and 
was not throwing his weight about in other parts of Europe, but his office had 
constantly disturbed the Vatican routine by requesting and obtaining audiences 
for V. I. P. s at unreasonably short notice. (143) 
Montini pointed out how after the outbreak of the Korean War President 
Truman had announced the possibility of a regular Diplomatic mission to the 
Holy See, but nothing more was heard. With regard to which Montini remarked 
that the Vatican was more interested in collaboration with temporal powers in 
the works of peace than in offering them moral support in time of war. He 
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recalled the Pope's refusal of an audience to General Eisenhower at the time of 
the closure of the American office, and stated that it was for such reasons 
that the Pope would not see the General. (144) 
Somers-Cocks told Montini that he was sorry there was a chill in Vatican- 
United States relations, but there was some good in that Communist propaganda 
would now find it more difficult to claim that the Vatican was in the pay of 
American imperialist warmongers, which propaganda had done a great deal of 
harm recently. In response, revealing that the Vatican was still desirous of an 
American representative, Montini emphasised that if the United States had been 
in proper diplomatic relations with the Vatican, the Pope would have received 
Eisenhower in spite of the Communist campaign of calumny which would have 
followed it. This prompted Somers-Cocks to end his despatch with the kind of 
sardonic remark of which Montini had earlier complained Vatican concessions to 
Taylor inspired: 
It certainly is too bad that the Vicar of Christ should now be given the 
bird, after having to play red hot momma all these years to God Almighty, 
incarnate in Myron Taylor. (145) 
Later that year, despite offense over American behaviour, the Pope granted 
a private audience to Myron Taylor on June 6, and to Margaret Truman, the 
President's daughter, on June 28,1951. (146) As Fisher informed the Bishops of 
York and Chichester on June 25,1951, Myron Taylor was "on the go again". (147) 
Fisher referred to Taylor as "Truman's personal representative at the Vatican", 
illustrating that Fisher still perceived him in that capacity. Moreover, from 
the nature of his activities, despite his resignation, it was clear that he was 
still acting on behalf of the President. Having been unable to establish 
relations through official channels, Truman was again reverting to Taylor to try 
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and achieve his objectives in the religious sphere. (148) This time Truman also 
exerted pressure on the Head of the American Episcopalian Church, Bishop 
Sherrill. Prior to receiving Taylor's letter, Fisher had been informed by 
Sherrill, that he had had a long talk with Taylor regarding the possibility of 
some statement being made by individuals representing various Churches with 
regard to the international situation. As a result of the talk Sherrill, who 
lived in New York, went to Washington where he spent some forty minutes in 
discussion with President Truman. Sherill subsequently informed Fisher that 
the subject was one greatly on Truman's mind; moreover, the President wanted to 
change the emphasis from a group of people in the United States to a much 
wider area. The thought was that Bishop Sherill, Archbishop Fisher, Bishop 
Dibelius, Athenagorus, Pastor Boegner, and possibly the Pope, might join in an 
appeal to the peoples of the world for peace and for the establishment of 
freedom based upon justice. (149) 
Taylor met with the Pope, and subsequently informed Sherill that the 
Pontiff was willing to evaluate the project and give it serious study. (150) 
Sherill told Fisher that it seemed to him that five or six individuals, 
including the Pope, could sign such a statement; it would be of historic 
significance as breaking down barriers which had stood for many years, even in 
a cause in which faith and Church order were not involved. Sherill was coming 
to England and told Fisher that he would go into further detail when they met. 
It was a subject which needed to be talked over at length and seemed to him, 
"due to its authorship", of possibly very great importance. (151) 
Fisher wanted that the discussions on this matter be initially limited to 
Taylor, Sherill and the British Bishops, Garbett and Bell. (152) Fisher informed 
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the latter two of what was proceeding, noting in reference to Taylor: "If 
anything is to come of this suggestion I should certainly want your advice 
about it while if it is as woolly and unsubstantial as his other suggestions I 
should value your aid in resisting it. "(153) He stated that the matter was 
important, and that great importance was attached to it by Sherrill because of 
Taylor's position as a go-between the President and Pope. 
Bishop Bell was asked by Taylor to see Bishiop Dibelius, following which 
he reported the German Bishop's response to Fisher. According to Bell, Dibelius 
considered, roughly, that anything that would convince the countries in danger 
of coming under Communist rule that it was the West that brought peace and 
freedom, would certainly not be useless; if Myron Taylor were to secure an 
appeal to that effect "it would certainly be something". Dibelius said that 
German leaders would join in, if asked, and he quite thought they might not be, 
although they would not feel that anything particular had been done. A good 
moment would be if the Korean War ended, and all Church leaders, with special 
emphasis on the Orthodox, spoke. That would be a great thing. (154) 
On July 3, Taylor met with Fisher, Sherill, Bell and Garbett. Fisher 
subsequently reported the proceedings to Pastor Boegner in Paris. Sherill had 
begun by stating that the President in his ardent desire for peace earnestly 
wished the Heads of the Christian Churches, including the Pope, should put out a 
Call based on high moral principles for the promotion of peace. (155) Taylor 
then reported his meeting with the Pope who had made two comments: Firstly, 
that it would be very difficult indeed to draft a document which the Heads of 
all the Churches would be willing to sign; and secondly, that the other Churches 
had shown themselves unfriendly to him in their comments upon the new dogma. 
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The previous year, Fisher had denounced the Papal Encyclical "Humana 
Generis, " and both he and the Archbishop of York had "felt obliged" to put out a 
brief statement in reply to the announcement of the Corporal Assumption of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary being made a necessary article of faith for Roman 
Catholics. On September 12,1950, Fisher told Convocation: 
We cannot understand their insistence on requiring acceptance within their 
own ranks of doctrines altogether outside the Bible and the ancient 
universal creeds. It leads only to the confusion of Christian truth when 
Roman Catholic theologians draw inference from inference far removed from 
any evidence, historical or otherwise, and when their authorities impose . 
priori deductions as being equivalent to divine revelation and equally 
necessary for salvation. (156) 
In reference to the new Papal dogma, Fisher spoke of the necessity of 
cooperation between Christians and all men of goodwill "who desire to defend 
the civic and social virtues on which civilisation rests", adding that for 
constructive work, "Christians as such need to stand together. " He then 
deplored the Pope's dogma for making cooperation with the Church of Rome "more 
and more difficult". As Fisher sought to blame the Vatican for the inability of 
Christians to come together and cooperate against Communism, he was attracted 
to a suggestion from Sherril, following the meeting with Taylor, that the 
Protestant Bishops should make a show of cooperation with Truman in order that 
the Pope might be blamed for the non-achievement of Truman's scheme. From 
Taylor's report the Bishops had concluded that it was extremely unlikely that 
the Pope would join with them in signing the proposed document; and without the 
Pope there was no point, since a non-Roman effort would simply be a duplication 
of pronouncements made by the Presidents of the World Council of Churches. 
This caused Sherill to suggest that they draft a possible document for Taylor 
to show the Pope, the Pope would certainly refuse to sign with the non-Roman 
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signatories, "and that would finally convince Myron Taylor and Truman that it 
was the Pope to blame for frustrating a general appeal. "(157) 
The Bishops were well aware that Truman's design had nothing to do with 
peace, as Fisher quite plainly told Boegner: 
Myron Taylor really meant this document to be a clarion call to 
everybody this side and that of the Iron Curtain to cast away the 
Communist works of darkness and put on the armour of light, i. e. it was an 
attempt not to make peace but to strengthen a crusade. (158) 
Fisher suggested making the appeal one which could give no offence to 
either side, based on "the principle to which both sides had publicly adhered 
that it was possible for the Communist and Capitalist societies to dwell 
together side by side in peace and without mutual attack", and could be signed 
by even the Russian Patriarch: "If it was an appeal to lay aside recriminations 
and to dwell in peace with one another there would be no ideoligical reason why 
he should not sign it since it is what the Soviet Peace Movement says and of 
course if a document was signed by the Pope and by the Patriarch of Moscow 
along with all of us it would be front line news. "(159) 
Fisher was here effectively suggesting to the Bishops what Hewlett Johnson 
had suggested to him in 1949, that if all joined the peace movement it would 
become world and not simply Soviet inspired. The chances of such a document 
coming to fruition in the West during the Cold War were remote; a fact of which 
Fisher could not fail but to be aware, as the other Anglican Bishops clearly 
were. Although Fisher asked the other Bishops each to prepare a draft document 
along these lines, from which a final draft could be created for submission to 
Myron Taylor, neither Bell nor Garbett thought the effort sufficiently 
worthwhile to do so. (160) Fisher nonetheless asked their advice on his own 
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draft, written, as he explained to the Bishops, so that Sherrill's version of a 
possible appeal might not stand alone, as he, after all, had to answer to Truman 
and to some extent to Myron Taylor, and, moreover, "He is quite sure that the 
Pope will not sign any document but he wants the blame for refusing to be on 
his shoulders and not on ours, so that he may look Truman in the face and for 
that reason, he is very anxious we should suggest some document for Myron 
Taylor to submit to the Pope. "(161) 
At the same time Fisher asked advice about the structure of the document 
from Sherill, to whom he wrote that he had been greatly impressed by the point 
that Taylor ought to be given some kind of document to show the Pope so that 
if, as one could assume, the Pope turned it down, both Taylor and Truman might 
understand the blame rested an the'Pope and not them. (162) Garbett was also 
impressed with this point, and while he otherwise did not feel the attempt to 
secure an agreed declaration worthwhile, in view of Sherrill's strong opinion 
and his relationship to the President, he thought, "even if it is against our 
better judgement, we ought to make some attempt, so that if there is failure the 
responsibility rests with the Pope. "(163) Garbett also feared that Sherrill 
might lose some of his influence with the President if an effort to comply with 
his wishes were not seen to be made. He therefore agreed with the letter 
Fisher proposed to send to Myron Taylor. (164) 
The Bishop of Chichester remained opposed to the Truman/Taylor proposal. 
Under his chairmanship the Executive Committee of the WCC considered 
proposals that the WCC should seek the support of other Churches in issuing a 
general Appeal for Peace, but stated that peace could not be conjured up by the 
stroke of a pen while the acute international tension had lasted too long and 
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was too complex in origin to admit of a quick termination, or a simple solution. 
Neither Truman or the Vatican were mentioned by name; however, the report's 
timing and its content clearly registered the VCC'S opposition to Truman's 
objective and his means of attaining it: 
Nor are they true friends of peace who, while crying out for peace, create 
strife and so intensify division, for the World Council of Churches to 
seek to join with other great Churches outside its membership in a general 
peace appeal now is not a practicable policy and its pursuit would not 
help the general situation. (165) 
The Bishop of Chichester supported the idea of a peace appeal, but not in 
conjuction with the Vatican. Bell was Chairman of the WCC Executive Committee; 
and the position of the VCC was in opposition to what it perceived as "the 
Vatican line", the creation of a Christian Western bloc in opposition to a 
materialist atheist Eastern bloc. Moreover. Bell had his own ideas about an 
international peace conference which he regarded as superior to those of 
Truman. Having been party to the VCC's rejection of any participation by the 
Churches in their membership in a scheme such as Truman proposed, Bell set out 
his own scheme in a lengthy letter to Sherrill on August 16,1951. Bell 
proposed a four Power Conference, with unrestricted agenda and an independent 
Chairman belonging to neither blac. (166) Bell's own position was not as 
independent nor as objective as he himself considered it to be, for he was 
another authoritative, ranking churchman implicated in surreptitiously spreading 
the British Foreign Office line on the Soviet Union. At the beginning of August 
1951 he had written to Vaddams asking to be supplied with a dozen copies of an 
April 1951 Foreign Office review of "Peace and Soviet Policy", for "discreet 
distribution - without saying it came from the Foreign Office", to the Executive 
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Committee meeting at Rolle to discuss the proposal of a joint statement by all 
faiths. (167) 
On August 28,1951, Sherrill wrote to Fisher stating that in view of the 
WCC's decision, he felt it better to abandon the project. (168) This was greeted 
with relief by the Archbishop of Canterbury. (169) However, it did not please 
Truman. His frustration at being again thwarted in his scheme to launch a 
religious crusade was expressed in an attack on the Churches for being unable 
to cooperate in the world's hour of need, delivered in a speech at the National 
City Christian Church to the Washington Pilgrimage of American Churchmen. The 
speech identified the American nation with ancient Israel, created by God for a 
special purpose and with great obligations imposed by their religious heritage. 
Truman cast the international crisis as the preservation of a world civilisation 
in which man's belief in God could survive and spoke of the need for all men 
who professed belief in God to unite: 
It is not just this church or that church which is in danger. It is 
not just this creed or that which is threatened. All churches, all creeds, 
are menaced. The very future of the Word of God - the teaching that has 
come down to us from the days of the prophets and the life of Jesus - is 
at stake. 
For some time I have been trying to bring a number of the great 
religious leaders of the world together in a common affirmation of faith. 
And that common affirmation, as I said a while ago, is in the 20th chapter 
of Exodus, and in the 5th, 6th, and 7th chapters of the Gospel according 
to Matthew - the Sermon on the Mount. And I have been trying to make a 
common supplication to the one God that all creeds and all religions 
profess. I have asked them to join in one common act that will affirm 
these religious and moral principles on which we all agree. 
Such an affirmation would testify to the strength of our common 
faith and our confidence in its ultimate victory over the forces of Satan 
that oppose it. 
I am sorry to say that it has not yet been possible to bring the 
religious faiths together for this purpose of bearing witness in one 
united affirmation that God is the way of truth and peace. Even the 
Christian churches have not yet found themselves able to join together in 
a common statement of their faith that Christ is their Master and 
Redeemer and the source of their strength against the hosts of irreligion 
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and danger in the world, and that will be the cause of world catastrophe. 
They haven't been able to agree on as simple a statement as that. I have 
been working at it for years. (170) 
Truman indicated the necessity of persevering with the effort to bring the 
Churches together in greater unity in a crusade for peace, concluding with the 
plea that God might "unite the churches and the free world, to bring us peace in 
our time. " (171) 
Responding to this attack by the President of the United States on the 
Christian Churches, Visser 't Hooft, secretary of the VCC, wrote to Fisher: 
It may be that President Truman's statement is a good occasion to make 
clear that the Church cannot possibly identify themselves to such an 
extent with any particular national or international policy or ideology 
that they loose their birthright and give up their independence and their 
right to speak their own word in obedience to their Lord. "(172) 
't Hooft attacked the veracity of Truman's speech, declaring that Taylor's 
mission had been for "a fighting statement against Communism", not what 
Truman claimed, a declaration on religious and moral principles on which all 
agree. (173) 
Although he was one of the Presidents of the WCC, Fisher had not consulted 
't Hooft about the recent meetings between himself and the other Bishops with 
Taylor at Truman's behest. Truman's statement and 't Hooft's response forced 
Fisher to admit to knowing "what provoked Truman to make this very silly 
statement, and I should perhaps before now have told you about it. " Fisher then 
related the whole affair, concluding, "No doubt Taylor communicated with Truman 
who then fulminated. "(1? 4) Fisher was clearly concerned not to offend Truman 
further and make matters worse. He told 't Hooft that he prefered that the WCC 
made no reply to Truman's statement, "I sincerely hope that we shall take no 
notice whatsoever of Truman's statement, and not attempt to answer it as a 
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World Council", although he conceded the necessity for indirect replies, from 
time to time, as made by the American Bishop Dun, who put the Church viewpoint 
on political affairs and received coverage from the New York Times. (180) 
Fisher agreed with 't Hooft that it was not for political leaders to try to 
mobilise the Churches. He considered that while secular powers were perfectly 
right in wanting to strengthen in every kind of way the political resistance to 
Communism and the Church encouraged them, still the Church was not part of the 
political armoury of the secular states and must go its own way about things. 
Fisher observed that politicians must talk in terms of strength to resist 
aggression, political manoeuvering and so on: "The Church, even though it has to 
admit the necessity of such things and to approve much of them, must yet 
always remain in some sense above this conflict, free to criticise secular 
governments of the Vest when they act unrighteously or unwisely, amd free all 
the time to say to Communism that the Church's voice to them is one of peace 
seeking and peace making as the Church's primary concern, calling them to seek 
the same spirit. M(176) 
Informed of the proceedings, 't Hooft responded that he was pleased with 
the stand taken by the Archbishop and the other participants in resisting 
Truman's design: 
We are already being told from behind the Iron Curtain that there is no 
difference between our voice and the voice of Wall St and there are many 
in Continental and Western Europe, particularly in France and Germany, who 
are all too ready to believe that sort of propaganda. So it was in one 
way a very useful thing that we could make it clear that we are not going 
to let ourselves be used for political purposes. In this way President 
Truman may have rendered us a real service. "(177) 
It Hooft told Fisher that he intended to exploit the situation to the full with 
a series of articles clarifying the position of the Church. 
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In theory the position of the Church was exactly that claimed by 't Hooft 
and Fisher. In practice the "encouragement" given State resistance to 
Communism by the Church was its full support; and Church approval of the 
necessary means was invariably interpreted as a Christian endorsement. While 
Fisher was ready to insist that the Church must be free to criticise Western 
Governments, he was not as prepared to exercise that freedom as he was to 
defend it. On Fisher's own admission, throughout the first decade of the Cold 
War he and the Church which he led supported British policy every step of the 
way. In December 1955, speaking at the Royal United Service Institution on "The 
Church's Answer to Communism", Fisher stated: 
We believe that Communism has to be resisted by every appropriate means. 
The Church recognises that our statesmen and country must, under God, take 
every possible political step to deliver us from the threat of Communism. 
The Church is not itself concerned to do more than observe what 
politicians do, and judge it with such powers and judgement that they 
have... I think it is true to say that the Church over the last ten years, 
since the war, has approved all the steps that our Governments have taken, 
both to preserve peace to the utmost, and yet not give an inch to the 
illegitimate demands of Communist States... (178) 
Those within the Church that did exercise the right to disagree with 
British policy or criticise it, as in the cases of Hewlett Johnson and Stanley 
Evans, discovered there were consequences, that the Church's toleration was as 
theoretical as Fisher's statement to 't Hooft that the voice of the Church to 
Communism must be one of peace seeking and peace making. The voice of the 
Western Church to Communism was not one of reconciliation and peace, it was one 
of hostility and threats, and it echoed those of the Western States. 
The resistance to Truman's design had much to do, as he had stated, with 
internal conflicts among the different religions, and much to do with the fact 
that the political motives which inspired Truman were so blatant that to have 
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acquiesced in such a conference would have indelibly undermined the credibility 
of the Churches as having any independence at all. Much more subtle and 
effective was the British method of encouraging the Church to promote anti- 
Communism by its own methods, with unobtrusive Government guidance which gave 
an appearance of independent action on the part of the Church authorities. This 
provided the anti-Communist cause with moral sanction apparently undefiled by 
political intervention. 
pZ 
NnTF. S: ChAn+ r7 
1. Visser ''t Hooft, "Notes on the World Council of Churches as Between East and 
Vest: Confidential, Not to be quoted, March 1949; Fisher Papers, Vol 66: 200n. 
Owing to his position as General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, It 
Hooft was an influential figure in the Christian world, and during the war, as 
General Secretary of the WCC in Formation, It Hooft was party to the Christian 
Peace Aims Group discussions. At one such meeting, attended by the Bishop of 
Chichester and other Church dignitaries, where the Jewish question was raised, 
It Hooft observed that he favoured letting the Jews into Palestine under US and 
British supervision, otherwise he foresaw a real problem with stateless Jews. 
He commented: 
Our failure has been at this point. We say, let the Jews behave 
better. God has had his experience with those Jews a long time ago. They 
were behaving like that then. Do we say as Christians that our principles 
hold only for pleasant people, or also for unpleasant people? I do not see 
the slightest hope for any real change of attitude to the Jews on the 
purely 'natural' level. The natural man is anti-Semitic. 
Peace Aims Group discussions, 1944; Bell Papers. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Mary Bailey, "Confidential Memorandum", n. d., but accompanied by Grueber 
Report, "Sachsenhausen 1940-1949". 
: ý3 
5. Ibid 
6. Karl Barth, lecture, April 17,1949, reported in the Dutch Communist 
newspaper pie Wahreit, and quoted in Religion and the People. 
7. Rev RD Say to Waddams, January 20,1949; Fisher Papers Vol 106: 344. 
8. Ibid, "Western Europe and the Churches: Summary", June 20,1949; Vol 106: 
345. 
9. Ibid, Fisher to Garbett, July 27,1949; Vol 53. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Harvey to Osborne, February 26,1947; FO 371 67917. 
12. Perowne to Foreign Office, April 13,1948; FO 371 73428. 
13. New York Times, February 8,1948, p 32: 1. 
14. Ibid, April 9,1948, p 12: 2. 
15. British Legation to the Holy See to the Foreign Office, January 24,1949; 
minuted on the report was the hope that the Legation would not be passing the 
"comments" on to the Holy See, implying that some were possibly irreverent, and 
ýr" 
that British sympathy was not always with the Church but, as in the Mindszenty 
case, could reside with the Communist authorities. FO 371 79902. 
16. Victor Matter to Sir Orme Sargent, January 11,1949; FO 800 518. 
17. Ibid, although not widely known at the time, the deliberate efforts of the 
Americans to insure a Communist defeat in the Italian elections, which included 
finance to the Vatican which was pursuing the same end, is now part of the 
historical record. See Paul Blanshard, Communism. Democracy and Catholic Power, 
1952, p 272. The connection between financial aid to Italy and the Vatican in 
joint opposition to the Popular Front did not, however, pass without comment. 
In March 1948, Religion and the People observed how U. N. R. R. A. butter and flour 
had been distributed with the label attached: "Dona del Papa (Gift of the Pope)" 
Following the defeat of the Left in the Italian elections, the New Statesman 
commented: 
Invited by Togliatti and Nenni to dispense with material aid from the 
West and spiritual salvation from the Church - to forgo the good offices 
of both Mr Hoffman and St Peter - they have firmly declined to do without 
the $700 million proffered under ERP, and have shown an unmistakable 
reluctance to risk hell-fire by voting for the Popular Front. 
New Statesman, April 24,1948, p 1. Mr Hoffman was the Administrator of ERP. 
18. "A Diplomatic Pope Becomes a Fighting Pope", Mew York Times Magazine, 
February 20,1949, Section 6, p 7. 
19. Perowne to Bevin, February 24,1949; FO 371 79883. 
-465- 
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid, Perowne to Bevin, May 19,1949. 
23. Ibid. 
24. New York Times, July 31,1949. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Sir V Mallet to Foreign Office, July 19,1949; to the list of names the 
Foreign office added, "? Hitler", indicating that resentment of the Pope's war- 
time neutrality and his refusal to condemn Hitler still persisted; FO 371 79883. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid, Perowne to Foreign Office, July 20,1949. 
29. Ibid, Minute, John Russell, July 26,1949. 
30. Ibid, Minute. CAE Shuckbrough, July 27,1949. 
31. Ibid, Minute, C Mayhew, August 2,1949. 
AP 
32. "Vatican and Kremlin: Survey of Effects of Papal Decree", New York Times, 
August 7,1949. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid, Sir V Mallet to Mr Attlee, "Effect in Italy of Vatican's Anti-Communist 
Decree", August 8,1949. 
35. New York Times, August 7,1949, p 5: 2. 
36. New Statesman, August 1,1949, p 1. 
37. Mallet to Attlee, August 8,1949; FO 371 79883. 
38. "Russian Prelate Denounces Pope", New York Times, August 27,1949, p 14: 4. 
39. "Archbishop's Address to Diocesan Conference", Fisher Papers, Vol 53: 282. 
40. "Annual Review of 1949" by Somer-Cocks, First Secretary to the British 
Legation to the Holy See to the Foreign Office; FO 371 89815. 
41. Perowne to Sir I Kirkpatrick, March 23,1949; a minute on the report 
observed, "To my mind the broadcast reads rather patronisingly - somewhat on 
the lines of the late Lord Beauchamp's reference to the people of New South 
"67 
Wales as 'worthy individuals who had wiped out the shame of their origins' or 
words to that effect. " FO 371 79887. 
Commenting on the Vatican's acceptance of alliances with Socialists in 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands in order to defeat Communist power more 
effectively, Paul Blanshard observed in 1952: 
To justify this cooperation the Vatican has evolved a formula which 
divides socialism into two varieties, the materialist kind and the humane 
or Christian variety. Marx and his materialist philosophy are still 
anathema, but all other brands are acceptable if not commendable, 
especially if they acknowledge the vague and sentimental contributions of 
Leo XIII 'and Pius XI to the literature of reform. 
Communism. Democracy and Catholic Power, p 276. 
On August 1,1949, the New York Times reported that the Catholic bishops 
of West Germany had endorsed the "Christian doctrine of socialism, as the Popes 
have demanded for so long. " Nonetheless, Pius XI in his encyclical 
Reconstructing the Social Order, after praising the moderate tendencies of some 
Socialists, still concluded: 
We pronounce as follows: whether Socialism be considered as a doctrine, 
or as a historical fact, or as a movement, if it really remain Socialism, 
it cannot be brought into harmony with the dogmas of the Catholic Church, 
even after it has yielded to truth and justice in the points We have 
mentioned; the reason being that it conceives human society in a way 
utterly alien to Christian truth. 
Five Great Encyclicals, p 157. 
42. Foreign Office Research Department Review, December 5,1949; FO 371 79904. 
In November 1950, Mr Gregory Macdonald, head of the Polish-Czech-Hungarian 
Section of the European Service of the BBC called at the British Legation to the 
Holy See. He explained that one of his main jobs was to try to prevent 
Communism capturing the minds of the three countries with which he dealt, and 
: kei 
that part of that job was to try and maintain the resistance of the Catholic 
Church and the faithful. To this end he was supplied with a steady stream of 
information by the Foreign Office, including copies of despatches from H. M. 
Representatives in the countries concerned, and would like copies of material 
from the Legation. The Legation responded that they were willing to help in 
any way they could, requesting an exact statement of needs from the BBC to be 
sent via the Foreign Office's anti-Communist Information Research Department, 
after consultation with the Vatican, if necessary. British Legation to the Holy 
See to the Information Research Department, November 30,1950; FO 953 704. 
43. "Terms of Reference for 'Cold War' Sub-Committee", Russia Committee, Annex A, 
Top Secret, November 24,1948; FO 371 71687. 
44. British Legation to the Holy See to Western Department, June 29,1949; FO 
371 79881. 
45. At the end of the war, in 1945, the amount of correspondence between the 
British Legation to the Holy See and the Foreign Office was negligible; but from 
1945 an there was a noteable increase, reaching a peak in 1949 when an 
extraordinary number of documents were retained by the Foreign Office from 
general release to the Public Record Office. See Public Record Office indices 
for the Foreign Office, FO 371, Western Department, "Vatican". 
46. In Communism. Democracy and Catholic Power, 1952, Paul Blanshard argued: 
Already our reputation in Europe is shockingly reactionary. We are known 
as an enemy of Socialism, and for the European masses Socialism is almost 
_! 
/'; ý'} 
synominous with social welfare. Whether we like it or not, we should be 
honest enough to admit what every trained observer of European politics 
knows - that free enterprise has already been partially dethroned in 
Europe and that Communism cannot be defeated on that Continent without 
the aid of the middle-of-the-road Socialist movement. An American policy 
which ties us to a reactionary clerical bloc and to anti-Socialism is 
destined to defeat no matter how many billions in American relief go with 
it. (p 297). 
Blanshard quoted former Assistant Secretary of State, Adolfe Berle, who 
had pointed out: "Principles aside, the pragmatic results (in the European war 
against Communism) suggest indeed that the chief political instrument against 
Stalinist Communism is precisely support of the Socialist groups. " Truman, 
however, also sought an alliance against Communism with the Vatican. In this 
he was followed by the British Foreign Office, as shown by both the documentary 
evidence and the number of retained documents. 
In 1948 and 1949, Social Democracy and Christianity, together, were 
claimed by British propaganda to be the solution to Communist domination. By 
1950 the emphasis was almost wholly on Christianity. Even before the British 
Labour Government had lost power to the Tories in 1951, the emphasis which 
Bevin had placed on the role of Social Democracy in British foreign policy was 
noteably diminished, if not completely absent. 
Political circles in both America and Britain perceived themselves as 
being at war with Communism and the Soviet Union. Foreign Office 
correspondence made numerous references to the "undeclared war". In a top 
secret report on "British Overseas Obligations, " dated April 27,1950, this 
precise term was used twice. Firstly, in noting that: "Owing mainly to the 
state of undeclared war with the U. S. S. R. the United Kingdom is obliged to 
support larger forces, which must be equipped with far more costly armaments. " 
- 470 - 
Secondly, in recording the feeling of some parties that "the United Kingdom 
cannot, in its present economic position, support the status of a World Power, 
with obligations not only to hold many exposed positions of the present state 
of undeclared war but also to make heavy unrequited payments in order to 
sustain its political influence. " Also of significance was the meaning given 
the term "West" in this report: 
Where reference is made in this paper to "the West" or "the Western 
world", these phrases are intended to mean those countries which are 
associated with the United Kingdom and the United States of America in the 
world-wide struggle against Stalinist communism. 
"British Overseas Obligations", April 27,1950; PREX 8 1200. 
Political warfare between East and West had, of course, been in existence 
since 1917, but in the Cold War it dominated policy making and created a need 
for a Western ideology as a counter to Communism. In September 1948, N Birley, 
Educational Adviser to the Military Governor in the British zone of Germany, 
urged the necessity of political training on RITA Hankey in the Foreign Office: 
POLITICAL WARFARE. Each recruit would have to be trained to understand 
the nature of the political struggle with Russia and Commumnism. This 
would naturally involve a study of Marxism and modern Communism. But 
that would not be enough. When the Russians set up schools for political 
warfare, they do not teach the students about what they will fight against, 
but what they will fight for. We should do the same. There are obvious 
difficulties in this. Western Democracy, of its essence, has no political 
Bible and no one "Credo". But it has a positive answer to Communism and 
this can be expounded. The greatest danger is to think that this can be 
found in the works of nineteenth century Liberal thinkers. It is 
essential, also, that Eastern and Slavonic answers to Communism should be 
studied. 
The Foreign Office had plans for creating a corps of experts in this 
field, making use of the School of Slavonic Studies, where a great deal of 
controversy was created during this period over the dismissal of the Communist 
lecturer Andrew Rothstein. Birley thought the plan of insufficient scope. 
- 471 - 
(Birley to Foreign Office, September 29,1948; FO 371 71631. ) In a subsequent 
letter to RMA Hankey, Birley acknowledged the importance of an "Education 
Branch", but still thought it insufficient as people had no idea what they were 
faced with. (Birley to Hankey, November 23,1948; FO 371 71632A) 
47. Mayhew to Bevin, February 27,1949; FO 800 495/77146. Benin replied February 
28,1949, telling Mayhew not to make any further comment. After consultation 
with the Foreign Office News Department there were two vigorous defences of 
Mayhew's comments in the News Chronicle, "Odd Business" on March 3,1949, and a 
further article by Vernon Bartlett. 
By the end of 1949 Benin was expressing concern to the British Ambassador 
in Washington about recent manifestations of American policy towards Western 
Europe as the American Economic Cooperation Administration sought to impose 
courses of action upon O. E. E. C. countries by assertion rather than argument, a 
fact remarked upon by independent observers such as the Canadians: "There is 
growing talk everywhere that the United States policy is one of 
'satellisation'... This is the sort of thing which, if it got out, would be a gift 
to Soviet propaganda. " FO 800 516/85031 
48. Minute, Murray, April 11,1950; FO 953 627. 
49. CFA Warner to Sir D Kelly, Moscow, April 27,1950; FO 953 627. 
50. Ibid, Minute, Murray, April 11,1950. 
- 472 -; 
51. Ibid, CFA Varner to Sir D Kelly, April 27,1950. 
52. Foreign Office to Colonel AH Read, GPO, July 18,1950; HO 256 337. 
53. "James Dobson's Political Commentary", No 17, by JM Mackintosh (S); first 
broadcsat January 9,1950, Albanian and Bulgarian Programmes; FO 953 701. 
54. Ibid. 
55. LQ, Information Officer, British Embassy, Belgrade to Information Policy 
Department, Foreign Office, March 22,1950; FO 953 701. 
56. Press Department, British Embassy, Noscow, to Information Policy Department, 
Foreign Office, February 14,1950; FO 953 701. 
57. JA Dobbs, Information Officer, British Embassy, Moscow, to B Ruthven-Murray, 
Information Policy Department, February 14,1950; FO 953 701/P1022/3. 
58. Ibid, Sir D Kelly to Foreign office, May 1950. 
59. Ibid, BBC to Foreign Office, June 27,1950. 
60. Ibid, Moscow Chancery to Information Policy Department, February 24,1950. 
In other words, Moscow preferred offensive propaganda, the Communist threat to 
- 473 - 
Christian civilisation, rather than defensive propaganda which concentrated on 
projecting a positive image of the British way of life. 
61. Ibid, British Legation, Bucharest to Southern Department, May 25,1950; 
states: "We are also anxious that the BBC should as far as possible debunk the 
'peace' campaign. " A suggestion was made that "coordination in the field between 
the BBC and the Voice of America may be one of the subjects that might suitably 
be considered by the new Anglo-American Information Committee. " 
62. The sensitivity of the Church of England to charges of State control was, 
significantly, shared by the Foreign Office, as was illustrated by the response 
of the British Legation to the Holy See to an Italian article which made such 
charges. On July 23,1948 a Roman Catholic publication, Nuovo Cittadin, 
published an article about the Church of England by a priest named xietta, who 
lived in Switzerland and was apparently an authority on Nazism. In two places 
the article stated or implied that the Church of England was subject to control 
or was supported by the British Government. Victor Perowne responded, by 
sending a letter of protest claiming that the author was seriously misinformed 
and gave a very wrong impression of the Church of England. Perowne pointed 
out that the Church was not financed by the Government and while certain 
appointments were in the hands of the King, "the Church deals with its own 
problems without any kind of interference from the Government. " Perowne made 
it quite clear that he wanted his criticism of the article printed, stating, "I 
an sure that in the interests of accuracy and mutual understanding you will 
readily aquiesce in my requests that you should publish this letter of 
- 474,7 
correction. " Perowne even brought the matter up with the Vatican, speaking to 
Montini about it, as he subsequently informed Vaddams of CFR when he sent him 
a copy of the "letter of correction". 
63. In conversation with Purcell, Fisher stated: 
I grew up with an inbred opposition to anything that came from Rome -I 
objected to their doctrine; I objected to their methods of reasoning; I 
objected to their methods of operation in this country. So I grew up, and 
I saw no reason for differing from that opinion as the years went by. p 
271. 
Fisher did modify his views in later life after a meeting with Pope John XXIII, 
whose personality impressed him greatly; p 273. 
64. Bevin to Attlee, October 27,1950; discussed at meeting of Ministers October 
30,1950 at 10 Downing Street with Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations and Attorney General in attendance; CAB 130 171/73034. 
65. Foreign Office to Fisher, October 1949; Fisher papers, Vol 56. 
66. Ibid, Fisher to Johnson, October 1949. 
67. Ibid, Johnson to Fisher, October 1949. 
68. Perowne to Waddams, November 1.1949; CFR Papers. 
69. Perowne to Waddams, November 4,1949. As an excuse to publish the material 
provided by the Legation, 11 Popolo began its article "with a somewhat 
- 475 - 
mendacious little preamble saying that it was doing so in view of unfounded 
rumours that the Archbishop of Canterbury was himself in Rome. " Perowne to 
Vaddams, November 29,1949; the enclosed despatch was from Ward to Attlee: 
I cannot deplore too strongly the presence of the Dean of Canterbury at 
the "Peace Congress". As will be seen from the enclosed report, he was on 
two occasions mistaken for the Archbishop of Canterbury, and we were able 
to publish the text of a statement by the Archbishop setting forth his 
views on the Dean's wanderings, which was sent by the Reverend Waddams, 
the Secretary of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, to 
His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See. Nevertheless, while Anglicans can 
appreciate the arguments used by the Archbishop of Canterbury, it was 
almost impossible to persuade Roman Catholic Italians, accustomed as they 
are to the strong discipline of the Holy See, that a mere Dean could travel 
abroad without his Archbishop's permission. His presence contributes to 
the wavering of many sentimental Christians and must have a deleterious 
effect. Mercifully the Italian press of all complexions concentrated more 
on his picturesque exterior than on the pernicious opinions he expressed. 
70. On April 22,1949, Perowne's despatch from the Holy See to Bevin noted that 
Roman Catholic clergy who supported the peace movement were punished by the 
Church for "their errors and misdeeds". Perowne to Bevin, April 22,1949; FO 
371 79883 Z3277. 
71. "Week of Study of the Philosophy of Communism", April 19 - 26,1949, a 
conference organised in Rome under the auspices of the Pontifical Academy of St 
Thomas Aquinas and of the Catholic religion, speakers included ecclesiastics, 
professors and politicians. Foreign Office Minute: "This is, in a small way, an 
answer to the various Communist 'intellectual' conferences. But worldly goods 
overshadow reason in the working man's life. " MB Jacomb, May 3,1949. IRD 
requested the texts be sent to them when they arrived from Perowne in Rome. 
Perowne noted in his despatch to Bevin, April 27,1949: 
- 476 - 
The Week had joined with the Popes in demanding an improvement of the 
condition of the workers, and if Communism adopted Christian ideals of 
liberty, justice, peace, unity and humanity, that was no reason for the 
participants in the Week to abandon them. The speakers during the Week 
had, however, gone fully into the principles of the philosophy of 
Communism, and had demonstrated that these could not stand up to a 
dispassionate examination by the light of reason... (Communism) denied 
the two truths which enabled the world to be explained and the conduct of 
man to be directed - namely, the existence of God and the immortality of 
the soul. To limit man to life on this earth, if it could be proved, would 
be the gravest mutilation possible, but since this could not be done, 
because man is as God made him, to preach such a limitation was the most 
dangerous of-deceits. FO 371 79883. 
72. Ibid. 
73. See below. 
74. "Report on a Visit to Rome", Reverend Dr GFL Prestige, the Church of England 
Council on Foreign Relations, CFR 484; FO 371 89232/31449. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Fisher watched the Times carefully, suspicious of its Catholic management, 
and continually sought evidence of its Catholic bias. On February 28,1949 the 
Bishop of Dover sent the Archbishop some notes, "You asked me some time ago to 
get you any evidence I could about the Roman Catholic influence on the fig. " 
He had obtained the notes from a member of the staff who wished not to be 
implicated but whose name the Bishop could disclose to the Archbishop. The 
notes dealt with the Editor, the Assistant Editor and the new manager, giving 
background details and Roman Catholic influence. The notes claimed that both 
- 477 - 
the Editor and the manager were Irish Roman Catholics, that Fleet Street was 
full of. Irish - formerly wise sons of the "English Garrison" in Ireland. It was 
also stated that several of the lead writers were Irish and one a very ardent 
Roman Catholic. Fisher subsequently complained to Campbell Stuart who replied 
that the Assistant Editor, Mr Tyrerman, was not a Catholic, and'while the Editor 
was, he was a non-practicing one and perfectly ready to avoid any bias. Fisher 
remained suspicious and was upset when Roman Catholic ecclesiastical news was 
put before that of the Church of England. Fisher informed some directors 
plainly that many people felt that the Roman Catholics had captured the Times 
and they had better watch what was happening carefully. 
An article in the Times, "Catholicism Today: Relations between Rome and 
the Christian World", on October 31,1949, gave further confirmation to Fisher's 
suspicions, as well as generating a great deal of controversy in the 
correspondence columns from November 2 till December 5,1949. The controversy 
spread into other publications: "Catholicism Today: Is Britain Isolated? ", 
Catholic Herald, December 2,1949; "Half a Century" by Ngr RA Knox, Tablet, 
November 19,1949, p 331; as well as a further leader in the Time, "Rome and 
Europe", November 29,1949. Fisher asked the Bishop of Winchester to make a 
reply; the Bishop of London preached on the matter in the Minster, but felt it 
unsuitable for a Bishop to reply by writing, thus the Church Union were 
arranging a correspondent; the Bishop of Lichfield on the other hand was 
"almost hysterical in his indignation", according to Garbett, about the Anglican 
failure to respond and wanted all the Church's historians and scholars turned 
on to counter-argue. 
- 478 - 
Fisher detailed his responses to the affair in a memorandum. He began by 
making a complaint to Sir Cambell Stuart who came to see him agreeing with all 
his strictures "and very distressed about the situation. " He advised him to see 
Astor: "Cambell Stuart's own position is delicate and we agreed that the fact 
that I had been in touch with him should remain entirely secret. " Astor came 
in immediate response to a telephone message and Fisher told him that many 
people were disturbed about the Roman element in the Times office and regarded 
the leader in question as a sign of their influence. Fisher considered that 
Astor was shaken about the leader, although, "he himself is quite aware of the 
infiltration methods of the Romans, and their readiness to exploit any position 
to their own advantage... " (Memorandum, "Catholicism Today", Fisher, December 8, 
1949) Fisher's final assessment of the controversy was that: "The 
correspondence in the Times will have done good if it has made Anglicans aware 
that Roman Catholicism is making a renewed effort to capture the Church of 
England from within. * Fisher Papers, Vol 63,121 - 137; and Vol 75,174 - 178. 
77. Ibid, Prestige Report, p 3. 
78. Ibid. 
79. Bevin's private papers, "Report on the Vatican preceding the visit of the 
Secretary of State", stated that Communist propaganda affirms that the Vatican 
is in the pay of Vail Street and a lackey of Anglo-American warmongers, and 
that the Vatican was sensitive to these affirmations. The report noted that 
while relations between the United States and the Vatican were probably not 
- 479 - 
very close, the Vatican was undoubtedly interested in the United States, both as 
a great opponent of Communism and a source of much money needed to meet 
"Church expenses". The United States, said the report, contained the largest 
single bloc of Catholics in any non-Catholic country, some 25 million in all. 
FO 800 578, "Vatican 1945-50". 
Bevin's visit to the Pope was stressed as being a "courtesy call", and 
Perowne reported to the Foreign Office that it was a success, with the Pope 
appearing more favourable to Bevin than to most guests. Bevin was not in the 
best of health and had stipulated his inability to walk more than 30 yards; so 
the Pope had allowed Bevin to use his own private lift. February 1,1950; FO 
371 79901. 
80. Taylor to Fisher, November 21,1949; Fisher Papers, Vol 78: 1. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid, Fisher to Garbett, November 22,1949; Vol 78: 3. 
83. Ibid. Truman was not noted for his piety, thus Fisher naturally suspected 
that Taylor was attributing a Christian inspiration to Truman which was more a 
product of Taylor's "wishful thinking" than of the President's real sentiments. 
On July 15,1950, Truman asked Taylor to resume his past efforts to form an 
alliance of religious leaders, despite Taylor's resignation as his personal 
representative to the Holy See and the controversy it had caused there, in a 
letter which stressed the President's desire for peace as being paramount. 
- 480 - 
Truman's tone and the substance of the letter resembled the rhetoric used in 
Truman's public speeches when he addressed the subject of America's moral 
duties to the rest of the world, and showed that Taylor's elevated language was 
derived directly from his Commander-in-Chief: 
Dear Mr Taylor: The heart of the world is set on peace. The soul of 
mankind yearns for peace in a world riven by anger, hatred, jealousy and 
ill-will. Peace, we know, would descend overnight but for the machinations 
of one wicked man who is spokesman for a cabal of evil associates. 
The victims of these doers of evil are found throughout the satellite 
states. They are whole populations held in slavery under totalitarian 
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the nomination, just prior to adjournment, the consensus being that the 
President did not expect an early appointment knowing there was no time for 
Senate to act. One theory, that Truman wanted to enable Congress to gauge the 
strength of public sentiment on the issue was indicated at a news conference 
where the President said the nomination would enable "everyone to get things 
off their chest". Another theory was that Truman was merely making a gesture, 
aware that many Congressmen would rather do nothing than take sides in a "hot" 
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religious controversy and anticipated that the Clarke appointment would be 
"sidetracked". Meanwhile the President would be on record as favouring a move 
much welcomed by Catholic voters, thus hoping to counter the influence of such 
Catholic Senators as Joseph R McCarthy and Pat McCarran with their charges of 
"softness" to Communism in the Administration. 
A further factor was that the appointment of a military man contravened a 
long standing Federal law forbidding those in the military to accept diplomatic 
posts, and it required action by both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives to exempt General Clarke from this statute, whereas in nornmal 
circumstances only a majority of the Senate was needed to confirm nominations. 
This added further fuel to the speculation that the appointment was nothing 
more than a gesture. 
The Vatican papers expressed genuine gratification at the appointment of 
an Ambassador and the British Legation to the Holy See reported that the 
Vatican were delighted with the appointment as it meant an Embassy and not a 
mere legation; they regarded the military status of the appointee initially as 
owing to American internal politics, stating that President Truman knew the 
Senate best. This gratified the British Legation which was pleased to see that 
the Vatican was not being stuffy over points of protocol. (British Legation to 
the Holy See to Morrison, October 25,1951; FO 371 96287) Press comment on the 
appointment of a general was not so generous, particularly the Communist, which 
saw a politico-military plot with the Vatican as a notorious spy centre. 
Moscow Radio stated that the new Ambassador would direct a psychological 
campaign for the preparation of a new war, already entrusted by the United 
States to its Vatican accomplice. The Osservatore Romano responded with 
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articles rebutting the Communist charges. <Ibid, British Legation to the Holy 
See to Morrison, October 26,1951) 
140. The issue was kept open for consideration in the State Department, although 
when asked about the return of an envoy to the Vatican at a press conference in 
October 1954 President Eisenhower said his views remained unchanged. During 
his 1952 campaign Eisenhower repeatedly emphasised that he did not favour an 
Ambassadorial appointment to the Vatican and before considering any such 
action, he would certainly seek the advice of the whole American people as 
demonstrated by their representatives in Congress. Mew York Times, October 29, 
1954; 13: 3. 
141. Somers-Cocks, British Legation to the Holy See to GP Young, Western 
Department, February 13,1951; FO 371 10214/96284. 
142. Ibid. A common practice among all the Churches, not just the Vatican, was 
the proclamation of their neutrality in political matters, although the reality 
of their allegiances was obvious in practice; particularly so in the case of 
America and the Vatican, and British officials were not immune to the sardonic 
comments of which Montini complained. A Foreign Office Minute of May 6,1947 
recorded concern among the Cardinals in Rome that the Pope might be replaced 
by a non-Italian were he to die and were "convinced that if this should happen 
the new non-Italian Pope would shortly become a tool in the hands of the 
Americans, that he would be used by the United States Government as a weapon in 
their anti-Communist campaign and that the Vatican would thus lose its age long 
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tradition of neutrality in political issues, etc, etc"; to which OG Bleght 
responded: 
It is new to me that the Vatican is at present neutral as between 
Communism and anti-Communism. Since the Vatican derives the far larger 
part of their income from the USA they had better bethink themselves of 
the text: "Where your treasure is there will your heart be also, " and 
accept it in their own case. FO 371 67921. 
143. Ibid, Somers-Cocks to Young, February 13,1951. 
144. On January 17,1950, the New York Times reported that it was understood 
that General Eisenhower would be received in a private audience by the Pope 
before his departure. Eisenhower was in Italy for discussions with the Italian 
Government. Following Taylor's resignation and Gowan's recall, the Pope refused 
to see him. On January 19,1950, the New York Times reported that Eisenhower 
and the Pope both wished to meet each other, however the view prevailed that 
it was preferable for the Pope, who has never ceased to plead for peace and who 
considers himself outside and above all 'earthly competitions', not to meet him. " 
145. Ibid, Somers-Cocks, February 13,1951. 
146. Ibid, Somers-Cocks to Young, June 29,1951; in the spring and early summer 
of 1951, at a time when anti-Americanism was rife in Europe, the President's 
daughter made a six week "good-will" tour of Europe, visiting England, France, 
Holland, Luxembourg and Italy. She had a twenty-minute private audience with 
Pius XII; she also lunched with British and Dutch royalty and described the 
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high point of her visit as lunch with Winston Churchill at Chartwell. Harry 
Truman, Margaret Truman, pp 522-3. 
147. Fisher to Garbett, June 25,1951; Fisher papers, Vol 90: 235. 
148. See above. 
149, Ibid, Sherrill to Fisher, June 13,1951; Vol 90: 228. 
150. Ibid. Taylor to Sherill, June 6,1951, informed Sherrill that the Pope was 
willing to evaluate the subject and give it serious study; Vol 90: 230 
151. Ibid, Sherrill to Fisher, June 13,1951. 
152. Ibid, Fisher to Taylor, June 24,1951; Vol 90: 233; the Bishop of 
Chichester, George Bell, was Chairman of the Church of England Committee on 
Foreign Relations and also of the Executive Committee of the World Council of 
Churches. 
153. Ibid, Fisher to Garbett, similar letter sent to Bell, June 25,1951; Vol 90: 
235. 
154. Ibid, Bell to Fisher, July 5,1951; Vol 90: 244. 
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155. Ibid, Fisher to Boegner, Fedration Protestante de France, July 6,1951; Vol 
90: 240-1. 
156. "False Imperialisms", the Primate's Address to Convocation, September 12, 
1950. Well before Sherill suggested his plan for casting blame on the Pope for 
the failure of Christian cooperation, Fisher had effectively been doing exactly 
that in his own addresses, as the British Government looked to him, as Truman 
did to Sherill, to cooperate wih the Vatican in opposition to Communism. 
Fisher's September address to Convocation attacked the Pope for his most recent 
Papal Encyclical Humani Generis, issued August 21,1950, and blamed him for 
preventing the creation of a common Christian front: 
It contains statements and arguments so far removed from the 
conception of Christian truth held outside the Roman Church that their 
publication and enforcement cannot but increase the isolation of that 
communion and must make any approach to understanding more difficult. 
Even so, we might hope that we might be able to stand together with them 
in the defence of freedom when they are suffering so much in that cause. 
But it is unfortunately the fact that here too the Roman Church takes its 
own line and does not stand as an ally towards other Christian Bodies in 
the cause of freedom. For there are parts of the world in which the Roman 
authorities permit without protest and even encourage the use of political 
compulsions in their own favour against Christian Bodies not of their 
obedience, and sometimes with the design of ending their existence. 
The times are inimical to freedom. All who value it on Christian 
grounds should stand together. The Vatican has several times recently 
called for a common front among Christians: it is tragic that the Roman 
Church at the same time says and does so much to make a common front 
impossible. 
Fisher also attached blame to the Pope in his private correspondence. On 
August 15,1950, an appeal was made to Fisher from Eleanor Adlard for all 
Christians to unite in a great crusade against Communism and asked if Fisher, 
standing as he did between the Roman Catholics and the Non-Conformists, could 
not launch it. ( Vol 70: 279) In his reply of August 21, Fisher distinguished 
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between spiritual and political action and asserted it was the former that was 
the constant work of the Churches to encourage. He then referred to the 
increasing fellowship of the Churches, adding, "It is nothing but a tragedy that 
the Church of Rome should choose this moment to take unilateral action in 
adding a doctrine which has no foundation in Scripture or the early Church its 
Creed. " (Fisher Papers; Vol 70: 280) 
From the Catholic viewpoint one of the most important developments of the 
Holy Year was the November 1,1950, solemn proclamation by Pius XII of the 
dogma of the Assumption of Our Lady to heaven. Claimed by Catholic writers as 
a tribute to the Mother of God and a spiritual contribution to the Pope's peace 
efforts, it was seen by Protestant leaders as yet a further obstacle to a 
common Christian front. This was regarded as unjustified by Catholics for whom 
the dogma of the Assumption was "merely a solemn confirmation of a traditional 
belief of the Church", in a matter in which there had always existed a basic 
difference between Catholics and Protestants. Stating that the Holy See "could 
not give up any principles of faith even for the purpose of strengthening the 
peace front against Communism", the Catholic historian Oscar Halecki observed: 
"Unfortunately, some prominent Protestant leaders interpreted the new doctrine 
in an entirely different way - as a decision which tended to increase the 
division among Christians at a time when it was necessary to create a common 
front against the Communist danger and in defence of freedom. " Oscar Halecki, 
Pius XII, 1954, pp 310-11. 
157. Ibid, Fisher to Boegner. 
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worst evil, and in fact they ought to guard against any such misinterpretation. " 
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The outbreak of the Korean War exacerbated Cold War tension and sharpened 
the ideological conflict. This meant further deterioration in the relations 
between the Churches of East and Vest. What was essentially a civil war was 
presented by Western leaders as part of the East-West struggle, with American 
action hailed as the defence of the free world against unprovoked Communist 
aggression. This perspective was upheld by Western Church leaders. The 
Archbishop of York claimed, "Much more than the freedom of South Korea is at 
stake, for the defeat of the democracies would give an immense stimulus to 
aggression elsewhere, and would encourage a triumphant and Militant Communism 
to launch a supreme attack on Western Civilisation. " (1) 
Communist leaders blamed America and the Russian Orthodox Church 
condemned American aggression, as the Western Churches condemned Communist 
aggression, and made an appeal to the United Nations Security Council for an 
immediate peaceful settlement. (2) This elicited an unsympathetic response from 
Lambeth, whose attitude was indicated by a CFR memorandum on'the "Russian 
Orthodox and Peace": 
The Patriarch Alexeii of Moscow has now wholeheartedly and formally 
associated himself and his Church with the Communist inspired World Peace 
Movement and the activities of the so-called World Peace Council. An 
official statement of his appeared in the Tass News Agency "on behalf of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. " 
The Patriarch's expressions of his desire for peace are of course 
entirely blameless and thoroughly desirable in any Christian, but he seems 
unable to distinguish between the Christian desire for peace which all 
genuine Christians have, and identification with a particular peace 
movement which has a particular political programme. 
The Russian Orthodox Church leaders are always complaining of the 
tendency of western Christians to get mixed up in political affairs, and 
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are always reiterating the claim that they have nothing to do with 
politics. Yet, not only does the Russian Patriarch identify himself with 
the political programme of the World Peace Council, but in his statement 
he claims as absolutely necessary "termination of the sanguinary American 
aggression in Korea. " 
The most charitable explanation of his attitude is that he is misled 
by Soviet propaganda in a judgement which he would not maintain if his 
ignorance were dispelled. (3) 
The Korean War stimulated support for peace in many quarters, particularly 
among clergymen who increasingly gave their support, to the Stockholms Peace 
Treaty, which called for the outlawing of atomic weapons. This trend was not 
welcomed by the Church of England whose two Archbishops issued statements 
condemning it and discouraging clergy from lending support. (4) Telling the 
clergy to refuse to promote the appeal and to advise their people not to sign 
it, Fisher stated: "The Church is foremost in its desire for peace; but it puts 
above peace the good ordering of the world on sure foundation of justice and 
truth. " (5) Garbett was equally critical and suggested it be sent not to the 
House of Commons but the Kremlin, "whose representatives have blocked, over a 
period of several years, all proposals for international control with an 
effective inspectorate. "(6) The previous March Russian Church leaders had 
issued statements supporting the Treaty; so its condemnation by the British 
Primates was yet another source of friction. 
The fact that Anglican/Orthodox ecclesiastic relations were subject to 
political fluctuations caused some concern at Lambeth. In November 1951, 
Vaddams presented a memorandum to Fisher in which he stated that he thought 
the time had come for the Archbishop to make another attempt to create better 
understanding between the Church of Russia and that of England. No positive 
proposals had been made since 1947/8 when the Russian Church was invited to 
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send representatives for consultation at the time of the Lambeth Conference and 
a suggestion was made for consultation on the subject of Anglican Ordinations. 
The first of these was declined and the second misinterpreted, so that nothing 
came of either proposal. Since that time Fisher had tried to explain his point 
of view about the Stockholm* Peace Appeal and the political perspective of the 
peace movement as viewed from the West, while constantly reaffirming his good 
will toward the Patriarch. Nonetheless, international events had indubitably 
created some tension, as Waddams conceded: 
In general I should say that during the last four years our relations 
have deteriorated somewhat, though not seriously. I believe the Patriarch 
of Moscow understands our Christian sentiments and good will, and 
probably appreciates our good care not to put him and his Church in a 
difficult position by making impossible requests and proposals. At least 
I hope so! 
Nevertheless the Peace Campaign has injected an additional cause of 
misunderstanding into a situation that was already difficult enough. The 
Russian Church has never been one of those most sympathetic to 
Anglicanism, though friendly. Its own history and the element of 
messianic selfsatisfaction in it together with distance and lack of 
contact have combined to erect a formidable barrier of ignorance and 
wrong ideas. 
Passivity is perhaps the best policy still from some points of view, 
but from others some iniative is highly desirable. It should not consist 
of anything startling, and the less publicity about it at first - the 
better. (7) 
Waddams memorandum gave official voice to existing concern within the 
Church of England about deteriorating relations and misunderstanding between it 
and its sister Churches in the Communist bloc. Although Waddams assumed that 
the Patriarch appreciated the sentiments of the Anglican Church, not everybody 
was so convinced. Sydney Linton, the chaplain of the English Church in Finland 
who travelled frequently to Moscow to minister to its English community, wrote 
to Vaddams on May 4,1951 saying that he doubted that the Patriarch had 
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appreciated the attempts of Fisher to convey his perspective of the peace 
movement: 
... church leaders in Russia are just as much in the dark about conditions 
outside Russia as the rank and file. Having nothing but the official 
propaganda to go on, they are probably genuinely unable to conceive what 
people are thinking abroad, or to understand how the Archbishop of 
Canterbury could write as he did. It was an excellent letter, but I do not 
think they could ever understand it, because we think a different language 
in a different enviroment. (8) 
Waddams' associate in CFR, Macartney, was concerned to promote relations 
between the two Churches. He wanted Fisher to respond to an article in the 
Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, in which comments were made on the 
Archbishop's reply to the appeal of the three Patriarchs, with their 
justification for identifying with the movement of the Partisans for Peace. (9) 
In his note to the Archbishop, Macartney suggested sending the Patriarch a 
sermon on peace which Macartney had prepared for him. He mentioned that he 
had discussed the scheme with Professor Zander of the Moscow Jurisdiction in 
Paris who had felt that it could do no harm, and stressed the point that "the 
Church in Russia must not be judged by the hierarchy, and when the Iron Curtain 
eventually drops, our relationships with the Russian Church will depend to a 
large extent on how consistently we have tried to keep in touch with her. "(10) 
The sermon was clearly written to persuade the Patriarch that Fisher was 
earnestly working for peace and that he took an objective stance on 
international events, because it contained a number of criticisms of the British 
Government, as well as of statesmen and politicians in general. Britain's 
colonial policy was criticised, and her exploitation of third world countries. 
Fisher's position on the Korean War coincided with that of the British 
Government, that it was a necessary stand against Communist aggression. 
0 
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Macartney's sermon written for the Archbishop included a remark about, "the war 
that is now raging in Korea where a backward nation is being sacrificed most 
cruelly to the political rivalries of the day. "(11) 
Nor did the Church escape censure: 
It is nor surprising that these evils are still so evident in our 
society when we consider how plain they are in our Church. The same evils 
are in fact there in our midst producing the same results - divisions, 
disunity and strife instead of the oneness of the true Body of Christ. 
Has the centuries old quarrel about the supremacy of the Church had effect 
on the strife we now see among nations to be "top nation"? Has the 
jealously guarded individuality of each Church not conduced to the 
emphasis on nationality? Has the stress on antiquity and prestige not fed 
the sense of racial superiority which bedevils the relations of East and 
West? Whether or not the Church is the Mother of such terrible offspring, 
she cannot deny that she shares their dreadful features. Shame be upon us 
in God's sight. (12) 
In his note to Fisher, Xacartney explained that the idea for the sermon as 
an answer to the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate article had not occurred 
until Vaddams had gone. Vaddam's absence certainly accounts both for its 
submission to Fisher and its content, as well as the suggestion that the 
Archbishop present it as his own views, which it was anything but, as he 
subsequently informed Macartney in no uncertain terms. (13) Querying point 
after point in Macartney's composition, Fisher told him that he did not want to 
make a statement or preach a sermon of that kind. Moreover, having read the 
article in question, he felt, "It is quite unseemly that I should reply to that 
article myself, or take any notice of it. "(14) Despite Fisher's dismissal of 
Macartney's effort, the episode was significant in demonstrating that, despite 
Fisher's reaction, there were churchmen in positions of influence, who were most 
certainly not left-wing, who were becoming increasingly critical of the Western 
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contribution to international tension and were deeply concerned about the 
consequent effects on ecclesiastical relations. 
The impact of the East-West struggle on Church relations was illustrated 
by developments in the VCC after Korea. Immediately after the WCC's Toronto 
Executive Resolution on July 13,1950, describing the United States-United 
Nations action as a "police measure which every member nation should support, " 
the Chinese President of the Council announced his dissent and invited others 
to join him. According to Religion and the People of February 1951: "The result 
was a breach largely'on racial lines within the Committee. Chinese Christians 
strongly backed the action of their President. "(15) Nor did the Resolution have 
a positive impact upon Asian Christians. The strain created by the Korean War 
was reflected in the Ecumenical Review which stated: "The declaration on Korea 
(in which the E. C. of the World Council supported the U. N. war) has not evoked 
such a favourable response even among the more thinking Christians of Asia. " 
In the same issue, another article pleaded, "The name of Jesus Christ must not 
come to Asia linked with the names of Bao Dai and Syngman Rhee. "(16) 
The next important statement by the WCC, made in early 1951, revealed a 
measure of compromise when it conceded that within the World Council 
constituency "there are many different opinions about rearmament, " and 
commented on the international crisis: 
The governments and many people of the Vest have come to fear that the 
more powerful of the Communist nations are ready to extend the area of 
Communist influence by means of force, and, as a result, they are rapidly 
rearming. In Eastern countries there is a growing fear that these 
developments might lead sooner or later to the outbreak of a preventitive 
war. Thus rearmament has become the main and general emphasis 
everywhere. Its declared purpose is peace, but it can in reality endanger 
both peace and security and social justice is seriously threatened.... We 
are convinced that it is the duty of all the churches to champion peace 
with justice. The churches which still have real opportunities to 
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influence government policies have a special duty... Every chance for 
negotiations must be used. (17) 
Vaddams' subsequent suggestion that the Church of England attempt to 
reach a better understanding with the Russian Church was less a CFR iniative as 
a reflection of a growing desire within the Christian community to reach a 
settlement with Russia and achieve a stable peace. At its 1951 General 
Assembly, the Unitarian Church of Great Britain passed a resolution stating: 
This annual meeting of Ministers and delegates of the General 
Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches, in order to fulfil the 
hope cherished by the peoples of the world, whatever be their views of the 
causes that have brought about the danger of a world war, and in order to 
strengthen peace and safeguard international security, urges the conclusion 
of a pact of peace among the five Great Powers, the United States of 
America, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain and 
France. (18) 
In April 1951, the International Department of the British Council of 
Churches proposed a resolution which included the need "to maintain and if 
possible strengthen available means of communication and intercourse with the 
leaders and members of the Churches in Eastern Europe and China. "(19) It 
further resolved "to support H. M. Government and the United Nations in 
persistent attempts, over a period of years if necessary, to negotiate with 
Soviet Russia and with the People's Republic of China a just and workable 
settlement of outstanding problems that threaten the peace of the world. " 
After a keen debate the BCC inserted into this resolution on the international 
situation, at the insistence of the Dean of Chichester and the Archbishop of 
York, a paragraph about supporting "H. M. Government and the United Nations in 
their efforts to uphold the law of nations. "(20) This did not, however, detract 
from what was a very significant indicator of Christian sentiment. 
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That same sentiment revealed itself in the Church of England in a debate 
in the autumn session of the Church Assembly on a motion proposed by the 
Bishop of Chichester which supported the resolution of the BCC: 
In view of the many areas of tension and danger in the world, and 
with a full realization of all the points contained in that programme, 
Christians and World Affairs, published by the BCC, the Assembly calls 
particular attention to the third and fourth points which emphasise the 
need to support H. M. Government and the U. M. both in their efforts to 
resist aggression and also in persistent attempts, over a period of years 
if necessary, to negotiate with Soviet Russia, and with the People's 
Republic of China, a just and workable settlement of outstanding problems 
that threaten the peace of the world. "(21) 
This plea for negotiation was vehemently opposed by the Provost of 
Portsmouth, the Rev N Porter-Goff, who asked why should the Assembly urge 
negotiations with Soviet Russia or China? This was the kind of matter he 
thought that should be left to the Government. The Provost, who was at one 
time Secretary of the Churches' Commission of the League of Nations Union, was 
strongly supported by the Dean of Chichester, at one time Chairman of the same 
Commission, who affirmed that the Church Assembly should not have a foreign 
policy. Nonetheless, an amendment to omit all reference to Russia and China 
was defeated and the motion was carried by 124 votes to 112. (22) Considering 
the very conservative composition of the Church Assembly, this was another 
significant indicator of growing concern within ecclesiastical organizations 
that the tension between East and West be in some way resolved. 
Symbolic of these ecclesiastical proceedings was a meeting between 
representatives of the WCC and the World Peace Council, which was reported in 
the Ecumenical Press Service on November 30,1951. The meeting took place on 
November 24, at the Hotel Continental in Paris where there was an exchange of 
information and a clarification of their respective positions. While nothing of 
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moment emerged from these conversations, that they took place at that point in 
time was itself of significance. 
On July 23,1951 a further peace appeal had emanated from the Eastern 
Christian Churches. Issued by the Heads of the Orthodox Churches of Antioch, 
Russia, Rumania, Georgia and Bulgaria and endorsed by the Albanian Orthodox 
Church, it blessed the demand, "of the peoples for the conclusion of a peace 
pact among the Great Powers, for we believe that such a pact is the wisest and 
best solution of the world crisis. "(23) This appeal gained in significance when 
a Quaker delegation returned from Moscow with a report that the Russian 
Patriarch was "obviously favourably inclined" to a proposal for talks between 
the Church leaders of East and West. (24) 
There is no doubt but that within the Church of England there was anxiety 
that the Russian Church be given an appreciation of its own solicitude for 
peace related matters, and that a clearer understanding of the Russian Church's 
position was sought. This concern was illustrated in a letter from Linton to 
Waddams, discussing a Russian article on the Church, The Captivity of a 
Russian Conscience": 
The middle part of the article contains what may be an attempt by 
the Orthodox Church to convey to us some explanation of their line of 
action. They write: "There are in the world many Christians who.... 
consider it their Christian duty to work with those who are striving for 
peace without knowing the Gospel, and who in that very striving reveal the 
beginning of faith in the 'one living truth', and in a better order of 
human life upon earth which may be a step on the way to the Kingdom of 
God". Do they mean by this: "We are fishers of men and are trying to 
manouevre a very big fish into waters where he might be hooked into the 
Kingdom of God"? They plead that ""Jerusalem" be not destroyed "before 
she can learn what it is that belongs to her peace and salvation". Do 
they mean "Give us time to save Mother Russia from within before you 
destroy her from without"? And are the two references to "heroic living" 
an inverted claim that they are doing their best in a very difficult 
situation? (25) 
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While there were genuine and valid ecclesiastical reasons for pursuing 
relations with the Russian Orthodox Church, there were political restraints 
which Waddams had to consider, as he conceded when noting that from some 
points of view "passivity is perhaps the best policy. "(26) 
The military stalemate in Korea meant an increasing emphasis on Cold War 
propaganda which inevitably meant increasing pressure on the Churches owing to 
the ideological conflict and the Western stress on the defence of Christian 
civilisation and ideals. A memorandum prepared by request for Sir Harold 
Parker by George Catlin in July 1952, stressed "that the extreme importance of 
the development of the democratic case and of propaganda is an issue which has 
to be faced. " Catlin's remarks were made following discussions with "Mrs FD 
Roosevelt, General Eisenhower, Mr John Foster Dulles, Senator William Benton 
(USA), Mr Eric Harrison, Mr Percy Spender (Australia), Sir Hartley Shawcross, Mr 
Henry Hopkinson, Mr John G Foster, Lord Vansittart, Sir Michael Wright and Sir 
Robert Fraser. " (27) 
Catlin posited that: 
Recent Soviet gains in prestige and power, although supported by the 
Red Army, have in fact been achieved neither by bombs nor armies, but 
chiefly by an exceedingly skilful propaganda perfected over many years and 
based on theories occasionally shown empirically to be right. (28) 
It was essential to counter these gains; Catlin pointed out that the perfection 
of propaganda was more than a technological matter of means in press and 
broadcasting, but required extensive and acute studies: 
Propaganda must be considered as no less than a very important 'fourth 
arm' of war; but yet constructive, bloodless, and relatively inexpensive. 
It is not to be compared with either (a) the passive and perhaps 
financially wasteful handing out of information or, still less (b) with a 
caricature of itself, the technologically good development of ill- 
considered or blundering propaganda which can have actually a harmful 
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effect. Expert consideration of policy must precede technological 
perfection. (29) 
Concluding, Catlin emphasised Eisenhower's comment, as President of 
Columbia University, that a great deal of available expertise was not yet 
harnassed to the work of national and collective security; and he recalled 
Eisenhower's words of January 22,1952: "It does appear that there is room for 
action in the great field of moral and intellectual leadership. " (30) Such views 
on the part of the world's political leaders inevitably had repercussions for 
those of the world's Churches. This meant that the political perspective on 
peace had an impact on the ecclesiastic. 
As far as the West was concerned, the Vatican counted greatly in the field 
of moral and intellectual leadership, and there was a good deal of concern in 
the Foreign Office that the Papal attitude toward peace had the potential to be 
construed in such a way as to seem to lend support to the aims of the peace 
movement. In June 1950, the Vatican organs of publicity had come out strongly 
against the Communist Peace Campaign, stating that the Communists did not want 
men labouring for peace, but automatons obedient to chiefs who would not 
hesitate to cause mass bloodshed. (31) However, the outbreak of the Korean War 
inspired especially pressing appeals for peace from the Pope because, as 
Roberts pointed out in his report to the Foreign Office, a war between East and 
Vest would be disastrous for the Vatican which wanted the Christian world 
united under the moral supremacy of the Pope. Roberts informed the Foreign 
Office that the Pope considered "that the West, unlike the East, lacks a 
coherent ideology round which to rally. "(32) 
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Following the Pope's 1950 Christmas speech, a Foreign Office minute noted: 
"Rather an anodyn speech which, no doubt, circumstances required it to be. "(33) 
Nonetheless, the Foreign Office was well aware of the dilemma in which the 
Korean War placed the Pope, recognising his peace appeals as necessary counters 
to those of the peace movement. In spite of this, there was still concern, 
voiced particularly in the British Embassy in Paris, that the Vatican was 
adopting a peace policy which adapted itself particularly well to Communist 
peace propaganda. (34) In his report from the Vatican on February 28,1951, 
Somers-Cocks quoted the Pope's speeches at length in order to show that he had 
not changed his position, including the statement that "The Christian will to 
peace meant strength not weakness. "(35) Commenting, on this despatch in the 
Foreign Office, MD Butler observed: 
Mr Somers-Cocks reports that the Holy See's policy towards Communism and 
Peace remains unchanged and much as it should be from our point of view. 
The Pope's recent emphasis on peace does not mean "Peace at any price", 
though some people have thought it does, but it is merely a necessary 
reaction to the "Peace Campaign"(36) 
Following the departure of Myron Taylor from the Vatican and the closure 
of his office, there had been something of a chill in U. S. -Vatican relations. 
However, in November 1951, Somers-Cocks reported to the Foreign Office that the 
prospect of the appointment of a United States Ambassador to the Vatican had 
led Tardini to make much more indulgent remarks than hitherto about that 
nation. Tardini was also exceptionally forthcoming about the true attitude of 
the Vatican, which in public remained steadfastly "neutralist" to the 
containment of the Soviet Union and the Peace Movement: 
Monsignor Tardini went on to say how fortunate it was that the 
United States had got the atom bomb first and had kept the lead in atomic 
research, for that alone had kept the Soviet Union at bay. I remarked 
that I was glad to hear this, in view of the rumours that the Vatican had 
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gone "neutralist". Nor was it so long ago that L'Osservatore Romano had 
thundered against the policy "Si vis pacem, para bellum", and had insisted 
that the only common sense policy was "Si vis pacem, para pacem". I 
realized that the Holy See must preach peace and nothing but peace, but I 
was glad that the necessity of negotiating from strength with the Soviet 
Union was appreciated in private by the Secretary of State. Monsignor 
Tardini replied that no effort must be spared, whether by the Holy See or 
anyone else, to achieve a detente, but the Soviet regime was just a lot of 
bandits and it must be kept at bay meanwhile. 
This, I think, is the conclusive answer to the suggestion.... that the 
Vatican is in favour of appeasing the Soviet Union at any price. I have 
felt all along that the Vatican were realists in private and that they 
must be aware how much they, and the whole civilized world, would stand to 
lose from any weakness towards the Soviet Union. (37) 
In his review of 1951, the British representative to the Vatican noted 
that there was a demand in the free world that the Pope should choose between 
the Communist states and those opposing them. On the other hand, the 
Communist World Council of Peace had invited the Pope to support its 
disarmament proposals. This led the Pope to restate the position of the Holy 
See as "neutralism. "(38) 
The Foreign Office preference, naturally, was that the Pope should speak 
out in support of the West, and in 1952, consideration was given to the means 
of developing closer relations with the Vatican, regarded as particularly 
important now that the United States was no longer in formal diplomatic 
relations with the Holy See. In the Foreign Office CG Thornton noted that HMG 
and the Vatican had much in common in their attitude toward the Communist 
menace. He thought that Britain should accept an Inter-Nuncio from the Vatican 
as, apart from gratifying British Roman Catholics, it might help to promote a 
closer understanding in the anti-Communist field between HMG and the Vatican 
if the latter's representative in London were permitted diplomatic rank. (39) 
BJA Cheetham observed that any action to be taken in that direction must 
- 515 - 
include consulting the United States, as the Foreign Office had no wish to 
embarass them by agreeing to a reciprocity with the Vatican such as they had 
rejected. (40) 
In May 1952, the Foreign Office approached the Home Office stating that 
they had been approached by Roman Catholics canvassing the question of the 
appointment of an Inter-Nuncio in London which would give the Vatican full 
diplomatic representation in Britain. The Foreign Office remarked that they did 
not consider there would be much opposition from the ultra-Protestants. (41) 
The Home Office, however, were opposed to such an appointment. (42) 
In August 1952, the Foreign Office took another tack, informing Roberts at 
the Holy See that they would like to see the English hierarchy represented in 
the Curia. It had been the opinion of the Foreign Office in the thirties that 
such could be advantageous. In November 1937, Sir 0 Sargent had instructed the 
Minister to continue to press directly for such. It was thought important from 
a political point of view. The views of a Foreign Office official of the time 
were repeated. He apparently took the view that it would be helpful to have an 
English Cardinal in the Curia to help in those delicate and mainly herarchical 
matters where the Legation would doubtless not wish to tread and where the 
rather isolated Hierarchy of Great Britain were powerless to act. (43) 
Roberts did not think that there need necessarily be a British Cardinal, 
but he certainly felt the need for a British element in the central 
administration of Rome, stating that the lack of such put him at a disadvantage 
as compared, for instance, with the French or Irish Ambassador. Moreover, "If a 
British senior ecclesiastic - not necessarily a Cardinal - were among the 
Pope's advisers here, there would be some chance at least that the statement or 
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declaration or whatever it might be would not be prepared without some 
appreciation of British foreign policy. "(44) When Roberts' despatch was 
received in the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick recommended steps to get a 
British element into the central Vatican administration and suggested Roberts' 
views be aired in the Catholic Union. Aware that a Foreign Office official 
could not approach the Catholic Union on a matter of this kind, Kirkpatrick 
suggested that Roberts' letter be shown to Sir George Rendel, the Vice-President 
of the Catholic Union. (45) 
In May 1953, Roberts talked to the Pope about closer relations between him 
and the British Secretary of State, stressing their particular importance at 
that juncture when the Holy See had no diplomatic contact with the USA and was 
also cut off from Soviet Russia and China. This meant that the Vatican was 
effectively only in touch with one Great Power. (46) In Roberts' opinion "the 
crying need of the Western world in its struggle against Communism is 
ideological cohesion. "(47) Roberts reasoned that a large part of the Western 
world paid allegiance to democracy, and a large part also paid spiritual 
allegiance to the Holy See; thus it was important that the two institutions 
could pull together effectively. However he recognised that the extent to which 
the Holy See would pull with the democracies would depend largely on those 
democracies providing stability and security against Communism: "If they fail to 
do so, the Holy See will, I regret to say, be liable to reinsure with those who 
desire authoritarian regimes of the Right. " To which he added: "This would not 
be good for the ideological cohesion of the Western world. "(48) 
While there was no question but that the Pope was at one with the West in 
opposition to the Soviet Union and to Communism, he was extremely sensitive to 
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the Communist charges of war mongering, and he tended to be cautious in his 
public expressions of support for the anti-Communist policies of the Western 
Governments. At Christmas 1951, Roberts had a long talk with the Pope, whom he 
wanted to praise and encourage the efforts of UNO, which he had not mentioned 
by name in his Christmas speech. The Pope had in fact never expressed his 
approval of the aims of the United Nations. Roberts also wanted his position 
on peace clarified, as during the Korean Var, Papal pleas for peace were seized 
upon by peace movement supporters to imply Vatican support for their cause. 
Roberts, however, was not optimistic that the Pope would comply, he considered 
him overly concerned with Italy and Communism there: "... I am left with an 
impression of a saintly character and of a most able teacher who will always 
inspire deep devotion and maintain order, but I find few signs of a prophet 
capable of leading his followers in an inspired spiritual crusade. I hope I may 
prove to be mistaken. "(49) 
During 1952 the Pope did express his approval of the United Nations, as 
part of his desire to promote peace. He also, in an address to the 'Pax 
Christi' association in September, 1952, welcomed the movement for European 
unification. (50) However, the Vatican still came in for frequent criticism for 
continuing to hold its fundamental policy of political neutrality, which it felt 
unable to openly renounce by publicly supporting one camp over the other. This 
aspect occupied one of Roberts' final despatches before he left the Vatican. 
Roberts considered that the Roman Catholic Church played an important part on 
the world stage and that it should be more widely understood. 
Conscious that Britain's reputation stood high in the Vatican, Roberts 
stated: 
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She is regarded as the one Power in the free world which, during and since 
the second world war, has shown exceptional qualities of stability, 
resilience and political wisdom. (51) 
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office needed to appreciate that the aims of the Holy 
See and of temporal States were fundamentally different, and that this would 
always affect their relations with regard to political judgement. He quoted his 
predecessor at the Vatican, D'Arcy Osborne, who in 1947 told the Foreign Office, 
"the Pope and his advisers do not consider and resolve a problem solely in the 
light of its temporary and obviously apparent elements. Their approach and 
survey are by habit and tradition unlimited in space and time... and this 
inevitably renders their policy inscrutable, confusing and on occasion 
reprehensible to time conditioned minds. " To which Roberts added: 
It is true that the Church is at one with the Western Powers in its 
rejection of Communism, and is active in exposing Communist aims 
throughout the world. But it has been careful to avoid taking sides in 
the political conflict; for to be associated with any alliance of States, 
no matter how praiseworthy their purposes, would be inconsistent with what 
it conceives to be its founder's teaching and its secular mission to 
humanity. 
We on our side must, therefore, as I see it, be careful not to fall 
into the error of regarding the Church as a potential partner in applying 
our policies for the defence of the free world. (52) 
The Foreign Office supplied the Vatican with a great deal of anti- 
Communist material, and looked to the Vatican as a source of extra intelligence; 
however, it found the Vatican less than forthcoming, an issue which Roberts 
addressed in his summary: 
The Vatican regards the material for exposing Communist policies prepared 
by the research departments in London and passed on by this post to the 
Secretariat of State and to other centres in Rome, as most valuable. I am 
assured that no such material is received from any other source and that 
much of it is of higher quality than that compiled by the Church itself. 
It has been suggested from time to time that we should press the 
Vatican to reciprocate, and I did in fact speak in this sense to Mosignor 
Tardini, Pro-Secretary of State for Extraordinary Affairs. But on 
reflection I have come to the conclusion that we should be wise not to 
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press the matter. I do not think that the failure to reciprocate is due to 
lack of goodwill but rather to the fear of similar requests from other 
governments. In the back of their minds may also be the thought that it 
would be inappropriate to single out for special favours a Government with 
which the Holy See is not in full diplomatic relations. (53) 
The despatches from the British Legation at the Holy See illustrate how 
the Foreign Office regarded the Vatican as an important ally which it sought 
assiduously to cultivate during the Cold War, without, however, exerting the 
type of pressure applied by President Truman via Myron Taylor. This more 
subtle British approach certainly paid some important dividends in the 
propaganda field, however, as Roberts indicated, despite winning Vatican respect 
and the continuation of good relations, they were no more successful than were 
the Americans in forcing the Pope to abandon his public declarations of 
"neutralism". 
While the Foreign Office fully supported the Vatican in its anti-Communist 
crusade, the Archbishop of Canterbury, despite important concessions, was at 
best a reluctant participant, as he explained to Myron Taylor following the 
failure of his mission on behalf of Truman to secure a joint Christian 
statement condemning Communism: 
Part of the trouble in all this conflict against Communism is that we 
cannot whole-heartedly claim the Roman Church as a champion of freedom 
against Communist tyranny when, regretfully though one must have to say 
it, the Roman system is itself a spiritual absolutism, which is really 
foreign to Christian doctrine. (54) 
Although Fisher found the concept of anti-Communist cooperation with the 
Pope unpalatable, and although he had failed to cooperate fully with Myron 
Taylor's anti-Communist mission, he himself was fully committed to anti- 
Communism in both the spiritual and the political sphere. However, like the 
Pope, Fisher needed to appear above political conflict and, again like the Pope, 
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had to act cautiously. (55) The care exercised by the Church in its anti- 
Communist activities was illustrated in early 1950 by the secret formation of a 
special committee to advise the Archishop on combating Communism 
George Bell, Bishop of Chichester and Chairman of CFR, was responsible for 
gathering together a group, Sir Reginald Leeper, Tracy Philipps, Major Tufton 
Beamish, M. P. and the Dean of Chichester, to discuss the Church of England and 
Communism: "With a view to considering in an objective way what line it might 
be useful to take, so far as the Church of England is concerned, in face of the 
general campaign from Moscow for world Communism. "(56) Bell, quoting Tracy 
Philipps, asked: "are we clear that Russian Communism intends to dominate the 
world, and in certain countries is using the Churches as tools? What can we do 
here? And what can we do abroad? "(57) 
Bell informed Fisher that the meeting agreed with the view that Communism 
could not be met, "as Bevin thinks", by purely economic measures. It required 
the building up and the teaching of a better religion and a truer philosophy. 
Eyes in England needed to be opened, particularly in the Trade Union movement 
and in the schools: "the Church of England could take a wise, as well as an 
active part in this and also in the teaching of the truth of Christianity as 
opposed to the falsehood of Communism. " Bell then told Fisher: 
It was suggested that there should be a small group of Church of 
England people, whose existence would be unknown to the public, who would 
meet together quite privately and discuss ways and means. It was thought 
that the best way of appointing it, so as not to make it too official and 
yet be in close touch with yourself - if you approved - would be that I 
should be allowed or encouraged to invite a few persons to form such a 
private committee, saying in the invitation that I was doing it with your 
approval. Naturally such a committee would like to feel that any 
suggestions or advice it gave would be carefully considered by you, with a 
view, if you thought wise, to following them up. (58) 
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Along with themselves, the meeting proposed for the committee: Harold 
MacMillan, "who knows a great deal and feels intensely that the economic answer 
is not the deepest answer (he and Beamish both live in the same village in my 
diocese, and are both strong churchmen)"; Lord Salisbury, "who is believed to be 
sympathetic"; TS Eliot; Dorothy Sayers; General Jacob, of the BBC; Dr Kallas, and 
Voigt as a possible addition. A handwritten note, obviously not by Bell, added 
with reference to Voigt, "a most intransigent and impossible "Liberal" and anti- 
Muscovite of the Atholl School. "(59) Those at the original meeting were all 
noteably right-wing and deeply anti-Communist, those selected by them were all 
Establishment figures with known anti-Communist credentials. This clearly 
indicated that such a committee would be giving the Archbishop if not a 
prejudiced, certainly a far from objective view. 
With the proviso that the Committee remain secret, the Archbishop was 
fully in favour of its formation and approved its proposed membership: 
I can see no harm and indeed considerable good in your calling 
together a Committee such as you suggest, provided that its existence 
should remain confidential, at least at present: and the names which you 
mention for the committee so far as they are known to me are 
admirable. (60) 
Fisher was not clear as to what, if anything, the Church could properly do 
more than it did already in a general way, "but it would be valuable to have 
your group thinking along these lines":. 
It is at present nobody's particular business in the Church of 
England to give special attention to communist propaganda and the possible 
action and reaction from the side of the Church of England. Vansittart 
would say that it is quite time that we did something to purge our own 
ranks ! (61) 
At the end of his letter to Fisher, Bell had stated, "I do very much hope 
that you will see your way to encouraging the formation of such a 
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committee. "(62) To which Fisher responded, "I should certainly encourage you to 
form a group and should hope to be kept in touch with its deliberations. * (63) 
The formation of the group was confidential, as were its deliberations and 
the advice given the Archbishop. However, there were certain incidents in the 
following years where its influence was detectable. One of these was Fisher's 
approval of anti-Communist pilgrimages to certain major British cathedrals. In 
the first half of 1949, a CFR Committee meeting had endorsed a scheme to hold a 
sevice of intercession for those suffering religious persecution in Communist 
countries. The idea had then been put to Fisher by Halifax and Leeper, but 
although the Archbishop had responded favourably in the first instant, he 
eventually decided against it. Leeper had discussed his regret at this decision 
with Prestige, the acting secretary of CFR, who then wrote to Bell to suggest 
Leeper as a suitable member for the group he believed Bell to be assembling: "If 
you are collecting a group to discuss this sort of thing (as I rather gather 
that you are), may I suggest that Leeper would be a good person to have in it. " 
Prestige told Bell that Leeper had discussed his scheme exhaustively with 
Halifax before it was proposed to the Archbishop, and that he was against 
general intercession services throughout the country, "which would merely give 
an opportunity to idiot parsons to say absurd things, " and favoured the 
Archbishop alone speaking from St Paul's: "He and many others, feel a strong 
obligation upon the Church of England to protest against the persecution of 
Christians in Eastern Europe, (of course an intercession service should not be 
regarded as a form of public protest), and to pray for its victims. "(64) 
Prestige clearly felt that religious persecution was abhorrent and a valid 
cause for protest; however, he was equally clear that it should not be simply 
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the justification for an anti-Communist exercise aimed at the Soviet Union, an 
opinion of which he informed Leeper and Bell: 
I said that in my judgement any such protest ought to be accompanied by 
an unequivocal assurance of our determination not to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of Russia, and of our entire political aquiesence in the 
Communist regime for Russian use; it is accepted by the entire Russian 
people and Church, and I fancy that anyone acquainted with the Russian 
mind (except of course, a Russian emigre) realises that only through the 
development and humanisation of the existing Communist regime can Russia 
conceivably hope to find her own salvation; our aim therefore is to 
influence and humanise, not to indulge futile and abortive hopes for the 
overthrow of Communism in Russia. "(65) 
Although Prestige told Bell that "Leeper seemed perfectly content to assent 
to this standpoint", Bell's letter to Fisher certainly implied that the group 
wanted to see the Church active in a field which went far beyond the confines 
of protesting about religious persecution; it stated a belief that Communism 
aimed to conquer the world, and that the Church should be active against it 
nationally and internationally. (66) 
The anti-Communist substance of Fisher's Loyal Address, delivered before 
the ging on June 21,1950, suggested the influence of the Bell group. The 
address was written on May 9,1950, shortly after the group's formation; its 
influence was discernible in the condemnation of Russia as an imperialist, 
expansionist power, and of Communism as anti-Christian. In the speech, Fisher 
spoke of Russian ambition and Communist hostility to Christianity: 
Much has been accomplished in all these tasks by the great efforts of our 
people with the cooperation and help of Your Majesty's dominions and of 
the United States of America as of other friendly nations. But it must be 
sorrowfully recorded that Soviet Russia, which had so gloriously shared in 
the winning of the victory, was misled by her Communist masters into 
refusing to cooperate in the re-establishment of orderly conditions and, 
by linking its political theories to imperialist and expansionist ambitions 
has kept the world in a constant state of anxiety and alarm, gravely 
increased by the fact that Communist governments have displayed a 
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conception of human life hostile to Christian principle and to the most 
valued traditions of our race and country. (67) 
The organization of anti-Communist pilgrimages by the National Pilgrimage 
Movement in the early 1950s had all the hallmarks of the original Leeper 
scheme. Committee influence is suggested by the fact that whereas previously, 
left to his own iniative, Fisher had discarded the Leeper/Halifax proposal for 
the very similar services of intercession, this time he overrode strong 
objection to try and ensure the success of the pilgrimages. The first 
pilgrimage was to Canterbury Cathedral. The pilgrimages were organised by the 
National Pilgrimage Movement which received public endorsement from Fisher, who 
gave his permission for the Movement to use the sermon he had delivered after 
the King's death, informing the Executive Committee that he approved the 
following: 
In allowing us to use the following extract from his sermon in St Paul's 
Cathedral after the King's death, the Archbishop of Canterbury writes 
appreciating the declared purpose of the National Pilgrimage Movement to 
strengthen the spiritual foundations of the nation against the perils of 
Communism amd Materialism and to lead the laity back to Church going and 
collective prayer. (68) 
The literature of the movement stated: 
We believe that in this hour of peril and anxiety all Christians must seek 
the help of God in overcoming the Communist conspiracy against Christian 
civilisation... 
Christianity and Communism are incompatible, and we shall go on the 
pilgrimage believing that the time has come when Christianity must meet 
the challenge of Communism by itself becoming the challenger... 
We prayed that our Nation might be inspired to put on the whole armour of 
God in the supreme struggle 'against the evil and godless forces of 
Communism and Materialism... (69) 
A great deal of controversy was created in January 1952 when Canon 
Collins refused to give the movement special facilities at St Paul's Cathedral. 
Letters of protest were written to the Daily Telegraph by Lord Vansittart, 
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Major-General Lindsay and Herbert Ashley, published under the heading: "St 
Paul's and Communists, Doing Justice to the Truth. "(70) According to a 
memorandum in the Fisher Papers, Canon Prestige had certain knowledge that the 
letters of three prominent persons sent to the Daily Telegraph stating the 
other side of the case were not published. (71) On January 28,1952, the Daily 
Telegraph published a letter from Martel, under the heading "Fighting 
Communism"; and on February 9,1952, its editorial dealt with the "Peril to the 
Church. " 
Fisher himself was the recipient of a protest from Smithers, who not only 
complained about the lack of reception given the movement, but also criticised 
the Church of England. (72) Fisher defended the Church, but agreed with 
Smithers about the lack of courtesy from St Paul's. (73) Fisher's response to 
the controversy was illustrated by a memorandum in his papers in which he 
noted that he had encouraged Martel, who was running the movement while Lord 
Craigavon was away in Australia for some months, to have another and bigger 
pilgrimage: 
I did suggest that the first thing should be to have another pilgrimage of 
an outstandingly successful kind which would bury the St Paul's trouble 
and remove the taste it left in one's mouth. (74) 
Fisher strongly advised Martel at their next meeting to have his next 
pilgrimage at Lichfield Cathedral, as it would not recall the St Paul's trouble 
and would enable his northern adherents to show their support. However, as 
Fisher remarked to Alan C Don, the Dean of Westminster, the next chosen venue 
of the movement, "I do not think he has got many Northern supporters. "(75) 
Don felt as little inclined as had Collins to welcome the movement, 
complaining to Fisher that Martel was obsessed with Communism. (76) Fisher 
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conceded this characteristic, but told Don that, "I rather like him and he is 
quite sincere. As you say a little obsessed by the menace of Communism but 
really anxious to strengthen the spiritual foundations of the Nation. " Fisher 
urged Don to follow the example of Canterbury where one of the Canons, at an 
appointed time, went into the pulpit and said a prayer provided by the 
movement. (77) Fisher further observed: "To say no to him is extremely difficult 
and at once makes a controversy, and since they are a respectable body of Godly 
people why should one say no to them? "(78) 
Don and his chapter did not regard the movement as simply "a respectable 
body of Godly people", as the Dean pointed out to Fisher after the chapter's 
deliberations on the matter in June 1952: 
... we did not feel justified in doing what the General suggested - partly 
on the ground that the National Pilgrimage Movement has, through what 
happened at Canterbury and, more especially at St Paul's, become identified 
in the public mind with a definite public opinion and that, whether that 
identification is justified or not, we must take account of it; and partly 
on the ground that we felt that the promoters of the movement are not a 
sufficiently representative body to warrant a special service at 
Westminster Abbey, which would involve the closing of the church for the 
time being to the general public and so forth. (79) 
Don himself also found the credentials of the Executive Committee less than 
palatable: 
Personally I cannot say that I am impressed by the list of names on 
the Executive Committee, consisting as it does of Lord Craigavon, a 
diehard Ulster Protestant and Tory; General Martel, a very gallant soldier 
with a one-track mind; Mrs Pollock, the widow of the late Bishop of 
Norwich whose views were notoriously reactionary; and three other people 
of whom one knows nothing whatever. I feel that until the movement has 
the support of more representative people it would be difficult to regard 
them as a "national" movement in such a sense as to justify the placing of 
Westminster Abbey at their disposal. (80) 
Fisher replied with a friendly and informal letter, apologising for the 
fact that Don had "to wrestle with Martel. " He told the Dean there was no need 
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whatever to shut the Abbey or provide a special service. Pointing out that Don 
could not keep them out if they wanted to come in without closing the Abbey to 
everybody, Fisher reasoned, "Is it not better to let them come in and knowing 
that they are there to say this prayer, which takes about five seconds, and let 
them depart in peace. " Fisher argued that to refuse them admission would cause 
another row "of the worse kind", which would certainly be publicised as St 
Paul's was. (81) 
Persuaded by Fisher's argument, Don relented, telling Fisher that his 
letter had tipped the scale in their favour: "Whether they will be content with 
this remains to be seen, but at any rate we have not slammed the door in their 
face. " (82 ) 
Throughout this period the Foreign Office continued to send information to 
Lambeth regarding Communist anti-religious activities. It was also very 
unsympathetic to clergy at home who supported the peace movement in whatever 
innocuous way. In May 1953, Mr Egg of the Foreign Office called in person on 
Colonel Barron to draw his attention to a letter in the Manchester Guardian of 
May 8,1953, in which the Dean of Manchester stated that he welcomed the 
holding of a peace congress in Manchester on May 17,1953, and that every 
Christian should do so, he did not know anything of the organization behind it 
but he authorised the Rev V Watts to make use of his letter in any way he 
wished in support of it. (83) 
Mr Egg said the Foreign Office took this as a typical example of an 
intellectual who was being hoodwinked by the Communist peace propaganda and 
was lending it their support without any knowledge of the facts. As Bishop of 
Singapore, the Dean had been a prisoner of the Japanese. (84) Egg produced a 
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document, British Peace Congress 1953, and asked if CFR had seen it and if a, 
copy could be sent to the Dean of Manchester. He also asked whether: 
1. CFR could help in getting over this type of document to members of the 
clergy; 
2. CFR would submit for their guidance a list of Church newspapers, 
societies, women's guilds, etc. which we think would benefit by an 
unofficial circulation, if necessary from the Foreign Office, of this kind 
of pamphlet. (85) 
The following August JH Peck sent Waddams a Foreign Office paper "on 
propaganda moves which the Soviet Government might take to further its 
campaign to secure world-wide favour as the champion of 'peace and friendship' 
between nations. "(86) Waddams was informed: 
Should you wish to use any of the information contained in this 
paper, please do so, but I must ask you to ensure that neither the paper 
itself, nor the speculation it puts forward, is attributed to the Foreign 
Office. (87) 
Stating that the main method would principally be pressure on public opinion 
largely exercised through "peace" propaganda, the paper listed a series of 
conciliatory gestures which the Soviet Government might take in support of its 
"peace and friendship" policy. These included a possible approach to foreign 
Churches: "Church delegations, congresses in Moscow, etc. Perhaps even some 
sort of compromise with the Vatican. Permission for two Roman Catholic priests 
to be appointed in Moscow. " 
On October 22,1954, Waddams requested the Foreign Office to provide him 
with a list of front organizations which might present a temptation to 
clergymen. (88) As Waddams subsequently explained to Fisher, his request 
originated in a suggestion which was made to him that the "clergy needed to be 
warned about a number of organizations which they might be prevailed upon to 
join or support without knowing in the least what their objectives were. "(89) 
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The Foreign Office replied that the "Communist-tainted bodies which clergymen 
might be induced to support" could be divided into three categories. There were 
three societies specifically aimed at practicing Christians; there was also a 
dozen or so bodies which, although purely secular in character, might attract 
clerical support; and there were six organizations which, although not 
proscribed by the Labour Party, could fairly be described as Communist in aim 
and character. 
The Foreign Office cited the Society for Socialist Clergy and Ministers, 
the Christians and Crisis Group, and the Christian Peace Group as the 
organizations existing to "mobilise Christian opinion. " The first was the oldest, 
and the Foreign Office said, "by far the most dangerous. " The latter two were 
regarded as of comparatively slight importance, "and indeed seem to have 
merged. " Vaddams was sent accounts of these bodies and lists of the front 
organizations by the Foreign Office, and he passed them onto the Archbishop, 
asking him if he thought it worthwhile for some information on the subject to 
be circulated, possibly to the Bishops, or possibly to some other group of 
responsible persons. Waddams suggested that even publication might be 
considered in one form or another. (90) Fisher certainly thought the Bishops 
should be informed, and a draft statement was accordingly prepared to be read 
at the Bishops' meeting where Fisher told his colleagues: "It has been brought 
to my attention that there are a number of bodies which exist to try and 
mobilise Christian opinion in support of Soviet policies. Some of them 
masquerade under harmless names and it is possible that a certain number of 
clergymen become attracted to them without appreciating their real 
character. " (91) Without attributing his source, Fisher repeated the information 
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provided by the Foreign Office, including a list of the names of Anglican 
clergymen who were associated with the Society for Socialist Clergy and 
Ministers, which Fisher stated to have been under the indirect control of the 
Communist Party for some years. (92) This naming of names and black-listing 
was in the worst tradition of established anti-Communist witchunting. 
Certain members of these organizations had participated in the unofficial 
ecclesiastic delegations to East European Churches, deprecatingly reported by 
British Missions abroad, which reports were then passed on to Lambeth. After 
the death of Stalin in May 1953, and the end of the Korean War in August, there 
was a thaw in Anglo-Soviet relations. One of the ways in which the Foreign 
Office took advantage of this was to try and get the Soviet authorities to use 
official delegations rather than those provided by left-wing organizations 
which were genuinely sympathetic to the Soviet Union and the new regimes of 
Eastern Europe and had provided visitors when no one else would.,, - This 
point was made in a discussion between Sir William Hayter, British Ambassador 
in Moscow, and Mr Yakovlev, the Deputy Head of WOKS. (93) In his despatch to 
the Foreign Office, Hayter reported that they spoke of the Anglo-Soviet 
Friendship Society and the Society for Cultural Relations and their involvement 
in arranging delegations to the Soviet Union. Hayter considered that Yakovlev: 
seemed to be somewhat on the defensive about this, recognised that they 
were under Communist control and had been banned by the Labour Party, but 
asked how, if they did not arrange meetings through them, they were to do 
it; he said they would like to put the matter "on a broader basis. "(94) 
Hayter remarked to Hohler that this would fit in well with the proposals which 
they had discussed when he was in London. 
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Within the Foreign Office, L Richardson commented that Yakovlev's raising 
of the question of the channel for cultural relations and his remarks confirmed 
the impression formed from ones made earlier at a meeting with Mr Corsellis of 
the E. I. C. that the Soviet authorities would be prepared to deal with a more 
representative body than the two societies. (95) 
Hohler told Hayter that in London the Foreign Office were careful to avoid 
any connection with the celebrations of "British-Soviet Friendship Month", an 
annual event held in November under the auspices of the British-Soviet 
Friendship Society. A circular was issued in the Foreign Office and, with the 
approval of the Home Office, advice was offered to other Ministries in 
Whitehall, that invitations to functions which were being held in connection 
with this event should be refused, even if they came from the Soviet Embassy. 
This attitude was adopted because the various concerts, receptions and meetings 
were clearly advertised as being under the sponsorship of the Society for 
Cultural Relations with the USSR (SCR) and the British-Soviet Friendship 
Society (BSFS). BSFS was proscribed by the Labour Party, but SCR was not 
similarly discredited, and Foreign Office efforts were "chiefly directed towards 
enlightening Whitehall about the true nature of SCR. "(96) 
Hohler advised Hayter to boycott any function in Moscow with which SCR or 
BSFS were demonstrably connected, although he admitted exceptions had been made 
in London as they were not able to explain to the Soviet Embassy the real 
reason for the refusal of invitations, considering it best "not to make our 
hostility to the SCR and BSFS clear to the Soviet Embassy until we can point to 
the existence of some alternative body capable of organising Anglo-Soviet 
cultural exchanges. " (97) At that moment in time there was a proposed Committee 
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under the auspices of the British Council for organising cultural exchanges 
which, Hohler stated, "would of course meet our needs admirably. " 
Later that year the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council was 
established: "formed with the encouragement of H. M. G., with the object, inter 
alia, of thwarting the activities of the so-called 'friendship societies'. " 
Jellicoe informed the Charge d'Affaires in Moscow that the Foreign Office had 
taken steps to see that the Soviet Embassy had no illusions about H. M. G. 's 
attitude toward these societies. (98) With Foreign Office approval the Chairman 
of the Soviet Relations Committee, Mr Mayhew of IRD, had spoken to the Soviet 
Embassy on several occasions about the "undesirability of channelling exchanges 
through unrepresentative organisations. "(99) The British representative at the 
Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers also took this line with the Soviet 
delegation. The Foreign Office had subsequently taken a much stronger stand 
about performances organised for British-Soviet Friendship Month, trying to get 
them under the auspices of the Soviet Relations Committee rather than BSFS. 
Jellicoe considered it desirable that the Soviet authorities in Moscow be left 
in no doubt about the strength of H. M. G. 's feelings in this matter: "I think it 
desirable to make our position clear cut to the Russians. "(100) 
At the same time as Hayter was indicating to Yakovlev that delegations to 
Moscow by unrepresentative bodies were not approved as exchanges likely to 
foster good relations between the two countries, Prebendary Arrowsmith was 
delivering a similar message at the Moscow Patriarchate on behalf of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury. (101) On December 28,1954, after assuring the 
Partiarch that Fisher "was anxious to do everything possible to strengthen the 
ties beteen the two Churches", Arrowsmith raised the subject of the invitation 
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to Canon Collins. The Patriarch knew nothing of this, and Metropolitan Mikolai 
explained it had been a parallel invitation from the Russian Orthodox Church 
and the Soviet All-Union Baptist Society. Arrowsmith said that "the Archbishop 
would greatly appreciate it if he could be informed of such invitations. " 
Expressing concern that he had not been, it was agreed that in future 
invitations to Anglican delegations were to be made through the Archbishop. 
This was clearly a means of controlling the personnel who formed such 
delegations and was essentially intended to stop the visits of left-wing clergy 
and replace them with delegates who enjoyed the support and approval of the 
Church of England and hence the Foreign Office. 
The Moscow Embassy sent a despatch reporting the conversation between 
Arrowsmith and Alexei to the Foreign Office, from where Jellicoe sent a copy to 
Vaddams. (102) Arrowsmith told the Embassy that Fisher had opposed the 
Collins' delegation and warned two Anglican clergymen not to take part, he also 
reprimanded Collins. (103) 
Fisher's intervention certainly had the desired impact. In July 1955, the 
official objection to these sorts of delegations was stressed by Waddams to a 
delegation of Russian Christians visiting the United Kingdom. He told them 
that the Archbishop of Canterbury, on more than one occasion, had adverted to 
the character of unofficial delegations visiting Russia of Church of England 
clergymen, pointing out that some very unwise persons had been included. The 
Churchmen told Waddams that Karpov, secular Head of Religious Affairs in the 
Soviet Union, had "made a point at their last reception that delegations should 
be more official and steps would be taken to implement this on their 
return. "(104) 
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The Russian delegation had been invited by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 
his official capacity as President of the British Council of Churches. Before 
issuing the invitation, the Council consulted the Foreign Office "informally". 
The Foreign Office response was discussed in a minute which noted: 
We encouraged them to proceed with it, since, as you know we favour direct 
exchanges of this sort between representative bodies in the Soviet Union 
and this country. (105) 
Despite this policy, it was also policy to oppose the peace movement, and 
amongst the clergy invited,, were those who had given it active support. A 
confidential memorandum within the Foreign Office considered "Should we grant 
visas to these members of the delegation of Russian Churchmen, invited to this 
country by the BCC, who are connected with the Peace Campaign? "(106) It was 
thought that "In view of the fact that contributions to the Peace Campaign are 
'de rigueur' with the Churches in the Soviet Union", making it difficult to have 
it representative delegation without one or two peace campaigners, and as these 
particular clergymen were not exceptionally prominent in the Peace Campaign, 
for were they coming to England to promote it, visas ought to be granted. This 
'decision was influenced by the fact that: "To refuse them visas would gravely 
embarrass their hosts and would, I suspect, be taken amiss by public opinion. " 
'the Foreign Office thus recommended to the Home Office that they did not wish 
Aeace Campaign affiliations to be a bar to the granting of visas on this 
týccasion. (107) IRD concurred. (108) 
Nonetheless, the issue of visas for the Russian Churchmen was raised 
again, questioning whether in view of the lateness of their application they 
Should be refused. Although they were not refused, they were delayed; and on 
4uly 1,1955, Hayter informed the Foreign Office that the Patriarchate had 
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informed the Embassy that in the absence of visas they had been obliged to 
alter their travel arrangements. The Patriarchate wished it to be known that 
they were offended by this delay. (109) Vhen the delegation did arrive, the 
Foreign Office advised the Secretary of State not to attend the British Council 
of Churches' reception for the delegation, stating it was not high ranking, 
"definitely the third XI. " The Home Office were informed of this advice, being 
"rather sensitive about being left out of things of this sort. "(110) 
This cavalier attitude toward the Russian Christians, despite the 
"reputable nature" of their British sponsors, illustrated that the Foreign Office 
were far from reconciled about how to view or treat the Churches in the Soviet 
Union. Although a Commonwealth Relations Office Memorandum, dated July 26, 
1955, had noted, "we are anxious to support the Christian Church within the 
Soviet Union, of whatever denomination", within the Foreign Office there was a 
diversion of opinion as to whether the Russian Churches were friends or foes, 
particularly with regard to the Russian Orthodox Church. In July 1954, Sir V 
Hayter had reviewed the position and prospects of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
stating: 
This picturesque anachronism naturally attracts the attention of foreign 
visitors, some of whom tend to regard the Church as the only form of 
organised opposition to the Communist 'line' and to imagine that at some 
future date it might emerge as an independent and active force. Such 
hopes are in my opinion without foundation. (111) 
Hayter argued that a superficial view might indeed create the impression 
that the Church in the Soviet Union was by no means in a bad way, but such a 
favourable impression would be misleading. (112) He posited that the Church 
survived on sufferance for two main reasons: that it was no danger to the 
regime and was of some slight positive use: "It plays its part in the Peace 
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Campaign at home and abroad, and from its continued existence the Soviet 
Government can claim credit for tolerance and magnanimity. Hayter expressed 
his agreement with Lenin by remarking that the Church kept some people happy 
who might otherwise be tiresome: "i. e. it is still to some extent the opium of 
the people'. "(113) 
Hayter considered that survival was the most the Russian Church could 
hope for in the future, which, apart from the attitude of the regime, he 
attributed to the inherent nature of the Orthodox Church. Noting that it had 
long been subject to the State, he called its leaders "timid, cautious, sly 
characters", and stated that the Orthodox religion lacked moral content and 
missionary zeal, remarking that it "never much bestirred itself to attract 
believers. "(114) Hayter emphasised the formal observance, carried out in 
traditional detail, at traditional length and in traditional, and to most 
Russians incomprehensible, Church Slavonic, of the Orthodox Church, which he 
regarded as not only ill-equipped to challenge Soviet materialism, but further 
considered it unlikely that it either could or would adapt itself to face this 
task. (115) 
Hayter thought that as material conditions improved and the regime was 
able in some measure to justify its promises, "the people will have less need to 
look beyond it for comfort than they do now; they will have less need of 
opium. " He concluded that the Church enjoyed little popular support and that 
its influence seemed unlikely to increase to any marked extent in the future, 
but that there was no reason why it should not be permitted to exist for some 
time to come as it had its uses in the propaganda field and presented no threat 
to the regime. (116) 
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Hayter's observations and conclusions would not have been agreed by 
numerous independent observers, nor were they fully endorsed within the Foreign 
Office. Richardson and Jellicoe agreed with Hayter's conclusions, although 
Richardson thought there were too many imponderables to be dogmatic about the 
future. He disagreed that observers saw the Russian Church as potential 
opposition, his impression being that they were more likely to think of the 
Orthodox Church as prosperous and free and a willing partner in the Soviet 
Peace Campaign. (117) 
Jellicoe and Richardson recommended that the despatch be printed. Hohler, 
however, advised against this; partly because subsequent to its being written 
there was a renewal of anti-religious propaganda in the Soviet Union which he 
felt changed the situation; and also because he disagreed with much of its 
content. He argued that if it had been possible to destroy the Russian Church 
this would have been done in the early days of the Revolution, and while he 
agreed with Hayter that its survival in relative peace was because it caused no 
real anxiety to the regime, he also considered that was "because the regime has 
found the religion of the people too insidious to stamp out. " He also thought 
it: 
... arguable that 
traditional church observance does contain for Orthodox 
believers (and half-believers) a greater challenge to dialectical 
materialism than if the Church deserted its traditional role and entered 
the arena of politics. During the most dangerous days of the war the 
Church emerged as having a far greater hold on the minds and imagination 
of the people than Western observers had realised to be true then, and the 
Soviet Government were glad to seek its assistance in keeping people happy 
in the bad times. Many more churches are open now than during the war 
and a further moment of national stress might yet reveal new strength in 
the Church, if it can keep its position and survive. To survive it must, 
as Sir W Hayter says, be sly; and it is also possible that the traditional 
services in Church Slavonic provide as good a target for sly 
inscrutability as can be found. (118) 
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Mrs B Miller, of the Foreign Office Research Department and the Church of 
England Council on Foreign Relations respectively, took issue with Hayter on a 
number of counts. She agreed that it was not in the nature of the Russian 
Orthodox Church to act as an organised potential opposition to any regime, 
nonetheless, if times of trouble were ever to recur in Russia, it was not 
impossible that the Church would serve as a rallying point for national unity 
and a focus of order and authority. Commenting that Church leaders could 
hardly be any other than cautious and sly if they were to survive, Miller saw 
distinctions between individual characters and groups among the hierarchy: 
... some give the impression of genuine Christians biding their time, 
others of being complete 'stooges' of the regime, with in between a group 
of not altogether insincere Jingoists who regard Soviet successes in the 
world 'not without relish'. (119) 
Miller added that the underground or non-juring Church should not be forgotten; 
though acknowledging that its influence might be exaggerated, she stated that it 
undoubtedly existed and there was evidence that many Christians in the Soviet 
Union had little to do with the official Church. 
Miller considered that Hayter's description of the Russian Church as 
lacking missionary zeal required some qualification. The Byzantine Church 
before the Turkish conquest was certainly as zealous in evangelising as Rome, 
and the Russian Church in the nineteenth century prosecuted a most vigorous 
missionary policy. As to Church Slavonic, Miller declared it to be at least as 
comprehensible to Russians as was Latin to Italians; observing, moreover, 
possibly with a thought to the interpretation of the Gospel according to 
Christian Socialists such as Hewlett Johnson and Stanley Evans, that: "A 
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Protestant Church with its main emphasis on the Ministry of the Word is more 
exposed to perversion by Communists. "(120) 
Although the validity of Hayter's observations were questioned in the 
Foreign Office, and by no means agreed, still it was suggested that his 
despatch be brougnt to the attention of the Anglican authorities. It was 
proposed that IRD send a copy to Waddams. This proposal was supported by 
Hohler, who had himself been at variance with Hayter's views, on the grounds 
that, "... we should not encourage wishful thinking at Lambeth. " Moreover, Hohler 
considered the time particularly propitious in that the Foreign Office were 
currently well placed to put over "unvarnished facts" as the Archbishop of 
Canterbury had recently written to the Secretary of State to say that he had 
been very much impressed by the news he had received of the religious 
activities of the Foreign Office Missions and Legations in Iron Curtain 
countries. (121) 
As Vaddams was then at the WCC's Assembly at Evanston, the issue was 
raised by RH Mason with CFR's Mr Holt, who was informed that the Foreign Office 
had a document they wished Waddams to see. Holt took the opportunity of his 
conversation with Mason to discuss the views of Serge Bolshakoff who, he 
explained, worked closely with CFR and was considered an expert on the Orthodox 
Church. Bolshakoff, he said, was at that time writing two books on the Church 
behind the Iron Curtain, one for publication in Britain and one for America. 
Bolshakoff had writen to Holt that a friend whose judgement he trusted had 
recently been in Russia and had reported that he had been particularly struck 
by the fact that the churches in Moscow were open and full during Easter, that 
the Orthodox monastery at Zagorsk had been beautifully restored and that 
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numerous monastic communities and young monks and pilgrims were to be seen: " 
He had estimated that 30% of the total population of Moscow go to church 
regularly and that this proportion was higher than that in most European 
captials and other cities including Paris, Barcelona and Brussels. He applied 
this percentage to the whole of the Soviet Union and concluded that there are 
millions of Christians in Russia. " 
Holt told Mason that Bolshakoff had formed a favourable view of conditions 
for Christians in the Soviet Union. It seemed to Mason an altogether too 
favourable view. He expressed scepticism at the indication that conditions were 
favourable for believers, particularly in view of the reported revival of 
religious persecution. Holt had heard of this also, and said he regarded 
Bolshakoff's figures with some reserve. Mason, however, had the impression that 
Holt was inclined to believe the general picture painted by Bolshakoff and was 
clearly concerned at the prospect: 
We are of course aware that there is a tendency in the Church of 
England Council on Foreign Relations to emphasise the fact that the 
Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union still gives Christian witness and to 
ignore, or minimise, the fact that they suffer themselves to be used as a 
tool of the Party and the Government. It is not to be expected that the 
Council would see eye to eye with us on this matter and it has never been 
our policy to insist too much upon the political aspect. Nevertheless I 
cannot help feeling slightly uneasy about the potentialities of Mr B. to 
encourage the Council to be even more tolerant towards the Orthodox Church 
in the Soviet Union. I hope to see Mr Holt in the near future and find 
out a litle more about B. and their attitude toward him. (122) 
Mrs Miller, herself an experienced member of CFR, offered some reassurance on 
this point, declaring that the Council was not unduly influenced by Bolshakoff 
who was at best an "Exalte. "(123) 
On his return from Evanston, Waddams called at the Foreign Office on 
September 23,1954, to read the Hayter despatch. It had been decided in the 
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Foreign Office that security at Lambeth was inadequate to permit its release 
there. (124) Waddams read the despatch in Mason's office. His main objection 
was that the Ambassador was not altogether justified in saying that the Church 
enjoyed little popular support; he considered the recent anti-religious drive in 
the Soviet Union indicated the contrary. Although he agreed that it had a long 
history of subservience to the State, he felt that the Russian Church had 
developed a strong spiritual side. Nor did Vaddams accept that it had been 
lacking in missionary zeal, particularly within Russia; moreover, it had been 
active in Alaska and the Middle East, although he realised that the latter had 
had political inspiration. Reporting this meeting with Waddams and the latter's 
reaction to Hayter's comments, Mason stated: 
Mr Waddams did not react nearly as strongly to Sir William Hayter's 
criticisms of the Orthodox Church as I have known him to react to much 
milder criticisms in the past. (125) 
The Foreign Office were clearly pleased to see that Vaddams was coming to 
view the issue from a similar perspective to themselves. They subsequently 
informed Hayter that Waddams' comments were rather similar to their own and 
those of the Foreign Office Research Department. (126) 
When the anti-religious drive referred to above had begun, the Foreign 
Office, with evident satisfaction, had noted its prompt seizure by the Press. 
They were less pleased with a series of articles on Russia by Patrick Sergeant 
published in the Daily Mail in October 1954, which included a favourable 
assessment of the religious situation. (12? ) Sergeant's articles were based on 
his acceptance of the Soviet challenge of actually going to Russia and seeing 
4 what sort of people we are - how we live and what we believe in. " 
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Sergeant reported the strength of the Russian Churches and Russian 
spirituality. He stated that the Churches in Russia were both free and 
flourishing, both spiritually and financially, and with congregations full to 
overflowing. He found that the anti-religious campaign was affecting neither 
church attendance nor religious freedom, and quoted one Baptist minister who 
thought the campaign actually of benefit to the churches as it aroused the 
people's interest in religion. Declaring religion to be a strong, free and 
growing force in the Soviet Union. Sergeant praised the Russian churches, 
claiming it was they which, knowingly and deliberately, would prevent the 
submission of the Russian people to Communist ideology. (128) 
The revival of anti-religious propaganda was the subject of Hayter's report 
to Eden on November 19,1954. He reported that Kruschev had signed a decree 
issued by the CPSU, "On Mistakes in Carrying out of Scientific-Atheist 
Propaganda among the Population, " which was published in Pravda. While the 
decree re-stated the Party's attitude to religion, it associated Kruschev 
personally with a particularly moderate line in a question closely affecting 
popular feelings and criticised recent excesses in anti-religious propaganda, 
stating: 
The feelings of believers must be respected and there must be no 
administrative interference in the work of religious bodies. It was 
entirely wrong to represent clergy and believers as politically 
unreliable. (129) 
Hayter insisted that the position of the Orthodox Church remained as described 
in his July despatch. Similarly, Soviet leaders remained committed to a 
thoroughly materialistic society. However, he stated that "in issuing this 
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corrective it seems to me that the party leaders deliberately took the occasion 
to make a significant shift in the general line": 
If the Party had merely wanted to check local excesses and raise 
propaganda standards, they could have done this, as they have done it 
before, by suitable articles and lectures. No decree, especially a decree 
issued with the personal authority of the Secretary of the Party, was 
necessary. It was unnecessary also for the Party to emphasise so 
categorically that the clergy and the believers in the Soviet Union are 
good citizens, and generally above political suspicion. The statement 
criticises the excesses which have occurred much more sharply than 
hitherto. I suspect that the effect of the statement will be to increase 
church attendances; religion will become almost respectable, although of 
course, only for non-party people. The statement is likely to be well 
received, not so much perhaps for the greater tolerance which it promises 
for religious practice - that would only touch a small minority of the 
population - but because the moderation in anti-religious propaganda for 
which it calls is another step away from the Russia of the purges which 
was brought to mind at the time of the Doctors's plot on January, 1953. 
While being in no sense a departure from basic Communist doctrine on 
religion, this new statement smacks of common sense rather than any 
extremism. It seems to be another step in the regime's slowly evolving 
policy of trying to turn the Soviet Union into a "normal" country, whilst 
maintaining its Marxist-Leninist basis.... the Soviet leaders want to instil 
into the people the common sense "efficient" attitude to life which they 
themselves think is necessary for the solution of the Soviet Union's 
present problems. Both religion and excess of religion are unnecessary 
distractions, and baiting of religious people merely sets up conflicts 
within Soviet society without achieving any practical purpose. (130) 
It is noteworthy that Vaddams was not summoned to the Foreign Office to read 
this Hayter despatch, as with the previous, nor was it referred to him. 
Following the Russian delegation's visit to England, the Church of England 
arranged to send an Anglican delegation to the Russian Orthodox Church in July 
1956. The prospect of this visit concerned Sir V Hayter, who viewed the 
Russian Church as a tool of the regime and wrote to Hohler in December 7,1955, 
urging caution on the Anglican delegation. (131) Hohler accordingly spoke with 
Vaddams, although he told Hayter that he had to go carefuly with the Anglican 
authorities as they did not readily accept advice from the Foreign Office about 
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their relations with other Churches: "They would, I am sure, feel that it was 
their Christian duty to give such aid and comfort as they can to Churches in 
Eastern Europe whose position under Communist rule is so appallingly difficult. " 
There was also the further consideration that as the position of these Churches 
was perfectly valid canonically, "however subservient they may be to the secular 
power, the Anglican authorities have no choice but to give them full 
recognition. " (132) 
Hohler did, however, sound a note of caution to Waddams, and was able to 
inform Hayter that: "the worthy canon, (about whom there is nothing starry- 
eyed) made it quite clear that they were aware of the pitfalls you have in 
mind. "(133) For example, the discussions in Nosow were not to disturb their 
relations with the Oecumenical Patriarch. The intention, therefore, was to go 
as far, but no further, than they already had gone in their discussions with the 
latter. (134) 
While Hayter welcomed this proposal concerning the extent of the 
discussions, he was disturbed by Hohler's remark that the Church of England did 
not readily accept advice regarding their relations with foreign churches: 
I quite see that we have to go carefully with the Church of England 
in this matter. They will surely admit, however, that the external 
relations of the Russian Church must be closely controlled by the Soviet 
Government, that any "aid and comfort" extended in this connexion to the 
Church would probably also bring "aid and comfort" to the Government, and 
that to this extent the Foreign Office is entitled to put its views 
forward. (135) 
The ambiguous attitude of the Foreign Office to the Churches in Eastern 
, 
Europe, and the problems this created for Lambeth, was again displayed in April 
1956, in regard to the visit of the Supreme Catholicos of the Armenian Church 
to the Armenian Church in Britain. Fisher had invited him to stay at Lambeth 
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Palace and had written to H. M. the Queen suggesting that she might wish to 
receive the Catholicos. He also invited the Secretary of State to a dinner 
which he was giving for the Catholicos during his visit. Added to this, CFR 
had been approached by Archbishop Toumayan, the Head of the Armenian Church in 
England, with a suggestion that the Foreign Office might be prepared to send a 
representative to meet the Catholicos when he arrived at London airport. The 
Soviet Relations Committee also considered whether they should offer 
hospitality to the Catholicos. (136) 
All these questions were considered in the Foreign Office, as was the fact 
that: "The Armenian Church, in collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church, 
has vigorously supported the Soviet 'Peace' Campaign": 
The statements of Soviet Church leaders are exploited in Soviet propaganda 
to further the current aims of Soviet foreign policy. Recognition of the 
Catholicos by H. M. G. might be used to aid Soviet subversive activities in 
the Middle East. (137) 
There was also the consideration that branches of the Armenian Church in the 
Middle East were staunchly anti-Soviet. (138) The decision was therefore taken 
that H. M. G. should not make any special effort to mark the visit of the 
Catholicos to Britain. Hohler thus recommended that the Queen was not to 
receive the Catholicos; the Secretary of State was not, to attend the dinner, and 
a Foreign Office representative would not meet him at the airport. (139) 
In the immediate post-war period, the Foreign Office had seen the 
potential of Christianity to form the core of popular resistance in Eastern 
Europe to Communism. (140) To this extent the Christian Churches there were to 
be supported. However, this perspective was sharply tempered by the fact that 
where the Christian Churches established working relations with the Communist 
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regimes, then Christianity became a means of reconciling Christians to the 
Communist authorities. The Churches were also useful in supporting the 
Communist propaganda offensive against the West. Causing yet more concern was 
the fear that the Churches could help the Soviet Union to promote Pan Slavism, 
and thus become a medium for Russian imperialist ambitions. Doubts about the 
Eastern European Christian Churches appeared confirmed to the Foreign Office 
when those Churches voiced support for the Peace Movement. From viewing these 
Churches as potential weapons of internal subversion within their own countries 
against the Communist regimes, the Foreign Office came to regard them with some 
suspicion as they recognised their potential to be used to the advantage of 
their Communist Governments against the West. (141) However, the one 
consideration did not necessarily negate the other, and there was considerable 
ambivalence and conflicting attitudes within the Foreign Office on this issue. 
Governments either side of the East-West divide saw the Churches of the 
other as national tools, and sought to use their own Churches accordingly, each 
side trying to give an appearance that in all cases the Churches gave their 
support freely, willingly and independently. This not only confronted the 
Churches with numerous difficulties at home, but put ecclesiastical relations in 
real jeopardy. United in loyalty to God, earthly allegiance divided the 
Churches. Churches either side of the divide recognised the restraints placed 
on their brethren by their respective Governments, East and Vest. The methods 
differed, but the aims did not. All the Churches understood the necessity of 
rendering unto Caesar. As the Cold War thawed more normal ecclesiastical 
relations could be pursued; as normal, that was, in a world where the demands 
of Caesar tended to displace those of God. 
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delegation from all and sundry to such an extent as almost to be embarrassing. " 
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Vaddams to Foreign Office, "Theological Conference at Moscow - July 1956", FO 
371 122981 A/RO/H/20. 
113. Ibid, Hayter to Eden, July 21,1954. 
114, Ibid. Stockwood had told the Patriarch that in his opinion there were 
some fundamental errors in the Marxist theory and asked whether in the Soviet 
Union the Church engaged in any religious propaganda to combat the growth of 
atheism. The Patriarch replied that he possessed only the vaguest ideas as to 
the details of the Marxist system. He said, however, that this system clearly 
contained much that conflicted with religious teaching but that the Orthodox 
Church had never been a Church that engaged in militant proselytizing or 
propaganda. It was the duty of the Church to carry out its functions as laid 
down, to hold its services regularly and so on; but it had never sought to 
spread the faith by fire and sword. "God will provide", said the Patriarch in 
this connection. (Account of Interview between Canon Stockwood, the Director of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Patriarch Alexei, sent by British Ambassador 
in Moscow to Vaddams. ) 
115. Ibid. In contrast to Hayter's views, were those of the Rev Sydney Linton, 
who ministered to the British community in Moscow: 
... as I see the crowds 
in the churches in Russia, I feel that Christian 
worship is a great national movement there. It is the people as a whole 
who go to church, not a class of church-goers. At least, the privileged 
classes of the regime are absent from church, but the mass of the people 
is there. The battle for religious worship does seem to have been won in 
Russia by the commom people. And however much the regime may diskike it, 
to renew persecution of the church would be to rouse wide discontent. The 
church leaders must be conscious of their power and the backing they 
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possess in the people, even though they must walk warily vis-a-vis the 
regime. 
116. Ibid. 
117. Ibid,, Richardson, minute, July 28,1954; Jellicoe, minute, July 29,1954. 
118. Ibid, Hohler, minute, August 17,1954. 
119. Ibid, Miller, minute, October 5,1954; Miller's views were repeated to 
Moscow, but not to Waddams when he was asked to read the Hayter despatch. 
120. Ibid. 
121. Ibid, Hohler, minute, August 20,1954. 
122. Ibid, Mason, minute, September 6, -1954. 
123. Ibid, Miller, minute, September 6,1954. 
124. Ibid, Masan, minute, September 24,1954. 
125. Ibid. In fact, neither Vaddams nor CFR were as indulgent towards the 
Russian Orthodox Church as the Foreign Office imagined. However, Vaddams' more 
apparent sympathy with the Foreign Office viewpoint could possibly be, in part, 
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attributed to his involvement at Evanston in establishing an Anglo-American 
group which hoped to influence both the Foreign Office and the State 
Department, which would be difficult if he were thought to take a pro-Soviet 
view. The idea for such a group originated with Waddams, and was chiefly 
concerned with discussing "matters of conflict or tension between the two 
countries; in this it emulated a major concern of the British Government as well 
as the Foreign Office. The idea was proposed to Waler van Kirk, Waddams 
stressing that "my idea was a small group of those like himself engaged pretty 
well whole time in that kind of sphere and having good contacts with the State 
Department and the Foreign Office. " Waddams' Diary, "Evanston, USA, 1954"; CFR 
Papers. 
126. Ibid, Northern Department to Moscow Embassy, October 29,1954. 
127. Ibid, Daily Mail, "I Found 'Standing Room Only' at Church in Moscow", 
Patrick Sergeant, October 19,1954, p 4. 
128. Another article which displeased the Foreign Office appeared in the 
Spectator, June 3,1955, "Church and State in the Soviet Union", p 699. Written 
by John Lawrence on his return from Moscow as part of a Christian delegation 
which had visited the Russian Patriach, it favourably reviewed the position of 
the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. Foreign Office minutes 
commented on the article: 
It seems a pity that Mr Lawrence approaches his subject with the 
inhibiting thought - "and who are we to throw stones? " We have every 
right to expose the cynical exploitation of the Orthodox Church by the 
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Soviet State. Mr Lawrence's article could have been robuster. It could 
also have been worse. 
Hibbert, June 8,1955; FO 371 116830 NS1? 82/17 
129. Ibid, Hayter to Eden, November 19,1954. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Hayter to Hohler, December 7,1955; FO 371 122981. 
132. Hohler to Hayter, February 27,1956; FO 371 122981. Hohler told Hayter 
that, rather to the surprise of the English Churchmen, "the Russians made the 
running at the Lambeth meeting and seemed very anxious to push on towards 
closer relations and even inter-communion. " While Hohler told Hayter that he 
was sure that he was right in urging caution on the English churchmen in their 
dealings with the Russian Church, he could not subscribe to his view that it 
was no more than a picturesque survival: "Any Church that has kept going under 
the pressure and persecution of the last 39 years in Russia has claims to be 
unexpectedly tough and inextinguishable". 
133. Ibid. 
134. Ibid. 
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135. Ibid; Hayter to Hohler, March 7,1956; responding to Hohler's disagreement 
with his view of the Russian Orthodox Church, Hayter said: 
As to the general condition of the Church here, I agree that it has 
considerable capacity for self-preservation. But, as you know, we have 
always been less optimistic than you as to its vitality. In my view it 
survives only because, and to the extent to which, the Soviet Government 
wishes it to survive. 
He then informed Hohler that he preferred not to press further than he had for 
a firm commitment to dates for the arrival of the British delegation: "I should 
not wish to press them further; it would minister to their superiority complex 
to the Church of England. " 
136. Ibid, Hohler, Confidential Memorandum, "Visit of the Armenian Catholicos to 
the United Kingdom", April 4,1956. 
137. Ibid. 
138. Ibid. 
139. Ibid. 
140. On July 17,1956, the Moscow Embassy sent the Foreign Office a translation 
of a Komsomol Pravda article indicating anti-religious activity: 
The article is of interest as showing that in Lithuania there seem to 
be a considerable number of young people who attend church. The author's 
suggested remedies for this state of affairs are various. He first 
suggests that more pagan festivals should be organised such as those held 
at the end of spring sowing and also popularised versions of the ancient 
Lithuanian marriage ceremony. He secondly states that, "no church can 
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bear comparison with a good club" and suggests how kolkhoz clubs can be 
improved. 
Moscow informed the Northern Department that copies of this letter were being 
sent with enclosure to IRD and FORD; and that "We shall draw the attention of 
the Church of England delegation to this article. " 
141. Even the Vatican, despite its unimpeachable anti-Communist credentials, was 
looked at askance by the Foreign Office when it seemed that some of the Pope's 
speeches on peace might lend support to the Peace Movement. See above. 
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Before the end of the Second World War, official British opposition 
to the Soviet Union, particularly its emergence as a world power, was 
manifest. At the end of the war, one of the strongest ingredients 
brought to their new offices by Attlee and Bevin in the summer of 1945 
was hostility to the Soviet Union. In certain quite crucial respects 
these two Social Democrats were front runners in world anti-Communism. 
Subsequent American hegemony over the Western alliance was encouraged by 
the Labour Government which played a vital role in establishing the 
relationship between America and Europe in which the central theme was 
anti-Sovietism. During the period of the Attlee administration the 
evolution of British subservience to the United States was significantly 
advanced as Britain lined up against the Soviet Union and espoused 
enthusiastic Cold War ideology on the international front. This caused 
Britain to lock itself into a warfare economy, with closely integrated 
defence and security-intelligence networks. 
The Cold War was clearly seen by all participants as a war on two 
fronts: abroad and at home. Internal controls over dissent were 
increased, particularly dissent from the political and military logic of 
the Cold War itself. The Cold War demanded conformity in a period which 
was characterised by the extreme polarity of left and right. This 
created a real dilemma for supporters of peace and those who advocated 
friendship with the Soviet Union, or indeed any of the new Communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe. This applied with equal force within 
spiritual institutions, despite their natural association with peace and 
reconciliation. In the Church of England pacifism was not always 
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approved, but it was generally tolerated. This tolerance was severely 
eroded by what the Anglican leadership termed the "Soviet-inspired" 
peace movement which it unequivocally condemned. The Anglican 
leadership morally endorsed the British Government's anti-Communist 
policies and spiritually sanctioned the Western anti-Soviet alliance, 
and made it quite clear that dissent was not welcome. 
On the domestic front the Church actively approved the purging of 
the state apparatus of "security risks" of doubtful "loyalty". It 
imitated the Government in labelling left-wing opinion and activity as 
"subversive" and potentially connected to the enemy abroad, and by its 
very specific intervention in the domestic political community where it 
delegitimated certain ideas while strengthening others. 
The Church was of exceptional value in projecting anti-Communism as 
a positive ideology which sought to promote and defend human rights, 
political freedom, religious toleraration and so forth. Anti-Communists 
made great use of a rhetoric which assigned a very large place to these 
essential values, despite the selectivity which they brought to their 
defence and the indulgence which they. proved willing to extend to the 
most repressive of regimes, provided they were not Communist. The 
Church not only acquiesed in this process, but on its own part 
vociferously condemned Communist persecution of religion while remaining 
silent about other forms of religious persecution perpetrated by 
supporters of the Western alliance. 
Apart from the selectivity with which both Government and Church 
manifested their concern for human rights and freedoms, they both 
applied to them an extremely circumscribed meaning. These rights were 
taken to be violated when people were deprived of the opportunity to 
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exercise elementary civic and political rights and were persecuted for 
their opposition to their government or regime. However, as Hewlett 
Johnson, the Dean of Canterbury, persistently pointed out, human rights 
were also violated when people were denied the elementary requirements 
of life. Unemployment, poverty, hunger, disease induced by destitution 
and high mortality rates are great violations of human rights which 
anti-Communists failed to address. Anti-Communism rather led to the 
acquiesence in, and even the support of, social orders responsible for 
such violations, in opposition to movements which sought to undo the 
status quo. 
The Church was an invaluable ally in the propaganda sphere of the 
Cold War. Its support for the West's anti-Communist forces greatly 
contributed to vesting the political policy of containment with the 
moral accoutrements of a spiritual crusade. The Church endorsed the 
concept of the bogey of a Soviet military threat of world-wide 
dimensions which sought to eradicate Western civilisation and destroy 
Christianity. This played an absolutely essential part in the 
development of an anti-Communist crusade theme which served to 
legitimate American and other interventionist enterprises in every part 
of the world against revolutionary and even reformist movements, on the 
principle that these movements, if allowed to grow and succeed would 
facilitate Russian expansionism aimed at world domination and the 
destruction of Western civilisation. It also served to legitimate the 
arms race. 
Despite the fact that Church leaders were genuinely horrified by the 
destructive powers of nuclear weapons, they defended and justified the 
arms race on the grounds that the Soviet Union was an aggressive power 
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against which a nuclear deterrent was the only realistic alternative 
able to maintain the peace while preventing Soviet domination. 
Moreover, the rejection by Western statesmen of Soviet overtures 
directed toward limiting the arms race and securing peace received 
ecclesiastical support on the grounds that it was impossible to 
negotiate with regimes whose ideology denied the dignity of human 
beings. 
When the Churches in Eastern Europe called on their brethren in the 
West to give their support to the Soviet peace movement, the Western 
Churches reiterated the political stand of their Western governments 
that the peace movement was a Soviet ploy to exploit people's desire for 
peace as part of their strategy of eventual world domination. By 
supporting the call for peace, the East European Churches were alleged 
by their Western counterparts to have become tools of Soviet 
expansionism. This created a spiritual divide which parallelled the 
political divide between East and West. A further divide within the 
Churches existed between left and right. 
The Anglican Church had within it a strong tradition of Christian 
Socialism. However, with the descent of the blanket of conformity which 
comprised the Cold War, progressive views within the Church became 
increasingly unwelcome and subject to systematic attack. The Christian 
Socialists within the Anglican Church presented it with similar problems 
to those with which the modern Catholic Church has been confronted by 
liberation theology. Both begin with the position of the oppressed and 
read the Gospel from the point of view of the poor. In the immediate 
post-war period the Church of England could ill afford to be seen to be 
taking the part of the more affluent sectors of British society against 
_ý 
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the working classes; nor could it appear to be witch-hunting, 
particularly given the British distaste for McCarthyism, when it was a 
putatively politically tolerant institution. 
The outbreak of the Korean War hardened sentiment against Communism, 
and the perceived association in this period between not simply 
socialists, but political dissidents of all degrees, peace campaigners 
particularly, and the Soviet "enemy", encouraged the Church to take a 
more decisive line against its politically "turbulent" priests. This 
was particularly evident in the cases of Hewlett Johnson and Stanley 
Evans, both of whom were critics of Britain's Cold War policies, were 
opposed to the Anglo-American alliance, condemned the Korean War and 
advocated peace and friendship and trade with the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European regimes. 
At the end of the Second World War, Social Democracy amd 
Christianity both found themselves poised in commanding positions on the 
world stage. In a war-torn world, where reconstruction and the building 
of new and better societies which would safeguard against the recurrence 
of a major war headed the priorities of most peoples, Social Democracy 
and Christianity were presented with both the challenge and the 
opportunity to establish themselves as popular movements, as well as to 
restructure the social order and implement more just and humane systems. 
These aspirations were, however, undermined by the Cold War and the 
traditional anti-Communism with which the leadership of both were 
imbued. By concentrating their post-war efforts on the containment of 
the Soviet Union and the stemming of the growth of Communism, Social 
Democratic and Christian forces contributed to the resurgence of 
reaction and their own eclipse as counter-revolutionary and conservative 
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powers came to the fore in the post-war world they had helped to create. 
In 1951 the Labour Government not only conceded power to a Tory 
Government headed by Winston Churchill, but left it without any 
effective socialist opposition as its own anti-Communist offensive had 
defeated the major forces of the Left, leaving them blunted and confused 
by the Cold War itself. 
World War II had revealed to the Church the power of moral authority 
and the desire of people for a coherent and just system such as that 
promised in the New Testament. Ecclesiastic leaders perceived the 
potential in the post-war world for Christianity and the Church to 
reassert their influence both at the state level and in the hearts and 
minds of the common man. However, where their collusion with Government 
during the war and their opposition to Nazism had worked to their 
advantage, their collusion with Government after the war and their 
opposition to Communism did not effect the same impact. Both Fisher and 
Garbett were suspicious and wary of the socialist reforms effected by 
the Labour Government and reserved their most enthusiastic support for 
the Government's anti-Soviet foreign policy. The inability of the 
Anglican leadership to abandon their role as an institution of the 
Establishment and overcome the prejudices of their class and side with 
the cause of the common people on the domestic front alienated the 
Church of England from the ordinary man. 
On the international front, Anglican support of British anti-Soviet 
policies created a rift between them and those Churches in the Eastern 
bloc which sought a modus vivendi similar to that enjoyed by their 
sister Churches with Western Governments. At the same time, the 
Anglican leadership found itself unable to comply with the demands of 
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the American President Truman to join in the creation of a religious 
anti-Communist front directed against the Soviet Union. This had 
nothing to do with ethics nor opposition to organised anti-Communism. 
There was recognition of the design as part of the plan for American 
domination and a feeling that it was too blatant a propaganda exercise. 
Also, deep-seated Anglican antipathy to Roman Catholicism and a 
conviction of superiority over other world religions prevented the 
Anglican leadership from committing itself to a religious anti-Communist 
crusade headed by the Pope and including diverse other faiths. 
Anti-Communism divided the Churches East to West and right to left. 
The Second World War opened doors of opportunity for both Social 
Democracy and Christianity to assert themselves in Britain and 
throughout the world. Their submission to Cold War forces lost them 
these opportunities. The tragedy of Social Democracy was that its 
preoccupation with defeating Communism, perceived as a political and 
ideological rival, led to its failure to implement Socialism and 
contributed to its own political demise in favour of the class enemy of 
both Communism and Socialism. Similarly, the tragedy of the Churches 
was that they failed to implement Christianity. Like the Social 
Democrats, Christian leaders saw in Communism a rival, and had no 
hesitation in calling it a rival religion which they feared would have 
more appeal to the working classes than a Christianity much debased by 
centuries of political intrigue and association with the ruling classes. 
Yet again, however, in the effort to render unto Ceasar the things that 
were Ceasars' and unto God the things that were of God, the leadership 
of the Church of England got the balance wrong and allowed too much 
political accomodation and cooperation. 
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In many ways the post-war struggle against Communism must have 
appeared to the Anglican leadership as an ideal means for the Church on 
the level of state to re-establish its position as an authoritative 
institution, while, on the level of the people, to proselytize amongst 
the less privileged sectors, those most susceptible to the promise of 
Communism. By joining forces with the Government, however, and allowing 
itself to be used for political ends, the Church ultimately undermined 
its own authority and alienated those very classes it sought to win. 
One of the declared aims of anti-Communism was to save Christian 
civilisation from Communism. In the process the Churches were mobilized 
and manipulated politically. The effect was to compromise the Churches 
and discredit Christianity. 
5%1- 
Post-war Britain might have escaped the extreme purges of the McCarthyism 
which plagued Cold War America; the files of the National Council for Civil 
Liberties, however, prove that Britain suffered from an anti-Communist campaign 
which extended, as in America, beyond the persecution of Communists to include 
people of progressive and liberal thought and even to those who were mere 
associates of such people. (1) While the British purges might not have been as 
extensive or as violent as the American, still they served the same essential 
purpose; to demonstrate that certain beliefs and associations were wrong and 
would not be tolerated. Like their American counterparts, they began at the 
centre, within government institutions, and then spread. 
There are a number of reasons why the British purges never reached the 
extremes of those in America. Britain had a Socialist Government in the 
immediate post-war period, and while it initiated the witch-hunting against 
Communists', it was wary of its being extended too wide and thus attacking the 
base of its own support; although this did happen, particularly after the Tories 
took power in 1951. Naturally, the Tory opposition gave full support to the 
anti-Communist measures of the Labour Government. Ironically, had they tried 
to institute such measures, they would have encountered strong Socialist 
opposition. 
Inevitably, concentrating public fear on the Left eroded Labours own power 
base and aided the Tories. Once in power, the Tory Government proved far less 
discriminating than had, the Labour Government, and the epitaph "Communist" was 
liberally applied to all who opposed Tory policy, although this process had, in 
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all fairness, begun under Labour, particualrly with application to those who 
supported the peace movement or friendship with the Eastern regimes. 
One of the most interesting facets which distinguished the British purges 
from the American, was the degree of caution applied. In America left-wingers 
were witch-hunted with an almost gay abandon, and McCarthy enjoyed, at least 
initially, an overwhelming amount of public and Republican support. In Britain 
Vansittart was dubbed "Lord Witch-hunt" and held up to general ridicule by the 
press which had vowed to keep Britain free from the McCarthyism which was seen 
as tainting their allies across the Atlantic. The British public was genuinely 
appalled by McCarthy and McCarthyism. Until 1948 official British foreign 
policy had been friendship with Russia. While the vast majority of the British 
people and were overwhelmingly opposed to Communism in Britain, they preferred 
some sort of modus vivendi with the Communist regimes to a relationship of 
tension and conflict which might lead to war. 
Concern existed at all levels of British society that rampant McCarthyism 
might take America into waters into which Britain preferrred not to venture. 
This meant a certain caution in the domestic application of the British purge 
in comparison to the unrestrained abandon of the American version. In Britain, 
where security was involved, the charge of Communism, or association with 
Communism, was regarded as valid. In other areas, while Communism or, more 
ususally, progressive opinion was the motivating factor for removing a suspect 
from their post, alternative causes would often be cited. This guarded against 
possible charges of witch-hunting and a public outcry against "McCarthyism". 
There were certain commercial institutions which unashamedly and unreservedly 
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emulated McCarthy tactics. Establishment institutions, however, particularly 
the Universities and the Church, preferred a more cautious approach. (3) 
The Church of England was at that time traditionally known as the "Tory 
Party at prayer", a perception it sought to dispel in the post-war world as it 
strived to establish a broader base of support in British society. Adverse 
perceptions of the Anglican Church were partially ameliorated between the wars, 
owing to the commitment of many Anglican ecclesiastics to the alleviation of 
the worst of the social evils associated with poverty. This was, however, a 
preoccupation of many in that era and not just the Church. Nor did Church 
concern with the more blatant social consequences of the industrial era 
eradicate its opposition to the Left, particularly Communism but also Socialism. 
In the Cold War, the Church had few reservations about proclaiming its staunch 
opposition to the atheism of Communism, but it was careful not to attack those 
principles of Communism which appealed to the working classes. It was 
recognised that not to acknowledge the positive aspects of Communist doctrine, 
many of which were akin to Christian principles, would have identified the 
Church with reaction and alienated the very people to whom the Church looked 
for post-war support. 
Stanley Evans was an Anglican clergyman whose commitment to the working 
class movement and to left-wing causes denied him employment in the Church for 
many years. Throughout those years, Evans was left in no doubt by his 
ecclesiastical superiors that it was his politcal activites which caused his 
unemployment. In the McCarthy years, the early fifties, rather than leave 
themselves expose the Church to charges of witch-hunting, the diocese of 
London, to which Evans was attached, denied that Evans' political beliefs were 
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the cause of his non-employment and, while emphasising that the Church was 
indifferent to his political beliefs and wished only to help him, endeavoured to 
dispose of what threatened to become a controversial issue by appointing Evans 
to a poor living away from the public eye. 
The Church looked with disfavour and disapproval on politically active 
clergymen with inclinations towards socialism. Although this remained a 
constant feature of the Church leadership, its expression differed according to 
the political climate. During the war, prior to the Anglo-Soviet alliance, it 
was expressed to Stanley Evans in no uncertain terms in a letter from the 
Bishop of Barking. During the McCarthy years, wary of political controversy, 
disapproval of Evans' political activity was equally strong, but condemnation 
was confined to oral messages as care was taken not to compromise the Church. 
A letter such as that sent to Evans by the Bishop of Barking in February 1941 
would have been inconceivable after the war, although the sentiments remained 
unchanged. Barking's amazing letter, replete with deliberate grammatical and 
spelling errors, was remarkable not simply for its sheer effrontery, but for the 
Bishop's absolute confidence that he could blatantly decry both the workers 
movement and the Soviet Union without any thought of political repercussions. 
The immunity of the Church leadership from political considerations concerning 
the working classes is illustrated by the sarcasm and absence of any note of 
respect in Barking's letter to Evans, then a young curate in his care: 
My dear Evans 
I an sending you an further cheque - thinking things over I realise 
that you have been severely underpaid by that vicar - it so often happens 
that those who talk most about sweating etc are the worst offenders - of 
course we are rather pleased about this because we have trying to catch 
your vicar out for some time and now let him raise his voice about wages! 
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Of course we were very sorry for you when you went there. We knew 
the whole thing would be a failure and thank goodness it has been. As you 
know I was very much against his going there at all but Henry would have 
it and said it "would certainly quiet him". Of course between ourselves we 
never thought he would be able to get a curate at all but you let yourself 
in for it without asking us. 
I will let you have some more cheques from time to time but think it 
better that it comes this way so that we can still have it up against 
Putterill. 
Nay I say how delighted we are that you are on the National 
Committee - it is splendid that the church is represented in the midst of 
the workers' movement - it is good for us to have a footing in this camp 
so that if the workers do bring anything off (which we pray earnestly 
that they wont) then we can cash in on it. And between ourselves if they 
make you an Archbishop of Canterbury do remember me for Winchester, I 
have always wanted to go there - Please dont breathe a word about this 
especially to Putterill. 
Of course if you could desert the movement and the workers at some 
stage and denounce Russia you can rely on anything from us - there are 
some very good livings that would suit you about £1000 a year and good 
sailing and fishing and golf. 
We are not at all keen for you to stay on at St Andrews - it will be much 
better to have you in a decent living and somewhere near to your National 
Committee work - perhaps one of the city livings ) preferably one of the 
demolished Churches - you wouldnt want to be bothered with a congregation 
- it would seem strange to you coming from St Andrews. I shall do all I 
can for you and keep you well in mind. Please understand that all I said 
about your getting married was a pure blind to rattle Putterill. If you 
could let us have any scandal about him we should be delighted and reward 
you handsomely. Please remember my daughter and I to your delightful wife 
and daughter and rely on me for everything - Remember me to Pritt and Dut 
- 3/4 splendid fellows. By the way is that Charles a friend of yours - 
he's a splendid fellow and we should like to have him in the soup diocese 
- do remebre us to him when you see him. 
Cheerio another cheque following. 
J. T. Barking. (4) 
Stanley Evans trained at Mirfield, home to the Community of the 
Resurrection, from 1929 to 1935, before being ordained in the Diocese of London. 
He was ardently committed to the workers movement and following his ordination 
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became actively involved with a number of London and national organisations at 
committee level, including the Industrial Christian Fellowship in 1937; the 
London Federation of Peace Councils in 1936, and the International Peace 
Campaign in 1937. At the same time he publicly censured British policy toward 
Spain and India and was a vocal opponent of Colonialism. On December 20,1938, 
he led a deputation to Mr Butler on behalf of Spain and against the granting of 
belligerent rights to Franco. On February 22,1939, he led a deputation to Lord 
Plymouth, emphatically protesting against the possible recognition of Franco by 
the British Government. On June 11,1939, he was part of the Hyde Park 
demonstration that condemned the delay of the National Government in concluding 
a pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Thereafter, up until the 
Anglo-Soviet Alliance in mid-1941 following the Nazi invasion of Russia, Evans 
was opposed to the war which he saw as a conflict between rival Empires. 
For Evans, political activity was an extension of his Christian ministry. 
Writing in the sixties, following his disillusion with the Soviet Union and his 
break with the British Communist party following the Russian invasion of 
Hungary in 1956, Evans elucidated his perception of Christianity and of faith, 
which in turn elucidated why an Anglican clergyman had become a political 
activist, often supporting causes which his own Church despised. For Evans 
there was "no such thing as Christianity apart from a way of living in 
community with God and man, a way of living which is according to the whole 
and which is therefore Catholic. "(5) With regard to faith, Evans was "not 
concerned at all with faith in the abstract, with faith in and for itself, with 
faith as a dogmatic assertion for dogmatism's sake": his concern was more with 
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"faith as a handmaid to living.... Faith is the means to the end, not the end 
itself". (6) 
Evans believed that, "He that doeth the will shall know the doctrine", as 
being a fundamental principle of the Church. Faith was the handmaid to the 
living of a Christian life, "as a navigational aid to those who would be in the 
way that leads to God's Kingdom, and not as an academic exercise for members of 
a hydrographical department who have lost their taste for putting to sea, or as 
a reflective study for those who would spend their days lying quietly at 
anchor"(7) There was an implicit criticism of the Church in this analogy 
which expressed Evans' conviction that the Church should be "on the march with 
man", a participant, an activist. Only then could the Church have any real 
meaning in the life of man, any real hope of renewing man's faith and 
performing God's will: 
The renewal of our faith begins and must begin in action, in the 
service of man in all his needs. A Catholic faith which is afraid to 
discuss the morality of nuclear weapons is wrong to talk of renewal, it 
can only prepare for atrophy. In all his need man must find the Church 
by his side, whatever the need may be, There is no situation which the 
Church has any right to avoid. 
The renewal of the faith is to be found in marching with man for the 
future of man, in the practical reassertion of the doctrine of God's 
Kingdom, because there the Church encounters its Lord. Man is not God, 
but he is the glory of God, and it is here that the divine image is to be 
found. (8) 
In the intellectual debate which fed Cold War propaganda, one of the most 
important questions concerned the compatability of Communism and Christianity. 
Christianity repudiated the concept that a purely materialistic outlook could 
provide an adequate basis for human life. Many churchmen of that era, however, 
perceived Marxism as having the potential to incorporate religion. Evans 
shared that perception. Writing in the sixties, he stated: 
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It (Marxism) is a serious philosophy which starts from a recognition of 
the objective reality of the external world, and while it starts from 
matter it is acutely aware of the changing of quantity into quality and 
the existence of the mental and the Spiritual. It sees no need of the 
hypothesis of God and regards contemporary religion as "opium for the 
people". On the other hand, it makes an acute study of the process of 
historical development which it sees proceeding in a recognisable 
direction which it would call purposive, if such a phrase would not be the 
admission of theism by the back-door. Archbishop Temple regarded it as 
the only serious philosophy of the 20th Century apart from theism. (9) 
In the post-war period Evans considered that Marxism, with a Christian impetus, 
could help achieve the Kingdom of God on earth. 
One churchman who continually tried to help Evans find a position within 
the Church commensurate with his abilities, regardless of his left-wing 
activities and associations, was the Rev 0H Gibbs-Smith. Although Gibbs-Smith 
did not share Evans' political convictions, nor his vision, he subscribed to the 
idea that it was people with conviction and vision who could most stimulate and 
carry forward the work of the Church. On March 23,1942, Gibbs-Smith, who was 
then Rector to a combination of parishes in St John's Vood, asked Evans if he 
would like to work with him. (10) A mutual acquaintance subsequently advised 
Evans of Gibbs-Smith's attitude and of his own feelings on the matter: 
He seems obviously very keen and was quite happy about your 
political line etc - indeed seemed keen to get someone who had given much 
thought to a special sphere of Christian responsibility but could be 
trusted to fulfil the other functions of pastoral and priestly care... 
There seems little doubt that he is ready to give you scope to do any 
good you can - partly out of sheer joy at finding someone who has fresh 
visions of his function and ministry. And on the whole I think he is 
right that in such a situation you would have more scope in preaching and 
ministering to the unconverted than in many of the alternative spheres 
where one is mainly talking to those who already agree... 
My own opinion, which I am diffident to press, is that if nothing 
obviously more fitting has presented itself, you would be well advised to 
accept and plan out the scope of the job as colleagues rather than Vicar 
and assistant. It will I think open up real opportunities of valuable work 
and of preaching the Word and what follows depends upon your own ability 
and the movement of the Spirit. (11) 
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Evans gave valuable service during this period, including being an 
officiating chaplain to the Air Force during the war; reporting, under the 
chairmanship of the Archdeacon of London, on the answers to the questions 
submitted to the clergy at the Bishop's Primary Visitation, and being a member 
of the Dean of St Paul's Committee which prepared the message for the Mission 
to London, quite apart from the manifest duties imposed by day to day parish 
work. In 1946 Evans resigned his post in St John's 'Wood at the request of the 
diocese in order to facilitate the ecclesiastical reorganisation of the area. He 
was told that his action was appreciated and that as soon as a suitable post 
was vacant he would be appointed. In the post-war period the Church was 
desparately short of man-power. Evans was a first-rate scholar who had 
rendered services to the Chapter of St Pauls as a scholar of mediaeval Latin. 
He was an accomplished writer and preacher. His admirers state, and his 
detractors concede, that he had a piercing intellect, was a wonderful orator and 
was possessed of a great capacity for hard work. (12) Yet the years passed and 
the promised post never materialised. 
In 1953, Evans had been seventeen years in Orders, but remained without an 
independent sphere of work in the diocese. Without a permanent position since 
1946, he had been forced to rely on temporary postings, occasional offerings 
and work outside the Church such as teaching and journalism. (13) Gibbs-Smith, 
then Archdeacon of London, valued Evans' abilities and advised him to write 
direct to the Bishop when his own efforts on his behalf proved futile. (14) In 
advising Evans what to say and what to emphasise in his letter to the Bishop, 
the terminology used by Gibbs-Smith was a crucial indicator of the nature of 
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the proceedings and that Gibbs-Smith, on his part, had no doubt but that it was 
Evans' politics which were responsible for his ecclesiastical non-employment: 
State your politics are left-wing (as he knows) but that you are not and 
never have been a member of the Communist Party (Refer to your interview 
with him). (15) 
Up until the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Evans followed the 
Communist line implicitly on all the major issues of the day, and he was 
suspected in many quarters of being an actual Party member. He was certainly 
suspect at Lambeth where Herbert Waddams, Secretary of the Church of England 
Council on Foreign Relations, informed the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey 
Fisher, that John Lawrence had been told that Evans definitely was a Communist 
Party member: 
John Lawrence told me this morning that he had heard from a reliable 
friend of his who has been a very active fellow-traveller and was now an 
Anglican that Stanley Evans was and has for a long time been a member of 
the Communist Party and that it was the Party which had ordered him to 
become a parson. John Lawrence thinks this may be true: if it is it 
presumably means that Evans is not a Christian at all in anything but 
name. (16) 
Passing this information to the Archbishop at the rquest of Waddams, 
Fisher's chaplain expressed doubt about the presumption: 
Evans may be, and probably is a member of the Communist Party now. He 
was at Mirfield for five or six years 1929 to 1935. I cannot think that 
he pulled the wool over the eyes of all the acute members of C. R. who were 
there at that time. Some time ago Gibbs-Smith told me that they were 
always able to trust Evans absolutely in any preaching engagements of 
locum duty he undertook in London not to preach Communism, though of 
course they know that outside the Church he is active in Communistic 
circles. (18) 
When Evans was interviewed for an appointment to Willesden in May 1954, 
the Dean commented that he had been assured that Evans did not preach politics 
from the pulpit and asked was that true. Evans said it was, noting that he was 
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unusual in that he did not discuss Russia in services. This, of course, was an 
implicit criticism of the right-wing of the Church which frequently addressed 
the subject of Russia in that period, usually in decidedly unfriendly terms. (19) 
In April 1953, when Evans wrote to the Bishop of London regarding his 
unemployment, he insisted that he was not a member of any political party: 
.... I an aware that the fact that my political opinions are left-wing is 
the occasion of a measure of suspicion but it is perhaps right to add that 
I am not a member of any political party and that the cause which I have 
most espoused, that of friendship between East and Vest, is of fundamental 
importance not only for our national future but also for the future of 
Christianity as a whole. (20) 
Subsequently Evans was received by the Bishop in the May and was advised 
that if he were given an appointment, "there might be criticism", the 
implication being that the criticism would be of a political nature. At that 
time Evans was deeply involved in the "Save the Rosenbergs Campaign", a 
politically controversial and sensitive issue which was commonly regarded as 
being of Communist inspiration and intended to discredit the United States. (21) 
At the end of July Evans was informed by Christian Action, an organisation 
formed by Canon Collins of St Paul's which initially enjoyed the support of the 
Anglican leadership, but which was withdrawn after Collins proved a trifle too 
independent, that Clifford Rhodes, editor of the Church of England Newspaper 
would be happy to address the problem of his inability to secure work in the 
diocese. This was a significant development because Evans had frequently 
criticised the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet stance of the Church of England 
Newspaper in his newsletter Religion and the People. Nonetheless, illustrating 
the depth of British revulsion against American McCarthyism and the 
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determination to guard against political witch-hunting in Britain, Rhodes was 
willing to publicise the dilemma of his erstwhile detractor. (22) 
Although Evans did not take up the offer, at the end of November, still 
without a living, he once more approached the Bishop, this time mentioning that 
one of the Church newspapers had asked confirmation of the story that his 
ecclesiastical unemployment had a political basis. Evans added that while this 
particular journal had stated its disagreement with his views, they felt bound 
to oppose political victimisation in the Church of England. Evans informed the 
Bishop that he had evaded any kind of reply, but was apprehensive that a 
refusal to answer actually implied an answer: 
... I have no desire to state that 
the answer to their question is 'yes' but 
a categorical 'no' would, I fear, be less than honest. 
I have always tried to avoid publicity of this kind but it is not 
possible, as I am sure your Lordship will understand, wholly to obscure 
the fact that I am seeking work. 
I should much welcome your advice in this matter. (23) 
To which the Bishop of London succinctly replied: 
I don't think you need have any hesitation in telling your enquirers 
that your failure to secure ecclesiastical employment is not due to your 
political views. Clergymen of the Church of England are free to hold what 
political views they like. (24) 
Evans' experience within the Church and with the Bishop was, of course, in 
direct contradiction to the Bishop's statement, to which Evans effected a 
"perplexed" rejoinder. He told the Bishop that "as the years have passed, on 
the rare occasion when I have seen a member of the Diocesan staff it has never 
been suggested that the hesitance to appoint which had arisen was due to 
anything but questions of politics "(25) Evans reminded the Bishop that at 
their last interview in May, he had implied the same himself. Evans stated 
that if his non-employment was not owing to the political reasons he had 
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always been given to understand, then he wished to be told what the reason was, 
"for in the one hand it is obviously right that I should exercise my ministry 
and on the other I have a family to keep and am in need of church. "(26) 
In his reply to Evans the Bishop provided no alternative reason, but 
repeated his assurances that politics were not involved and that there were 
simply no suitable posts vacant. Significantly, however, the Bishop informed 
Evans that "the Archdeacon of London has told me this morning that he is 
prepared to have a talk with you and explain the position to you by word of 
mouth. You will be hearing from him in the near future. "(27) Evans heard from 
the Archdeacon the very next day, and what, he had to say proved that the 
Bishop was guarding himself against any possible political repercussions by 
refusing to put the real reasons for Evans' situation in writing. It also 
proved that the Bishop was aware that his action would not meet with public 
approbation. It was equally an illustration of how the Church sought to conceal 
its true political identity. 
On the eve of the Rosenberg execution, Evans had led a dramatic last- 
minute appeal direct from the London demonstrations to Churchill at Chequers. 
Appeals for clemency in this case had come from virtually all the major 
European leaders, including the Pope and the French hierarchy, and it was widely 
believed that Churchill's influence with Eisenhower could tip the balance if 
only he would intervene on their behalf. Churchill's repudiation of the 
delegation and his refusal to appeal for clemency was reported throughout the 
media the following day when the Rosenberg execution dominated the news. At 
its climax the clemency campaign had the support of all the major organs of the 
British press and the sympathy of most of the British people, and Churchill was 
- 594 - 
furious with Evans for placing him in the invidious position of withholding his 
support from what had become a popular cause. Gibbs-Smith told Evans that the 
Bishop had been informed of Churchill's displeasure by the Prime Minister's 
secretary. He had been exceedingly embarrassed. (28) 
Evans understood from his conversation with Gibbs-Smith that where his 
chances of ecclesiastical employment had not been favourable at the beginning 
of the year, inciting the Prime Minister's wrath had considerably worsened his 
already less than auspicious prospects. Evans discussed his predicament with 
two friends and fellow Christian Socilaists, the Labour M. P. Tom Driberg and the 
Reverend Jack Putterill. Both were outraged and determined to pursue the matter 
with the Bishop, a fact of which Evans informed Gibbs-Smith. (29) Putterill 
subsequently informed Evans that he had sent the Bishop a ten page letter in 
which "you can be assured I have not spared plain speaking! I trust it will 
disturb him and provoke him into action - ". 
Putterill's missive had the desired effect. The Bishop subsequently 
summonsed Gibbs-Smith and spoke about Evans in "the most friendly terms". He 
claimed to respect Evans' position and hoped to find something suitable for 
him. He also declared himself to be entirely happy for Gibbs-Smith to approach 
the Bishop of Chelmsford or some other patron on Evans' behalf, although with 
the proviso of, "it being understood that we should be perfectly frank with 
them about the difficulties which have arisen in this Diocese over the question 
of a living. " The Bishop even expressed concern for the needs of Evans' family 
as Christmas approached and gave Gibbs-Smith a £25 cheque to give to Evans, 
"from a private fund at the Bishop's personal disposal". (30) 
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On his part, Evans expressed gratitude for the Bishop's kind message and 
gift and indicated his own willingness to "welcome the offer of a living from 
any patron. " Although heartened, Evans clearly felt that the ill treatment 
accorded him by the Diocese of London, and his claim against it, should not be 
simply disregarded in the light of the new developments : 
I do honestly think that any such approach should not be allowed to 
obscure the fact that I have a claim against the Diocese of London and 
that 'the difficulties' which are supposed to have arisen are only 
difficulties so long as the Diocesan authorities insist on regarding them 
as such and that to have played any part in a movement to try to save the 
lives of two people is not something which should be held against a cleric 
even of the Church of England! (31) 
This prompted yet more plain speaking from the Bishop, through his 
emissary the Archdeacon of London. Evans received a request to telephone the 
Archdeacon, who reiterated and emphasised on the telephone the great 
embarrassment the Downing Street business had caused the Bishop, although he 
concurred that of course a man must not be penalised for acting according to 
his conscience; he was thus doing all he could to secure a position for Evans. 
Some possibilities were then mentioned. Of particular interest in the course of 
their dialogue, was the introduction of an hitherto unmentioned factor allegedly 
effecting Evans' employment prospects. It was now claimed that part of the 
difficulty supposedly lay with Church Councils. (32) This latter consideration 
had first been used by the Bishop in his letter to Tom Driberg in explanation 
of Evans inability to secure a living. This shifting of the onus of 
responsibility from the leadership to the laity was a very firm indication of 
how worried the Bishop was about the whole affair, particularly when it was an 
allegation that was to be proved to have no foundation. His increasing concern 
over the Evans'case was reflected in his giving a further financial donation to 
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help the Evans family. Gibbs-Smith informed Evans, in concluding the above 
conversation, that another cheque was being sent to him as the Bishop was 
worried about his financial position and did not want his family to suffer. 
Evans was told that if in need of money he was to go to the Bishop who would 
"find a way. " 
When Evans originally disclosed his situation to Tom Driberg, he had sent 
him copies of the correspondence with the Bishop in which the latter had denied 
that political considerations were the reason for Evans not being offered a 
position, following which Gibbs-Smith had specifically informed him by word of 
mouth that it was exactly such considerations which were responsible for his 
situation. Evans explained: 
Following the last letter I saw the Archdeacon of London on Tuesday, 
December 8, who then informed me he was directed by the Bishop to say 
that my name had been on the list from which appointments are made, that 
my name had not been removed from the list, but that the situation had 
been changed by the fact that some time ago the Bishop had been informed 
by the Prime Minister's secretary that I had led a deputation to the Prime 
Minister on the question of the Rosenbergs which had caused embarrassment 
to Downing Street. This communication had naturally caused embarrassment 
to the Bishop and had made the question of an appointment 'more 
difficult'. (33) 
Driberg subsequently wrote himself to the Bishop, enclosing a copy of 
Evans' letter, stating: 
I do not myself share all Mr Evans's political views, and he is associated 
with organisations to which members of the Party to which I belong are 
not permitted to belong. Nevertheless, there are aspects of this episode 
which seem to be disquieting, paricularly the intervention by the Prime 
Minister, in view of his constitutional position as adviser to the Crown 
on ecclesiastical preferment. ((34) 
The Bishop replied with what Driberg later termed to Evans "an 
extraordinary letter. "(35) The Bishop told Driberg: 
It is good of you to interest yourself in the case of Stanley Evans. 
This chap is his own worst enemy. We don't care two hoots about his 
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politics, as you can imagine, but every time we are on the verge of doing 
something for him he gets himself in the headlines, and then of course no 
Churchwardens or Parochial Church Council would consider accepting him, 
and we have to let the thing die down before we can start again. 
I don't know what he has got in mind about the Prime Minister, but I 
can assure you that there is not the slightest truth in the suggestion 
that the Prime Minister intervened in his case in the slightest degree. I 
am sure that Evans would not intentionally make a false statement, but he 
must be under some very odd misapprehension somewhere. (36) 
A similar line was taken with Putterill who informed Evans: 
It looks to me as if they intend denying all knowledge of Churchill's 
reprimand - which explains why it wasn't written in the first place. They 
likewise fear any political bias - and put the case solely on the 
difficulty of presentation - ". (37) 
The Bishop's categorical denial of political considerations and of Churchill's 
intervention, deflated Putterill's hopes of marshalling a campaign on Evans' 
behalf: "They are acting with considerable caution and I don't want to do 
anything to make your position worse - ". 
The Church's solution to the problem created by Evans was to isolate him 
with an appointment to a poor living away from his political activities in 
London and hopefully keep him out of the public eye. In February 1954, Gibbs- 
Smith asked Evans if he wanted a nomination to Mucking in Essex, frankly 
disclosing that it was the sort of place designed, I imagine, to kill the soul 
of any man who undertakes it. "(37) This placed Evans in a dilemma, for if he 
refused it the Diocese would be able to claim they had found an appointment for 
Evans and he had turned it down, and thus keep him waiting indefinitely. Evans 
sought advice from another left-wing ecclesiastic, Hewlett Johnson, who had also 
suffered political victimisation at the hands of the Church authorities having 
incurred the wrath of the secular powers. Evans wrote: 
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I an now offered by St Paul's the Parish of Mucking, a little place 
between Tilbury and Canvey where they deposit the contents of London 
dustbins. It has a population of about 750... What ought I to do? (38) 
Johnson and his wife Nowell both cautioned against Evans refusing the 
offer. Aware that the Church had played a very clever hand which left Evans 
without recourse, and sensible to Evans' natural dejection, the position being 
far removed from what a man of his dedication and abilities aspired to, still 
they knew that the simple provision of a parish for a man of Evans' political 
convictions would still displease the Church authorities. They thus introduced 
a note of levity into their advice to Evans, illustrating that they were fully 
aware of how the Church authorities regarded them and others of their political 
ilk: 
The parish is not what should have been offered to you, perhaps there was 
nothing else available at the moment! 
But the offer having been made we think you would be ill advised to 
refuse it. To do so would remove a valuable weapon from your hands. And 
the offer is a stepping stone... It opens a gap into security at any 
rate. (39) 
The humorous approach was also taken by Putterill who gave the same 
advice: "- and as to Muck perhaps St Paul had this place in mind when he said 
condescend to things of low estate. "(40) Evans thus informed Gibbs-Smith that 
if Mucking were to be offered him he would accept it, although he made no 
attempt to disguise the fact that it was in no sense what he would have liked, 
and that he recognised it as a form of banishment. He equally recognised that 
within the limitations imposed upon him, Gibbs-Smith had done what he could to 
help Evans, for which Evans expressed his gratitude and also apologised to 
Gibbs-Smith for all the trouble he had caused him. (41) 
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Following the first tentative offer of Mucking, made on February 12,1954, 
Evans received a telephone call from Canon Collins of St Paul's who had the 
nomination of Willesden and wanted to nominate Evans. Collins told Evans that 
he had charged Gibbs-Smith to discuss the proposition with the Bishop of 
London, confident that his support could be gained as at that time the Church 
was suffering a great deal of adverse publicity over the Harman affair. Harman 
was an Anglican priest with pacifist convcictions who had lost his living owing 
to his attendance at a peace conference. (42) At that time Tom Driberg was 
raising the matter in the House and had already secured the support of 150 
M. P. s. Collins told Evans that the Bishop was "in a state of diarrhoea" as 
Evans was still without a job and it seemed likely that his case would also be 
brought to the attention of the House and also to that of the public. (43) 
Driberg had, in fact, already approached Evans, as he was quite prepared to 
include his case in the campaign for Harman. Evans was, however, more 
concerned to secure work within the Church than to use its treatment of him as 
a means of exposing its reactionary attitudes. This in itself is an interesting 
comment on Evans and his commitment to his priesthood. Evans told Driberg on 
March 14,1954 that he preferred to secure the Willesden posting which it 
seemed the Harman case could make possible: 
I don't know whether you have yet got any further with the matter we 
discussed but the signatures you have collected in the Harman case have 
transformed the situation and Falkner is in full flight! A London job is 
under discussion at the moment and looks as if it will come off. The 
whole story is very complex and I will gladly tell it you whenever you 
have a moment to spare, but at this precise moment publicity would stop it 
and I would suggest therefore, provided nothing has yet gone too far, 
suspending any question of publicity until we see the outcome of their 
latest moves. (44) 
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Although this letter of the 14th revealed optimism, on March 10 Evans had 
been informed by Gibbs-Smith that there were "more problems about Mucking than 
we thought" and that the P. C. C. seemed unwilling to accept Gibbs-Smith's 
nomination and that the Bishop of Chelmsford was not prepared to insist on 
Evans' appointment. Gibbs-Smith was clearly suspicious of and disgusted by 
this turn of events: "There is a feeling (and I think we both share it) that 
the Diocese of London is just using this opportunity to try and wash its own 
face, and so appear to make itself clean of any further responsibility to 
you. " (45) 
The London job to which Evans referred was Villesden, where Evans knew 
that the Churchwardens and the P. C. C. wanted him. Evans had ministered at 
Villesden, albeit on a temporary basis, and was known and well liked. Moreover, 
he was the only nominee. The Bishop, however, in spite of the Harman affair, 
intervened, and on March 14 Collins was called by Gibbs-Smith who told him 
that the Bishop was against Evans being appointed to Willesden as it was much 
too important a living. The Bishop had complained to Gibbs-Smith that Evans 
had twice put him in a very difficult position, Belgium in 1948 and Churchill in 
1953 and he could not possibly now acquiesce to an appointment such as 
Willesden represented. (46) The Bishop subsequently instructed Gibbs-Smith to 
talk with the Dean at Willesden and have inserted into the the P. C. C. minutes at 
their next meeting that the Bishop opposed Evans' appointment. This resulted 
in a search for further nominees to stand in opposition to Evans. The Chapter 
subsequently agreed to consider further nominees. (47) 
On May 1,1954, Evans was accorded a further interview with the Bishop of 
London who told Evans that he would be perfectly frank. He stated that the 
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Diocesan staff were mostly against putting Evans on the list for appointments 
as they did not want another Dean of Canterbury business. The Bishop claimed 
his main concern was the "the peace of the Church"; with Evans as an incumbent 
he foresaw trouble. He tried to persuade Evans of his unsuitability, adding 
that the Communists would really want Evans. To this Evans replied that if 
progressive people came to church it would be a good thing. The Bishop 
disagreed, "No, the motives would be wrong! " Evans questioned the right to 
judge motives. The Bishop then related how he had lectured the staff college on 
Communism, taking the "Lambeth line", only to have thrown in his face that a 
London priest had converted an officer to Communism. The Bishop had assumed, 
wrongly, that it was Evans. Evans commented on how if scores of clergy wrote 
nonsense about Russia in magazines that was non-political. If one said a word 
of friendship that was wildly political. 
It became clear to the Bishop that he was not able to persuade Evans to 
willingly give up Willesden. He finally declared, "You are out. Sitting in 
your study writing and lecturing mainly out of London you can't cause us much 
harm. If we make you an incumbent we put you on a pedestal. We shall be 
criticised. " Evans responded that in any case they might be criticised for not 
so doing. To which the Bishop replied, "Of course, I realise that. But we are 
covered with the Church view. " In his record of the interview, Evans noted that 
the Bishop feared (a) criticism, and (b) influences. (48) 
Evans did not receive the appointment to Willesden. By the end of May 
three alternative candidates had been assembled, and the appointment was 
offered to a returned missionary from South Africa, who already had another 
living in York offered. (49) The decision created a furore which threatened to 
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culminate in legal proceedings. The Churchwardens and the P. C. C. protested the 
decision, sending a deputation to the Dean and appealing to the Bishop. The 
Deputation was received by the Dean on June 17,1954, and told that however 
many men they turned down they would not get Evans. In a letter to Evans, the 
secretary of the P. C. C. termed the Bishop's reply as being "simply unpleasant". 
The P. C. C. were told they had no right of nomination and should consult the 
Rural Dean before any question of legal action. (51) 
The Churchwardens and the P. C. C. decided against legal action, being given 
to understand that another suitable living had been offered to Evans. On may 
18,1954, Evans was received by the Bishop of Stepney who offered him Holy 
Trinity, Dalston, a living apparently commensurate with that of Mucking. Evans 
expressed gratitude, but explained he was waiting a decision on Willesden. The 
Bishop observed to Evans that he had rather been thinking in terms of a bird 
in the hand being worth two in the bush. (52) The Church was clearly willing to 
sacrifice the poor living of Dalston to Evans in order to insure that of 
Willesden against him, a fact recognised by Evans who subsequently informed 
Driberg: "I have now been appointed to the parish of Holy Trinity with St 
Philip, Dalston (which they appear to regard as expendable)". (53) 
Driberg received a similar message from Collins: 
I am afraid I lost the battle on Saturday about Evans. The Diocese 
has played an extremely clever game by emphasising that the Bishop 
intends to appoint him to Dalston. Despite this, I nearly won. For one 
moment the Dean himself became very strong, and insisted that we ought to 
appoint the best man, regardless of his political views... Evans, himself, 
is extremely disappointed, but has taken things extremely well. I am 
afraid he is now doomed (unless the Diocese is going to behave even more 
disgracefully than it has done up to the present) to Dalston, where I 
expect he will be left to rot. (54) 
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Collins was not alone in expressing his distaste for the proceedings; the 
Archdeacon of London, Gibbs-Smith, wrote to Evans: "I'm still 'chaffing' about 
Villesden. The whole affair was a piece of dispiriting dirt. "(55) 
Evans was inducted on January 4,1955. The ceremony was attended by 
progressive figures from all over the country, with a deluge of greetings from 
progressive figures all over the world. (56) Nor did Evans "rot". The Church 
was too mindful of the apathy in the East End and did not sufficiently consider 
the determination, energy, courage and the faith Evans had in people. He 
inspired the community and turned Dalston into a flourishing parish. 
Following Hungary and Suez, many people were forced into a re-appraisal of 
their convictions, and in the detente of the mid-fifties, opinion was not so 
polarised as in the depths of the Cold War. In particular, Kruschev's speech 
had proven a water-shed for Evans and his contemporaries in S. S. C. M. They felt 
they had to admit they had been too starry-eyed about the Soviet Union, 
although they still believed those who had been totally opposed were equally 
wrong. Thereafter there was no reason for any division of Christian Socialists; 
so S. S. C. M. amalgamated with the Christian Socialist League and formed the 
Christian Socialist Movement. (57) 
In the more temperate climate which followed the Cold War, Stanley Evans 
was able to find more scope for his abilities within the Church. Mervyn 
Stockwood, a fervent anti-Communist Socialist in the Cold War, appointed Evans 
as Canon and Chancellor of Southwark Diocese. There Evans inaugurated a scheme 
for training Church of England members of the priesthood while still at work, 
which pioneered the way to many similar schemes in other dioceses which are 
operating at present. (58) 
Unfortunately for the Church and the Socialist movement, Stanley Evans was 
killed in a car crash in the mid-sixties. He had contributed much to both. At 
the time of his death Evans was still committed to and worked for both 
Christianity and Socialism, each of which he saw as inseparable causes in the 
endeavour to establish God's Kingdom on Earth. 
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10. Christ Church, St Marleybone with St John's Wood Chapel and St 
Stephen, Avenue Road with St Andrew, Allitsen Road, shared the one 
staff. Gibbs-Smith was Rector. On March 23,1942, he wrote to Evans: 
I venture to think that this may well prove to be the right opening 
for you... there is no doubt you would have great scope here, 
amongst both the educated people of St John's Wood, as well as the 
artisans of the St Andrew's area. You would, of course, have a 
share in the preaching in St John's Wood Chapel, as well as in St 
Stephen's and in St Andrew's, and in the former at any rate you 
would be addressing the unconverted, and have chance to form 
contacts amongst people of varying types and positions, which I am 
sure you would feel very worthwhile. Compared with a parish which 
is wholly industrial, I should say that you might well feel that 
such a place as this offers a better scope for your ministry. 
It is clear from the correspondence between Gibbs-Smith and Evans that 
the latter had made his political stand quite evident, including showing 
him copies of Religion and the People. Gibbs-Smith appreciated Evans' 
frankness and observed: 
On reflection, I cannot feel that there is very much that I actively 
disagree with, and I certainly have general sympathy with your whole 
standpoint. In Theological matters our views approximated very 
closely as you will remember. Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2. 
11. Indecipherable signature to Evans, n. d. but most probably March 
1942; Evans Papers, DEV 1/2 
12. Edward Charles and Stanley Forman both testified to these traits in 
interviews with the author. 
13. Evans understood that his ecclesiastical nan-employment was owing to 
his political activities and beliefs, and turned to his friends 'and 
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colleagues on the Christian Left for help. Hewlett Johnson endeavoured 
to try and secure work for Evans in the ecclesiastical field: Duke of 
Bedford to Johnson, February 20,1953; Johnson to Sir Charles 
Trevelyan, Xarch 4,1953; Johnson told Trevelyan that Evans was "now 
without any means of support. " Johnson Papers. 
Johnson further suggested that Evans contact his associate AT 
D'Eye, to try and secure a teaching position. Apart from clerical work, 
Evans had done some teaching for the Workers Educational Association, on 
the subject "Modern Russia". However, as the political climate turned 
against Russia, it was a subject for which demand rapidly decreased, and 
Evans found that this means of supplementing his income vanished. 
14. Some indication of how Gibbs-Smith valued Evans' work is indicated 
by the following expressions of gratitude which he sent to Evans: 
I want to thank you most warmly for so kindly preparing those notes 
for a sermon on Quincuagesima Sunday... I think I shall have your 
support for my suggestion that a solemn declaration should be issued 
holding out the hand of fellow-ship to all other nations, etc. If 
you can spare time to tell me your opinion on my suggestion I should 
be most grateful. February 12,1951. 
I an enormously grateful to you for the sermon which is very much 
after my own mind and heart, but infinitely better than I could ever 
have expressed myself... So once again I am greatly in your debt. 
May 30,1952. 
The Clergy Centre Committee at a meeting held last week studied most 
carefully your Study Scheme and Sermons, and I am asked to write and 
tell you how much they value your work. They were very pleased not 
only with your Study Scheme, but with the material and arrangement 
of your sermons. July 13,1953. 
15. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, n. d. but probably February/April 1953; Evans 
Papers, DEV 1/2. 
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Fisher Papers, Vol 140: 379. 
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18. Ibid, EGJ to Fisher, June 11,1954; Vol 140: 380. 
19. Evans' notes, May 29,1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2. 
20. Ibid, Evans to Bishop of London, April 13,1953; DEV 1/2. 
The Bishop of London in this period was John William Charles Wand, D. D. 
21. In Britain it was generally accepted that the Rosenbergs were guilty 
and opposition to the death sentence was based on humanitarian grounds 
rather than being an indictment of American justice. In America the 
issue was politically explosive. The momentum of the clemency movement 
throughout Europe forced most European leaders, including the Pope, to 
make clemency appeals. Churchill's refusal isolated him from the rest 
of Europe's leading statesmen and made him appear less prepared to 
challenge American domination than was the rest of Europe. Churchill's 
refusal to intervene on an issue which had overwhelming public sympathy 
made it appear that he was unsure of the "special relationship, " and was 
not prepared to test it. Failure on the part of Eisenhower to respond 
to a personal appeal from the British Prime Minister would have exposed 
the special relationship as much less than the equal partnership vaunted 
before the British public. 
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30. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, December 15,1953, and Putterill to Evans, 
n. d. but clearly December 1953; DEV 1/2. Putterill was clearly 
incensed by the affair and saw the issue as one to take a stand on. He 
suggested that if the Church maintained its position of penalising Evans 
because of his role in the Rosenberg Campaign, then the Rosenberg 
Committees should be called back into action on his behalf. He also 
suggested a general petition from the Clergy and the Laity of the 
Church; questions in parliament; press articles and interviews; 
protest meetings at Caxton Hall and further representations and 
deputations to the Bishop. 
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33. Evans to Driberg, December 10,1953; Driberg Papers, Oxford. 
34. Ibid, Driberg to the Bishop of London, December 15,1953. 
35. Ibid, Driberg to Evans, December 18,1953. 
36. Ibid, Bishop of London to Dribeg, December 17,1953. 
37. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, February 12,1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2. 
38. Evans to Johnson, February 14,1954; Johnson Papers. 
39. Johnson to Evans, February 18,1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2. 
40. Ibid, Putterill to Evans, n. d. but probably February 1954; DEV 1/2. 
41. Ibid, Evans to Gibbs-Smith, March 2,1954; DEV 1/2. 
42. Canon Christopher Harman was the sixty-four year old vicar of South 
Xarston, near Swindon. He was offered the living of East Harptree, 
Somerset, from which he was subsequently asked to withdraw by Sir Clive 
Burn, Secretary to the Duchy of Cornwall who, in a letter to the Canon, 
said there were two objections to his transfer to East Harptree - that 
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he was a pacifist and that in 1952 he attended a People's Peace 
Conference in Vienna. Interviews followed with Sir Clive and the Bishop 
of Bath and Wells, Dr Henry Bradfield, following which Harman withdrew 
his acceptance. The publicity given the Harman case, and the motion 
tabled by Tom Driberg M. P. on his behalf, disturbed the Bishop who 
subsequently wrote to the Canon stating that his pacificism had nothing 
to do with his being asked to withdraw and castigating him for the 
attendant publicity: 
The situation is now made worse by the fact that I see a Motion 
is being tabled in the House of Commons... this will put me in an 
even more embarrassing and difficult situation. 
I am most sorry that you thought fit to give an interview to a 
reporter on Sunday instead of confining yourself to the statement 
which I suggested to you, and which could have done no harm. 
As it is, I fear that a great deal of harm has been done and not 
least to yourself! 
Harman had been promised another living provided he withdrew from 
accepting Harptree, but the Bishop continued with a warning that 
following "this immense publicity" the Parochial Church Council might 
not want his appointment. (Daily Herald, March 15,1954). On March 14, 
Mr Harry Crookshank, Leader of the House, refused time for a Commons 
debate on Driberg's motion attacking political discrimination against 
Canon Harman. On March 19, the Times reported that Harman was offered 
another living following the withdrawal of his acceptance of Harptree, 
but that it had since been withdrawn. 
43. Ibid, Evans Memorandum, February 1954; DEV 1/2. 
44. Evans to Driberg, March 14,1954; Driberg Papers. Falkner was 
Sherard Falkner Allison, D. D., the Bishop of Chelmsford. 
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45. Gibbs-Smith to Evans, March 10,1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2. 
46. In 1948 Evans had delivered a political speech in Belgium in which 
he spoke about friendship with the Soviet Union. This had annoyed 
certain Anglican clergy who complained to the Bishop who in turn wrote 
to Evans and demanded that, "when you are speaking in countries where 
there are chaplains under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of London you 
will restrain from having yourself advertised as coming from this 
Diocese. " The Bishop accused Evans of embarrassing local clergy, and 
questioned whether it was advisable for a priest to speak on party 
politics at all, and that if he did he certainly should not advertise 
himself as being a priest. Evans replied that he was unaware of there 
being any criticism from the Brussels clergy to whom the Bishop had been 
referring, adding: 
... although 
I am aware that at the moment the view I take of the 
possibility of British-Soviet friendship is that of a minority I an 
also convinced that a priest of the Church of England should work 
for international friendship at its most difficult point and that to 
do so is not merely consistent with but an expression of his loyalty 
to the basic teachings of the Church as a whole and therefore also 
of the diocese to which he is licensed. " 
Bishop of London to Evans, December 23,1948; Evans to Bishop of 
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Memorandum, June 28,1954; Evans' Papers, DEV 1/2. 
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The first number of Religion and the People appeared in May 1941. It was 
a duplicated sheet produced by two Anglican clerics, one, Stanley Evans, in the 
East End of London and the other, Edward Charles, in a factory district near 
Birmingham, both of whom, having endured much bombing with their people in 
time of war, "and having seen the unemployment and degradation of many of their 
people in time of peace, " felt, "the complete inadequacy of existing journalism 
to meet the real situation in which people were living and struggling and 
dying. "(1) 
The preoccupation with air-raids was reflected in the first edition. (2) 
The remainder of the issue was taken up with a discussion of theologico- 
political trends, chiefly concerned with what ought to the the approach of the 
Church in the years ahead. Discussed were the Five Peace Points of the Vatican, 
joint statements on educational principles, the Malvern Conference and the 
People's Convention. 
Religion and the Peoplle perceived its main task to be the surveillance of 
"the constant and ever-flowing interrelation of religion and politics"; 
because we believe that politics is always influenced by religion and 
because we believe that the Christian faith is a way of life lived in 
society and must therefore have a political expression. We believe that 
politics must be moralised or, to move to a higher plane, that the life of 
Grace must be lived in society; that the City of God is the only port our 
barque may know. (3) 
At various times a good deal of information was printed about the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and, after the war, about the Churches in Eastern Europe, 
*because it was not being printed elsewhere. "(4) Information about 
ecclesiastical news which was not readily published in the mainstream media nor 
the established church newspapers, was dealt with in the scanty pages of 
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Religion and the People. It printed statements from the Greek Bishops in 
favour of the Greek resistance, which were quoted from it in the Security 
Council of the United Nations. (5) It quoted the support of East European Church 
leaders for the Communist regimes and the aid given by those regimes to 
religious bodies to rebuild churches or mosques and to establish seminaries, at 
a time when Western propaganda was emphasising the determination of Communism 
to eradicate all religion. It published details about the trials and 
tribulations of American clerics being witch hunted for their liberal beliefs 
when America was presenting itself as the saviour of Christian civilisation and 
the citadel of democracy. It revealed the extent and scope of ecclesiastical 
support for peace and friendship with the Soviet Union while Western leaders 
strove to establish a religious anti-Communist alliance. Nor did Religion and 
the People refrain from attacking Anglican Bishops, or even the Archbishops, on 
both domestic and international issues. Equally, it was ready to praise as well 
as criticise, to try and understand the forces operating on ecclesiatical 
decisions, and, where possible, give an optimistic interpretation. 
Apart from the provision of information, Evans, who was editor, and 
Charles, whose role was mainly in the background as manager, took available 
documents and books, reports of religious conferences, such as Lambeth and 
Amsterdam in 1948, works of Berdyaev and others, for analysis and comment: 
"for the assessing of current trends is always one of the most difficult and 
one of the most important tasks confronting those who would play their part in 
shaping the future of the world in which they live. "(6) 
Rangion and the Peon derived its information from a wide variety of 
sources. Evans had entrees at East European Embassies; the Journal of the 
Moscow Patriarchate was available in an English edition; contacts with East 
-616- 
European church people and with like-minded clerics around the world. It was 
Evans' acute analysis and his willingness to deal with the controversial which 
distinguished Religion and the People from other theological publications. (7) 
The two-man enterprise, run an a shoe-string budget, was meant to be self- 
financing. Evans did all the writing and Charles was manager and sometimes 
financier; when subs failed to meet circulation and printing costs Charles made 
up the deficit from out of his own pocket. Despite its small circulation, 
Religion and the People was not without influence, as its being quoted at the 
United Nations indicates, and it managed to penetrate both the higher political 
and ecclesiastical echelons. Copies of Religion and the People are to be found 
in the archives of Lambeth, among the papers of the first two secretaries of 
the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations. Both Douglas and Vaddams 
retained some issues of the newsletter. Vaddams did not fail to note the 
critical review given his 1950 book on Communism and the Churches. 
Serge Bolshakoff, a Russian emigre expert on the Russian Orthodox Church 
who had some influence as a counsellor to CFR, also took note of the news and 
views expressed in the newsletter, to which he occasionally made reference in 
his own private publication, the Bulletin. Bolshakoff very deliberately 
cultivated relationships with men of influence, and was known at the Foreign 
Office as well as at Lambeth Palace. Bolshakoff claimed that his Bulletin was 
specifically written for an American readership. He stated that while the 
circulation was small, it was significant because it was the more influential 
and the thinking people who subscribed. Like Religion and the Peon, the 
Bulletin printed news about the Churches in Eastern Europe and the complexities 
of religio-politics, although the two publications operated in isolation from 
one another, with different audiences and different aims. 
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Charles recalls that Religion and the People was ignored by the media, but 
that it nonetheless did have some influential readers, although many disliked 
what they read. Although Charles considers that there was no large scale 
impact, he equally feels that, "as providing ammunition" and "the thin red line 
of progressive and socialist Christians", its influence was "modestly not 
negligible. "(8) 
Religion and the People also produced a number of pamphlets, again all 
written by Evans. One about the Mindszenty trial, which Evans attended as 
correspondent for the Daily Yorker, achieved a sale of 30,000. (9) Evans also 
wrote pamphlets for Magnificat, the organ of the Council of Clergy and 
Kanisters for Common Ownership, C. C. M. C. O., which subsequently became the 
Society for Socialist Clertgy and Ministers, S. S. C. M. Magnificat dealt much more 
with purely political topics. Both Charles and Evans were members of these 
organisations. Evans also wrote the New European Observer which was 
subsidised by the Czechoslovakian Embassy. 
Both Evans and Charles openly gave their support to left-wing causes, 
which, however humanitarian their inspiration, incurred the opprobrium of the 
ecclesiastical authorities, as well as the secular. Charles was more fortunate 
than Evans. Working in the diocese of Bishop Barnes of Birmingham, himself a 
progressive and controversial figure, Charles was never denied employment. 
Evans, however, was denied preferment and for many years was forced, in 
Charles' words, to "scratch a living with the help of his teacher wife. "(10) 
The objectivity of Religion and the People and the reliability of its 
sources are clearly important considerations in assessing its value as a focus 
on the period of which it was an observer. There is no question but that it 
had a left-wing bias and a too uncritical view of Russia and the new Communist 
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regimes. This was frankly admitted by its author, Stanley Evans, in a pamphlet, 
Russia Reviewed, written after the revelations in Britain of the Twentieth 
Comngress of the Soviet Communist Party. Stating that it was an elementary 
duty for all who had worked for friendship with the U. S. S. R. and the New 
Democracies to consider their position afresh, Evans observed that there were 
lessons to be learnt: 
The first is that most of us who have written and spoken about 
Russia and Eastern Europe, while we have reported truly and gauged 
accurately some aspects of Soviet life and the life of the New 
Democracies, have been grievously wrong about others. Our appreciation of 
the good and of the forward strides led us to reject uncritically much of 
the evidence which did not suit our particular interpretations. There is 
probably nobody who wrote in support of the U. S. S. R. of whom this is not 
true - and it certainly includes the present writer. The excuses we hear, 
that other people (anti-Soviet writers) were also wrong, are completely 
beside the point, just as is the alibi that there are brutalities in 
Colonial countries. We are discussing the future and not the past; we are 
concerned with the answer to colonialism. The excuse that we reported 
what we saw and that we could not know more again will not do. Other 
people manifestly did know and the fact is that we relied too exclusively 
on official sources of information and failed to distil the truth from 
sources we regarded as hostile. (11) 
Evans' statement was both a reflection of and a comment on the period of 
which Religion and the People was very much a product. Cold War polarisation 
equally permeated the spiritual and secular foundations of British society. 
1956 was, however, a time for reassessment for all parties. Kruschev's 
revelations were followed by Hungary and Suez. During the Cold War years 
leading up to these events, Religion and the People had not been afraid to speak 
frankly or criticise despite the increasingly suspicious and hostile reception 
given left wing critiques. Nonetheless, the newsletter remained steadfast in 
its commitment to Socialism and in its defence of the new Communist regimes. 
It also strove to give what it regarded as true Christian witness: 
For this in our turn we have been criticised and more. Criticism of our 
criticism has been healthy and useful; criticism of the fact of criticism 
has been a reflection of the minds of those afraid to grow up together. 
For there has been no age of the Church when vigorous and robust 
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discussion has not been part of the life-blood coursing through its 
arteries and in our generation the rejection of discussion can only be 
seen as the rejection of the very life of the Church itself. (12) 
Although this enterprise of Charles and Evans survived much longer than 
most of its ilk, and, moreover, as they conceded in the final number of March 
1957, "in some fair weather but mainly foul, " rising costs made deficits 
inevitable and they had gone "beyond the limit. " They also considered that 
while their task was not done, it was different from what it had been. Keenly 
aware that in a world of massive rearmament, of racial tensions, of growing 
economic crises, "The way to the Good Life means more than the provision of 
private transport systems and private cinemas to every home; that the rewards 
it promises are deeper and the struggles in the way such as need more profound 
equipment than is being provided. "(13) They perceived the new need, now that 
the sort of news they printed was being more widely published, was for thought 
and discussion: "A magazine is needed which can be used as a focus for the 
thought of Christians concerned to plot their way to the true deeps through 
which the tidal stream may bear them home. "(14) It was to this new endeavour 
that Charles and Evans then turned their efforts. The demise of the monthly 
newsletter Religion and the Pea le was followed by the birth of their new 
publishing enterprise, a quarterly magazine which, in consideration of the 
times, they called The Junction. 
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He will be near you all through the raid. 
When bombs are dropping and danger is near 
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10. Charles to author, November 2,1989. 
11. Stanley G Evans, Russia Reviewed, a Religion and the People 
publication, n. d. but can be placed in 1956, after March 20, when 
newspapers around the world carried. the news about the Twentieth 
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. 
12. Religion and the People, March 1957. 
13. Ibid. 
14. The Junction was already planned before Religion and the People 
ceased publication. In the final newsletter of March 1957, Evans 
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